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Resumen de la Tesis Doctoral 
 
1. Objeto de la investigación 
 
Esta tesis doctoral pretende ofrecer un nuevo marco teórico para analizar las causas y 
los orígenes de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Propone que es adecuado examinar 
los procesos de formación de estas insurgencias, a través de un análisis que incorpora 
elementos de varias disciplinas, para entender más comprensivamente las fuerzas, las 
dinámicas y los actores principales en el proceso de formación de los conflictos. Para 
ello, se construye un marco teórico basado en un análisis histórico de “estado 
marginalizador” como la estructura política-económica institucionalizada. En este 
marco se incorporan factores relevantes, incluyendo un análisis que enfoca el papel y la 
acción de las élites, las identidades y los actores tanto regionales como internacionales. 
Éste, ayuda a resaltar el proceso de formación de los conflictos en el sur de Sudán de 
forma más comprensiva de lo mostrado hasta ahora.   
 
Las principales cuestiones a investigar son: ¿Cuál es el papel de la formación y 
construcción del Estado en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias en el sur de 
Sudán? ¿Cómo han establecido diferencias entre “el Norte” y “el Sur” en Sudán las 
categorías identitarias históricas “árabe-musulmán” y “africano”, (re)construidas social, 
económica y políticamente? ¿Cómo han influenciado los factores externos 
(internacionales y regionales) la formación del Estado en Sudán y el surgimiento de las 
insurgencias en el sur de Sudán? ¿Por qué durante el proceso de descolonización y a 
principio de los años 80, de nuevo, surgieron las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán y no en 
otras áreas de la periferia del Estado sudanés? ¿Fue la segunda insurgencia que surgió 
en los 80 meramente una continuación de la primera que emergió en el proceso de 
descolonización? 
 
El objetivo principal de esta investigación es conseguir una mejor comprensión de cómo 
surgieron las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán y cómo están relacionados en este proceso 
tanto las dinámicas del “estado marginalizador” como los factores externos. Este 
enfoque analítico se define mejor como interdisciplinar, con elementos de análisis 
escogidos de varias fuentes teóricas principalmente de los ámbitos de historia y 
politología.    
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2. Hipótesis 
 
Las hipótesis que sostienen esta tesis responden a las cuatro cuestiones principales de la 
investigación.  
 
Por una parte se argumenta que el marco teórico conceptualizado en el “estado 
marginalizador”, que se introduce en esta tésis y que incorpora un analísis de las élites y 
poder de grupos e identidades, forma una base amplia y permisible para el análisis. Este 
marco ayuda a examinar y resaltar el papel de los actores, fuerzas y dinámicas en los 
procesos de formación de insurgencias en sur el de Sudán. Por ejemplo, se demuestra 
que la historia de marginación y exclusión junto con una subyugación sociocultural (la 
esclavitud y la jerarquía social), produciendo una “colonización interna”,  pobreza y un 
subdesarrollo regional y étnicamente definidos, son importantes para el entendimiento 
del surgimiento de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.  
 
En estos procesos se enfatiza las categorías identitarias como productos de procesos 
históricos, que se (re)construyen y (re)negocian continuamente y que resultan de su  
modificación (refuerzo/debilidad) periódica. En este proceso, es importante reconocer la 
importancia de las literaturas árabe y anglo-sajona en influenciar la (re)construcción de 
estas categorías. Por un lado, estas categorías se basan en la propagación de una 
percibida superioridad de la cultura árabe e Islám, y, por otro lado, se fundan en la 
resistencia a la esclavitud, la percibida subyugación y la jerarquía social dominada por 
una élite que se autodefine como “árabe-musulmana”. Se demuestra que estas 
categorizaciones no son primordiales, estáticas, incompatibles o inherentemente 
conflictivas, sino construidas y fluídas, que ayuda a entender los cambios en su 
extensión en el tiempo y el lugar, junto con sus efectos entre y dentro de diferentes 
grupos de la población y su impacto a la dinámicas políticas. La importancia de estas 
categorizaciones y su conflictividad se enfatiza periódicamente en la historia sudanesa a 
través de su (re)construcción y reforzamiento en las condiciones de inestabilidad 
política y violencia, mientras que durante los periodos más pacíficos se han remediado 
las divisiones.       
 
Por otra parte, en esta tesis se sostiene la importancia de los factores externos en el 
proceso de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, y se pretende demostrar 
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porqué se han producido estas interrelacionadas rebeliones particularmente en la 
periferia sureña del Estado sudanés. Este tipo de análisis no es habitual en la literatura 
existente sobre las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, que enfoca los procesos internos 
como las principales causas de los conflictos. Por tanto, se hipotetiza que ha sido la 
interrelación de los actores, las fuerzas y las dinámicas internas y externas que ha 
influenciado la construcción del Estado sudanés y los procesos de formación de 
insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Este contradice a algunos prominentes africanistas 
como Clapham (1996) y Chabal y Daloz (1999) quienes han argumentado que los 
orígenes de las insurgencias en África son inherentemente internos y que los actores y 
fuerzas regionales e internacionales entran en el juego principalmente después de haber 
iniciado el conflicto.  
 
Además, se hipotetiza que la particular experiencia histórica entre los pueblos del sur de 
Sudán y las sociedades arabizadas e islamizadas es distinta respecto a otros pueblos en 
la periferia del Estado sudanés. Esto explica el surgimiento de las insurgencias contra el 
Estado “árabe-musulmán” dominante especialmente en el sur de Sudán. También cobra 
importancia el debate sobre la cuestión temporal del comienzo de las insurgencias, 
enfatizando que la primera rebelión en el sur de Sudán empezó en los años 50 (Eprile, 
1974) en lugar de los años 60 como sostienen algunos autores (Chan, and Zuor, 2006). 
En el caso de la segunda insurgencia, es importante reconocer los vínculos con la 
primera rebelión, por ejemplo en términos de su liderazgo. Finalmente, mientras que 
prominentes historiadores han caracterizado la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán 
como inevitable (Holt, 1961; Daly, 1991, 1993, Collins, 2005, 2008), evitando la 
responsabilidad colonial, esta tesis cuestiona su planteamiento y propone que otras 
estrategias, relacionadas con el proceso de descolonización por actores involucrados, 
podrían haber evitado el conflicto. 
 
3. Objetivos 
 
Esta tesis tiene cuatro objetivos principales: 
 
Primero. Los procesos históricos desde el siglo XIX culminaron en la formación del 
Estado en Sudán. Sin embargo, el tipo de Estado creado correspondía a la dominación 
externa y su organización social a las realidades pre-existentes entre grupos locales.  
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En esta tesis se nombra el Estado sudanés como un “estado marginalizador” que se 
define como una combinación de un actitud mental y una estructura instituciónal 
correspondiendo principalmente a las identidades y los intereses de las secciones 
prominentes de la élite más poderosa.  
 
El primer objetivo de esta tesis es considerar la relevancia del marco teórico basado en 
el “estado marginalizador” y los componentes utilizados (élites, relaciones de poder 
entre grupos, identidades, actores y fuerzas externas) dentro de este amplio marco 
teórico. 
 
Segundo. Se ha debatido los orígenes identitarios de las insurgencies en el sur de Sudán, 
pero la literatura presenta una mayoría de trabajos que caracterizan las identidades como 
estáticas, primordiales y conflictivas, y así inherentemente incompatibles.  
 
El segundo objetivo de esta tesis es resaltar las dinámicas de (re)construcción, 
reforzamiento y manipulación de identidades, periódicamente hacía más conflictivas o 
más convergentes según el contexto político. 
 
Tercero. Se ha argumentado que los orígenes de las insurgencias en África son 
principalmente internas. A pesar de que siendo ésta la posición de algunos prominentes 
africanistas, la aserción es controvertida.  
 
Por tanto, el tercer objetivo de esta tesis es examinar no sólo los actores, fuerzas y 
dinámicas internas, sino también externas (internacionales y regionales), que han 
influenciado la formación y la construcción del Estado sudanés y producido las 
insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. 
  
Cuarto. A pesar de que se ha intentado explicar los orígenes de las principales 
insurgencias en el sur de Sudán, no se han presentado estudios comprensivos para 
explicar la temporalidad de su surgimiento. Tampoco se ha explicado extensivamente si, 
en efecto, la segunda insurgencia fue la continuación de la primera, o se ha estudiado en 
detalle si esa era inevitable a pesar de que varios prominentes historiadores han 
argumentado que fue así.  
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Por esta razón, el cuarto objetivo de esta tesis es mostrar por qué las principales 
insurgencias en Sudán han tenido lugar particularmente en el sur del país y por qué 
surgieron durante la descolonización o en los 80. En esta investigación se considera si la 
segunda insurgencia fue continuación de la primera y si la rebelión en sur de Sudán fue 
inevitable.       
 
4. Planteamiento 
 
El planteamiento fundamental de esta tesis se conforma en torno al intento de examinar 
y resaltar los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Su aspiración 
principal es determinar el papel de actores, fuerzas y dinámicas tanto dentro como fuera 
de Sudán, enlazándolos en el proceso de surgimiento de estas rebeliones. La tesis 
identifica a los actores y fuerzas más importantes y enfatiza intereses, identidades y 
aspectos institucionales de la insurgencia.   
 
Se plantea que las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán han sido resultado de varios 
elementos, incluyendo la (re)construcción y/o reforzamiento de los declives identitarios 
periódicamente, pero también relacionados con intereses de las élites y las instituciones 
formales e informales, incluyendo la proyectada jerarquía social “árabe-dominante” y 
respuestas a ella, el Estado y sus acciones, y la forma de gobernar. 
 
Las rebeliones en Sudán son la extrema manifestación de agravios hacía el poder y el 
orden establecido marginando la periferia. Particularmente en el caso del sur de Sudán, 
las insurgencias estan también asentadas en la historia del siglo XIX durante la 
formación del Estado y han surgido en dos periodos de inestabilidad política, con el 
incremento de marginación y exclusión. No obstante, aunque actores, fuerzas y 
dinámicas internos son importantes en este proceso, estos han sido siempre afectados 
por dimensiones externas (internacionales y regionales) que influencian y también 
forman parte de la realidad local. Esta interrelación local, regional e internacional 
significa, además, que la realidad local en Sudán afecta al ámbito regional e 
internacional. 
 
La investigación realizada en esta tesis pretende evitar una forma unidisciplinar de 
interpretar los procesos de formación de insurgencias para no caer en reduccionismo. 
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Por esta razón, el análisis pretende ser amplio e interdisciplinar, recuperando elementos 
teóricos de varias disciplinas, mientras que descarta algunos que no parecen representar 
la realidad en el caso del sur de Sudán.  
   
5. Marco teórico 
 
La aproximación teórica utilizada en esta tesis para analizar los procesos de formación 
de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán utiliza principalmente los conceptos teóricos 
asociados con el liderazgo político, el Estado, y actores y fuerzas relacionados. Estos se 
dividen en cuatro bloques de los cuales el primero, “Estado marginalizador”, forma el 
marco global (a) dentro del que se sitúan los otros elementos teóricos (b-d). En 
concreto, los elementos principalmente utilizados incluyen: a) la fragilidad del Estado y 
el concepto de “Estado marginalizador”; b) partes de la teoría de élites en que se 
incorpora el concepto teórico de poder, la construcción y la instrumentalización de la 
identidad política y el concepto de desarrollo desequilibrado; c) los conceptos de 
extraversión y redes que enlazan la dimensión local con la externa (regional e 
internacional); d) y la consideración de formación de insurgencias como un proceso. Se 
considera todos estos como relevantes en el contexto sudanés con la dinámica particular 
entre el centro del Estado y la periferia sureña. 
 
   a) La fragilidad del Estado y el “Estado marginalizador” 
Mientras que este trabajo busca evitar estrictas categorías sobre la fuerza del Estado, la 
base teórica de los análisis centrados en el Estado, sirve como un punto de partida para 
esta tesis. Se construye un marco teórico capaz de capturar las particularidades del 
Estado y su relación con los orígenes de las insurgencias. 
 
En base a esta trayectoria teórica se introduce el concepto de “Estado marginalizador”. 
Este se define, no como un Estado fallido en su forma convencional, sino como un 
Estado en que la marginación y exclusión se han convertido en una actitud (lógica o 
estado mental) entre las élites gobernantes y ha sido institucionalizado como 
culminación de unos procesos históricos. En este son importantes las dinámicas, las 
relaciones de poder y las jeraquías sociales preexistentes entre grupos, que se 
manifiestan en las estructuras políticas, las estrategias y el modo de gobernar. 
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El Estado sudanés es un producto de procesos históricos que incluye la formación de la 
élite “arabizada-musulmana” como su poder gobernante y la formación de una élite 
sureña como su principal desafío “regional” de la periferia del Estado. En Sudán, 
altamente heterogéneo, la formación del Estado ha requerido la utilización e 
institutionalización de estrategias de marginación y exclusión para mantener un poder 
exclusivo. Este ha surgido de forma conflictiva a partir del colonialismo, porque ha 
concentrado el poder en la élite árabizada que mantiene una autopercepción de 
superioridad cultural que justifica su poder particular. La concentración del poder de 
esta élite ha sido particularmente excluyente y ha mantenido su coherencia frente a la 
presión de redistribución del poder político y la riqueza. Este tipo de poder 
monopolizado excluye a la mayoría de sudaneses de la representación política y de la 
posibilidad de realizar sus aspiraciones económicas para escapar marginación social. 
 
   b) El poder y la identidad en el contexto de la teoría de élites y el desarrollo desigual 
El segundo bloque teórico utilizado en esta tesis combina conceptos sobre el poder, la 
identidad y el desarrollo desigual, y los considera con la teoría de las élites. Estos 
conceptos teóricos se sitúan dentro del marco global como elementos integrantes del 
“Estado marginalizador”. 
 
La descripción de poder utilizado en esta tesis combina principalmente nociones 
Weberianas y Foucaltianas y las une a la literatura política y económica sobre África y 
Sudán para establecer los enlaces entre el poder e indentidades colectivas. Es 
particularmente relevante para esta investigación la (re)construcción y/o reforzamiento 
de identidades y cómo éstas están vinculadas y utilizadas por y para los intereses de las 
élites. 
 
La posición adoptada aquí es que las élites son los actores más poderosos capaces de 
generar  una movilización colectiva según las líneas identitarias. Por está razón, se 
considera a las élites nacionales, regionales y locales como los principales actores en los 
orígenes de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Una parte de la conflictividad viene de la 
aspiración de la élite “árabe-musulmana” de extender su autoproclamada identidad 
“árabe” (como constituyente de la identidad “norteña”) hacia la periferia, utilizando su 
posición dominante en el Estado, mientras que las élites, particularmente en el sur de 
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Sudán, han organizado resistencias alrededor de una percibida identidad colectiva 
“africana” extendiéndola como regional “sureña”. 
 
El desarrollo desigual entra en esta dinámica a través de la política del Estado 
marginalizador proyectando la actitud de la élite “árabe-musulmana” (Roden, 1974; 
Badal, 1976). Sus estrategias centradas en intereses propios y satisfacer a su electorado, 
principalmente en el centro del país, han condenado a la periferia a un desarrollo 
desigual hasta el punto en que la diferencia relativa de ingresos y oportunidades 
colectivas ha llegado a ser muy elaborada y conflictiva (Stewart, 2002, 2001). 
 
   c) Extraversión y redes 
Los conceptos de extraversión y redes forman parte de esta tesis porque ayudan a 
visualizar la interacción entre actores, fuerzas y dinámicas locales y externas (regionales 
e internacionales) en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. 
 
A pesar de que varios autores han argumentado la predominancia de las llamadas causas 
internas, se demuestra en esta tesis que estas causas no son sólo internas, sino 
influenciadas por actores y fuerzas externas. En este sentido, la interrelación de las 
causas internas y externas les hace inseparables, ya que los (f)actores que no estan 
confinados dentro de las fronteras estatales siempre han afectado a la construcción y la 
transformación de la su  realidad y viceversa. 
 
En esta situación, la extraversión de utilizar la posición social, política o económica 
prominente para extraer recursos desde el exterior y mejorar su posición en el contexto 
local, junto a redes sociales, culturales, políticas y económicas, se convierten en 
importantes para considerarlas en el proceso de formación de las insurgencias (Bayart, 
1993, 2000, 2005).     
 
   d) El proceso de formación de insurgencias 
Esta tesis refuta la importancia, tanto de diferenciar entre las causas (raíces, 
estructurales, próximas y causas inmediatas) de las insurgencias como de categorizarlas. 
Argumenta que es más importante considerar las interacciones entre los actores y 
fuerzas que llevan a las insurgencias como procesos (Kalyvas, 2006), que categorizan 
entre ellos, y no toma en cuenta su carácter no estático y posible transformación de los 
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objetivos y dinámicas a largo plazo. Este ha sido el caso de las insurgencias en el sur de 
Sudán, en las que los objetivos de los grupos en las rebeliones han variado entre 
secesionismo, revolucionismo y reformismo. 
 
Se enfatiza aquí que es más importante percibir la formación de una insurgencia como 
un proceso que requiere organización y recursos materiales y no materiales (Weinstein, 
2005). Además, es importante considerar factores emocionales en el contexto local 
porque éstos pueden marcar la diferencia entre movilización de apoyo reducido o más 
general para una insurgencia. Frustraciones, percepciones de Estado y su legitimidad, y 
privación relativa se sitúan entre percepciones y emociones relevantes que se combinan 
con identidades políticas y culturales en este proceso.     
 
6. Metodología 
 
Como corresponde a los estudios interdisciplinares de realidad africana y relaciones 
internacionales, la metodología empleada en esta tesis combina investigaciones 
cualitativa y cuantitativa. Como es habitual para los estudios sociales, el método 
principal de análisis ha sido cualitativo con el objetivo de descubrir las razones de un 
comportamiento particular dentro de una estructura institucional. Los nueve capítulos 
que constituyen el trabajo usan un modelo de narrativa explicativa/expositiva de 
investigación. El marco teórico expuesto con el trasfondo de datos empíricos y las 
conclusiones enlazan las hipótesis iniciales con los resultados. En la investigación se ha 
hecho uso de entrevistas y observaciones, junto con fuentes primarias y secundarias 
publicadas o de otro modo disponible. 
 
Los capítulos de esta tesis se ordenan del modo siguiente: 
 
Capítulo I. Introducción general y planteamiento teórico 
1. Introducción: conflicto en el sur de Sudán 
2. Reseña de importantes tendencias analíticas sobre causas de insurgencias 
     2.1. Los análisis centrados a la identidad 
     2.2. Las explicaciones económicas y materiales 
     2.3. Las interpretaciones enfocadas a los agravios 
     2.4. Los análisis Estadocéntricos 
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3. Consideraciones teóricas 
     3.1. La fragilidad del Estado y el “Estado marginalizador” 
     3.2. Poder e identidad en el contexto de la teoría de las élites y el desarrollo desigual 
     3.3. Extraversión y Redes 
     3.4. El proceso de formación de insurgencias 
4. Preguntas de investigación y las hipótesis 
     4.1. Preguntas de investigación e hipótesis principales 
     4.2. Principales contribuciones de la tesis 
5. Conclusión   
 
Capítulo II. Formando el Sudán contemporáneo: el fondo histórico 
1. Introducción 
2. Arabización e Islamización en la región 
3. Inserción de la región en las redes internacionales del comercio de esclavos  
4. Incorporación al Turkiyyah  
5. Guerras Mahdistas 
6. Conclusión 
 
Capítulo III. Administración colonial: el Condominio Anglo-Egipcio 
1. Introducción 
2. Inserción de la región en el imperio colonial británico 
3. Gobierno colonial y surgimiento del nacionalismo en el “norte” de Sudán 
4. Poder colonial en el “sur” de Sudán 
5. Efectos del colonialismo 
6. Conclusión 
 
Capítulo IV. Descolonización: el surgimiento de la primera insurgencia 
1. Introducción 
2. El proceso de descolonización 
3. El surgimiento del “problema del sur” 
4. Efectos del régimen de Abboud en el sur de Sudán  
5. La fundación y la consolidación del Anya Nya 
6. Conclusión 
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Capítulo V. Desde la guerra hacia la paz 
1. Introducción 
2. Esfuerzos de paz fracasados 
3. Nimeiri asume el poder 
4. Remediando el “problema del sur” 
5. Llegada al acuerdo de paz en Addis Abeba 
6. Conclusión 
 
Capítulo VI. Sur Sudán autónomo 
1. Introducción 
2. El contexto político y económico nacional 
3. Factores externos desafiando la dependencia en el apoyo del Sur 
4. Implementación de la autonomía en el Sur 
5. La política regional sureña 
6. Conclusión 
 
Capítulo VII. El camino hacía la guerra 
1. Introducción 
2. El contexto nacional de islamización 
3. El contexto político y económico en Sur Sudán 
4. El final de la autonomía de Sur Sudán  
5. El auge de la inseguridad y militarización  
6. Conclusión 
 
Capítulo VIII. El surgimiento y la trayectoria de la segunda insurgencia  
1. Introducción 
2. Elementos de conspiración en el sur de Sudán 
3. Formación del SPLM/A y el conflicto entre sus facciones 
4. Escala del conflicto 
5. El camino hacía la paz y el acuerdo para una paz “comprensiva”  
6. Conclusión 
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Capítulo IX: Conclusión general 
1. Introducción 
2. Respondiendo a las preguntas de investigación 
3. La relevancia de los elementos teóricos utilizados 
4. Posibles caminos para futuras investigaciones 
 
7. Aportaciones originales 
 
Son cuatro las principales aportaciones originales de esta tesis doctoral. 
 
Las principales aportaciones del análisis introducido en está tesis incluyen el “Estado 
marginalizador”, un marco teórico amplio particularmente relevante al Sudán que 
incorpora elementos teóricos en el proceso de formación de insurgencias. Todo esto 
aspira a contribuir al debate sobre las razones, la sincronización, la interrelación y la 
(in)evitabilidad de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. 
 
i) Esta tesis ofrece un nuevo marco teórico interdisciplinar para analizar los procesos de 
formación de insurgencias basado en el concepto de “Estado marginalizador”. Se 
demuestra que las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán son producto de procesos históricos 
de una trayectoria particular. A través de estos procesos, las provincias del sur fueron 
incorporadas al Estado sudanés como áreas periféricas cuya relación con el poder 
centralizado ha sido caracterizada por una dominación violenta, coerción y subyugación 
desde el centro de la entidad política, llegando a un nivel diferente que otros territorios 
periféricos en Sudán. Estas dinámicas, junto con la política colonial, fomentaron a una 
élite políticamente consciente en el sur de Sudán que ha proyectado una identidad 
política regional para responder a la percibida dominación y desafiar la hegemonía de la 
élite “árabe-musulmana” gobernante.  
 
La tesis demuestra como los procesos históricos particulares produjeron un “Estado 
marginalizador” en Sudán en manos de una estrecha élite exclusiva y cómo el legado 
colonial y proyectos de las élites llegaron a la construcción de percepciones de un 
“norte, árabe y musulmán” y un “sur, africano” a pesar de la inmensa heterogeneidad de 
ambas regiones. Además se demuestra que las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán tomaron 
lugar hasta un punto importante por la política, las dinámicas y la lógica del Estado 
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marginalizador que requiere política exclusionaria para ser mantenida por la élite 
gobernante. Esta explicación desbanca a los análisis basados en incompatibilidades 
primordiales entre el “norte” y el “sur” en Sudán. De este modo la tesis introduce un 
nuevo marco teórico.     
 
ii) Esta tesis también demuestra como la resistencia al “Estado marginalizador” y su 
política, dominado por la élite gobernante arabizada (árabe-musulmana), fue el principal 
factor determinante en la materialización de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Además, 
señala como el proceso de descolonización influenciado  por actores y fuerzas externas 
(regionales e internacionales) fue un factor importante en el origen de la primera 
insurgencia y un elemento contribuyente en el antagonismo y polarización, según el 
declive identitario “árabe-áfricano” construido en los 50 y 60. Este fue un elemento 
importante en la consolidación de la insurgencia que se vió afectada por actores y 
fuerzas externas a lo largo del tiempo. 
 
La tesis también demuestra como la segunda insurgencia se incubó en el transcurso de 
los años 70, en condiciones de deterioro económico y (re)construcción de los agravios, 
llevando a la nueva polarización identitaria en el contexto de la limitada autonomía 
política del Sur Sudán. Se convirtió en una rebelión de gran escala en los años 80 con 
elementos externos, ganando importancia de nuevo en su continuación y terminación.  
 
Por lo tanto, se demuestra que la (re)construcción y el reforzamiento periódico de las 
grietas identitarias cambiantes, no como categorías rígidas de identidades, fue un factor 
importante en los orígenes y el desarrollo de las insurgencias, y que los actores y las 
fuerzas regionales e internacionales jugaron un papel importante en los procesos de 
formación de las insurgencias. Todo esto no se refleja en la literatura histórica sobre los 
conflictos en el sur de Sudán.  
 
iii) Además, esta tesis produce argumentos para contribuir al debate sobre cuándo 
estallaron las insurgencias, y a su inevitabilidad e interrelación. La tesis señala, por 
ejemplo, que la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán empezó ya en los años 50, antes 
de la formación del movimiento rebelde principal, mientras que la segunda empezó a 
tomar forma a lo largo de los años 70 y de modo parecido, se intensificó en la decada 
posterior cuando una nueva organización insurgente asumió el protagonismo. De este 
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modo la tesis contribuye al debate en curso sobre cuándo comenzaron las insurgencias 
en el sur de Sudán.  
 
iv) Por último, esta tesis identifica y resalta los (f)actores externos (internacionales y 
regionales) en el proceso de formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán y señala que 
son inherentes en las realidades locales. Se demuestra que la construcción del Estado y 
formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán consistieron en una interacción 
compleja de (f)actores, incluyendo elementos políticos, económicos y sociales, locales, 
regionales e internacionales, tanto históricos como contemporáneos. Este no se ha 
destacado en la literatura sobre causas de conflictos africanos y especialmente en la 
literatura sobre los orígenes de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. 
 
8. Conclusiones obtenidas 
 
Con las conclusiones obtenidas se trata de medir los resultados de la investigación 
frente a los objetivos planteados y a las preguntas de investigación. 
 
Pregunta de investigación 1: 
¿Cuál es el papel de la formación y construcción del Estado en los procesos de 
formación de las insurgencias en sur el de Sudán? 
 
En esta tesis se ha argumentado que la formación y la construcción del Estado están 
inherentemente vinculadas a la lucha y el conflicto político. El Capítulo II de esta tesis 
demuestra que los procesos históricos particularmente del siglo XIX son esenciales para 
la comprensión del Sudán contemporáneo. Se demuestra que factores y procesos 
históricos particularmente de este periodo son importantes para la formación del Estado 
y la emergencia de una organización política marginadora en Sudán, nombrado aquí 
como el “Estado marginalizador”. En este proceso, se muestra las estrategias de unas 
élites prominentes particulares para convertirse a “regionales” y la complicada 
experiencia histórica de las gentes del sur de Sudán respecto al Estado. 
  
El Capítulo III subrayó los procesos de consolidación del “Estado marginalizador” 
colonial durante el Condominio Anglo-Egipcio, demostrando los efectos de la política 
de aislamiento en el sur de Sudán, que resultó en el surgimiento de una élite con 
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identidad política y un proyecto forjado como reacción a la dominación histórica, en 
términos de la esclavitud y jerarquía social promovidos por varios grupos en el norte de 
Sudán. Se demuestra que esta élite también aspira a convertirse en “regional” en el sur 
de Sudán y a extender su identidad particular a la región como es el caso de la élite 
“árabe-musulmana” gobernante. 
 
El Capítulo IV demostró el impacto de las políticas del “Estado marginalizador” en el 
proceso de descolonización, que al final llevó a la insurgencia en el sur de Sudán. Aquí 
se observan interpretaciones locales de eventos específicos, factores emocionales y 
rumores que propagaron un miedo de dominación árabe-musulmana en el alba de la 
independencia, particularmente cuando la mayoría de la élite sureña fue 
deliberadamente excluida de la representación política y participación en los procesos 
de tomar decisiónes a nivel nacional. 
 
Mientras que el Capítulo V trata de la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán mostrando 
los factores que llevaron al acuerdo de paz y a la inclusión a corto plazo de los 
representantes del Sur en el Estado marginalizador, el Capítulo VI enfocó la 
implementación del acuerdo de paz de 1972 firmado en Addis Abeba. Estos capítulos 
han demostrado que las reformas institucionales al Estado marginalizador acomodaron 
los intereses de una parte de la élite sureña por un breve periodo, el acuerdo de paz falló 
principalmente porque no fue capaz de remediar los agravios del “sur” a largo plazo por 
la reconfiguración del “Estado marginalizador”,  que de nuevo reforzó la lógica y 
dinámica marginadora en su política y gobierno exclusivo. 
 
El siguiente Capítulo VII analizó el cambio de las alianzas del presidente Nimeiri y el 
surgimiento de sus vínculos con el sector islamista de la élite árabe-musulmana. Este 
cambio de alianzas promovió la reconfiguración de las estructuras políticas y el Estado, 
también llevando a la lógica marginadora a culminar en una política que tenía un efecto 
de deterioro en la estabilidad política en el sur de Sudán, donde la élite militar había 
decidido reiniciar la insurgencia. La continuación de este proceso se demuestra en el 
Capítulo VIII, que también debate brevemente la parte final del conflicto durante el 
cual, la facción islamista de la élite árabe-musulmana consolidó su poder sobre el 
Estado. Sin embargo, los acuerdos de paz recientes promueven la esperanza para la 
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reconfiguración del Estado marginalizador y las élites en poder que podría llevar a una 
paz más estable. 
 
Por tanto, en base a la evidencia presentada en esta tesis se concluye que en caso de 
ambas insurgencias en el sur de Sudán los procesos de formación y construcción del 
Estado han sido integrales en su surgimiento. Sin embargo, se debe enfatizar el carácter 
cambiante del nivel de marginación y la continuidad de la (re)construcción y 
(re)negociación del Estado. Esto es porque varios sectores de la élite arabizada 
compiten por el poder del Estado, traduciéndose en periodos más o menos autoritarios 
dependiendo del nivel de la autoridad, legitimidad, y política hacia el sur de Sudán, que 
se entiende como la amenaza principal para el poder exclusivo de la élite arabizada 
gobernante. 
 
Por lo tanto, basada en la evidencia compilada de la investigación realizada para esta 
tesis, se puede concluir que los procesos de formación del Estado y su (re)construcción 
fueron íntimamente relacionados a los procesos de formación de insurgencias en el sur 
de Sudán en el caso de ambas rebeliones. Esta confirma la hipótesis presentada en el 
Capítulo I que asume que un marco teórico basado en el concepto de Estado 
marginalizador proporciona una excelente fundamentación para explicar la formación 
de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán.  
 
Pregunta de investigación 2: 
¿Cómo han sido construidas las identidades “árabe-musulmana” y “africana” en su 
contexto histórico, económico y político? ¿Cómo se han proyectado estas identidades 
como diferencias entre el “norte” y el “sur” y cómo este ha afectado los procesos de 
formación de insurgencias en el sur de Sudán? 
 
En esta tesis se adopta la posición mixta constructivista-instrumentalista de las 
identidades grupales. El Capítulo II ha demostrado como en el curso de la formación de 
un Estado en Sudán, la jerarquía social dominada por la percibida superioridad de la 
cultura árabe-musulmana se convirtió en una fuerza principal dentro de la cual  se 
configuró el poder político y económico. El siguiente Capítulo III se concentra en el 
periodo colonial anglo-egipcio y demuestra como la política colonial fomentó el poder 
de una élite árabe-musulmana particular y exclusiva que extendió su proyecto político 
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para promover una percepción del “norte” como “región” homogénea “árabe-
musulmana”. Además, se subraya como la política colonial de separación promovió la 
formación de la élite política en el sur de Sudán, que ha fomentado una visión 
“regional” para el Sur basado en un discurso identitario “africano” para el área, también 
heterogénea, como respuesta a la identidad norteña. Esta visión se funda en  la historia 
de la resistencia al “norte árabe” contra la dominación, la esclavitud y la jerarquía social 
impuestas particularmente en el siglo XIX. 
 
Los siguientes capítulos indican la importancia de los cambios periódicos en las 
identidades colectivas, facilitando la fluidez y movimiento dentro y entre las élites 
norteñas y sureñas y en otros periodos, reforzando la categorización identitaria más 
rígida y separatista. Este ha promovido las insurgencias o permitido periodos más 
pacíficos en otras ocasiones. En el Capítulo IV se demuestra como la competición y la 
lucha política produjo una securitización del “problema del Sur”, proyectando el sur 
como una amenaza para la nación, durante el proceso de descolonización que fomentó 
una división regional identitaria entre el Estado marginalizador asentado en las manos 
de la élite árabe musulmana en el norte y los sectores prominentes de la élite en el sur de 
Sudán. El Capítulo V demuestra como en la parte final de la insurgencia en el sur se 
moderan estos discursos divisorios identitarios “norte-sur” y “árabe-africano”, 
facilitando una solución negociada para acabar con la guerra. 
 
Al contrario, los Capítulos VI y VII demuestran como la implementación de estructuras 
políticas nuevas para asentar una autonomía limitada en “el Sur” finalmente fracasó y 
resultó una nueva insurgencia orquestada principalmente por elementos descontentos 
con el liderazgo militar sureño junto con unos políticos de la región. Durante este 
periodo, la división identitaria se expandió de nuevo debido a las acciones de las élites. 
Se demuestra que mientras que la sección islamista más poderosa de la élite norteña 
promovió una política estatal más represiva, unos sectores de la élite sureña 
respondieron con un incremento del militarismo que aumentó la división identitaria 
“norte-sur” de nuevo. Mientras que el Capítulo VII señala como la renovación de la 
insurgencia incialmente extendió la división de la identidad, el Capítulo VIII demuestra 
que de nuevo una posición más moderada por parte de las élites facilitó un proceso de 
negociación que al final llevó a un proceso y acuerdo de paz impuestos por actores 
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regionales e internacionales. Este ayudó a remediar la polarización de identidades y 
promover la paz en el futuro.  
 
En conclusión, esta tesis ha demostrado que las categorías identitarias (re)construidas y 
reforzadas se ajustan y se transforman en el tiempo, respondiendo a la inestabilidad 
política, la lucha y el conflicto. Como se ha demostrado, este ha facilitado acuerdos para 
remediar la violencia y la guerra en Sudán periódicamente,  y ocasionalmente, también 
ha permitido que otros grupos de la élite árabe-musulmana tengan un poder político 
limitado dentro de las estructuras del Estado sudanés. Este confirma la segunda 
hipótesis  del Capítulo I que se refiere a la (re)construcción y al cambio de identidades, 
la creencia en las propias identidades, pero también a su uso instrumental, rechazando 
su primordialidad. Este desafía la posición de varios autores de la tradición anglo-sajona 
que han proyectado las insurgencias en Sudán como batallas entre categorías “árabe vs. 
africano”, “musulmán vs. Cristiano-animista” o “norte vs. sur” incompatibles, que 
oscurece la vigencia de las élites y la responsabilidad de los poderes externos y 
coloniales. 
 
Pregunta de investigación 3: 
¿Cómo los factores externos (internacionales y regionales) han influenciado la 
formación del Estado en Sudán y la emergencia de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán? 
 
Esta tesis ha tratado de mostrar la importancia de los actores y fuerzas externas 
(internacionales y regionales) en la dinámica política dentro de Sudán. El Capítulo II 
demuestra que fuerzas y actores externos iniciaron el proceso de formación del Estado 
en Sudán, que llevó a la construcción de una entidad política marginalizadora. Este 
proceso analizado en el Capítulo III se extendió durante el colonialismo Anglo-Egípcio, 
culminando en un “Estado marginalizador” colonial. El Capítulo IV demuestra que este 
Estado fue dominado exclusivamente por sectores de la élite arabizada en el proceso de 
descolonización contenciosa, involucrando íntimamente a actores e intereses regionales 
e internacionales compitiendo por la hegemonía e influencia regional. Se demuestra que 
no sólo los actores y las fuerzas regionales e interncionlaes dominaron la formación de 
Estado en Sudán, sino que también afectaron a la formación de la primera insurgencia 
en el sur de Sudán. 
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Los actores externos (regionales e internacionales) estuvieron particularmente presentes 
en la parte final de la primera insurgencia en el sur de Sudán. Como demuestra el 
Capítulo V, apoyando directamente a los protagonistas, algunos de ellos teniendo un 
papel en la mediación que promovió un acuerdo negociado para acabar con la guerra. 
Los Capítulos VI y VII demuestran que, de un modo similar, algunos actores externos 
afectaron a la nueva emergencia de la política represiva del “Estado marginalizador”, y 
el Capítulo VII señala que los actores externos estaban integralmente involucrados en el 
contexto político y económico en que estalló la segunda insurgencia. Al final, el 
Capítulo VIII muestra el papel importante de los actores y las influencias externas que 
fueron importantes en la finalización de la segunda insurgencia.   
 
Por tanto, la intervención externa directa e indirecta por parte de los actores y fuerzas 
internacionales y regionales ha sido un factor importante, creando las condiciones que 
conducen a la guerra y a la paz en el sur de Sudán. Este rechaza la tesis de la 
exclusividad de las dinámicas locales en el proceso de formación de las insurgencias y 
confirma la hipótesis presentada en el Capítulo I sobre que en la literatura general sobre 
la formación de las insurgencias en el sur de Sudán falta un análisis que enfatice los 
factores regionales e internacionales como una parte integral de los orígenes de los 
conflictos. 
 
Pregunta de investigación 4: 
¿Por qué las trayectorias históricas, políticas, económicas y sociales llevaron a las 
insurgencias en el proceso de descolonización durante la primera parte de los años 80, 
concretamente en el sur de Sudán? ¿Y fue la segunda insurgencia meramente la 
continuación de la primera? 
 
En esta tesis se realiza un esfuerzo para descubrir por qué las insurgencias de gran 
escala se materializaron en dos ocasiones, particularmente en el sur de Sudán y no en 
otras partes de la periferia del Estado sudanés hasta mucho más recientemente. Se 
subraya aquí que las trayectorias históricas de dominación y formación del Estado son 
importantes en el entendimiento de la particularidad del caso del sur de Sudán. 
 
El Capítulo II trata el legado del siglo XIX, junto con la historia anterior, con el objetivo 
de explicar el papel de la esclavitud y la jerarquía social que han afectado a las 
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relaciones intergrupales en Sudán hasta hoy en día y han establecido una lógica 
persistente y particular de dominación social que sigue siendo perpetuada. El Capítulo 
III demuestra la importancia de la historia colonial en moldear las estructuras políticas y 
sociales, reforzando los tipos de inclusión y exclusión jerárquicas y particulares que han 
moldeado actitudes e identidades entre grupos. Estos procesos han creado divisiones 
entre las élites en el “norte” y el “sur” y estallado en violencia organizada por ellas en el 
proceso de descolonización. Como indica el Capítulo IV, las políticas coloniales han 
favorecido la emergencia de una élite regional especialmente en el sur del país, en parte 
por la historia y el legado particular de la esclavitud y la subyugación. Esta historia 
diferencia al “sur” de las otras regiones periféricas del Estado sudanés.  
 
Además, el Capítulo V demuestra como la insurgencia en el sur de Sudán fue 
extensivamente destructiva y a pesar de que se concluyó con un acuerdo negociado para 
finalizarla, la violencia organizada residual persistió. El Capítulo VI demuestra las 
dificultades de la implementación del acuerdo de paz y los agravios perpetuos en el sur 
de Sudán. Hasta este punto la segunda insurgencia que se desencadenó en la primera 
parte de los años 80, que se analiza en los capítulos VII y VIII, fue la continuación de la 
primera, también en parte porque fue liderada por varios protagonistas del movimiento 
rebelde anterior y utilizó los agravios locales relacionados con la percibida desigualdad, 
injusticia, falta de autodeterminación y desarrollo económico relativo al norte del país. 
El acuerdo de paz CPA en 2005 remedió estos agravios hasta un punto, pero su 
implementación no se ha producido como se había acordado. 
 
El análisis también ha indicado que las insurgencias son producto de un complejo 
conjunto de procesos interrelacionados y varias motivaciones. La investigación ha 
revelado que no es posible considerar las insurgencias como producto de la oportunidad 
o la selección racional, que desbanca a las interpretaciones economicistas basadas en la 
lógica de Homo Economicus. Se ha señalado que este tipo de análisis no sólo reducen la 
realidad a unos factores específicos sino que también pueden inspirar unas 
recomendaciones equivocadas para la resolución de conflictos. 
 
La evidencia compilada y analizada en esta tesis demuestra que las trayectorias 
históricas (política, económica y social) enlazan al sur de Sudán para formar parte de la 
entidad política sudanesa, pero a la vez negando a sus élites una participación efectiva y 
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influencia sobre el Estado, son principalmente responsables de que se produzcan 
insurgencias en el sur de Sudán. Esta historia también explica, hasta un punto 
importante, la particularidad de las insurgencias en este área, por qué se materializaron 
y por qué la segunda se produjo después de la primera. Esta confirma parte de la 
hipótesis presentada en el Capítulo I.  
 
Sin embargo, refuta la suposición realizada de que las dos insurgencias fueron 
inherentemente diferentes. Por tanto, la evidencia analizada demuestra que la segunda 
insurgencia fue, hasta un punto importante, la continuación de la primera. Además, 
parece que a pesar de que no se ha podido confirmar que las dos insurgencias han sido 
inevitables, uniendo la combinación de las fuerzas y los intereses externos con la 
dinámica y la lógica internas del Estado marginalizador. Se mantiene que ambas 
rebeliones fueron potencialmente evitables con una mejor preparación del proceso de 
descolonización y transfomación del Estado para aceptar una redistribución del poder 
político y económico desde el centro hacía la periferia. 
 
Por esto, un sistema político y una cultura política particulares, productos de procesos 
históricos específicos en Sudán, han sido decisivos para moldear el contexto político en 
el que un poder político y económico exclusivamente distribuidos por los sectores más 
poderosos de la élite arabizada han adquirido un carácter altamente conflictivo en el 
Estado postcolonial. El análisis realizado aquí sugiere que la situación podría 
remediarse posiblemente a través de un proceso equitativo de redistribución del poder 
político, los recursos, y a largo plazo, de la dinámica y la lógica del Estado 
marginalizador formadas históricamente. 
 
9. Posibles futuras líneas de investigación 
 
A pesar del análisis de los procesos formacionales de las insurgencias en el sur de 
Sudán investigados en esta tesis, varias preguntas siguen requiriendo atención. Mientras 
que algunas de estas preguntas están relacionadas con el Estado, gobierno y los orígenes 
de los conflictos enfocados aquí, otras vinculan realidades y dinámicas durante las 
insurgencias o como estas terminan. 
 
22        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Primero, las dinámicas, la lógica del “Estado marginalizador” (concretamente su 
sistema y cultura política) y los procesos de formación de insurgencias investigados 
aquí son particulares para el sur de Sudán. Sin embargo, se puede preguntar si existe 
una posibilidad de generalizarlos y esta explicación ser probada en otros casos en 
África. Aunque hay que reconocer que el caso del sur de Sudán presenta varias 
particularidades únicas que no se pueden generalizar, examinando la lógica del concepto 
teórico del “Estado marginalizador” y comparando los procesos de formación de 
insurgencias con otros casos, proporciona posibles caminos para la investigación en el 
futuro. 
 
Segundo, otro posible camino para la investigación en el futuro que surge del análisis, 
es la concentración en los discursos de las élites y su relación con la inclusión y 
exclusión dentro de los grupos étnica, racial, cultural, o religiosamente definidos. Se ha 
reconocido en esta tesis que los grupos de las élites dominantes “regionales” son ellos 
mismos heterogéneos. Las estrategias de inclusión y exclusión merecen más 
investigación porque pueden desvelar más sobre las dinámicas internas de los grupos 
particulares de las élites e identificar los centros y concentraciones del poder dentro de 
ellos. Esto ayudaría a ver detrás de los grupos aglomerados de las élites como 
“norteños” y sureños”. 
 
Tercero, el Estado en África y Sudán siguen siendo temas debatidos. En el caso de 
Sudán, es necesario más investigación  sobre las estructuras híbridas de gobierno, las 
élites y sobre cómo se ejerce poder en varios contextos locales. Esto podría desvelar 
problemas relacionados con la interacción de la administración centralizada como una 
superestructura y las administraciones locales, y como ambos interactúan con actores no 
estatales y no gubernamentales. 
 
Cuatro, esta tesis se ha concentrado en los procesos de formación de las insurgencias. 
Sin embargo, las preguntas más amplias relacionadas con la duración y la conclusión de 
las rebeliones merecen más investigación. Particularmente, las dinámicas y la duración 
de las insurgencias en el caso del sur de Sudán se han dejado sin la adecuada atención 
académica. A pesar de la existencia de poca literatura sobre este tópico, estudios más 
específicos podrían mostrar las estrategias para la transformación y la resolución de los 
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conflictos. Se debería también realizar investigaciones de otros casos africanos para 
facilitar estudios comparativos. 
 
Finalmente, hay otro camino para la investigación de las insurgencias en el sur de 
Sudán. Se refiere a un análisis sobre la implementación del CPA desde su inserción en 
2005. Un camino particularmente interesante pueden ser los estudios después del 
referendum de autodeterminación para el Sur Sudán y Abyei, planeado para enero 2011. 
Este referendum es una de las claves principales que puede facilitar la vuelta a la guerra 
o la consolidación de la paz en Sur Sudán. 
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Chapter I. General Introduction and Theoretical Underpinnings 
 
Sudan is a land of paradoxes where the multiple pasts of a conquest state joust for 
acknowledgment against a hegemonic perspective that privileges one of the many 
constituent parts of the contemporary polity (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 19). 
 
  Anyone who finds injustice in his country is sure to fight it (Sudanow, Jan. 1982, p. 10)  
          -President Jaafar Nimeiri of Sudan in an interview on the war in Chad- 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sudanese civil strife is among the most elaborate ongoing state crises in the 
contemporary world. The incalculable human toll has reached millions of conflict-
related deaths in three main episodes of large-scale conflict since the 1950s.1 The first 
insurgency, a violent manifestation of a “Southern Problem”,2 erupted in August 1955 
only months before Sudan gained its independence. In the early 1960s the conflict 
accelerated and it took approximately 17 years and more than 500,0003 lives before 
Addis Ababa Peace Accords ended the large-scale hostilities between the government 
and the southern insurgents in February 1972.  
 
However, many southern factions were unhappy about the peace treaty, some engaging 
in residual guerrilla warfare and others becoming increasingly discontented in the 
course of the 1970s. In May 1983 a second large-scale rebellion broke out in southern 
Sudan and was formally ended almost 22 years later by a 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, after an estimated 2 million people had died and 4 million had become 
displaced.4 Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 and other 
subsequent peace treaties,5 Sudan’s future continues to be highly uncertain and, at the 
                                                 
1
 These are the first and second southern insurgencies, and the ongoing Darfur rebellion.  
2
 Disorder in southern Sudan became commonly know as the ‘Southern Problem’ for northern Sudanese 
political cadres.   
3
 Estimate is from Edgar O’Ballance, The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972. London: Faber and Faber, 
1977, p. 13. However, he considers the number as highly unreliable and in reality much higher 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 158). 
4
 Estimate is from Adam O’Brien, “Sudan’s Election Paradox”. ENOUGH, June 2009, p. 1. 
5
 In 2006 the regime signed peace agreements with sections of Darfur rebels and the Eastern Front 
opposition movement. 
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time of writing, there is a very real possibility of renewed warfare between the former 
southern rebels and the central government.  
 
Insurgencies in Sudan and their causes have long been investigated and debated. As in 
the case of most of Africa, the predominant media image projected to wider audiences 
has often reduced the Sudanese crisis to a new form of barbarism, a resurgence of 
ancient hatreds drawing on primordial differences, or a resource war narrative with 
overwhelming emphasis placed on the importance of a war economy based on looting 
or controlling and selling Sudan’s natural endowments of high economic value. 
Whereas a number of scholars have claimed that apparently unchanging regional 
identity differences and incompatibilities are a major, if not the main, source of war 
(Ruay, 1994; Batahani, 2005; Poggo, 2008), this view is in the process of becoming 
discredited by deeper analyses of identity formation.6 Similarly, following the recent 
popular focus on analyzing rebellions simply through economic factors, a tendency 
credited to Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), some authors have pulled 
the second insurgency in southern Sudan out of its historical context and argued that it 
was provoked largely by economic opportunism (Batahani, 2005), natural resources 
(Ross, 2004), or simply petroleum (Hernandez Zubizarreta, 2009). Thirdly, while so-
called “failed state” analyses have been applied to the case of Sudan, they have not been 
convincing in explaining the processes of insurgency formation. Fourthly, a large part 
of the current historical literature on insurgencies in southern Sudan has an endogenous, 
or domestic, focus, and there tends to be a lack of analysis of the regional-international 
context in which rebellions have taken place and how this interacts with domestic 
reality. Finally, influential part of the Anglo-Saxon historical literature is deterministic, 
with at times Victorian overtures, when analyzing causes of insurgencies in southern 
Sudan.7 It is argued in this dissertation that closer observation of historical analyses and 
interdisciplinary literature on Sudanese conflicts reveals that studies focusing on a 
single cause or solely the domestic sphere are not fully reflective of the insurgency 
formation processes in southern Sudan. 
                                                 
6
 There are a multitude of historical or political science analyses that portray Arab-African cleavage in 
Sudan as inherently incompatible, and northern and southern Sudan as homogeneous entities. However, it 
is argued here that these identities are not primordial per se, but have been historically constructed, 
maintained, and reshaped. In these processes the role of elites has been important. 
7
 Some works showing these characteristics, such as Daly (1991), Ruay (1994), and to a certain degree 
Johnson (2003), have all been used in this dissertation because the author recognizes their otherwise 
recognized elevated scholarly value. 
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Although there is an element of truth in a number of the abovementioned 
interpretations, there are other more immediate factors that contribute to the underlying 
political and economic crisis and their escalation to insurgencies. Interdisciplinary 
examination of the roots of conflict in Sudan reveals, for instance, the relevance of the 
discourse that argues that armed conflicts within states take place in conditions of 
extreme inequality and uneven development (Stewart, 2000, 2001; Cramer, 2003, 
2006). The author of this thesis has argued that relative political, economic, and social 
disparities between the “North” and the “South”, or more accurately between the center 
and the periphery, which the current crisis in Darfur demonstrates, constitute among the 
principal preconditions for armed opposition against policies of highly exclusive, 
narrow, and predominantly authoritarian national governments (Ylönen, 2005, 2008). 
This helps to highlight the limitations of interpretations restricted within boundaries of 
specific academic disciplines and often blind to other approaches.   
 
Although a large part of the contemporary literature on insurgencies utilizes terms 
“civil” or “internal” or “regionalized” war, this dissertation prefers to use inter-
changeably insurgency and rebellion, and conflict and war, on the basis that it is 
misleading to call any war “civil” or strictly “internal”, since war can hardly be 
characterized as “civil” and regional and/or international actors and forces have always 
been directly or indirectly present in the making, driving, and ending of Sudanese 
insurgencies.8 This dissertation uses O’Neill’s (1980: 1) definition of an insurgency “ . . 
. as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the former 
consciously employs political resources (organizational skills, propaganda, and/or 
demonstrations) and instruments of violence to establish legitimacy for some aspect of 
the political system it considers illegitimate”. 
 
Insurgencies are a complex phenomenon involving a variety of actors and forces. This 
dissertation further explores the process of insurgency formation in southern Sudan by 
investigating the processes that led to politically, economically, and socially inspired 
large-scale violence. The investigation is guided by a theoretical approach based on the 
notion of “marginalizing state”, which allows deeper and more comprehensive 
explanation on the process of insurgency formation than political approaches based on 
                                                 
8
 For instance, Cramer (2006: 66-70) points out that “civil wars” are never strictly internal phenomena 
since conflicts always have regional and international involvement and influences. 
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“failed state” or “new wars” paradigms, or economic analyses founded on “rational 
choice” and “opportunity” of Homo Economicus.9 
 
First, the research presented here adopts a historically anchored concept of the 
“marginalizing state”. This is an approach that draws from state exclusiveness, 
weakness, and illegitimacy in the peripheries, elite theory, identity politics, and center-
periphery approach (concepts of uneven development and internal colonialism), to 
explore the origins of insurgencies in southern Sudan. Second, the dissertation views the 
insurgencies in southern Sudan largely as products of the decisions of specific sections 
of particular elites. This takes place in the context of a process of persisting violence 
and socio-culturally derived political and economic domination to which southern 
Sudan and its peoples have been historically and contemporarily subjected through 
structural conditions (de Waal, 2007a, 2007b), and governance by the Arabized ruling 
elite that has monopolized political and economic power since independence. Whereas 
historically this domination has taken the form of colonialism, from the time of de-
colonization it has become characterized as “internal colonialism” (Bodley, 1988, 
1999), a somewhat controversial term but one which can usefully illustrate the colonist 
mentality of the Arabized elite in northern Sudan, underscoring similarities to the 
mentality of the withdrawn European colonizers.10 In the case of southern Sudan, this 
has been widely recognized but not significantly substantiated.  
 
Finally, this dissertation proposes that unveiling networks linking actors and influences 
is a useful approach in exploring insurgency formation in southern Sudan in local, 
regional, and international contexts, by incorporating Bayart’s (1993, 2000) concept of 
“extraversion”. In other words, rather than focusing strictly on economic or political 
causes of war, an attempt is made to provide an analysis which is more comprehensive, 
historically founded, and interdisciplinary. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 See further discussion and critique of these theoretical frameworks in section 2. 
10
 The concept has been applied to a number of cases in European countries. See Kirkinen (1972), Salvi 
(1973) and Hehcter (1975). 
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2. Review of Major Analytical Trends on Causes of Insurgencies 
 
During the Cold War, there were a number of major explicative narratives used to 
analyze insurgencies. These wars were mostly conducted by the competing superpowers 
and their allies within the territories of the client states of the opposing party, often 
converting peripheries of post-colonial states into war zones.11 A common feature of 
Cold War conflict studies was to describe insurgencies as internal. While these conflicts 
became increasingly proxy wars fed by the bipolar power struggle, they also owed to 
the systemic contradictions internal to states involving the processes of identity 
polarization, and hybrid forms of social organization including amalgamations of 
imposed colonial and indigenous institutions. 
 
Explanations growing out of these analytical currents to explain the proliferation of 
insurgencies in the 1990s12 can be organized in three broad and interrelated categories 
according to their theoretical base. First, essentialist identity-based analyses including 
primordialism and “ancient hatreds” could be said to have crystallized in the “new 
barbarism”, which attempts to explain the emergence of insurgencies due to population 
pressures or historically incompatible identities that were set loose after the Cold War. 
Second, a discourse emphasizing material economic factors largely advocated by 
econometricians, such as resource scarcity and underdevelopment, has explained the 
origins of conflicts through related pathologies, focusing the contest over resources and 
underdevelopment. In the late 1990s, such economic explanations evolved into material 
explanations of insurgencies involving natural resources and greed, or material 
opportunity. Third, largely in response to this trend, new emphasis was put on 
grievance-based analyses in part to re-emphasize the importance of identity and 
“traditionalism”, at times as a response to Western materialism, and to highlight 
grievances as opposed to Homo Economicus explanations derived from self-interest and 
rational choice models. What could be considered as a fourth parallel current, but linked 
to comparativist political scientists and sociologists, is analyzing insurgencies through 
the crisis of the post-colonial state, or state failure, which became increasingly apparent 
in the 1980s due to economic crisis and increasing political strife. In this latter 
                                                 
11
 Vast literature exists on the topic. See i.e. Henderson and Singer (2000: 2) for some views. 
12
 Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta (2002: 31-34) offers an excellent overview of a number of explicative narratives 
since Cold War. 
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literature, out of which the “new war” paradigm credited to Kaldor could be said to have 
emerged, lays the basis for later analyses explaining state weakness, failure, and 
collapse. 
   2.1. Identity Centered Analyses 
 
     Essentialist Interpretations 
 
Horowitz (1985) and others have highlighted the importance of ethnic elements in 
insurgencies. In the early 1990s his work was followed by a trend which perceived 
insurgencies as increasingly “new” and “uncivil” (Snow, 1996). From these studies the 
essentialist “new barbarism” thesis emerged, which explains “civil” wars as a new form 
of savagery with the primary victims being civilians (Kaplan, 1994; 2000; Peters, 1994). 
Kaplan and Peters put forward the idea of “new barbarism” as senseless violence, with 
Kaplan (1994, 2000) claiming that the prevalence of violence and insurgencies in the 
1990s resulted from Malthusian population pressures and accelerating urbanization.  
 
Perhaps the most famous work to lend support to argumentation along such lines has 
been Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and Remaking of World Order (1997), 
which portrays international politics as an extension of a tribal13 conflict between 
competing civilizations. This argument also gained momentum through ill-explained 
media images, given that “ . . . many anthropologists, NGO activists, and journalists 
tend to perceive violence as an outcome rather than a process . . .” (Kalyvas, 2006: 21). 
Occulting the rationale behind insurgencies, this resulted in violence in Africa being 
portrayed as irrational, inhumane, and tribal, in the midst of misery and poverty.  
 
Inherent to the discourse based on primordial identities is the “ancient hatreds” 
argument. For instance, Garnett (2002) claims that because of the ancient hatreds which 
had retaken the arena of ethnic politics in a number of developing countries after the 
Cold War, political structures dwindled or collapsed, resulting in anarchy and conflict. 
                                                 
13
 Stereotypical Western views of tribe are often related to traditional, stagnated societies that lack 
progress and modernization. However, Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that generally these are 
misconceptions in the case of Africa, where traditional social order was manipulated to create and shape 
ethnic communities through “tribalism” by establishing competing group categories as a political weapon 
coinciding with a peculiar type of modernization in part imposed by colonial powers.  
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The idea that ancient hatreds or incompatible identities were bound to clash given 
opportune conditions was used to explain ethnic and tribal conflicts. 
 
     Shortcomings of Essentialist Interpretations 
 
Many academics, such as Geffray (1990), Deng (1995a, 1995b), Richards (1996), and 
Lesch (1998), have found primordialism insufficient in explaining why insurgencies 
take place, and as a result the idea of violence in Africa based on incompatible 
unchanging identities has been largely discredited. While some have argued that there 
exist inherent ethnic incompatibilities, such as between the “Arabs” and the “Africans”, 
as is often argued in the case of Sudan,14 Mazrui (1973: 56) has shown that intermixing 
through marriage and reproduction “ . . . has saved the Arab-Negro division in Africa 
from being a dichotomous gulf – and converted it instead into a racial continuum of 
merging relationships.  
 
In addition, Kalyvas (2006: 21) argues that the focus of the “ancient hatred” arguments 
“. . . is on instances of violence rather than the complex, and often invisible, non violent 
actions and mechanisms that precede and follow them. Often, the description of very 
recent acts of violence is accompanied by references to ancient historical events, with 
no reference to the period in between”. This has led Richards (2005), Johnson (2006), 
and Kalyvas (2006) himself to point out that discovering the real cause and effect 
relationships related to the origins of insurgencies requires a contextual analysis 
considering violence as a process. This defies strict categorization of causes of conflict 
because such approach is likely to exclude relevant elements that can affect the process.  
 
Moreover, a closer observation also discredits the catastrophism projected through the 
overpopulation argument as the cause of insurgencies because a number of African 
states are in fact under-populated relative to their large geographic extensions and 
resources. In other words, despite the popular appeal of the “new barbarism” and 
                                                 
14
 This has been part of politically charged rhetoric by warring parties during insurgencies and part of the 
socialization and indoctrination processes to portray the conflict as between “Arabs” and “Africans”. 
Highly polarized dynamics of political and economic inclusion and exclusion have fed such perceptions, 
as has a media often used as a propaganda tool by elites interested in extending such views. For instance 
Turner (1998: 203) has claimed, “The roots of the conflict are not only political but also religious and 
cultural, pitting the Muslim Arab north against the Christian and Animist African south”.  
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“ancient hatreds” discourse, it has been largely dismissed from academic analyses of 
causes of insurgencies. 
 
     Instrumentalist Analyses 
 
Arguments concerning identity factors related to causes of conflict have been put 
forward in influential books, such as The Invention of Tradition (1992) edited by 
Hobsbawm and Ranger, and Ignatieff’s The Warrior’s Honour: Ethnic War and the 
Modern Conscience (1997). The main argument of the chapters in Hobsbawm and 
Ranger (1992) is that many of the public traditions recognized by masses are well-
designed inventions of 18th and 19th centuries to facilitate control and manipulate 
opinions of large populations. For instance, Ranger (1992) demonstrates how in Africa 
the colonial authorities imported Western and invented new local traditions, which were 
later used by ethnic and nationalist movements. In a similar vein, Ignatieff (1997) 
points out what he calls the “narcissism of minor difference”, having to do with elites 
manipulating the political discourse and ethnic differences to gain or preserve power, as 
being largely behind rebellions. A similar thesis is advanced in a number of articles in 
Armed Conflict in Africa (2003) edited by Pumphrey and Schwartz-Barcott, with for 
instance Lemarchand (2003) showing how it was conducive to the Rwandan genocide.  
 
This current of thought, known as instrumentalism, is a more widely accepted identity-
based discourse that has attempted to explain particularities of African cultural 
adaptations15 as determinants of political systems and insurgencies. According to 
instrumentalists, cultural roots of conflict could be defined to include instrumentalizable 
identity elements such as religion, ideology, customs, and ethnicity “as collective sense 
of identity and heritage”, for political mobilization of constituencies and, at times, to 
deliberately provoke inter-ethnic conflict and armed violence (Bates, 1983; Brass, 1991; 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 2005; Lemarchand, 2003; Pumphrey, 2003: 9-10). As a result, 
reconstruction, reinforcement, and manipulation of the continuing process of 
transforming ethnic identity by the elites for political mobilization and conflict is widely 
demonstrated.16 For Chabal and Daloz (1999) motivations for political strife are often 
linked to the shrinking of the financial patrimonial base of political strongmen, turning 
                                                 
15
 See e.g. Chabal and Daloz (1999) for an analysis evolved from this.  
16
 See i.e. Castells (1997), Romanucci-Ross and DeVos (1998), Fearon and Laitin (2000). 
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clients into enemies, and other strongmen challenging those in power or excluding 
minorities from access to national resources. The authors consider this a criminal 
attempt by prominent individuals to use popular grievances to assert themselves 
politically and materially.  
 
In this context, political boundaries become an important factor, and particularly in the 
case of Africa (Gingyera-Pinycwa, 1973; Clapham, 1996) because many ethnic groups 
have been divided by borders drawn during colonialism. This has provided a significant 
element in the regionalization and internationalization of “ethnic” conflicts (Ryan, 
1995; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004). 
 
     Constructivism: A Critique of Instrumentalist Analyses 
 
Constructivism highlights the importance of context in shaping the development and 
identity of the individual. According to Jean Piaget (1971, 1985), the processes of 
accommodation and assimilation are of paramount importance as new information is 
weighed, shaped, and interpreted according to an established background. In the African 
political context, the constructivist approach opposes the essentialist discourse and 
points to the ability of political strongmen, who draw a large part of their legitimacy 
from the channeling resources to their constituents, to mobilize followers for personal or 
group objectives in pursuit of their own personal agendas. Thus, constructivists claim 
that political decisions that lead to action by the elites are not inherently instrumental, or 
merely manipulative, but based, for the most part, inescapably on their convictions and 
social background. 
 
As a result, constructivists discredit instrumentalism as non-contextualized. While 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) describe political instrumentalization as inherently criminal 
when oriented towards fomenting ethnic conflict, constructivists, such as Ruiz-Giménez 
Arrieta (2002), do not subscribe to such claims, in part because they believe that 
political decisions are to an extent founded upon innate beliefs acquired via cultural 
context, upbringing and education of the individual. It is also pointed out that not all 
individuals in political constituencies subscribe to decisions promoting ethnic conflict 
because individuals react differently based on their strategies of accommodation and/or 
resistance. Although in Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument (1999) Chabal 
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and Daloz adopt an instrumentalist approach, the revise their stand in their Culture 
Troubles: Politics and the Interpretation of Meaning (2005) by pointing out that politics 
is not only instrumentalization to achieve objectives, but is often founded in identity and 
cultural connections between leaders and their constituents.  
 
Posner’s Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (2005) has adopted, in a sense, a 
mixed approach between instrumentalism and constructivism. For Posner, ethnic 
identity is not only reconstructed and at times instrumentalized, but it is also situational 
with both leaders and followers selecting aspects of their identity for group belonging 
depending on the particularities of each situation. He further explains that leaders have a 
variety of identity elements to choose from and among which they then select the most 
appropriate to exploit for their purposes, while often sharing a degree of genuine belief 
with their followers in any such identity component. 
 
     Relevant Elements of the Identity Analyses for the Case of Sudan 
 
Identity discourses provide a number of useful elements for the analysis of insurgency 
formation in southern Sudan. In particular, the instrumentalist and constructivist 
approaches appear relevant because in order to maintain power exclusively, the 
governing sections of the Arabized elite have a long history of justifying their 
paramount role in Sudanese politics and economy through their Arab-Muslim identity 
claim. While this is partly an innate feature of the search of identity within the larger 
Arab world/cultural sphere, it has also justified the instrumentalization of culture and 
religion, i.e. Arabization and Islamization, as political tools. At times these tools have 
been imposed repressively while demonizing local populations in the periphery, holding 
them responsible for creating instability, most notably in case of the largely non-“Arab” 
and non-“Muslim” southern Sudan. This way southern Sudan has been portrayed as the 
other against which Arab culture and Islam has been reflected, depicting them as 
superior identity and personal status elements. This outlook has also justified the 
dismissal of the political opposition from the peripheral marginalized regions by 
portraying “regional” demands as a security threat to the state, and permitted continued 
marginalization and exclusion of such regions by denying them the possibility of 
building effective representation at the center of the political system. Arguably, this has 
been the case since de-colonization when sectors of the Arabized Muslim elite assumed 
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exclusive political power from the British and faced strong political opposition from 
sections of southern Sudanese leadership demanding federalism.  
 
However, such strategies benefit immediately only narrow sectors of the governing 
elite, while excluding others. This is why competition over the state political and 
economic power within the Arabized elite itself is intense. Yet, the promotion of an 
Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy also benefits the Arabized elite’s 
constituencies particularly in north-central Sudan, as it generally provides them with a 
socially privileged position relative to the non-Arabized and/or  non-Muslim peoples 
from the state periphery at least in terms of social status and employment.    
 
Conversely, since decolonization the local elites in southern Sudan have received a 
largely Western education that often demonized the Sudanese “northern Arabs”.  
Together with local histories of slave trade and oppression, this has been instrumental in 
shaping the views of the majority of the southern elite, which, according to 
constructivists, would in turm affect their political decision-making. Indeed, this has 
often been the case in terms of political orientations, sentiments, and actions. For 
instance, many historians, including Eprile (1974), Holt and Daly (2000), Collins 
(2005), and Wassara (2007), mention collective sentiments of fear, anxiety, and mistrust 
as being relevant to conflict formation in southern Sudan, and emphasize the 
leadership’s use and encouragement of such feelings which has at times highlighted the 
existing sense of insecurity towards the other (Arfi, 1998; Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 
1999; McSweeney, 1999). 
 
The identity approaches also point out the regional and international dimension, and 
divisive politics, of fragmented ethnic communities. This is highly relevant to the case 
of southern Sudan where a number of groups, such as the Nuer (Hutchinson, 1996) and 
many Equatorians, maintain links with their ethnic kin in the neighboring countries. 
Moreover, Berdal and Lonsdale’s (1992) and Lonsdale’s (1994) claim about political 
interest groups, or parties, reinforcing divisive politics and local dynamics of ethnic 
exclusion appears to apply in the case of Sudan in terms of the use of ethnic and 
religious identity politics enforcing political factionalism and tribalism. In this, the 
personal agency of individuals, not only structural conditions, is important as people’s 
reactions to changing circumstances differ.  
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The author views the abovementioned theoretical considerations useful when examining 
the cases of conflict formation in southern Sudan and adopts a mixed constructivist and 
instrumentalist approach similar to that of Posner (2005). It is sustained here that such 
an approach, explaining particular elite strategies as more instrumental while 
considering that others may be based more on constructivism, is the most adequate in 
analyzing the case of Sudan. Neither one is considered exclusive of the other. 
 
   2.2. Economic and Material Explanations  
 
     Economic Approaches 
 
What could be called a second group of antecedent narratives concentrates on economic 
and material factors. In the early 1990s these evolved into a discourse perhaps best 
exemplified by the work of Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994, 1999) which argues that 
underdevelopment related to environmental scarcity creates conflict between societal 
groups to the extent of causing inter-ethnic feuds and rebellions. While Kaplan (1994, 
2000) used this as part of the “new barbarism” thesis, the terms development and 
underdevelopment, as Western concepts that emerged after World War II (Munene, 
1995; Handelman, 1996; Rist, 1997), became increasingly linked to explaining conflict 
formation. Pointing to increasing poverty, environmental degradation, and population 
explosion, social exclusion, marginalization, elite corruption, and inherent militarism of 
African societies in the origins of conflicts became growingly popular (Ruiz-Giménez 
Arrieta, 2002).  
 
The underdevelopment discourse has argued for the importance of development in 
curbing conflict. Three major variants of the underdevelopment discourse are the 
neoliberal, dependency, and Marxist, of which the latter two focus mainly on exchange 
relations and their distorting effects in developing countries.  Duffield (2001) has shown 
that it has been used in the neoliberal discourse to justify why conflict happens in the 
poorest parts of the world and the moral obligation for aid and development 
cooperation. By the mid-1990s, analyses founded on neoclassical economic theory 
gained momentum, although traditionally the study of war has not been central to 
economic inquiry. Some authors increasingly highlighted the economic aspects of 
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insurgencies based on observations that economic agendas had arguably become 
increasingly important, particularly in the case of internal wars17 which had become the 
most common form of large-scale armed conflict (UCDP, 2008). 
 
Some influential economic studies, such as Hirshleifer (1987, 1994, 1995) and 
Grossman (1991, 1995), laid the basis for the highly publicized and vigorously debated 
Collier-Hoeffler paradigm18 of economic causes of “civil wars”. These studies 
coincided with more descriptive historical analyses, such as Tilly (1985, 1992) which 
described state-making process in Europe as organized crime perpetrated by violent 
entrepreneurs. 
 
The Collier-Hoeffler framework became quite possibly the most influential analysis to 
grow out of this discourse, influenced by the neoliberal agenda of the World Bank. It 
sought to explain causes, duration, and termination of these conflicts since the Cold War 
by using datasets dating back to the 1960s, and became famous soon not only because 
of its controversial findings, but also because it established a general cause and effect 
relationship based on rational choice that was popular and easily adopted by 
policymakers (Herbst, 2000: 287) and the donor community. Academically, it initiated 
and dominated a “greed versus grievance debate”, developing a research current based 
on rational choice logic and neoclassical economics while being stimulated by its 
contentious results.19 The Collier-Hoeffler discourse claims that insurgencies take place 
in poor regions of the world mostly because of economic opportunity, or greed, of anti-
government forces seeking to extract wealth through armed violence by looting or 
                                                 
17
 The term “internal war” is used here to refer to wars that are fought in a territory of one state pitting the 
government against non-state actors. According to the protagonists of this trend the term “internal” is not 
meant to exclude regional or international dimension that is always present in armed conflicts. According 
to one of the proponents of this trend, Gadir Ali (2000: 242), “The economic core of the causes of African 
conflicts expresses itself in various guises: the high risk of dependence on natural resources; uneven 
development; and the capture and sharing of rents of the state machinery”. 
18
 See i.e. Collier (2000b, 2003a, 2003b), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), and Collier 
and Sambanis (2005a, 2005b). This led to de-legitimization and criminalization of rebellion and to a 
general assumption that any governments’ counter-insurgency measures are acceptable. 
19
 The studies by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler established the greed versus grievance debate by 
claiming that rebellions are caused predominantly by the economic greed of the insurgents. See i.e. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Emerging from a World Bank research project, they use the basic concepts 
of orthodox neoclassical economic theory in their framework, and have inspired a growing literature as 
other authors have built upon their analyses. Some examples of econometric work inspired by Collier-
Hoeffler paradigm are Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), Reynal-Querol (2002) arguing for the importance 
of religious differences, Anyanwu (2004), while Latif Mohammed (1999), Herbst (2000), and Sherman 
(2000) pose as some examples of qualitative studies associated with the rational choice theory in African 
context.  
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controlling natural resources (Cater, 2003: 20-1).20 In conjunction with this analysis, a 
discourse depicting post-colonial conflicts “resource wars” became increasingly 
apparent (Markakis, 1998; Clare, 2002; Clayton, 2003).      
 
     Shortcomings of the Economic Approaches 
 
Some accept that contemporary insurgencies are characterized by a more visible 
economic logic relative to rebellions during the Cold War. It is also argued that this is 
due to the growing need for governments and rebel organizations to replace superpower 
or other external financing. However, Bowles, Franzini, and Pagano (1999) and Fine 
(1999, 2001) demonstrate that the idea of supremacy of economics has often been 
justified through the subordination of other disciplines, which have long explained civil 
conflict, by using the economic approach to overshadow the importance of alternative 
explanations. For instance, the empirical record of insurgencies suggests that rebel 
motivations and operations are more complex, and likely to be less founded on 
economic rationality than what economic theory based on rational choice logic and 
profit maximization would appear to indicate (Herbst, 2000; Richards, 2007). 
 
Cramer (2002, 2006), Herbst (2000), Mkandawire (2002), and Pearce (2005) have 
further questioned the statistical approach, simplicity, inaccuracy, and dichotomy of 
“greed versus grievance” (Collier, 2000a, 2000b). Berdal (2003) points out that the 
absence of historical foundations and portraying only single-intent motivation provides 
a distorted image. Such approaches tend to criminalize insurgencies and buttress 
policies to restore state authority (Collier, 2000a; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), 
preventing objective evaluation of a state which can itself be repressive and criminal. 
Apart from ignoring the degree of state legitimacy, they have often lacked recognition 
of repression, regional or group-based horizontal inequality (Stewart, 2000, 2001), and 
the degree of coercive capacity in the social context of a state’s periphery where 
insurgencies tend to take place.21  
 
                                                 
20
 See i.e. Collier (2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004), and 
Collier and Sambanis (2005a, 2005b). 
21
 Some analyses have attempted to fill such gaps by comparing the impact of repressive and non-
repressive state policies (Betléhemy, Kauffman, Renard and Wegner, 2002), analyzing the impact of 
governance in minimizing armed conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000), or dealing with the geographic 
features of insurgencies (Buhaug and Gates, 2002).  
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Moreover, the Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2002a, 2002b, 2004) economic approach 
emphasizes poverty, the existence of natural resource wealth, and unemployed urban 
youth as determinant factors leading to insurgencies, and dismissing anything but 
material motivations. Yet, Reno (various) and Matturi (2007) have argued that the 
political process through which resources are distributed is paramount and its 
relationship with insurgency formation needs more emphasis, while according to 
Richards (1996, 2005: 10) the motivations of poor young men in search of material 
rewards are more complex. 
 
Another questionable concept is the motivation to loot as one major initiator of 
insurgencies, as claimed by the Collier-Hoeffler economic focus. Although looting 
exists in almost every armed conflict, it is rarely the principal cause of rebellions, which 
rebel-centric rational choice models sometimes ignore. Rather, reactions to looting or 
other types of violence and repression may lead to armed conflict, as has been arguably 
the case in southern Sudan, the Nuba Mountains, and Darfur.  
 
The economic analyses of civil wars were not been applied to the case of Sudan until 
recently, largely because of the complexity of the war in Sudan.22 Among the attempts 
to solidify the economic theory of civil wars based on Collier-Hoeffler literature were 
the World Bank publications, Understanding Civil War, volumes I and II (2005a, 
2005b), of which the first one, Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis 
(2005a), includes a chapter called “Sudan’s Civil War: Why Has It Prevailed for So 
Long?” by Ali, Elbadawi, and El-Batahani. This seeks to explain why the insurgency in 
southern Sudan has endured, but also to point out why it has taken place.  
 
The authors begin the chapter with two quotes of which the second is a statement of the 
late Dr. John Garang, founder and leader of the SPLM/A, the main rebel group of the 
second southern insurgency. He said on 3 March 1984 that 
The burden and incidence of neglect and oppression by successive Khartoum 
clique regimes has traditionally fallen more on the South than on other parts of 
the country. Under these circumstances, the marginal cost of rebellion in the 
                                                 
22
 For instance, Ross (2003: 66) has commented that most troubled civil wars are “ . . . separatist conflicts 
over obstructable resources, in which unlootable resource becomes both a source of grievance and a 
source of finance. There is, fortunately, just one state from the sample that fits into this cell: Sudan”. 
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South became very small, zero or negative; that is, in the South it pays to rebel 
(see Garang, 1987: 21 or Gadir Ali, Elbadawi, and El-Batahani, 2005: 193).   
The quote is used to draw the study closer to the economic foundations of the Collier-
Hoeffler literature, but Garang’s statement has been taken out of context to portray the 
decision to start a war as purely economic.  
 
Indeed, the variety of causes of Sudanese insurgencies cannot be appreciated through 
simple economic modeling. Rather in this case, the economic motivations behind the 
rebellion should not be seen as paramount, but as part of the socio-political context. 
This reveals the otherwise downplayed predominance of political and social grievances 
to which economic determinants, including lack of jobs, uneven development, unequal 
distribution of wealth, and poverty are inherent. Thus, Garang’s statement equally refers 
to the poor economic conditions in southern Sudan, social subjugation of the 
southerners, socio-economic inequality, political marginalization, and the lack of 
regional economic development, all of which are linked to the policies of an Arabized 
Muslim elite-dominated state.          
  
Moreover, Gadir Ali, Elbadawi, and El-Batahani (2005: 213) conclude that the civil war 
in Sudan could not have been avoided due to the social polarization which they claim to 
be the “key explanatory variable”. Yet, as demonstrated in this dissertation, the claim 
regarding the inevitability of war is highly questionable, while social polarization is 
often a product of violence and identity manipulation and is alone insufficient to explain 
why southern insurgencies have materialized. The authors do not view economic and 
social agendas in their context of historically derived social and political legacies and 
processes. 
 
     Relevant Elements of the Economic Approaches for the Case of Sudan  
 
Among the most important contribution of the economic analysis of insurgencies has 
been the finding that economic motivations interact with political components in 
conflicts. This has been explored from an economic and a political science perspective 
in the influential War, Hunger, and Displacement (2000) edited by Nafziger, Stewart, 
and Väyrynen. It demonstrated that economic factors, but grievances rather than greed 
founded on rational choice, including poverty and group-based inequality, are relevant 
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to the origins of insurgencies, particularly when economics is viewed in the context of 
the distribution of political and socio-economic power. These aspects are significant 
factors related to mobilization for insurgencies in southern Sudan (Ylönen, 2005, 2008). 
 
There is a difference of degree and focus among various researchers as to how 
economics is related to conflict. However, the economic focus has made clear that the 
role of the material in conflicts is probably more eminent than previous analyses 
recognized. As a result, comprehensive conflict analyses should include economic 
aspects. They are useful, for instance, in mapping economic motivations and activities 
of relevant actors and forces among other non-economic motivations and within the 
broader social and political context of insurgency formation, duration, and termination. 
Yet, as Humphreys (2003: 5) concludes in his review, “There are then many possible 
explanations for the relationship between natural resources and conflict . . .”, and 
unfortunately comprehensive studies considering economic and material only as one 
part of the social organization and political context of insurgencies are seldom 
undertaken.  
 
   2.3. Grievance Focused Interpretations  
 
     Analyses Highlighting Grievances 
 
The trend to highlight grievances in insurgencies gained renewed strength in response to 
the growth of the economic and material explanations. For Richards (2005: 4) and 
Johnson (2006: 93), most material explanations lack sufficient emphasis on social 
context and attention to construction, changes, and manipulation of collective identities 
by elites. To this extent, they have not been able to challenge identity explanations 
(Deng, 1995a, 1995b; Ignatieff, 1997; Fearon and Laitin, 2000), which incorporate 
economic agendas.  
 
Rather, it is the politics of exclusion that appears to be generally at the heart of 
insurgencies. Ballentine (2003: 260) explains that grievances are “ . . . bred by 
systematic exclusion of ethnic minorities and from political power and an equitable 
share of economic opportunities and benefits”. According to Ross (2003: 65-6), 
exclusionary politics has been central to the formation of grievances based on a 
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perception of inequitable distribution of resources, which in turn has fueled armed 
mobilization and reinforced a deeply founded sense of ethnic exclusion. Although in 
terms of violence, Kalyvas (2006: 20) states that “ . . . it does not matter if civil wars 
begin because of grievances or opportunities . . . ”, what appears common to 
insurgencies, at least in case of Sudan, is that their material origins often lie in local 
grievances caused by broken government promises, unanswered economic expectations 
involving disparate regional development, expropriation of property or resources, or 
violent dispossession of economic assets (Ylönen, 2005, 2008).  
 
For Richards (1996, 2005: 10), motivations to join rebellion are contextually linked to 
culture and society, with frustrations over unemployment and poverty often motivating 
violent behavior. Meanwhile, Stewart (2000, 2001) has demonstrated the importance of 
“horizontal” or group-based economic inequality, which is principally a political 
grievance. Moreover, Ballentine (2003) points out that sections of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone or some insurgents in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) were quick to invade the state capital rather than settling 
to loot and control the resource rich areas in the state periphery, which shows that 
political grievances have made up a significant, or arguably at times even dominant 
part, of rebel motivations.23 This points to the attempt to alleviate grievances by 
controlling the state, while it may also be that the central government policy to attempt 
to exploit natural resources from the territory belonging to the regional government 
jurisdiction can provoke conflict in the periphery, as has been the case in southern 
Sudan (de Chand, 2000; Ylönen, 2005, 2008).  
 
     Shortcomings of Grievance Analyses 
 
The grievance analyses often ignore that the leaders behind governments or rebel groups 
seldom constitute homogeneous groups that can be treated as non-fragmented entities. 
Instead they are often amalgamations of a number of power centers and constituencies 
                                                 
23
 Ballentine and Nitzsche (2003: 17) have argued that conflict formation “. . . is mediated by critical 
governance failures by the state. Systemic corruption and economic mismanagement, patrimonial rule, 
and political and socio-economic exclusion of ethnic or other minority groups may create conditions 
conducive to the onset . . .”, and Ballentine (2003: 262) has further noted that “In all cases, political 
motivations appear to have been dominant factors in the origin of insurgent and ethnoseparatist 
movements . . . [and] combatant motivations appear to have been shaped by a mix of continuing 
aspirations for political power or independent statehood as well as desire to capture resources”. 
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which may develop into different directions, resulting in fractionalization and infighting 
that produce complex crisis patterns. This has been the case in a number of African 
conflicts, such as in the case of Sudan. 
 
Combatants and civilians also have varied motivations to take decisions in how to 
respond to an insurgency situation. These decisions are based on a number of factors. 
For instance, Nordstrom (2004: 13) has argued that combatants are affected “. . . by 
everything from local grievances through foreign military advisors to global media and 
music”. Nyaba (2000) also points to varied motivational factors for rebel recruits to join 
an insurgency or the army, including political reasons, personal ambitions, need of 
belonging and survival, enrichment, or any combination of these factors. Social 
pressure, particularly within the Nilotic warrior cultures in which militarism and 
deterioration of family structure has become more pronounced after prolonged wars, has 
also been an important determinant in recruitment.24 Moreover, it is also plausible to 
argue that some young men may rebel due to non-structural but emotional motivations 
such as fear, belief in the rebel “cause”, involuntary conscripting, or a cultural, 
community, and family survival strategy (Nyaba, 2000; author’s field notes, 2005; 
Leonardi, 2007). 
  
It should also be mentioned that some members of southern elites in Khartoum have 
deliberately “Arabized” as a strategy to suppress their personal grievances and facilitate 
coexistence with local “Arabs”. This conformance with the persisting Arab-Muslim 
dominated social hierarchy in north-central Sudan in which the southerner is viewed as 
“Black”, “African”, or even slave and a provider of low level labor, shows how 
grievances can be responded and dealt with based on individual choice.25 Thus, how 
grievances can be responded to in a number of ways is often ignored by more general 
analyses. 
 
Indeed, the personal agency of individuals does matter, while grievances are only 
structural conditions and may or may not be contributing to variety of decision-making 
                                                 
24
 Based on author’s field research and observations, September 2008 in South Sudan. 
25
 Akok and Schultz (2009) provide evidence of how this has been the case of ethnic identities in southern 
Sudan. They show that, for instance, a southern Sudanese living in diaspora may choose to abide to an 
aspect of his ethnic identity that sees “Arabs” as the collective other and an enemy, while sections of 
southerners living in southern Sudan in distinct circumstances may opt to emphasize ethnic animosity 
towards other groups in the south for self-definition. 
44        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
and reactions. The responses and strategies of accommodation and/or resistance may be 
distinct in the case of each individual, while only some (mostly privileged males in the 
case of Sudan, for instance) within the elite power centers benefit from political 
decisions and resulting actions. 
 
     Relevant Elements of Grievance Analyses for the Case of Sudan 
 
Grievance narratives contain a variety of useful elements for the analyses of 
insurgencies. Among perhaps the most important features are the notions of 
marginalization, poverty, social hierarchy, exclusion, and elite corruption, which often 
create structural and proximate conditions conducive to conflict. Moreover, although 
grievances are normally structural conditions and may not be direct causes of conflict, 
the elite actions to maintain or gain power, or respond to repressive politics, linked to 
the overall state legitimacy and economic marginalization along ethnic lines, and should 
also be considered. In addition, any analysis of insurgency formation should consider 
political practices and conduct, such as the use of authoritarian ruling methods and 
military interventions, and conditioning factors, such as collective sentiments and the 
high level of availability of small arms in the society. All of the above is highly relevant 
to the case of Sudan. 
 
As is widely recognized, the grievances in southern Sudan stem from the history of 
slavery, inequality, and marginalization.26 In the case of southern Sudan, “Arab 
domination”, “subjection”, and “lack of development”, among other factors, provide the 
major grievances deemed “general” or “regional”. These are often portrayed as inherent 
unchanging or “traditional” (cultural or other) circumstances and incompatibilities 
between southern Sudan and the governing forces of the state. It is useful to be able to 
recognize these grievances, but also to see how they have been and continue to be 
(re)constructed through major narratives and interpretations of history. They are also 
picked up by the interested elite sections, which do to an extent believe in them, to 
project southern “regional” identity as opposed to the “northern Arab”27 or those whose 
interests may lie in challenging the inter-ethnic power relations in southern Sudan. This 
                                                 
26
 See i.e. major historical works, such as Alier (1990), Holt and Daly (2000), Johnson (2003), Collins 
(2005, 2008). 
27
 “Arab” here merely refers to categorization by the southern Sudanese of northern Sudanese as the other 
against whom identity politics discourse in southern Sudan has been generally oriented.  
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legitimizes political action and is useful for the analysis of insurgency formation in 
southern Sudan.  
 
2.4. State Centered Analyses 
 
By the end of the 1990s, a paradigm coined “new wars” emerged.28 Drawing upon a 
Clausewitzian description of war, anthropology, development studies, and political 
science, this paradigm laid emphasis on transformation of warfare and nature of 
conflicts thesis, converting them essentially into network wars (Kaldor, 2003: 119-23). 
Kaldor (1999; 2003) has claimed that wars have become illegitimate and criminalized 
with emphasis on economic opportunism, expansion of informal networks, and 
systematic victimization of civilians as an end itself, while ideological factors apparent 
during the Cold War have disappeared.  
 
This analysis claims that state weakness in developing countries and an increasing role 
for economic factors are the main determinants causing “new wars”. According to this 
discourse failed state formation has resulted in inadequate social and cultural integration 
in such states, further hindered by external involvement during the Cold War, and 
resulted in inescapable wars of state disintegration with intense external intervention, in 
opposition to the state-building wars of post-medieval Europe allegedly subjected to 
less external influence (Münkler, 2004: 7-10).29    
 
Other authors associated with the literature explaining “new” aspects of wars have 
pointed out the importance the links between local, regional, and international spheres 
in conflicts. According to Duffield (2001: 14), “ . . . market deregulation has deepened 
all forms of parallel and transborder trade and allowed the warring parties to forge local-
global networks and shadow economies as a means of asset realisation and self-
provisioning”. Moreover, according to Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa 
(2001), edited by Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham, but also Nordstrom (2004), and 
Vlassenroot (2004), such networks result in the emergence of local non-state socio-
political and economic authorities in conflict areas.  
                                                 
28
 This has been generally attributed to Kaldor (1999). 
29
 This inspired a focus on state capacity, state-building, and consolidation, which has become 
emphasized both by Western academic and policy circles. 
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This paradigm has stimulated state-centered analyses focusing on the strength of state, 
governance, and post-colonial and post-Cold War crises. The debate was divided early 
on between the authors who emphasized the dysfunctional character of the state in 
Africa, and those who refused such a negative assessment.30 What was important in 
these debates was the emphasis on the low capacity of post-colonial states to develop 
institutions comparable to those found in the West, but maintaining the expectation for 
them in order to form part of the international community of states (Jackson, 1990), and 
needing to be adjusted or corrected to function more “properly”. Among the main 
elements in the incapacity of the post-colonial states were the inheritance of imported 
colonial institutions that organized governance and resources resulting in ineffective 
regimes functioning through patron-client networks and personalized ruling methods. 
This buttressed “strong man” logic, artificial borders dividing ethnic communities, 
economic and administrative structures to serve the metropolis, external dependency, 
and authoritarian politics aimed at “tribalizing” society according to administrative 
structures designed for “divide and rule”.31 According to a number of prominent authors 
many of these elements linked to the “failure of monopoly statehood” (Clapham, 1996: 
209) are causes of armed conflicts in Africa.32       
 
According to this discourse, structural conditions and the crisis of the post-colonial state 
linked to chronic underdevelopment and poverty are largely responsible for structural 
deterioration and conflict in the African state. For Clapham (1996), van de Walle 
(2001), and Münkler (2004), it was largely due to the decline of superpower financing 
after the Cold War that many African states became less able to maintain functions and 
coercive power over their territories, with some plunging into wars of disintegration. As 
a result, it is argued, armed conflicts within states take place largely due to the financial 
crisis of neo-patrimonial political systems, poor governance, and weak state institutions, 
creating conditions for increased elite competition and mobilization for insurgencies 
(Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Reno, 1997, 1998; Bates, 2008). For instance, Reno (2001, 
2003, 2004, 2005) has further pointed out the material sources for state weakening as a 
combination of international environment, state financial austerity, and the persisting 
                                                 
30
 See i.e. Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta (2000) on review of this literature. 
31
 There exists an extensive literature emphasizing these elements. See i.e. Bayart (1991, 1993), Chabal 
and Daloz (1999), Clapham (1996), Hyden (1983), Mamdani (1997), Sørensen (1998), and van de Walle 
(2001). 
32
 See i.e. Pumphrey and Schwartz-Barcott (2003). 
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neo-patrimonial ruling dynamics resulting in elite competition over diminishing state 
spoils in the midst of economic crisis. He has shown how this can lead to organized 
violence and state collapse as the legitimacy of states and the ruling elites becomes 
increasingly related to their control of the markets. Thus, weak rulers tend to buy out 
opposition and divert resources to other groups only when under threat (Reno, 2005: 
132-3).  
 
In other words, the proponents of this current of state “failure” or “collapse”33 have 
suggested that large-scale violence and resources have to be viewed in the context of the 
decay of the African state. In this neo-patrimonial clientelist governance practices 
through personal rule and rent-seeking are highlighted, which has led Bayart, Ellis and 
Hibou (1999) to call such states as “criminal”, Frimpong-Ansah (1991) and Fatton, 
(1992) “predatory”, and Ayittey (1999) “vampire”. Indeed, despite the rather moralistic 
overtones of the headlines of such analyses, they show that although being 
internationally and organizationally considered as states, many of them neither fulfill 
the basic requirements for empirical legitimacy, monopoly of coercion, maintaining 
order, or extracting resources for public good (Cater, 2003: 27), nor have they capacity 
or autonomy from the populace (Kopstein and Lichbach, 2005: 27). As a result, Azam 
(2001) and Mueller (2002) have claimed that the causes of insurgencies are linked to 
weakened inherently authoritarian rule which is unable to maintain its monopoly of 
violence.34 
 
It is further argued that patrimonial politics that consolidated at the national level in 
most African states after independence resulted in a number of regimes becoming “neo-
patrimonial” and increasingly exploitative.35 From the crisis of the post-colonial state 
emerged the theoretical categorization of states according to their strength.36 In addition, 
                                                 
33
 This includes i.e. Doornbos (1994), Zartman, (1995), Chabal and Daloz (1999), van de Walle (2001), 
Milliken and Krause (2002), and Rotberg (2003a, 2003b, 2004). Englebert (2000) and Ayoob (2001) 
further emphasize their lack of legitimacy and consistency. 
34
 Azam (2001: 442) also claims that “ . . . the occurrence of civil conflict in Africa is intimately related to 
the failure of governments to deliver the type of public expenditure that people want, i.e., with a strong 
redistributive component such as in health and education”. 
35
 An ample literature on the topic exists. For instance, see Reno (1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), 
and Chabal (2007) on “neo-patrimonial” state. 
36
 For instance, Rotberg (2003a, 2003b) puts troubled states into three categories: collapsed, failed, and 
weak. According to Zartman (1995: 1-11), Rotberg (2003a: 9-10, 2003b: 4-5), and Aguirre (2006: 1), 
collapsed states such as Chad and Uganda in the 1980s and Somalia, Bosnia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, 
Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, are the ultimate, but not permanent, manifestation of state 
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Ottaway, Herbst, and Mills (2004) and Clapham, Herbst, and Mills (2006) have argued 
that Africa’s big states, Angola, DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Sudan, are 
particularly dysfunctional and regionally destabilizing, suffering from structural 
problems and extending their problems to the neighboring states. 
 
     Shortcomings of State Centered Analyses 
 
Various aspects of the state centered analyses can be questioned. Kaldor (1999, 2003) 
has argued that insurgencies that broke out since the 1990s are “new” because they are 
characterized by looting and a lack of political objectives, and parties to the conflict 
deliberately targeting civilians. However, it is important to note that wars have always 
contained these characteristics, albeit to various degrees, although some of these 
economic, political, or strategic features may be more pronounced in some cases than 
others. Kaldor (2009: 16) has defended the “new war” paradigm by stating that it is 
intended to sway policymakers away from antiquated Cold War thinking and that since 
the Cold War, the destructive potential of arms has grown and intersected with 
globalization, transforming wars. Again, although there may be aspects of war that are 
more pronounced in some cases, this does not make them inherently “new”. Also, 
although new ways of conflict resolution should be encouraged, simply viewing wars as 
“new” is not enough to constitute novel approaches.   
 
According to Kalyvas (2009), most insurgencies today remain low-intensity conflicts 
and thus similar to the ones during the Cold War. In this assertion he points to the 
prevalence of unsophisticated infantry weaponry, globalization (in terms of economy 
and communication), and political, economic, social, and cultural networks that have 
facilitated the interlinking of local with regional and international dimensions of 
                                                                                                                                               
failure creating a vacuum of authority filled by the strongest private entrepreneurs. Failed states, such as 
Angola, Burundi, and Sudan, are deeply contested, factional, and conflictive, experiencing enduring 
political violence characterized by ethnic, religious, linguistic and inter-communal antagonisms. They are 
unable to control their borders, prey on their own people, cannot check increasing criminality, have 
flawed institutions, are rife with corruption, suffer from deterioration of infrastructure, and provide only 
limited political goods, emergency response, and state services for the selected few, all the above leading 
to the erosion of the social contract and legitimacy of the state among the general population (Rotberg, 
2003a: 5-9; 2003b: 3-4). Finally, weak states, such as Iraq under Saddam, Belarus, Libya, Turkmenistan, 
and North Korea, are feeble because of geographical, physical or economic constraints, internal conflicts, 
management problems, greed, despotism or external encroachment, intercommunal tensions, elevated 
crime, diminishing state services, corruption, and thus being possibly on their way to failure (Rotberg, 
2003a: 4, 2003b: 3).   
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insurgencies during the Cold War (2009: 20). This fostered, and continues to propel, 
regional conflict complexes in Africa in which causes of insurgencies have more to do 
with regional and international actors and forces than argued by some prominent 
scholars who emphasize their local origins.37 Thus, regional and international 
dimensions of contemporary wars are not new (Cramer, 2006), although the role of 
external non-state actors in the “internal” wars has been recognized only recently 
(Kalyvas, 2009: 18). 
 
In addition, the emerging socio-economic and political authorities and networks during 
war are not new, although some authors present them as a novel post-Cold War 
phenomenon. As will be shown in this dissertation, this is the case in Sudan where such 
orders emerged in the rebel held areas long before the end of Cold War, and could be 
said to have been a common characteristic in the 1960s and 1970s, and again in 1980s 
and 1990s, throughout both insurgencies in southern Sudan.  
 
Moreover, the “new war” paradigm harbors theoretical perceptions of state-building and 
novelty of war that are not necessarily new, but rather theories invented by Western 
scholars to reinterpret history for and via Western discourses. This tendency, in turn, 
can be claimed to generate efforts inspired by correcting Africa’s “problems” by means 
of state-building or other avenues that appear to serve Western interests (Chandler, 
2006). Chabal (2009) has argued that such interpretations bring about “scientific” 
misinterpretations of Africa based on misguided historical records.    
 
In addition, although providing useful elements, the crisis of the post-colonial state 
discourse related to the state weakness argumentation suffers from a number of other 
shortcomings. Perhaps among the most eloquent inadequacies is the lack of cultural 
analysis related to social behavior that obviously differs from the Western experience. 
Chabal and Daloz (1999) show that the branch of scholars that focuses on the incapacity 
of African states to modernize and develop suffers from a degree of determinism, which 
obscures the observation and analysis of non-conventional modernization and 
development different to that experienced in the West. The lack of such processes, or 
too meticulous modernization dictated by the Western expertise, as Currea-Lugo (2008) 
                                                 
37
 On the argument for the prominence of local sources of conflict see i.e. Clapham (1996) and Chabal 
and Daloz (1999). 
50        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
argues in the case of Sudan, may result in state crisis over modernization and heighten 
the politics of inclusion and exclusion. For instance, Reno (1997, 1998)38 emphasizes 
the historical foundations and institutionalization of neo-patrimonialism and nepotism in 
the social fabric of African societies, which is important to understand its deepness. 
Indeed, comparative political analysis suggests that the crisis of the post-colonial state 
should be explained in its social context to carefully analyze the complex causes of 
insurgencies (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 4-16).  
 
Finally, the state-based analysis has been criticized as being incomplete. It is said to 
serve to impose neo-imperial policies from outside, or exaggerating the security threats 
weak states pose for Western countries (Patrick, 2006: 27-53). Also, the categorization 
of states based on their strength penalizes weak states economically; having diminishing 
effect on receiving foreign investments if the states do not adhere to externally imposed 
economic models, which reduces resources for maintaining peace and security 
(Woodward, 2005; Pureza, Duffield, Woodward, and Sogge, 2006).       
 
     Useful Elements of State Centered Analyses for the Case of Sudan 
 
The “new wars” paradigm has pointed to the fact that conflicts take place in their 
specific regional and international contexts and the nature of war may change through 
time. Although not necessarily “new”, it should be recognized that contemporary 
conflicts, as well as those of the past, take place in their particular political and 
economic context. These approaches also highlight the importance of regional and 
international actors and forces as well as emerging orders alternative to the state. These 
considerations are relevant to insurgencies in southern Sudan.   
 
Furthermore, the narratives dealing with the crisis of the post-colonial state have also 
useful attributes to explain the favorable conditions for political strife and armed 
conflict arising from the economic crisis in the late 1990s. Evidently one of the 
strengths of the analysis is that it captures the interplay of political and economic forces 
in the process of conflict formation and provides evidence for politically founded 
factors in the causes of conflict. In the case of Sudan, considering the structures and 
                                                 
38
 See also Reno (2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). 
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dynamics of the post-colonial state is particularly relevant and a particular perception of 
this forms an important part of the theoretical framework of this dissertation.  
 
Theoretical considerations in this dissertation, introduced in the following section, aim 
at constructing an analytical framework capable of overcoming some of the major 
limitations of antecedent narratives outlined above.  
 
3. Theoretical Considerations 
 
Based on the review of antecedent narratives conducted above, it can be argued that 
African insurgencies are a combination of political, economic, social, and cultural 
factors. Apart from internal dynamics such as political instability related to a weak state 
and democratization, the roots of insurgencies in Africa involve a number of factors 
such as ethnicity and religion, economic considerations, historical variables such as de-
colonization and Cold War, and the influence of external actors (Clapham, 1996; 
Chaigneau, 2002; Pumphrey, 2003). 
 
The theoretical approach adopted in this dissertation and used to explain the process of 
insurgency formation in southern Sudan draws principally from theoretical concepts 
associated with the state and political leadership, and intersecting actors and forces. 
More specifically, theoretical elements used here include elite theory, the concept of 
power, construction and instrumentalization of political identity, and the concept of 
extraversion linking local, regional, and international dimensions, all relevant in the 
context of center-periphery and network approaches to the process of insurgency 
formation. The main contributions of the approach introduced here include the 
“marginalizing state”, a theoretical framework particularly relevant to Sudan which 
incorporates the above theoretical aspects and the concept of “internal colonialism”, 
considering the insurgency formation as a process in which political organization and 
mobilization together with emotional and sentimental factors are paramount. All this is 
undertaken in an attempt to add to the understanding of the processes of insurgency 
formation in southern Sudan, including the causes and timing of the insurgencies, while 
also contributing to the scholarly debate about they inevitability. 
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   3.1. State Weakness and “Marginalizing State” 
 
Whereas this dissertation seeks to avoid strict categorizations about state strength, the 
theoretical base provided by the state-focused analyses is the starting point for the 
theoretical framework of this dissertation. This adheres to Aguirre (2006: 2), who 
argues that the state is central to almost all political, social, and economic questions in 
Africa.  
 
Yet, it is suggested here that rather than simply compartmentalizing states into broad 
categories, it is more useful to design a theoretical framework suited to evaluate the 
particularities of the state and its relation to the insurgencies formation processes. 
Drawing from this line of thought, the theoretical concept of a “marginalizing state” is 
introduced here. In this case, instead of considering Sudan simply as a failed state 
(Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003; Rotberg, 2004: 13; Mayall, 2005: 51-2), it is suggested 
that it should rather be viewed as a “marginalizing state” driven by group and 
consequently regionally based marginalization (Ylönen, 2005, 2008). This 
marginalization has become an established attitude and logic, and arguably even a state 
of mind conditioning political decision-making, among the governing elites and those 
periphery elites opposing them, institutionalized through time according to pre-existing 
social dynamics, relationships and hierarchies between societal groups, and manifested 
in political structures, governance, and ruling methods and strategies of the post-
colonial state (Ylönen, 2009).  
 
The “marginalizing state” is a product of particular historical processes, including the 
formation of an exclusive culturally Arabized-Muslim minority elite in a widely 
heterogeneous polity, and the legacies of Turkiyyah, Mahdiyyah and Anglo-Egyptian 
co-dominium colonial rule. It is an institutionalized form of marginalization that has 
minimized or excluded effective representation from all but several narrow sectors of 
the dominant socio-cultural Arabized elite group, which have monopolized the 
competition and exercise of political and economic power.  
 
The narrow patterns of economic accumulation, distribution, development, and services 
facilitated the socio-economic emergence and concentration of political power to these 
dominant groups during the colonial period. Moreover, the continued economic power 
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has buttressed the exclusive political prominence of this Arabized elite, which continues 
to justify its position culturally and racially, seeking to (re)construct identities which 
dictate the narrow distribution of political and economic power and opportunities. The 
persistence of its political and economic dominance has been legitimized through self-
perceived socio-cultural superiority, leading to institionalized claims to power and to a 
position that defies power-sharing, which developed through historical processes.  
 
A direct result of this has been the monopolization and privatization of political power 
by the Arabized elite. The “marginalizing state”, thus, is to a large extent characterized 
by the continuation of a colonial form of governance through divide and rule logic over 
a highly stratified social hierarchy and the creation of poverty among the marginalized 
subjects. While marginalization has to an extent a debilitating effect on state legitimacy 
among the majority, the neo-patrimonial logic, in which nepotism in patron-client 
relations is significant, has ensured the Arabized governing elite sufficient 
constituencies, particularly in north-central Sudan to survive violent and non-violent 
challenges to its control over the state. Behind this common group agenda of the 
Arabized elite, however, also lays an intense competition for power among its sections, 
parties, and organizations, which also extends to individual power centers within such 
groups. This competition often results in the exclusion of those sections not 
collaborating with the governing clique in power.   
 
It is pointed out in the following chapters that before the 19th century the region that 
became the contemporary Sudanese state was divided into small kingdoms and 
sultanates, which particularly in northern Sudan experienced an Arab-Muslim 
dominated, culturally defined, social hierarchy in which “social race” (Deng, 1995a: 
369-400, 484-5) largely determined the distribution of political and economic power for 
the dominant groups. This resulted in the marginalization or mere exclusion of the 
perceived lower societal cadres from access to wealth and power, the most extreme case 
being southern “Blacks” or “slaves”.  
 
The formation of a unified administration and polity in the 19th century served the 
purposes of (re)construction and extension of the pre-existing socio-culturally defined 
marginalization and exclusion. It buttressed the social and economic predominance of 
Arabized Muslims from central region and led to the institutionalization of their version 
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of the Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy which was justified by the self-
perceived socio-cultural superiority. After de-colonization, this institutionalized social 
reality, and related attitudes, has directed the Arabized elite dominated state 
administration, its politics and ruling methods, and promoted concentrated exclusive 
economic accumulation for prominent members of particular Arab-Muslim social 
groupings.39 In the process, others within Arabized Muslim sectors benefited less, some 
being marginalized. Still, it was the majority population composed of other ethnicities, 
religions, and cultures of the highly heterogeneous contemporary northern Sudan, which 
was outright excluded as it failed to subscribe to the north-central Arabized elite 
definition of “Arab” and “Muslim” identity.40  
 
To contrast this perception, sectors of southern elites have fermented and promoted a 
loose but collective political identity since the 19th century. This identity layer, which 
differs from how southern groups relate to each other, has been constructed in 
opposition to the “northern Arab” domination. Despite being composed of a vast 
number of heterogeneous ethnic communities with ethnicity being the paramount 
determinant of group identity, the southern leaders generally oppose “northern Arab” 
domination and the hegemonic project of Arabization and Islamization (Badal, 1976) 
that some perceive as part of an “internal colonialism”. It is viewed that the successful 
imposition of Islam and Arab culture would be destructive to the position of southern 
elites and would profoundly transform southern cultures and identities. In spite of the 
inter-ethnic disputes at the local level, southerners tend to have a relatively uniform 
view of rejecting the northern imposed social hierarchy in which they occupy the lowest 
level in northern Sudan, along with other peoples considered as “Black”, such as the 
Nuba from southern Kordofan (Badal, 1976: 467-8; Jok, 2007). This cohesion, drawing 
from a perception of northerners as “Arabs” and “traditional” enemies, was partially 
                                                 
39
 As Abbink (2004: 4) claims, attitudes of superiority and inferiority based on this hierarchy continue to 
dictate the distribution of political and economic power and opportunities, which is significant because  
Northern Sudanese, also many of those opposed to the policies of the GoS [Government of 
Sudan], still largely think that most Southerners of various ethnic origins ‘have no culture or 
religion’, are ‘primitive’ and are in need of ‘development’, usually in the guise of Islamization. 
The entire political and economic programme of the GoS and its supporters, in slowly annexing 
the South and exploiting its labour force and natural assets, has been cloaked in a ‘civilizational 
project’ of Islamization. 
40
 For instance, the Rashaida who have relatively recently arrived in Sudan from Saudi Arabia are 
excluded from Sudanese politics although they are genetically more “Arab” that the members of the 
Sudnanese governing elite. Indeed, the Arabized groups holding power in Sudan share a long history of 
slavery and intermixing with southern Sudanese, and their cultural and racial distinction from other 
groups in Sudan can be considered as a cultural construction, or invented tradition.   
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cemented in the 19th century and has since been periodically reinforced by sectors of the 
southern elite.41  
 
In the process of de-colonization, members of the southern elite became increasingly 
frustrated by the lack of access to political and economic power. For instance, they were 
excluded from top civil service and military jobs, or a role in dictating national culture 
and objectives (Badal, 1976: 466-7, 469; de Chand, 2000; Johnson, 2003). This gave 
rise to southern regional consciousness, characterized by frustration, resentment, 
suspicion and fear, all of which became common elements in collective attitudes 
towards the “Arab northerners” (Badal, 1976: 469-70). These frustrations were further 
accentuated due to unemployment, northern individuals occupying superior positions, 
suspicion of Arabization and Islamization among students, and adverse perceptions of 
northern merchants, the jallaba. All played into a general view of a northern conspiracy 
to dominate, or internally colonize southern Sudan (Badal, 1976: 470; Woodward, 
1995: 92).  
 
The grievances of the southern elite also had other features. Many of them were 
frustrated by their numerical inferiority in the decision-making organs at the national 
level, lack of Arabic skills, internal differences, and northern attitudes of superiority. 
These sentiments were channeled to their constituencies in southern Sudan, where 
individuals from rural areas, initially mostly in Equatoria, responded with their almost 
total support, which extended regional consciousness and the separatist political agenda 
of sections of the southern elite (Badal, 1976: 470-1). Thus, attitudes rising from these 
social relations and dynamics have been a driving force of southern political opposition, 
and separatism, and are as relevant to political strife as the imposition and extension of 
cultural cohesion in northern Sudan based on Islam and Arab culture (Badal, 1976: 465, 
466).42 
 
It should be noted that the British colonial policies encouraged southern grievances. 
Members in the colonial administration aspired to safeguard southern cultures and 
                                                 
41
 Such perception became common among the southern leadership in the 1950s and 1960s (Howell, 
1973, 1978b), particularly after it realized the connection between wealth and prestige, and improved 
education, Arabic skills, lighter-skin, and the way of dressing of the central riverine northerners. It was 
reinforced again during the second insurgence (1983-2005). 
42
 According to Mamdani (1997), in Africa such imposition by the dominant groups is conducive to inter-
ethnic violence.           
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reduce nationalist threats after World War I (Woodward, 1995: 94) for self-interested 
reasons. Thus, through historical processes, cultural identities related to the perceived 
“social race” and the Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy and became an 
integral part of general attitudes between “northerners” and “southerners” in the post-
colonial state (Gray, 1961; Adams, 1991; Woodward, 1995). This owed much to the 
structural dynamics of the marginalizing state, a colonial creation, which was based on 
ethnic politics of exclusive group identities and characterized by nepotism and divide 
and rule. In turn, the Arabized ruling elite with experience of the colonial administration 
readily adopted these mechanisms.  
 
A highly educated and prominent section of the Arabized elite linked to the powerful 
Sufi orders developed the view of a predestined predominance of the awlad al-balad 
(Sons of the land) relative to other groups. It projected this view by creating a language 
and literature of cultural superiority.43 This narrative portrays non-“Arab” and non-
Muslim Sudanese as inferior, providing an exclusionary view of inter-group relations 
and stereotyping, even de-humanizing, those perceived as the other.44 An important 
aspect of this social hierarchy is outside perception that Arabs abroad tended to view the 
northern Sudanese merely as Arabized Africans, and often referring to them as abd. 
Europeans and North Americans tended to classify them as “Black”. This drove the 
Arabized elite in Sudan to deflect these views to southern Sudan and projected the same 
attitude towards the southerners in order to establish privileged social status (Sharkey, 
2007). In fact, while O’Fahey (2002: 55) asserts that “Northern Sudanese society is 
profoundly racist and colour-conscious”, Jok (2001: 21) adds that “South Sudanese 
continue to be referred to as abeed (slaves) by North Sudanese, whose privileged 
position today has much to do with their history as slave masters in the past”. Sharkey 
(2007) argues that prevalent narratives glorifying Arab culture and conquest of Sudan 
encourage such attitudes in northern Sudan, together with the political ideology and 
policies of forced assimilation by the minority governing elite, thereby turning 
relatively peaceful historical process of Arabization and Islamization into contentious 
and repressive political tools. 
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 See i.e. Ezza and Libis (2009). 
44
 For evidence on this process see i.e. Eltahir (2009) and Adam, Bartlett and Nour (2009). 
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Indeed, in Sudan these social dynamics are part of the political and economic realms. 
Since colonialism, they have become increasingly politicized and an important factor in 
mobilizing challenges to the Arabized elite dominated state, particularly from southern 
Sudan (Deng, 1995a, 1995b; Young, 2000). The state has been challenged from 
elsewhere in the periphery as well, particularly due to marginalization imposed by the 
state and its exclusion of local groups.  
 
This adheres to the affirmation that main cultural identifications in Africa are not only 
localist and tribal (Sørensen, 1998). They can also be genuinely regional or international 
and an integral part of politicized regional or local nationalisms (Milliken and Krause, 
2002). From this perspective, the armed and non-armed challenges to the state represent 
the responses of the Sudanese periphery to a dynamic of forced assimilation and partial 
inclusion that threatens local cultures or rejection and complete exclusion. This, in turn, 
has inspired the Arabized elite to perceive southern political demands as a “problem”, 
and their securitization as a threat to the Sudanese state. And yet, historically, southern 
demands have mainly been a threat to the Arabized governing elite’s exclusive power, 
and much less to the political unity of the state itself.   
 
During the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period this marginalization and exclusion became 
socially institutionalized part of governance. This took place through differential 
treatment of the northern “Arabs” and southern “Africans” by the colonial elite and was 
reflected in the social foundations, structures, and policies of the colonial 
“marginalizing state”. Imposed indirect rule forced an implementation of subjection as 
part of the prevailing societal structure (Mamdani, 1997), inherently linked to the 
creation of poverty and dependency of the center by the peripheries as a method of 
control (Munene, 2001). It is argued here that this was the case in Sudan, where 
underdevelopment and poverty became part of establishing a dynamic of periphery 
dependency on the more developed north-central Nile Valley region, systematically 
enforcing the economic prominence of those Arabized Muslim groups best positioned to 
take advantage of state services concentrated in the northern core areas. The impact of 
such policies in the marginalized regions was manifested particularly in the process of 
de-colonization which enabled prominent sections of Arabized Muslim elite to inherit, 
monopolize, and to an extent privatize, political power, which further buttressed group-
based economic prominence.  
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This situation has connections to other African states. For instance, Ake (2000: 36) has 
stated that generally, “As rulers and subjects alike extended their rights to their powers, 
the idea of lawful political competition became impossible; politics turned into the 
forceful determination of two exclusive claims to rulership”. In the case of Sudan, 
however, in the process of de-colonization the perceived “Arabs” from the core of the 
state became the exclusive rulers of those peripheral areas considered to be populated 
by “Africans”, “Black”, or “slaves”. The latter marginalized areas were less integrated 
to state structures and lacked economic development and services, while the shortage of 
state or institutional resources at their disposition hindered the emergence of any 
coherent political movement. In contrast, in north-central Sudan financial resources 
(Woodward, 1995: 95), education, and external interventions encouraged such 
development. Essentially, this is a structural condition cemented in historical processes 
(de Waal, 2007a, 2007b), ultimately leading to the Arabized elite’s total control of the 
marginalizing state.  
 
These processes carried over from the colonial period to the era of independence. 
Thompson (2004) demonstrates the persisting nature of the post-colonial state as 
interventionist, authoritarian, non-representative, and imposing coercion and co-
optation. This was largely because the newly established political elite had collaborated 
with the colonizer and acquired experience in managing political processes within the 
colonial state.45 Such sociopolitical and socioeconomic organization continues to stem 
from persisting historical cultural legacies (i.e. social inequality, political cultures, and 
patrimonialism), manifested in the political regimes and policies dictated by their 
formal institutions (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). But it also draws on institutional 
dynamics not formally incorporated to the state and deriving from traditional or cultural 
authority (Kaarsholm, 2006: 14). This in the case of Sudan has resulted in the structural 
condition of the “marginalizing state”, particularly in the periphery, on social, cultural, 
and regional grounds to justify the persistence of prominent members of the Arabized 
elite’s exclusive political and economic power. To an extent, “the marginalizing” state 
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 Ake (2000: 36) has further argued that 
Independence changed the composition of the managers of the state but not the character of the 
state, which remained much as it was in the colonial era. Its scope continued to be totalistic and 
its economic orientation statist. It presented itself often as an apparatus of violence, its base in 
social forces remained extremely narrow and it relied for compliance unduly on coercion rather 
than authority. With few exceptions, the elite who came to power decided to inherit and exploit 
the colonial system to their own benefit rather than transforming it democratically as had been 
expected. This alienated them from the masses whom they now had to contain with force. 
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colonizes the periphery internally, maintaining centralized power and regional 
inequality manifested in the extraction of resources, unemployment, lack of services, 
and poverty, buttressing the power of the center and causing emigration from the less 
developed areas (Kirkinen, 1972). In the case of Sudan this has been accompanied by 
the periodic forced assimilation to Arab culture and Islam, and imposition of a 
“northern Arab” administrative and economic elite in the periphery.  
 
In other words, it is argued here that a historically founded analysis of the 
“marginalizing state” is fundamental to the understanding of the structural origins of 
insurgencies in southern Sudan. As pointed out above, the “marginalizing state” in 
contemporary Sudan manifests itself in socio-culturally and regionally defined political 
and economic exclusion with roots in the colonial and pre-colonial periods. It is 
embedded in the governance, ruling methods, and policies, as well as formal state 
structures, all working together to sustain the privileged position of the Arabized elite 
and the exclusive political and economic power of its governing sections. It 
marginalizes and excludes the representatives of the remaining population from power, 
including those in the opposition from within the Arabized elite itself, but affecting 
above all the peoples from the state peripheries.               
 
   3.2. Power and Identity in Context of Elite Theory and Uneven Development    
 
     On Power in Sudan 
 
This dissertation uses the notion of power to demonstrate its relation to conflict 
formation in southern Sudan. Weber (1968) defines power as every 
opportunity/possibility, which allows one to carry out one’s own will in a social 
relationship, even against resistance.46 Russell (1962: 25) has defined it as “the 
production of intended effects”. Moreover, within Weber’s notion of power exists an 
attempt to further differentiate between overlapping economic power, in which a 
particular social group controls the means of production and the most profitable 
economic activity, and political power. Political power, in turn, enables the group to 
wield formal and informal societal influence that enables it to elevate itself over other 
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 The author is aware of the limitations of Weberian thought which emerged in a European context to 
interpret political systems and culture in Africa. However, he finds Weber’s definition of power useful. 
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groups. Foucault reminds us that these forms of power are embedded in social structures 
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 208) and hierarchies, which is particularly relevant to the 
grievances and insurgencies formation in southern Sudan. Mills (1956: 171) has further 
argued that “All politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence”, 
and Walter (1969: 32) has pointed out that “Power may be experienced as inspiring, 
wholesome, tolerable, or oppressive, depending on the circumstances . . . [and] . . . it 
may stimulate conflict and rebellion”.  Arguably this was the case in conflict formation 
in southern Sudan, when force and violent coercion have been used extensively in the 
conditions of lack of central government authority and legitimacy (MacIver, 1947: 16).  
 
Moreover, the Foucaultian notion of power shows the durability of subjection. 
According to Foucault, wholesale liberation from domination is impossible, as the 
subjected tend to continue to project themselves as lower sections due to the persistence 
of illusion of power in any given society as they are continuously subjected to dominant 
forces and institutions (Taylor, 1984). While this has explanatory power in the case of 
collective subjection of southern Sudanese in northern provinces, and appears as a 
motivational factor in the processes of insurgencies formation, it should be recognized 
that the institutionally weak state and the Arabized elite divided among several power 
centers has been unable to impose full hegemony in the periphery. 
The above description of power is intimately linked to the (re)construction and use of 
collective identities. These are sources of group formation and tend to provide African 
elites with legitimacy. This dissertation adheres to the constructivist approach (Mitchell, 
1956; Epstein, 1958; Barth, 1969; Castells, 1997) to identities advocated by many 
africanists,47 but does not disregard the occasional instrumentalization of identities for 
political interests as described by Posner (2005) through his mixed approach. Thus, a 
position similar to Posner (2005) is adopted here, considering ethnic identity not only 
constructed but also at times instrumentalized depending on the situation. This means 
that individuals hold a variety of identity layers, which are innate and which they 
believe in, that they choose from depending on the situation. This also means that the 
elites who share an identity layer/component with their constituents may seek to 
instrumentalize them for political or material goals, often founded upon the collective 
desires of their followers (Chabal and Daloz, 2005). Some examples of this in the case 
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 See i.e. Mazrui (1973), Bates (1983), and Brass (1991). 
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of Sudan are president Nimeiri’s use of “Arab” identity to extravert external support 
from the Arab states, or sections of the southern elite using a generalized southern 
identity layer positioned against “northern Arab” for political mobilization while 
overlooking the local ethnic rivalries that constitute another layer of identity.  
 
However, identity formation and (re)construction is a slow process, which Castells 
(1997: 8) proposes is formed along “legitimizing”, “resistance”, or “project”. 
Particularly the “resistance” identity is relevant to the groups in the peripheral areas in 
Sudan, because according to Castells (1997: 8) it is  
. . . generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or 
stigmatized by the logic of domination . . .  [and] It constructs forms of 
collective resistance against otherwise unbearable oppression, usually on the 
basis of identities that were, apparently, clearly defined by history, geography, 
or biology, making it easier to essentialize the boundaries of resistance . . .  
Crucially, Castells’ (1997: 8) “project” identity; “when social actors, on the basis of 
whichever cultural materials are available to them, build a new identity that redefines 
their position in society and, by so doing, seek the transformation of overall social 
structure”, applies to sectors of the dominant groups in the north-central Sudan as well 
as in southern Sudan. 
 
     On Elites and their Relation to Power 
 
Hunter (1953), Mills (1956), and Putnam (1976) all analyzed elites and their relation to 
power, showing that elites are a result of economic and political forces within a social 
structure and become the de facto dominant forces behind political representation for 
groups and socially constructed entities. When resources in the disposition of the 
political elite diminish, this undermines the maintenance of neo-patrimonial patron-
client redistributive networks through which political leaders, or strongmen, acquire 
their legitimacy from their constituents.48 Reno (2005: 128) has further shown that 
power of the governing elite in Africa is intimately linked to its ability to control 
markets. This shows the elite’s desire to monopolize power to control both the political 
and economic spheres inseparably. Yet, power can be considered to depend on 
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 See i.e. Reno (various). 
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perception and circumstances and be fundamentally contested (Lukes, 2005: 14), which 
leads to Bayart’s (1993) concept of the internal circulation of elites within the governing 
class. This appears relevant to the case of Sudan in which prominent sections of the 
Arabized elite (influential males) have formed such a class.  
 
On the other hand, it could also be argued that excluded local elites may turn to anti-
state activities to claim their share of political power and resources. This may 
particularly be the case when they are deprived of the opportunity to join the governing 
elite, as in the case of southern Sudan, and share benefits from the state through political 
positions and other claims to resources. Zartman (2005) proposes that in the process, 
need (perceived relative deprivation, unfulfilled expectations, etc.), creed (identity 
based factors), and greed (elite’s greed to obtain or control resources) become crucial 
components for the elite individuals organizing insurgencies. Unmet expectations 
concerning social or political relationships linked to material well-being or extraction of 
local resources and labor, including forced labor, as in the case of sections of the 
southern elite in Sudan, may cause instability conducive to insurgencies. Thus, breaking 
the broad categorizations of “northerners” and “southerners” widely used in the 
historical literature on Sudan, by highlighting the elite agency behind domination and 
insurgency formation, provides a more sophisticated analysis. 
 
In elite action the intertwined role of identity and power becomes highlighted. Believing 
in the superiority of Arab culture as a unifying force, various ideologues and 
policymakers of the culturally Arabized and Muslim elite have maintained their 
collective position towards the peripheries. This has been done by instrumentalizing the 
cultural aspects (religion, language, ethnicity) they themselves adhere to, including a 
perception of socially founded race prevalent in northern parts of Sudan, as an integral 
component of identity politics. This provides substance to the Arabized elite’s common 
political project of maintaining exclusive power and consolidating its self-proclaimed 
“Arab” identity nationally. This project is built around the attempt to maintain status 
quo and thus continues to be manifested in the state policies of marginalization of non-
Arabized state periphery. This periphery, even its Muslim areas in northern Sudan, is 
often claimed not to be doctrinally “pure”, which allows the use of identity (i.e. “Arab-
Muslim” vs. “Darfurian” or “Arab-Muslim” vs. “Beja”) to justify systematically created 
poverty by concentrating resources in the center. It also allows the securitization of 
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political and economic demands from periphery opposition forces and in this way 
legitimize repressive policies against those who are not considered culturally Arab 
and/or purely Muslim. The creation of insecurity through inequality and injustice has 
allowed the use of disorder as a political instrument, in benefit of the governing elite, 
and encouraged militarization in the periphery. This points to culturally based solidarity 
and common interests among the Arabized Muslim elite against challenges to its 
exclusive power. Such a common stand tends to be unquestioned, even though the 
Arabized elite is divided within itself into various political ideological orientations 
ranging from Islamism to communism.   
 
From this perspective, Idris (2001, 2005) has described Sudan as a “racialized state”. It 
is deeply affected by the legacy of slavery, together with differential treatment during 
colonialism, the British perceiving “Arabs” as semi-civilized and “Blacks” as savages. 
Jok (2007) argues that due to persisting racism the latter remain without possibility of 
becoming full members of the “Arab” group with equal rights despite adopting its 
cultural prerequisites such as language and religion. Whereas slavery was a rather 
marginal phenomenon in the later conflict (Branch and Mampilly, 2005: 4), its legacy 
contributed to the onset of violence as a force of extreme marginalization, exclusion, 
and exploitation faced by the southerners, particularly in northern provinces. Relevant 
to grievances involved in the second insurgency, Collins, (1985: 138) has noted that 
Unlike the relatively few missionary-educated Southerners who had dominated 
Southern political life since independence . . . new young men were politically 
and socially educated, and being at the lowest economic and social scale they 
became strongly militant as well as knowledgeable of the outside world. They 
returned regularly to their homes in the South, bringing with them a pent-up 
hostility and militancy that they developed while working as laborers on 
construction projects in the North. 
This points to the constructed, but persisting, social marginalization based on ethnic 
background or perceived racial origin due to skin color (Idriss, 2001, 2005; Sharkey, 
2003; author’s field notes, 2005), and the potentiality of the related frustrations to create 
animosity. Yet, these conflicting identity categories are products of historical processes, 
(re)constructed and largely situational, and their manifestations as social conduct 
depend largely, but not solely, on circumstances and individual experiences.     
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Thus, arguably since the 1950s the governing elite has portrayed political opposition 
emerging from the marginalized areas as a security threat to the state, while in fact it 
only threatens the continuity of the exclusive power of the “Arab” governing elite and 
the persistence of Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy. As a result, the situation in 
Sudan resembles to an extent that of Algeria and Egypt where the Muslim governing 
elites have politicized, extended and used their own religious interpretation and group 
identities to consolidate their claim on state power. 
 
On the contrary, as mentioned above, leaders from the peripheral regions have generally 
been excluded from claims to political and economic power at the national level. 
Perceivably, they and their regions of origin have been victims of deliberate 
marginalization. This along with the legacy of racial and cultural subjugation through 
slavery and violent resistance, served as powerful identity elements for political 
mobilization, particularly in southern Sudan. There, the “northern Arab” dominated 
state is commonly perceived as alien and hostile. These realities, aided by the British 
colonial intervention that buttressed certain “African” and European cultural values in 
southern Sudan as opposed to the “Arab” culture in the northern provinces, have served 
the creation of a collective narrative of a local political identity. This is often portrayed 
as primordially different from “northern Arabs” and inherently incompatible with the 
imposed “Arab-Muslim” state. Although the legacy of slavery, resistance, and cultural 
survival has become a key pillar of this discourse, it should be remembered that such 
identity politics have been emphasized by the southern leadership in times of repression 
by the marginalizing state. Thus, emerging from the colonial period, the southern 
political leadership’s role in emphasizing differences from the north-central Sudanese 
elites and the state, and subsequently integrated into the processes of insurgency 
formation, has been paramount and recognized as such by the Arabized elite. 
 
Finally, a center-periphery approach alluded to in a number of studies such as Roden 
(1974) and Badal (1976) and more generally in the Sudanese periphery by Kok (1996) 
and Cobham (2005), is adopted here. This is because it appears to shed light on the 
sentiments of exclusion and marginalization involved in conflict formation. The center-
periphery approach is related to growth pole policies which tend to promote uneven 
development patterns. This is because economic development and services are 
concentrated near the metropolitan area where they are firmly under state authority, 
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easily accessed, and provide job opportunities for urban dwellers and constituents of the 
national elite. This was the case in a number of European colonies in Africa in which 
the state was unable to consolidate itself fully in the periphery. It also enabled the 
minimization of the cost of developing colonial infrastructure, while the peripheral 
frontier of the colonial states experienced little material improvement relative to the 
center. These development patterns are related to group-based horizontal inequalities 
(Stewart, 2000, 2001), which due to their distribution along the lines of regional and 
group identity, provide exploitable grievances for provincial elites through a perception 
of injustice and the persisting historically founded social subjugation. This in the case of 
Sudan has been particularly evident due to the pattern of slavery and the associated 
group social hierarchy.  
 
Thus, it is argued here that the legacy of differential treatment of socio-cultural groups 
through racist perceptions and the history of slavery have affected policies that have led 
to the unequal distribution of wealth and political power, and regionally uneven 
development, within the Sudanese state. 
 
   3.3. Extraversion and Networks 
 
Although some authors tend to emphasize local roots of conflicts, it is asserted here that 
when examining processes of insurgency formation it is important to recognize the 
interplay of local, regional, and international actors and forces. For instance, Elbadawi 
and Sambanis (2000) and Henderson and Singer (2000) argue that separating civil and 
interstate wars analytically is likely to result in less telling results than more 
comprehensive and empirically founded conceptualizations of conflict. Such analyses 
require a wider internationalized dimension (Gleditsh, 2006), and should be conducted 
in their historical context taking into account the national political scene (Mkandawire, 
2002: 208). Murshed (2002: 392-3) has argued that   
The actual outbreak of civil war, however, requires triggers that are usually both 
internal and external; these are not predictable and must arise in the context of 
the failure of state and society to manage conflict. Internal triggers are events 
that actually push potential belligerents over the brink into warfare. External 
triggers consist of actions and signals by outsiders, neighbouring countries and 
great powers that make the prospect of fighting or secession more attractive. 
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It is also important to examine how local political realities have been constructed and 
transformed historically, and how they are affected by national, regional, and 
international influences (Appandurai, 1996; Hart, 2002).  
 
It is argued here that in the case of historical literature that deals with the causes of 
insurgencies in southern Sudan, there is an exaggerated emphasis on local causes of 
conflict. This is particularly the case with many prominent general works in the Anglo-
Saxon academic tradition (i.e. Daly, 1991; Holt and Daly, 2000; Collins, 2008), but also 
applies to many more specific works (i.e. Johnson, 2003; Collins, 2005). Generally, 
they tend to rely principally on local political, economic, and social factors when 
explaining insurgency formation. In addition, there appears to be a certain degree of 
determinism about the inevitability of war and the portrayal of a broad category of 
“southerners” as a relatively coherent group of naïve natives subjected to domination by 
more sophisticated “northerners” or “Arabs”. By applying concepts of extraversion and 
networks, this dissertation seeks improved incorporation of regional and international 
dimensions to its critical historical analysis of formation of insurgencies and 
inevitability of war in southern Sudan. 
 
   Extraversion  
 
It has been established that weak de facto statehood leads African leaders to use the 
recognized de jure status of the state to consolidate their rule. Bayart (1993, 2000) has 
called this “extraversion”, describing it as rulers’ attempts to build relationships with 
external actors such as non-African states, multinational corporations (MNCs), and 
international organizations to acquire recognition and resources to strengthen their 
position and achieve social stability locally.49 Bayart (2005: 71) introduces cultural 
extraversion which “ . . . consists in espousing foreign cultural elements and putting 
them in the service of autochtonous objectives”. In some cases, this may have inhibited 
state formation and the strengthening of weak or dysfunctional states (Herbst, 1990: 
117-39). In Sudan, such strategies have been manifested since the colonial and pre-
                                                 
49
 For instance, according to Reno (2001: 198), controlling economic transactions as part of international 
networks provides state leaders with economic resources to justify political power that extends beyond 
their juridical territorial authority, and enables them to use non-formal economic ties to face opponents.  
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colonial period when local social actors collaborated with the colonial masters and 
external actors to deal with adversaries. 
 
Extraversion linking the domestic and international spheres has also been used to fight 
challenges to state authority in times of decline. In circumstances where decline in the 
state’s monopoly of violence in parts of its territory has facilitated an armed challenge 
(Kalyvas, 2006: 18), “extraversion” may result in the birth of alternative forms of 
authority. These include i.e. unofficial local administrations or transboundary entities, 
which during war may be characterized by violent order and economic extraction or 
alternative forms of governance accepted by the local populations. This was largely the 
case in southern Sudan in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and again from the mid-1980s 
to 2005, when rebel governance in southern Sudan was recognized. Reno (2001: 205-8) 
points out that transboundary formations as political and economic entities allocating 
leaders with resources may help to determine winners in times of factional struggles or 
insurgencies. For instance, this is largely why the leader of the first Anya Nya rebellion 
in southern Sudan, Joseph Lagu, was able, to an extent, to centralize power within the 
southern opposition in the late 1960s. Finally, Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001: 
18) argue that the changing patterns of authority and order caused by the translocal or 
transnational formations imperil juridical reforms that ignore such non-formal 
structures. Keen (1998: 11) reminds readers that war “ . . . is not simply a breakdown in 
a particular system, but a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and 
even protection”. It should be noted that although this was suggested as part of the “new 
wars” after the Cold War, the insurgencies in Sudan show that many of so called “new” 
features were also present in older wars. 
 
     Networks 
 
While networks have existed historically, Castells (1996, 1998) argues that they are 
increasingly important as a social reality in the globalized contemporary world. Kaldor 
(2003: 95) defines networks as “ . . . flexible, fluid . . . forms of communication and 
information exchange; mutual discussion and debate transform the way issues are 
understood and the language within which they are expressed. They represent a two-
way street . . . ”. However, the view adopted in this dissertation is similar to Knoke 
(1994) and Knoke and Burmeister-May (1990) who claim that network analysis focuses 
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on examining interactions of political power relations, influences, and domination 
among social actors, which can involve economic, social, cultural, or ideological, two-
directional flows influencing those involved, “ . . . whereby the relations are treated as 
expressing the linkages which run between agents . . . [through] . . . . qualitative 
measures of network structure” (Scott, 1991: 3). Inherent to this approach is Wright’s 
(1978) assertion that states are complex networks of institutions.  
 
When focusing on the analysis of regional and global factors in Africa from this 
perspective, the concept of marginalizing state provides a well-founded starting point. 
Contemporarily, according to Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001: 5), the kind of 
states found in Africa have become sites of overlapping interests manifested in armed 
conflict, refugee management, external intervention, political manipulation, and 
economic extraction. This is partly due to their juridical sovereignty, which can be used 
for multiple purposes in the context of their weak empirical sovereignty that allows 
internal and external manipulation. However, it must be remembered that the 
transboundary formations as alternative form of authority may coexist with the socially 
established forms of order, such as patrimonial networks or communal allegiances and 
leadership. This has been the case in the borderlands of southern Sudan with ethnic 
communities closely connected to the territories of the Central African Republic (CAR), 
DRC, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. For Nordstrom (2001: 227-9), such formations, 
similarly to states, require social institutions to function, and are therefore inherently 
social constructions organizing political and economic activities. 
 
The network approach entails a relationship involving the local, regional, and 
international. Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001) analyze transboundary formations 
that link national, regional, and global forces, through structures, networks, and 
discourses, and impacting on Africa as well as the international community. According 
to Callaghy, Kassimir, and Latham (2001: 5), “Above all, they play a major role in 
creating, transforming, and destroying forms of order and authority.” This is due to the 
inter-connections between juridical and non-juridical institutions, and hybrid formations 
that exercise political and economic power. Such could be the relationships between 
institutions and networks that transit commodities (such as arms, natural resources, or 
foreign aid) and ideas (such as human rights, neo-liberal economics, development, or 
security).  This is relevant to the case of southern Sudan where large territorial 
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extensions have remained out of central government authority for extended periods of 
time during the wars.   
   3.4. The Process of Insurgency Formation 
 
A number of studies have differentiated between types of causes of conflicts to 
understand locally, regionally, and internationally founded social, economic, and 
political forces and actors responsible for their outbreak. Sriram and Nielsen (2004) and 
Alexander and Smith (2004) have argued that there are three causal clusters related to 
armed conflicts; root or structural factors, proximate factors, and triggers. Grey-Johnson 
(2006) has further claimed that such ingredients relate to the operability of the state, 
governance, legitimacy, provision of services, and the state/citizenry relationship. 
 
However, it is argued here that violence should be viewed as a process (Kalyvas, 2006). 
It is also proposed that insurgencies need to be organized and take place in opportune 
conditions in which adequate social and material support is ensured. Such 
circumstances include local conditions such as relative lack of development and 
services, persisting violence and insecurity, emotional factors such as sentiments and 
rumors, and regional and international elements, including social, political, and 
economic extraversion and networks. Weinstein (2005) argues that insurgencies are 
organized either around material resources, resulting in less control, more atrocities, and 
less conviction, or social resources, in which norms and justice seeking cause more 
control and less atrocities. Yet, it appears that at least in the case of insurgency 
formation processes in southern Sudan both material and social resources have been 
necessary, while individual motivations to rebel have varied greatly. 
 
Equally, categorization of insurgencies (O’Neill, 1980, 1990; Clapham, 1996, 1998) is 
possibly less useful than often considered. This is because the objectives and nature of 
insurgencies are conditioned by local, regional, and international factors and realities, 
which has been clearly the case in the prolonged rebellions in southern Sudan that have 
shifted between secessionism, revolutionism, and reformism. 
 
Finally, emotional factors linked to local conditions and social inequalities are also 
significant mobilizing forces in the process of insurgency formation. As Gurr (1970) 
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posits, frustrations are likely to turn into aggression in the conditions of perceived 
relative deprivation and if the state and/or its leadership are considered illegitimate. As 
will be shown in later chapters of this dissertation, this has been the case in southern 
Sudan. For instance, Wassara (2007: 7) has argued that “Many conflicts arise from what 
parties think may happen, from their anxiety, prejudice, fear, and uncertainties, rather 
than from any phenomenon that is actually threatening”. As will be shown, identity 
politics that emerge from cultural identity perceptions (Chabal and Daloz, 2005) are 
significant in stimulating sentimental elements that have been particularly important in 
the insurgency formation processes in southern Sudan. 
 
The next section puts forward the specific research questions and hypothesis that guide 
this dissertation, which arise from the above review and discussion.  
          
4. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
The historically founded analysis introduced in this dissertation provides an attempt to 
unveil the process of insurgency formation in southern Sudan. This dissertation seeks to 
answer a number of major questions related to the emergence of insurgencies in 
southern Sudan, many of which continue to generate debate. In the process it considers 
how leadership, identities, mobilization, political and economic agendas, resources, and 
regional and international actors and forces relate to insurgency formation.  
   4.1. Main Research Questions and Hypotheses 
This dissertation has four main research questions, but it may also answer a number of 
other questions related to the insurgencies formation in southern Sudan. 
 
1. What is the role of state formation and construction processes in insurgencies 
formation in southern Sudan?  
 
Hypothesis: The theoretical framework based on the concept of “marginalizing state” 
introduced in this dissertation, involving elites, group power, and identity, provides a 
wide and permissible base for analysis. It allows capturing and highlighting the actors, 
forces, and dynamics in the process of insurgency formation in southern Sudan. This 
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dissertation shows how the history of marginalization and exclusion, together with 
sociocultural subjugation (slavery and social hierarchy) leading to “internal 
colonialism”, poverty, and underdevelopment, are paramount to the understanding of 
the emergence of insurgencies in southern Sudan.  
 
2. How do the historical, socially, economically, and politically (re)constructed, 
“Arab Muslim” and “African” identities portray differences between the 
“North” and the “South” in Sudan? 
 
Hypothesis: It appears that these identity categories are products of historical processes 
and founded, on the one hand, on propagation of a perceived superiority of Arab culture 
and Islam. On the other hand, they are based on the resistance to the legacy of slavery 
and Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy. Their importance as an identity 
cleavage has been highlighted periodically through (re)construction and reinforcement 
during political instability and violence, while in more peaceful periods they have been 
less controversial in generating divisions. This will be analyzed to disprove the idea of 
incompatible, static, primordial, and inherently conflictive identities in Sudan. 
 
3. How have external (international and regional) factors influenced state 
formation in Sudan and the insurgencies formation processes in southern 
Sudan? 
 
Hypothesis: Internal and external (international and regional) actors, forces, and 
dynamics have influenced state construction and the processes of insurgency formation 
in southern Sudan. This refutes the claim of some prominent africanists (Clapham, 
1996; Chabal and Daloz, 1999) that the origins of insurgencies in Africa are inherently 
internal and that regional and international actors and forces come into play only after 
the conflict has been triggered. This aspect has been left with less emphasis in the 
historical literature on southern Sudanese insurgencies, which tend to promote domestic 
explanations based on broad categorical descriptions such as “northerners” and 
“southerners”. This has obscured the elite agency behind domination and insurgency 
formation. 
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4. Why did the process of de-colonization and the conditions in the early 1980s 
lead to insurgencies in southern Sudan and not in other areas of the Sudanese 
state periphery? Was the second insurgency merely a continuation of the first? 
 
Hypothesis: The historical record of southern Sudan and its peoples’ relation to the 
Arabized Muslim dominated societies in north-central Sudan differs from that of other 
peripheries. This explains the emergence of insurgencies against the Arabized Muslim 
dominated state particularly in southern Sudan. The question of timing of the 
insurgencies remains debated with some authors arguing that the origins of the first 
insurgency owe to the 1955 southern disturbances (Eprile, 1974), while others (Chan, 
and Zuor, 2006) consider the insurgency as being a result of the formal establishment of 
the Anya Nya armed opposition movement in the early 1960s. Although there is less 
controversy on the eruption of the second insurgency, it could be considered to have 
begun already by the mid-1970s. At least to this extent the second rebellion relates to 
the first, but it also has other elements, such as the leadership, that relates it to the first. 
Finally, some prominent historians (Holt, 1961; Daly, 1991, 1993, Collins, 2005, 2008) 
have described the first southern insurgency as inevitable, but this assertion has also 
been questioned in this research as it appears to obscure colonial responsibility.  
 
   4.2. Main Contributions of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation contributes to the scholarship on insurgencies in southern Sudan in the 
following ways (A-D): 
 
A) It shows that the insurgencies in southern Sudan were a result of a combination of 
particular historical processes. Southern provinces were marginally incorporated to the 
Sudanese state as peripheral areas whose relationship with centralized rule has been 
characterized by different type of violent domination, slave trade, coercion, and 
subjugation than in other peripheral territories. These dynamics along with the colonial 
policy of separation gave rise to a politically conscious elite in southern Sudan, 
projecting regional political identity in contrast to the perceived hegemony and 
domination of the Arabized governing elite. The dissertation shows how state formation 
in Sudan led to the “marginalizing state” in the hands of a narrow exclusive elite, and 
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how colonial legacy and elite projects led to the construction of the “Arab-Muslim 
North” and the “African South” despite the immense heterogeneity of each region.   
 
B) This dissertation also highlights the resistance to the Arabized elite dominated 
“marginalizing state” and its policies in the insurgencies formation in southern Sudan. It 
points out how the de-colonization process dictated by external (regional and 
international) factors led to the first southern insurgency and rising antagonism in terms 
of identity polarization along the constructed “Arab” vs. “African” rift that consolidated 
the rebellion. The dissertation also shows how the second insurgency incubated in the 
course of the 1970s in conditions of economic deterioration and became a full-scale 
rebellion by the mid-1980s with external factors again being significant. Thus, this 
dissertation shows that the periodical (re)construction and reinforcement of essentially 
continually changing identity cleavages, not broad and rigid identity categories such as 
“African southerner” or “Arab northerner”, were important factors in the origins and 
development of the insurgencies. It also demonstrates how regional and international 
actors and forces played an important role in the insurgency formation processes and 
beyond.     
 
C) Moreover, this dissertation adds to the debate on the timing and inevitability of the 
insurgencies, and highlights the emotional elements (collective sentiments and feelings) 
in their formation. Although the casualty accounts prior to the early 1960s might not 
have been very high, the antagonism of many southerners had resulted in low level 
violence that had a destabilizing effect already after 1955. Thus, it is argued here that 
the first insurgency in southern Sudan could be considered to have begun already in the 
late 1950s. In the case of the second insurgency, the deteriorating conditions in southern 
Sudan in the mid-1970s gave rise to the Anya Nya II activity that initiated violent anti-
government activity. This could be considered to have marked the beginning of the 
second insurgency. Although many prominent authors claim that the insurgencies in 
southern Sudan were inevitable due to primordial “North-South” incompatibilities, it is 
argued here that, since identities are constructed and changing, the conflicts took place 
instead principally in response to the exclusionary policies, dynamics and logic of the 
marginalizing state. 
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D) Finally, the dissertation shows that the state construction and insurgency formation 
processes in southern Sudan consisted of a complex interplay of factors in which 
historical, political, economic, social, and cultural determinants in the local and external 
(regional and international) context provided conditions conducive to rebellions. While 
the second insurgency was to an extent a continuation of the first, it took place in a 
slightly different political and economic domestic and external panorama. The 
emotional factors demonstrating general antagonism towards the state and its ruling 
elite were similar in both occasions in responding to exclusive governance, 
marginalization, and oppressive policies. The limitations of the historical literature that 
uses broad categorizations, such as “northerners” and “southerners”, and deterministic 
explanations on causes of war in southern Sudan are deconstructed to highlight the elite 
agency in domination and the process of insurgency formation.    
 
 5. Conclusion 
 
The theoretical considerations presented in this introductory chapter are used in the 
following parts of this dissertation. The subsequent chapters seek to highlight the 
processes of state formation and building, identity (re)construction and reinforcement, 
marginalization and related sentiments, accommodation and resistance, and external 
regional and international factors, all related to insurgencies formation. The final 
chapter provides the general conclusions and seeks to answer the research questions by 
using the evidence encountered during the research process. 
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Chapter II. Forging Contemporary Sudan: Historical Background 
 
1. Introduction 
  
This chapter sheds light beyond disciplinary boundaries that may obstruct 
comprehensive conflict analysis by highlighting the importance of the historical 
background that has shaped political, economic, and social trajectories in Sudan. It 
demonstrates how long-term social conditions, the foundations of marginalization, 
manifested politically and economically, are a product of historical processes of long 
duration and became key factors in conflict in post-colonial Sudan. Two enduring 
products of this particular history are how political identities are constructed in the local 
context and how a particular type of marginalizing polity was formed. In this, 
considering the creation of marginalization through identities, with the legacy of 
slavery50 as an integral par, is important. It is argued here that the emergence of a 
marginalizing polity took place as a result of an early state formation process in which 
previously dominant social legacies prevailed. This way, the pre-existing ethnically and 
culturally founded “Arab”-Muslim51 elite-dominated social hierarchy was adopted as a 
leading force organizing the newly founded polity in the 19th century by incorporating 
smaller political entities in the region. It has continued to serve dominant elites to 
influence construction and transformation of ethnic and regional collective political 
identities and mobilization against the “other”. In the construction of the “center” and 
the “periphery”, and “northern” and “southern” Sudan,52 the domination of the leading 
part of the central “Arab”-Muslim elite played an important part in establishing an 
ethno-cultural hierarchy that has since deprived many of the peoples in the margins of 
“northern” Sudan of claims to political power and resources, and those from “southern” 
Sudan of equal social standing and treatment due to the living legacy of slavery. It is 
shown in this chapter that these structural forces have served as long-term preconditions 
to the discord between the “Arab”-Muslim power-elite and dominant sectors of 
“southern” leadership, contributing to the emergence of armed conflict in the “southern” 
                                                 
50
 On the long history of slavery in Sudan see for instance Sikainga (1996), Collins (1992), Fluehr-
Lobban and Rhodes (2004), O’Fahey (1973), and Segal (2002). 
51
 For more discussion on this identity category see the following section. 
52
 In this dissertation a constructivist position is adopted deeming regional categories (center-periphery 
and north-south) as constructed or created largely through extension of identity discourses of dominant 
elites. 
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Sudan. Yet, this is not to suggest that such conditions are unchanging, but rather 
constructed as part of changing political identity discourses. 
 
Social legacies that derive from historical trajectories tend to be significant to the 
origins of insurgencies. In the case of Sudan, Deng (1995a, 1995b) and Lesch (1998) 
among others argue that in the long-term the origins of “southern” insurgencies are 
embedded in the construction of identities locally that draw from responses to social 
institutions aimed at gaining and maintaining the political power of one group over 
others by reconstructing and reinforcing the ethnically and culturally defined “Arab”-
Muslim domination to create a hierarchical and stratified society. In a similar tone, de 
Chand (2000: 25) and Jok (2001, 2007) have pointed out that slavery, as a particular 
age-old institution predating Islam, provided historically founded legitimacy to create 
the structural conditions needed for such domination and subjugation to endure in the 
process of creating the Sudanese polity. The dynamics involved in these processes were 
not inherently local but also regional and international, fomenting social, political, and 
economic marginalization locally. All these dynamics are important because they 
demonstrate how the sentiment of fear and resistance to domination and slavery in 
“southern” territories became important identity elements in response to 
institutionalized marginalization, and form part of the constructed “southern” political 
identity that developed as a response to north-central “Arab”-Muslim elite domination 
in and from “northern” areas.   
 
2. Arabization and Islamization in the Region 
 
Historical processes have been essential in shaping the social organization of the 
heterogeneous populations of bilad as-Sudan (the land of the blacks). In the course of 
the 19th century these were incorporated into the polity that emerged in the region. In 
this section reference is made to those social processes that the author considers as 
being significantly linked to the emerging identities and social power relations related to 
Arab culture and Islam and, consequently, dictating social organization of the 
marginalizing polity. Important in this is the concept of cultural superiority and the 
establishment of a particular social hierarchy dominated by sectors of elites of the later 
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self-proclaimed awlad al-balad (worthy sons of the land)53, genetically mixed peoples 
claiming superior Arab ancestry, to exclude others from equal social standing (Jok, 
2001, 2007; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 20-2). Emphasis is put on how Arabization and 
Islamization affected social relations and organization and what took place southwards 
of its sphere of influence in the area of contemporary southern Sudan.    
 
     Arabization and Islamization 
 
The historical processes of Arabization and Islamization have been essential in the 
formation of the social fabric of the Nile riverine region. This way, they have been 
relevant to the construction of the idea of “northern” Sudan,54 a loose entity of highly 
heterogeneous populations with Islam and Arab culture as its major homogenizing 
forces. These have been an essential part of social organization, including ideologies 
that fabricate historical narratives of Arab conquests to aggrandize Arab culture and 
Islam as its driving force. In Sudan, such narratives are founded largely on the Arab 
conquest of Egypt and the following Arab migrations and takeovers southwards (Iyob 
and Khadiagala, 2006: 19-20). 
 
One generation after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, Muslim armies invaded 
Africa. The region that later came to be known as “northern” Sudan was slowly annexed 
to Islam’s sphere of influence through the gradual movement of nomadic Arab groups 
southwards in search of a more fertile environment, often intermarrying with locals. 
This produced mixed Arabized frontier communities that at times had to pay tribute the 
dominant local groups before slowly being absorbed into society (Holt, 1961: 17; 
                                                 
53
 According to an elderly merchant anonymously interviewed on 29 September 2008 in Juba, the idea of 
awlad al-balad was adopted by the “fathers” to claim socially prominent position. Adam, Bartlett and 
Nour (2009: 7) assert that Shaiqiyyah and Jaaliyyin are often considered awlad al-balad and further 
explain: 
The term awlad albalad was invented in early 1880s when the Mahdi chose Khalifa Abdullahi 
from Darfur to be his successor which outraged his cousins who came out with the term to 
explain that they had more right than the gharrabi (western Sudanese for male) for the position 
of his first deputy. The term has become as a signifier of exclusion ever since. It has been used 
[sic] northern Sudanese to exclude the non-northern Sudanese Muslims from other parts of the 
country including even the non-northern Sudanese Arabs. Of course Christians and adherents of 
traditional African believe [sic] systems are automatically pushed away through Islamic 
discourse. 
54
 The constructed concept of “northern” Sudan refers to Islamized and to an extent Arabized areas of 
Sudan, encompassing the central riverine Nile region, Darfur, far northern territory (Nubia), and the Red 
Sea region in eastern Sudan, Kassala, and Kordofan. They are all predominantly Muslim with parts of 
local populations Arabized in terms of culture. However, there are a number of smaller areas within 
“northern” Sudan, such as the Nuba Mountains, which are far less Arabized and less Islamized.  
78        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Henze, 1991: 25; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 22). Gradually, sectors of Arabized 
sections gained prominence in these communities, often due to their position as affluent 
traders, and by engaging in propagation of the superiority of their religious culture 
transmitted to other sectors of the population. This made them desired husbands for 
Nubian and other women, while the Arabized Muslim women could not marry non-
Muslims (Mazrui, 1973: 72-3; Deng, 1995b: 80). The patriarchal system contrasted with 
the Nubian matriarchal structure and fostered prominence of the Arabized stock which 
based its claims for social adherence to Islam (‘Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 135-6; Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 22). While the influence of the Arabized nomads continued moving 
southwards along the Nile, another migratory movement arrived in the Red Sea region, 
fusing the institutions of local Beja peoples with increasingly Arabized communities, 
and giving further impetus to the Arabization of the Red Sea area (Hasan, 2003: 14; 
Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 23). However, some of the arriving Arabized peoples also 
adopted aspects of Nilotic cultures, particularly in the southern fringes of Arab and 
Islamic influence. For instance, Arabized Baggara cattle-herding nomads became semi-
sedentary, mixing with the neighboring populations, and replacing the camel with the 
bull as their main livelihood (‘Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 236-7). Still, they continued to use 
Arabic, “ . . . a conquering language . . . in its very pride tending towards ultimate 
triumph” (Mazrui, 1973: 73). This evidence shows the growing importance of claims to 
Arab identity through Islam and culture to indicate prominent social status.     
 
Military campaigns occasionally accompanied migration. This together with 
intermixing allowed the gradual submission of Nubian Christian kingdoms to a social 
order dominated by claims to Arabhood (Holt, 1961: 16-8). Southwards was the Funj 
kingdom, with its capital founded in 1504 in Sennar, and which despite early opposition 
to incoming influences adopted over time Arab language, customs, Islam, and status as 
a sultanate (Holt, 1961: 19; Henze, 1991: 25; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 23). It became 
the largest political entity in the central Sudanese Nile valley, but was never able to 
subdue Darfur or smaller chieftaincies and was in sharp decline upon the arrival of the 
invading forces of Muhammad Ali in the 1820s (Holt, 1961: 20-3; Collins, 1962: 8). 
The Funj society was based on three classes; the nobility, the subjects, and the slaves, 
with the nobility subordinating the other groups that provided labor and paid tribute, 
society being governed through customary laws, legal and property rights, and marriage 
(Spaulding, 1985: 75-7; Sikainga, 1996: 2). Smaller chieftaincies along the Nile, such as 
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the Jaaliyyin in Shendi, Nubians in Dongola, and in the course of 16th century the 
Shaigiyyah around Kurti, resisted the Funj, the latter carving gradually away the 
territory of the declining Funj sultanate (Holt, 1961: 20; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 
23).    
 
Similarly, Darfur had experienced attempts at centralized administration by the 13th 
century. However, the first historical records from the 17th century show the Keira 
dynasty of the clan of the Fur, having claimed Arab ancestry and becoming largely 
responsible for the Islamization of the region (Holt, 1961: 25-6; LOC, 1991). This is 
why the region bears the name Dar Fur, “Land of the Fur” (Abdul-Jalil, 2006: 22). The 
Keira dynasty ruled Darfur and annexed Kordofan until the 19th century. The golden age 
of the sultanate was in the latter 18th century when the centuries old caravan trade route, 
darb al-arba’in (forty days’ road), revived and linked the area to the Ottoman Empire.  
However, after the turn of the century the Keira dynasty was in decline, which allowed 
Ali’s Ottoman forces to invade Kordofan in 1821 and conquer Darfur in 1874 (Holt, 
1961: 27-8). In the 1880s, the Keira dynasty retook its rule over Darfur, only to be 
deposed permanently in 1916 by the Anglo-Egyptian colonial forces.  
 
The conquests of the sultanates in the abovementioned “northern” areas of 
contemporary Sudan were important because they buttressed the social organization 
centered on the adherence to Arab culture and Islam as identity pillars of the powerful 
conqueror. Thus, Arabism was identified with social superiority and Islamization 
provided a pretext for the conquest of “inferior” societies. As a result, “Arabization 
produced hybrid communities that identified more with the Arab culture and social 
structures and relegated their African/indigenous identities to a secondary tier” (Iyob 
and Khadiagala, 2006: 25), while claims to Arab origins, despite the genetically mixed 
ancestry, legitimized the claim to be descendent of Prophet Muhammad that resulted in 
the prominent role of religion in these societies (Lusk, 2005). Thus, Islamization 
accompanied Arabization and linked Islamized but less Arabized populations loosely 
with the Arabized stock, but it was also a process of missionary activity that divided 
northern Sudan into zones of influence of a number of distinct Sufi55 orders, giving rise 
                                                 
55
 Sufi refers to a particular type of Islam in which mysticism and diverse rituals emphasize the love for 
fellow men and a personal relationship with God, Allah. Sufism has been at times considered 
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to a particular sectarian social stratification (‘Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 239; Iyob and 
Khadiagala, 2006: 24-5). Originating during Funj dynasty, Sufi leaders exploited 
differences between each other to establish their own followings and extend their 
influence. This converted Sufism into a mass movement under the patronage of distinct 
headmen that created “A new transethnic and transterritorial identity . . . that countered 
the geographically and ethnically based kinship systems that guided the rules and norms 
of economic and political exchanges” (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 24-5). The strategies 
of conquest and peaceful propagation can be considered to have promoted a degree of 
perceived cultural similarity in the “northern” areas as opposed to regions where the 
influence of Arab culture and Islam did not reach.     
 
As in the Sahelian belt in general, claims to Arab identity linked to Islam became over 
time inextricably associated with power (Bayart, 1993: 24) in the sultanates and 
chieftaincies of “northern” Sudan. As a result, “Arab” and Muslim identity became 
increasingly inseparable as identity manifestations, particularly among the riverine 
groups, linking the fabrication of genealogic Arab origins and adherence to Islam with 
political and economic power (Johnson, 2006: 95). This led to a highly hierarchical and 
exclusionary form of social organization, which Deng (1995a: 369-400, 484-5) has 
argued to be based on “social race”, mainly defined in terms of Arabic culture, 
language, and Islam, and claiming superiority over non-Arabized and/or non-Islamized 
groups. This has made exclusion in terms of defining access to social eminence and 
power of the majority deemed as non-“Arabs”, “almost a racial issue”.56 The processes 
of Arabization and Islamization continue to be of relevance as the most powerful 
sections of the governing elite have used them deliberately as part of their coercive 
nation-building project (Woodward, 1997: 98). This became a factor in the two large-
scale insurgencies commonly described as “southern”, which have taken place since de-
colonization, because the vision of “Arab” and “Muslim” nation was challenged by part 
of the political, economic, and military elite in southern Sudan. 
  
                                                                                                                                               
inappropriate or even impure by some advocates of orthodox Islam since there exist Sufi orders that are 
only remotely linked to orthodox Islam. Some claim that Sufism even predates Islam. 
56
 Based on an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese on 24 September 2008 in Juba. “Almost 
racial” here refers to Deng’s concept, not race per se. It should be noted that many Islamized peoples in 
peripheral Sudan, such as the Beja in the east, the Fur in the west, and the Nuba in the southern fringes of 
“northern” Sudan, remain less Arabized even after adopting Islam, and feel more empowered by 
preserving their traditions in their local contexts. 
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Given that many peoples in the contemporary Sudanese periphery do not consider 
themselves Arab, many of them often find politically induced efforts of Arabization 
offensive.57 Rather, local elites in the periphery who perceive themselves as culturally 
different have reinforced and utilized such sentiment to maintain resistance, in part 
because Arabization and Islamization would threaten their own position of power. The 
author considers this important because it has led to the marginalization of resistant 
populations in the structures of the contemporary Sudanese polity by the dominant 
riverine “Arab”-Muslim elites holding political and economic power. 
 
A. Extent of Arabization in Contemporary Sudan in Terms of Language 
 
 
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica (2000) 
 
                                                 
57
 One such area is the Nuba Mountains in southern Kordofan which has been subjected to Arab and 
Islamic influences for centuries. “Arab” identity has not grown deep roots in the area for a number of 
reasons; violence and the legacy of slavery being among the most important ones, and generating 
resistance. In Darfur, the term “Arab” has often been an insult to nomads (Lusk, 2005). 
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Finally, partly because of the strong appeal of Arab identity due to its association with 
political and economic power, it is not uncommon that some individuals, elites, and 
communities from the margins of the “Arab” and Islamic influence in Sudan, have 
praised, adopted, or maintained such historically acquired cultural features. However, 
this type of accommodation applies only partially to the periphery of northern Sudan 
and is particularly scarce in southern Sudan where most people reject “Arab” and 
Islamic influences out of loyalty to their local cultures and the historic tradition of 
resistance to Arabization and Islamization. Yet, it is also important to note that the lack 
of wholesale Arabization and Islamization also makes “northern” Sudan a highly 
heterogeneous area with a number of different cultural traditions that have been affected 
by Islamization and Arabization in various degrees (Beswick, 1994). 
 
   Southwards of the Arabic and Islamic Influence 
 
The southward expansion Arabization and Islamization was limited. For instance, 
during the Funj dynasty, Arabized and Islamized mixed Arab-Nubian peoples of 
“northern” Sudan, mainly Juhayna and Jaaliyyin of which many were traders, extended 
Arabization and Islamization to today’s Kordofan, but peoples of such frontier areas of 
what is contemporary “northern” Sudan often preserved an array of indigenous cultures 
(Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 25-6). This is because in many such areas Arab culture and 
Islam were not considered superior to the local cultures and resisted by powerful 
sections of the local societies. 
  
In addition, Arabization and Islamization hardly extended southwards of the 13th 
parallel as “the areas later known as southern Sudan proved geographically inhospitable 
and populated by resistant communities” (Woodward, 1997: 96). Only small parts of 
this area came in contact with Islam in the 19th century, and there was interest in 
perceiving the local populations as pagan, rather than Islamize them, so they could be 
legitimately enslaved (Gray, 1961: 34, 46, 140-1, 143-4; Deng, 1995b: 80). For 
instance, in approximately 1750-1850, the area what is currently South Kordofan in the 
southern margin of what is contemporary “northern” Sudan was one of the main origins 
of slaves raided both officially and privately (Spaulding, 2006: 401-2). According to 
Spaulding (2006: 401) the slave-raiding “ . . . generated in South Kordofan a permanent 
state of institutionalized insecurity that distinguished all southern regions from other 
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provinces . . . ”, since their relationship with the north-central Sudan was through slave 
and cattle raiding expeditions or to extract ivory and other resources (Rolandsen, 2005: 
23). Such a permanent state of insecurity persisted, undermined traditional social 
organization of the affected societies, and fomented violence. 
   
B. Ethnic Map of Sudan 
 
Source: Marc Lavergne, ed. Le Soudan Contemporain  
(Paris: Lermoc/Karthala, 1989) 
 
Further south, in the region that during the later Anglo-Egyptian colonial period became 
known as southern Sudan, the Nilotic Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk, and the Sudanic Azande 
had grown dominant after the great migratory currents that took place in Central Africa 
in the course of earlier centuries. Beswick (1994) has shown that their northernmost 
populations had been only marginally influenced by Islamization and Arabization, and 
resistance to these cultural influences was championed through claims own cultural 
superiority. For the most part, these groups had entered today’s southern Sudan by the 
10th century, except the Azande, who are estimated to have arrived in the area as late as 
the 18th century (Hasan, 2003: 100). The Azande, prevalent in the west of the 
southernmost Equatoria region in southern Sudan, created a loose confederation of 
84        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
smaller populations, based on homesteads and adaptable agriculture, which provided a 
basis for tax collection and legal structures to support administrative cohesiveness, 
cooperation in warfare, and the Azande warrior culture (Gray, 1961: 15; Collins, 1962: 
7; Hasan, 2003: 100-1; Rolandsen, 2005: 23). 
 
On the other hand, the Nilotic Dinka, Shilluk, and Nuer peoples generally settled in 
more northern areas, from today’s Bahr al-Ghazal to the White Nile, and had therefore 
more contacts with the Funj and Keira sultanates north of them, and with the Abyssinian 
kingdom to the east. The Dinka and Nuer are predominantly pastoral peoples, both with 
an important warrior tradition, and adapted to the geographical particularities of Bahr 
al-Ghazal. Cattle are their most important possessions and play an overwhelming part in 
their economic, social, and religious life (Gray, 1961: 11). While the Dinka are mostly 
found in what is known today as the “southern” Sudan, the Nuer inhabit lands from the 
contemporary northeastern “southern” Sudan to western Ethiopia.58 The Shilluk, living 
near Malakal, are traditionally more sedentary with agriculture and fishing previously 
forming a significant part of their livelihoods. This facilitated the construction of 
hierarchically structured kingdom, based on royalty, nobles, commoners, and slaves, 
that gradually disintegrated, as the Shilluk put more emphasis on cattle-raising. Despite 
their common Nilotic origin, different ethnic traditions emerged among these diverse 
populations in the course of three major migrations due to overpopulation, overstocking, 
and external factors (Hasan, 2003: 102). Each group divided into distinct subgroups and 
chieftaincies, forming loose confederations of number of small resistant populations that 
managed to uphold their common culture, language, and religion despite foreign 
influences and occasional feuds between the subgroups (Collins, 1962: 5; Hasan, 2003: 
102; Rolandsen, 2005: 23).  
 
In general, the Nilotics have strong cultural traditions and have created social 
institutions that enabled them to absorb other populations in their areas of settlement. 
Generally, they account for a patrilineal system, as does the Arab culture, coupled with 
a warrior tradition that regards highly those individuals involved in military activities 
                                                 
58
 For instance, Nuer spiritual leaders had a historical network of relationships extending to Ethiopia. 
According to Johnson (1986), the Nuer have also historically formed the western “Nilotic frontier” of 
imperial Ethiopia. 
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(Mazrui, 1973: 72; Hutchinson, 1996).59 In addition, the Shilluk kingdom of Fashoda 
developed a centralized administration system that was able to establish itself in the 
vicinity of the Funj sultanate, and possibly influencing it, before having to give way to 
the advancing encroachment from the north (Collins, 1962: 4; Hasan, 2003: 104-5). Yet, 
the strength of the Nilotic cultures and belief systems is manifested in their resistance to 
Islam despite its geographic proximity (Beswick, 1994: 172-85).  
 
It is important to consider the extent of success of this resistance as part of identity 
formation. It was largely based on strong Nilotic cultural traditions and effective 
military power, which allowed the Nilotics to become the main ethnic super group in 
the area of today’s “southern” Sudan. This is significant because it contributes to the 
conflict between the Arabization and Islamization influences that have penetrated the 
Arabized populations of “northern” Sudan, and the Nilotic and other populations in 
“southern” Sudan, highlighting local traditions partly in contrast to influences from the 
north.     
 
Over the centuries, the main groups of Nilotics became increasingly dominant in the 
areas south of the Funj and Keira, except in Equatoria where the Bari living around 
Gondokoro-Rejaf-Juba area and the Azande, extending into the today’s DRC and the 
CAR, are significant. However, the southern communities remained largely divided 
along ethnic and clan affiliations within their larger group agglomerations, which was 
exploited by external actors from north and gradually allowed influences arriving from 
north to gain a foothold in the region (Gray, 1961: 10). 
 
A number of these local societies had contacts with Darfur, Kordofan, the Funj and the 
Keira sultanates, and southwest Ethiopia already before the 19th century. For instance, 
the Shilluk influence on the Funj sultanate was such that it has affected the debate 
concerning the mystical origins of the Funj. Hasan (2003: 105-6) asserts that what 
seems most likely is that many of the Funj were a mix of Arab, Nilotic, and local 
ancestry with cultural and linguistic affinities with the Shilluk. Although the Shilluk 
often raided the Funj communities, they also collaborated in the face of a common 
                                                 
59
 This tradition has made army, police, and other occupations related to security locally respected 
professions, encouraging many young men to join the state’s security apparatus or rebel organizations 
during insurgencies. The extent of militarization of southern societies is also somewhat related to this. 
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enemy, such as powerful Dinka societies which sought to expand to the White Nile 
region (Hasan, 2003: 107). This provides evidence of cooperation and accommodation 
between distinct groups in the face of common threats and refutes the existence of 
primordial identity incompatibilities.   
 
3. Insertion of the Region in International Networks of Slave Economy 
 
This section seeks to elucidate regional and international elements in the foundations of 
marginalization. In this process the international slave economy to which kingdoms and 
sultanates in the region contributed was important. These foundations were deeply 
involved in the processes that led to the institutionalization and consolidation of the 
marginalizing political and socio-economic system inherited by the Sudanese polity. 
 
     Slave Economy Prior to 19th Century  
 
Agriculture and commerce were the principal economic activities in the region that 
became Sudan for centuries, and still occupy an important role in its economy today. 
This is because apart from the sedentary agriculturalists of the Nile valley, the 
remaining nomadic and semi-nomadic population generally depended on trade, hunting, 
gathering, and selling natural products to traders and caravan-owners (Ahmad, 1977: 
31-9). Long distance trade to Egypt was conducted through three principal trade routes. 
Caravans, which reached up to 5,000 travelers, exchanged slaves, ivory feathers, gold, 
vegetables, and minerals for textiles, metals, hardware, beads, semi-precious materials, 
and firearms, as they made their way to Asyut in Egypt (Walz, 1978: 29ff). 
 
In the 16th and 17th centuries the local kingdoms exercised administered trade 
monopolized around the ruler. During this time slaves became one of the main export 
articles (Niblock, 1987: 3). Darb al-arba’in was among the main caravan routes 
connecting southern Sahelian Africa to North Africa and the southern frontier of 
Arabized territory of what is contemporary Sudan to Egypt through Darfur. Most 
caravans were destined to Ottoman Egypt. For instance, the Funj sultanate exported 
gold and slaves captured from the southern periphery among other articles, and the 
Keira sultanate also exported slaves along with other products (O’Fahey and Spaulding, 
1974: 55-56).  
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The raiding of slaves, together with the extraction of other resources, affected the 
southern frontier of the two sultanates, which later depleted populations from the Nuba 
Mountains to the Ethiopian borderlands (Niblock, 1987: 3). While by the 19th century 
this required a southward expansion to submit new areas to extraction of slaves and 
other trade commodities, it is important to note that the raids had a devastating effect on 
local communities in which the prolonged sentiment of animosity and resistance 
became an important identity component.  
 
Indeed, this was not in a sense coming together in equal terms. Rather, much like the 
Europeans in the Americas, the Arabized merchants bribed locals by introducing 
unknown items and articles in exchange for slaves and other articles. This relationship 
was largely limited to commercial exchanges with the Arabized merchants primarily 
interested in the local resources and did not promote general cultural understanding or 
accommodation by either side due to the socially hierarchic perceptions that regarded 
the “other” as inferior.60     
 
Slavery had existed in Sudan long before the arrival of Islam. The frontier of the slave 
extraction shifted southwards throughout the centuries when first the Nubians raided 
central Sudan, then the Funj sultanate in central Sudan enslaved Nilotic peoples around 
Gezira, and finally certain Arabized riverine groups and the Baggara engaged in slave-
raiding in the northern margins the of area of contemporary southern Sudan (Beswick, 
2004: 201). However, Islam brought with it another social context in which slavery was 
institutionalized and, importantly, all non-Muslim peoples were now potentially subject 
to slavery. This is considered in this dissertation as a crucial factor in establishing a 
social hierarchy of which marginalization became an inextricable part. 
 
Commercial networks extended between what was to be the “southern” Sudan and the 
areas north of it before the 19th century. For instance, the Shilluk established trade ties 
with the Funj through the Nuba Mountains, while sectors of the Dinka often supplied 
slaves for the Funj markets (Hasan, 2003: 107-8). In the course of the 18th century, 
commercial contacts between the Keira sultanate and the communities southwards 
appear to have also grown in importance. At the time, some nomadic Arabized groups 
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 Based on an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese (24 September 2008 in Juba), who also 
claimed that these Arabized merchants introduced articles such as ice and mirrors in the region. 
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and Nilotics had settled in southern Kordofan and Darfur to herd animals. However, in 
part due to the ecological conditions, but also because of Nilotic cultural influences, 
they substituted camel herding for cattle breeding and became mixed Arabized peoples 
known as the Baggara, the cow herders. In near proximity, groups of Baggara and 
Dinka coexisted and exchanged goods while competing for grazing areas, which led to 
periodic ethnic hostility (Hasan, 2003: 198-9; Beswick, 2004: 220). By the 19th century, 
the Nilotic expansion from the areas southwards menaced fringe Muslim territories, 
particularly around the southern frontier of the declining Funj sultanate. It was largely 
Nilotic influence that penetrated these societies to an extent that the impact of Islam and 
Arabization remained almost inexistent in the southern areas until the period of 
domination in the 19th and 20th century (Hasan, 2003: 109). 
 
     Impact of 19th Century Slave Economy 
 
During the 19th century centralized administration established during the Egyptian 
domination improved the security situation and stimulated trade. This facilitated 
construction of enhanced communications infrastructure including the telegraph, which 
in turn encouraged increasing commercial activity and shipment of goods along the Nile 
using the railroad that connected Wadi Halfa with Lower Egypt, and through Red Sea 
port of Sawakin (Holt, 1961: 72-4; Niblock, 1987: 7-8).61 This enabled an increasing 
movement of merchandise and ideas. 
 
Moreover, reinvigorated traditional trade routes served as commercial networks 
connecting the southern territories with regional and international markets through 
northern parts of the Turkiyyah. According to Alier (1990: 12), “ . . . military and 
commercial networks were expanded throughout the South by both Northern Sudanese 
and Turco-Egyptian officials, sometimes working in competition, but often working in 
conjunction with each other”. Particularly in Western Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur, old 
                                                 
61
 The growth of trade also had other effects and was accompanied by other economic developments. 
First, it facilitated the expansion of the Turkiyyah to Darfur since the commercial activities in Bahr al-
Ghazal in the southern frontier deprived the Keira sultanate of its resource base, contributing to its demise 
in 1874 (Niblock, 1987: 10). Second, expansion of demand for confectionary items and paper in Europe 
provided an incentive for a rapid increase of gum arabic production, particularly in the El Obeid region in 
south-central area of Kordofan, linking local economy with the world market. Other economic 
developments included the spread of private ownership of land in riverine Sudan and wider circulation of 
liquid currency (Niblock, 1987: 10). These economic developments also advanced a capitalist mode of 
production in which southern captives provided the main labor. 
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slave caravan routes re-flourished momentarily because these large areas were virtually 
controlled by slave lords as private entrepreneurs acting outside the government control 
and sending captives through the remote routes northwards (Björkelo, 1989: 123-4, 142-
3). This continued despite the administration’s later efforts to suppress that slave trade, 
particularly in the 1870s (Alier, 1990: 12). 
 
Progressively, during the period 1825-38 a government monopoly that dictated the 
exportation of a wide array of commodities to Egypt was put in place. It extended to 
products such as indigo, gum arabic, ivory, and feathers, and coinciding with the 
increasing trade in slaves, cattle, and hides (Hill, 1959: 49; Holt, 1961: 64; Ibrahim, 
2000: 5). Although this hindered trade to Egypt, internal trade flourished, contributing 
to the growth of Khartoum as a commercial center with 30-40,000 inhabitants by 1860 
(Björkelo, 1989: 114-6; Tiyambe Zeleza, 1993: 300). Also, traditional overland trade 
routes that linked Kordofan and Darfur to the Nile revitalized (Björkelo, 1984: 90-1). 
This led to economic opportunities, from which peoples of other areas less involved 
with the centralized administration were largely deprived. 
 
When government monopoly was loosened by mid-1800s under European pressure, 
some traders found ways to collaborate with the administration and gradually 
established themselves as the merchant class, the jallaba.62 The jallaba were a mix of 
mostly north-central riverine Sudanese who abandoned agriculture mostly in an attempt 
to escape heavy taxation, and made their way increasingly to the southern frontier to 
trade and seek fortunes. Rumors of southern riches stimulated such migration as slaves 
and ivory were viewed as profitable articles for trade (Warburg, 2003: 7), which blinded 
any attempts at understanding southern cultures.63 However, the loosening of the 
monopoly resulted in an influx of European traders who brought with them large 
companies, which in turn assumed a paramount role in local and import-export 
commerce, including in slave and ivory trade, while European administrators, consuls, 
and adventurers arrived as well (Muhammad Ali, 1972: 3-21; Tignor, 1987: 181; 
Björkelo, 1989: 118). This shows the importance of European influence in 
administering Egypt, which also stimulated European presence in Turkiyyah.  
                                                 
62
 The jallaba refers to the Arabic word jallab, which in this context means the one who “brings slaves”. 
See Ibrahim (2000: 8) for more. 
63
 This argument surfaces continuously in the “north-south” relations in Sudan. “Northerners” continue to 
be criticized for their limited understanding of the “southern” Sudan even today.  
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After the end of government monopoly, commercial raiding parties extracted ivory and 
captured slaves from the southern frontier. Despite the 1854 ban on selling slaves to 
Egypt pushed through by the abolitionist movement in Europe, and counter raids by the 
locals such as some Dinka, on Arabized frontier communities, the trade continued to 
flourish and slaves were exported to the Arabian Peninsula where there was a 
continuous demand (Niblock, 1987: 9; Ibrahim, 2000: 6). Referring to the southern 
frontier, Gray (1961: 46) asserts that  
It was the decision and actions of European traders which inaugurated and 
intensified conflict, and although the search for ivory continued to be the 
dominant purpose of their activity, it became ever more closely bound to the 
extension of violence and the capture of slaves.  
The European merchants remained prominent in Sudanese trade until the 1870s when 
the Egyptian regime sought to minimize external influence in the territory, leaving room 
for the jallaba to expand their economic activities. 
 
     Slave Economy and Consolidation of Stratified Social Hierarchy 
 
During the 19th century captives from the southern frontier became one of the most 
important trade articles. As with Arabized and Islamized areas of Turkiyyah, and 
similarly to other areas of the Ottoman Empire, slave owning became a privilege of the 
affluent. But, in the 19th century there was an increase in Egyptian, Libyan, and Arabian 
demand. Expansion of the slave trade enabled the number of slaves to rise dramatically 
in the northern Turkiyyah to satisfy a demand for slaves, known as Sudan, for manual 
labor as cooks, blacksmiths, and construction workers, apart from their more traditional 
duties as servants, soldiers, and agricultural laborers (Lesch, 1998: 27; Hasan, 2003: 58; 
Sharkey, 2003: 17). Sharkey (2003: 17-8) points out that “In the northern regions . . . , 
where Islam and Arabic language prevailed, a centuries-old slave trade had bestowed 
servile connotations on the adjective ‘Sudanese’” and “To the Northerners, who 
regarded themselves as Arabs, being “Sudanese” meant being “Black” . . . and being 
“Black”, in turn, meant having low social status”. This is significant because such self-
perception of prominent sectors permitted the maintenance of an overall social 
hierarchy dominated by Arab culture and Islam, which would  be extended over most of 
the Arabized territories.   
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Most slaves tended to remain in the hands of riverine groups. These included Jaaliyyin 
and Danaqla who constituted the majority of the jallaba in the slave extracting areas 
(Warburg, 2003: 13). Warburg (2003: 13) further asserts that, “The ownership of land 
and slaves was a precondition for prospering in nineteenth century Sudan and the 
emerging middle class, consisting mainly of riverain tribes, achieved this by 
collaborating with the Turkish ruling élite”. Both access to land and slaves provided 
economic advantage to the riverine groups which as a result became increasingly 
prominent in local society (Björkelo, 1984: 92-5). Thus, hierarchical social structure 
was increasingly consolidated as part of a perception of “northern” Arabized and 
Muslim Turkiyyah, and the centralized polity permitted such a view of society to 
establish itself in most areas influenced by Arab culture and Islam.   
 
As a result, slavery became one of the principal origins of marginalization of southern 
peoples, as the Blacks were categorized as the lowest in the social hierarchy throughout 
the core of the Turkiyyah. The word, abeed (slave) came to describe Black southerners 
generally and is still used in contemporary Sudan (Gray, 1961: 36; Jok, 2001: 95; 
Sharkey, 2003: 19). This was to an extent rooted in socio-economic perceptions in some 
pre-existing Arabized societies, but reinstituted and reinforced in its widespread 
extension to which the rampant slave economy contributed considerably. The growing 
number of slaves who performed virtually all agricultural work in “northern” areas 
advanced this image (Sharkey, 2003: 19). But above all, it was facilitated by the regime 
through official endorsement of the slave trade and the increasingly powerful sectors of 
the Arabized elites in the north-central Nile valley area promoting their perception of 
society linked to an aspiration to safeguard socio-economic and socio-political 
prominence. The European view that assumed the racial superiority local peoples, 
particularly Blacks, complemented this view (Sconyers, 1978: 12). Thus, this 
categorization was integral in justifying racial and cultural distinctions used to define 
social status according to the general attitudes of the Arabized elites and their 
constituencies. Such perception became dominant in the northern parts and 
institutionalized the role of the southerner, marginalizing, and hindering social mobility 
and personal development in the context of Arabized-Muslim dominated social 
organization.  
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The legacy of slavery has been used to justify the continuity of this social hierarchy and 
portray an image of the marginalization of southerners as “natural” in northern parts of 
contemporary Sudan. In contrast, the memory of 19th century slave raiding has served 
contemporary elites in the southern areas to justify political mobilization against what is 
portrayed as northern riverine “Arab” elite domination and oppression. This, in turn, has 
contributed to the polarization of identities and construction of a narrative of “Arabs” 
versus “Africans”, particularly in the context of war. 
 
4. Incorporation to the Turkiyyah  
 
This section focuses on the incorporation of the region which would be known as Sudan 
into the Ottoman sphere of influence, and how its major areas relate to the newly 
imposed administration. During this period the Sudan became a political entity for the 
first time and essentially Muhammad Ali’s Ottoman colony, the Turkiyyah.64 The 
attempt here is to highlight factors that played a role in the inheritance from the colonial 
to the post-colonial period, emphasizing the institutionalization of marginalization and 
formation of political identities in response to the Turkiyyah.  
 
     External Conquest 
 
In the beginning of the 1800s Egypt was part of the Ottoman Empire and governed 
through an oligarchy of foreign Turkish speaking governors, Mamluks, who drew from 
a class of slaves originally made to fight for the Ottomans. When the failed Napoleonic 
invasion left Egypt under British and Ottoman domination, the power struggle to control 
its administration began. By May 1805, Muhammad Ali, an Albanian mercenary, 
ascended and was subsequently appointed as the Viceroy of the Ottoman Sultan and the 
Governor of Egypt (ESIS, 2004). Ali consolidated his rule by massacring many leading 
Mamluks in Cairo in 1811, while the remaining took refuge in Dongola south of Egypt 
(Ibrahim, 2000: 7). 
  
                                                 
64
 In spite of recognizing the controversial debate over Turkiyyah’s nature, the author considers that 
evidence shows it having been essentially a colony if defined according to commonly accepted definition 
as: Country or area ruled by another political entity with political elite originating from the latter. 
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In 1820, Ali’s troops invaded territories south of Egypt in what was essentially a private 
venture by an autonomous Viceroy of the Ottoman Sultan. As a result, in the course of 
the 19th century most of today’s “northern” Sudan was annexed to Egypt and came to be 
known as the Turkiyyah, 65 while the areas south of it remained as frontier land where 
commodities were extracted and regime authority was largely absent.66 
 
This expansion to Sudan took place in two stages, resulting in control of most of today’s 
“northern” Sudan;67 however, extending to “southern” Sudan was less of a success. 
Increasing contacts with the local groups did not take place until the discovery of a 
navigation route through the Nile marshes by Salim Qapudan, a Turkish frigate captain 
ordered by Ali to search for the sources of the White Nile during 1839-41. This initiated 
the gradual opening up of the southern area to the influences from northwards due to the 
discovery of a waterway through the vast marshes of the Sudd (barrier or obstacle in 
Arabic) that extend hundreds of kilometers (Gray, 1961: 16-20; Sconyers, 1976: 10-1; 
Collins, 1990: 66-8). This was an important development since it provided a 
communication link between northern and southern areas beyond the White Nile, 
penetrating the natural boundary that had formed a geographical barrier for centuries 
(Holt, 1961: 58). 
 
                                                 
65
 The term Turkiyyah or “Turco-Egyptian” used by Holt (1961: 37) is adopted here to describe 
Muhammad Ali’s privately induced invasion and domination of areas in 1820-1885 that account for large 
parts of contemporary Sudan. Holt (1961: 37) establishes that it is not possible to talk about Ottoman, 
Egyptian, or Turkish invasion or occupation, but rather of Muhammad Ali’s private expedition to Sudan 
from Egypt, which was still not a modern nation-state. Therefore, the term “Turco-Egyptian” describes 
Egypt as dominated by a Turkish speaking Ottoman elite, composed of senior officers and officials, ruling 
over Arabic speaking Egyptian subjects. The administration of Sudan was equally largely a non-Egyptian 
undertaking as the officials were largely Greeks, Kurds, Albanians, and Europeans, leaving Egyptians 
junior posts in the army and administration. As a result, the Sudanese referred to the new rulers as al-
Turk, “the Turks”, in linguistic terms despite their distinct nationalities For instance, uneducated 
Sudanese also referred to the British officials as “Turks” (Holt, 1961: 37). “Turco” here does not refer to 
the state of Turkey that emerged later, but merely to the Turkish speaking elite and their Ottoman culture.   
66
 Among the principal motivations behind Ali’s decision to occupy these lands were controlling the 
origin, and building an army based on Nilotic slaves, capable of undertaking the expansionary campaigns 
through which he envisioned challenging the Ottoman Sultan’s hegemony in the Near East; the search for 
the mythical riches of the Sudanese kingdoms that he was personally obsessed with; and ending the luring 
threat that the Mamluks posed to his rule (Collins, 1962: 5; Holt, 1961: 36-7; Ibrahim, 2000).  
67
 First, during 1820-22 Ali extended Egyptian rule over central northern Sudan, annexing Dongola and 
the weakened Funj Sultanate in the central Nile valley, and founding Khartoum as an administrative 
center in 1824 (Henze, 1991: 26; Ibrahim, 2000: 7). By 1822 the Mamluk resistance in Sudan had been 
dispersed, the Funj Sultanate conquered, and subsequent expansion took place in 1840 when Egyptian 
rule extended to Kassala, and in 1865 when it reached the Red Sea coast where the ports Sawakin and 
Massawa were taken (Henze, 1991: 26). Subsequently, Ali’s grandson Khedive Ismail completed the 
second phase of expansion in the course of the 1870s by annexing Bahr al-Ghazal in 1871 and Darfur in 
1874 (Henze, 1991: 26; Warburg, 2003: 6).  
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From a geopolitical perspective, Ali’s expansion, which annexed lands south of Egypt 
to his dominion, was largely motivated by economic and military considerations. 
However, the European powers became particularly interested in Sudan in the 1880s 
after the Berlin Conference as geopolitical interests drove them to compete for the 
control of the Nile68 and a region viewed as “unoccupied” territory. Great Britain 
emerged as the most powerful European state in the region, warding off both French 
and Belgian threats. Their most feasible geo-political aspirations in Sudan had to do 
with securing the Nile River and ensuring the integrity of the Suez Canal and Egypt 
where at that time the British had a strong presence. 
 
     Incorporation to Turkiyyah and Centralized Administration  
 
Ali’s conquest forged together the territory south of Egypt as one political entity for the 
first time in history, administered essentially as his dominion. Among the main 
elements introduced was centralized administration, which covered most of today’s 
“northern” Sudan (Henze, 1991: 26; Ibrahim, 2000: 7-8; Warburg, 2003: 13). Laying 
emphasis on commercial exploitation, the new rulers sought to extract local resources 
systematically. As a result, new commercial and criminal codes were implemented, 
which promoted stability and generated an attractive environment, particularly after 
abolition of government monopoly over commerce in 1838-41, allowing European and 
North American merchants, companies, missionaries, residents, and administrative 
officials to exploit the newly opened opportunities (Gray, 1961: 20-1; Wheeler, 1991: 
47-51; Ibrahim, 2000: 8).   
 
The governance of the Turkiyyah as one entity required concentration of power. As a 
result, Ali made centrally located Khartoum the capital in 1833, which in continuation 
developed rapidly and gained importance over other urban centers (Warburg, 2003: 12). 
                                                 
68
 The geopolitical importance of the Nile had increased due to three particularly significant 
developments: the “discovery” of the sources of the Nile in Lake Victoria in 1862, the completion of the 
Suez Canal in 1869, and the bankruptcy of Egypt in 1876 (Collins, 1990: 26). First, when John Hanning 
Speke “discovered” the sources of the Nile at Lake Victoria on 28 July 1862 attention of European 
powers turned towards the Equatorian lakes and controlling the Nile flow down to Egypt (Collins, 1990: 
26). Second, the opening of Suez Canal on 17 November 1869, attracted the attention of any European 
maritime nation with interest in Asia as it reduced the travel time to the Orient by half (Collins, 1990: 27). 
Third, Egypt had experienced a financial boom in the 1860s when it took over the cotton supply to the 
British Isles, reduced due to the American Civil War.  But due to lavish spending on luxurious comfort 
and other projects by 1876 Egypt was bankrupt, and foreign powers Britain and France took control of its 
finances involving strategic interests in the Nile waters (Collins, 1990: 28).      
Chapter II. Forging Contemporary Sudan: Historical Background        95 
 
Moreover, a system of centralized administration was imposed, which laid the 
foundation for governing the later Mahdist regime and the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium (Ibrahim, 2000: 7-8). Because of vast the geographical extensions of 
Sudan, the system relied heavily on local actors in the administration. Rather than 
collaborating fully with the “tribal”69 shaykhs or the heads of established Sufi orders, 
potentially threatening due to their local influence, the new rulers allied themselves with 
one of the northern riverine groups, the Shaigiyyah (Warburg, 2003: 7). The Shaigiyyah 
had first fought the Egyptian expansion but after being defeated soon collaborated with 
the new masters by providing bashi bozuq, irregular soldiers exempted from tax 
contributions, to perform violent tax collection raids, or participate in lower levels of the 
administration. This suggests that sectors of the Shaigiyyah used strategies of 
extraversion to buttress their dominance in the local context, while the Turkiyyah found 
them culturally similar and controllable due to their geographic proximity. 
 
In addition, more intense cultural influences arrived with the new conquerors, which 
were politicized and aimed at transforming the local social order to consolidate the new 
administration. This was to be done through orthodox religious doctrine and economic 
and social development directed deliberately at the collaborating groups of central 
areas.70 This is important because it allowed privileged treatment of selected groups 
from the central Nile valley, and religious orthodoxy intentionally undermined the 
authority of those traditional leaders who based their legitimacy on Sufism. The cultural 
affinity also allowed Egyptians to teach local collaborators, which further advanced 
cohesion, although mainly with the population at the center and hardly at all among the 
vastly dispersed traditional rural dwellers and other periphery populations. These 
maintained an uneasy, at times angry, relationship with the state largely due to its tax 
regime and imposed doctrines. This shows that when such groups received little 
recompense for their material contributions and sacrifices and had little contact with the 
administration, their incorporation to the centralized polity remained incomplete.   
                                                 
69
 “Tribal” here refers simply to Arab social organization, not tribalism as manipulation of ethnic identity 
boundaries (El Zain, 1996).  
70
 The new regime improved agriculture and external trade to Egypt. Accordingly, new technology 
through introduction of the waterwheel, saqiyyah, expanded agricultural production, enabling further 
extension of cultivation, and Egyptian peasants were encouraged to teach their local counterparts (Holt, 
1961: 64). Moreover, relatively successful experimentation with new crops such as sugar cane and cotton, 
the establishment of warehouses, and the digging of watering holes for cattle to be exported, resulted in 
the expansion of the economy and trade over which Cairo initially maintained an exclusive monopoly 
(Hill, 1959: 7, 49-50; Niblock, 1987: 8-9). 
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According to the model applied in Egypt, Ali and his successors encouraged a system in 
which regime influenced religious institutions would play a significant role. They 
imposed orthodox Sunni Islam as the official religion to consolidate centralized power 
and as a method to exert control over traditionally powerful holy families and Sufi 
orders.71 Accordingly, the authorities brought al-Azhar educated Islamic scholars, 
ulama,72 to organize the employment of young local collaborators in government offices 
and the official sharia (Islamic law) courts, while establishing a mosque-building 
program along with construction of religious schools and courts (Warburg, 2003: 6; 
LOC, 1991). These efforts were undertaken to encourage the new religious and 
administrative order, and demonstrate the extent of Ali’s attempt to advance 
centralization. 
 
The new rulers recognized the need to collaborate with the prominent local social 
forces, but also to maintain them weak enough to minimize challenges to their 
dominion. This was in part because of the lack of resources and manpower needed to 
control the vast territorial extensions of the newly conquered lands. Although before the 
Turkiyyah local elites had already used tribal logic to organize communities and justify 
the trade monopolized around the ruler by headmen who used Sufi ideology for social 
organization among the Muslim population, the new rulers prioritized the traditional 
tribal formations under communal leaders as a form of socio-political local 
administration within the centralized system of governance (Hasan, 1985: 11; El Zain, 
1996: 524).  
 
Hence, in the process of centralization the power of communal leaders became 
increasingly emphasized at the local level. This allowed administrative divisions 
according to tribal allegiances, while the central riverine communities were favored 
over more remote populations to minimize collective challenges to the centralized 
authority in the core areas, excluding also non-collaborative leaders and subjecting 
                                                 
71
 A number of these existed and their organization included socio-economic as well as religious 
societies. See e.g. chapters by Awad-Al-Karsani and Abdullahi Mohamed Osman in Al Majdhubiyya and 
Al Mikashfiyya: Two Sufi Tariqas in the Sudan (1985). According to Woodward (2003: 96), “The politics 
of Islam from the eighteenth century onward was a reflection of the growth of the Sufi orders, or turuq 
(singular tariqa), who came into Sudan and steadily grew in size”.  
72
 Ulama are highly educated Islamic scholars who often also gain high level of knowledge of other 
disciplines during their studies. They are perhaps most known of their juridical functions as arbiters of 
Islamic law, sharia. 
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resisting non-Arabized groups in Kordofan and the southern frontier to enslavement 
(Al-Gaddal, 1985: 9-10; El Zain, 1996: 525). O’Brien (1979: 139) points out that 
Shayks took on the added role of representative of an outside power – the central 
government authority in the ‘tribe’. Their tribal authority and power therefore 
gained a limited degree of freedom from the consent of the governed. In other 
words, the structure and the nature of the groupings (tribes) were modified, 
distorted and transformed. Instead of an ‘original’ flexible organization of a core 
group that represented a ‘power centre’ to which followers were attracted, there 
started to emerge more stable power centres to which attachment became 
involuntary.   
These power centers formed around religious and tribal Arabized Muslim elites with the 
ethnic identity of an Arabized Muslim “tribe” portrayed as primordial, unchanging, and 
inherently incompatible with non-Arabized and non-Muslim communities deemed of 
lower status.73 This attitude, compatible with the slave system, extended to the northern 
Turkiyyah as a means of advancing the local elites’ political and economic interests and 
buttressing their position. This is particularly important because not only did it 
consolidate local elites, but it laid the foundation for “northern” as opposed to 
“southern” in the new political entity. These ideas were later developed into portraying 
“north” as distinct from the “south”, and both becoming “regions”.  
 
In addition, during the Turkiyyah many sectors of local subjects despised the official 
doctrine of religious orthodoxy. This was because it undermined local, more familiar, 
Sufi practices that had characterized the central Sudanese society during the Funj 
sultanate (Ibrahim, 2000: 8). Consequently the ulama, which became the guardian of 
this orthodoxy, did not enjoy similar popularity as the Sufi tariqa, or the holy men in 
the rural areas of northern Turkiyyah where the administrative authority remained 
weaker than around Khartoum (Warburg, 2003: 8-9). Still, the imposition of orthodox 
Islam was initially successful in consolidating the centralized administration over the 
traditional religious elite, although it left the weakened opposition alive to facilitate the 
rapid spread of Mahdism in the 1880s in the midst of popular discontent (Holt, 1958: 
24).  
                                                 
73
 See El Zain (1996: 523-9) for evidence of this. Author’s field interviews revealed further evidence of 
the paramount role of these leaders in the process of formation of Sudanese polity (interviews in Abri, 
Khartoum, and the Nuba Mountains in November 2005, and Juba in October 2008).  
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Still, the regime sought to use collaborators, such as sections of the central riverine 
groups to spread its legitimacy and view of Islam. Particularly the Khatmiyyah order 
based near Kassala, which promoted an Islam doctrinally compatible with government 
aspirations, was employed in this task. Having arrived to the area only recently before 
the Turkiyyah, and posing a lesser threat than the more established traditional orders, the 
Khatmiyyah benefited from collaborating with the administration and became the most 
prominent and politically influential religious group of the period. Although its 
particular religious centers were not tolerated, the Khatmiyyah enjoyed periodical 
privileges such as subsidies and tax exemptions that increased its economic prominence 
(LOC, 1991). Many of its supporters were Shaigiyyah, who collaborated with the 
administration, resulting in converging interests between the Khatmiyyah leaders and 
the regime, providing the former privileged positions (MacEoin and Al-Shahi, 1983: 
63). This is significant because such developments in response to Turkiyyah enforced 
the logic of tribalism, which was deliberately used to consolidate the regime by creating 
divisions and competition among religious strongmen and heterogeneous elites.  
 
The collaboration of the mentioned sectors with the colonial masters generated 
resentment among other sections of a highly heterogeneous society which prior to the 
Turkiyyah had consisted of a number of independent but interconnected realms. Some 
violent responses culminated in tax revolts, such as the 1822-3 Jaaliyyin and the 1870s 
Darfur uprisings (Ibrahim, 2000: 5; Warburg, 2003: 7), which were organized by the 
local elites in a number of recently conquered territories against the perceivably heavy 
tax regime. The instability and competition between dominant Sufi orders was also fed 
by resentment of the administration’s favoritism towards the Khatmiyyah and 
Shaigiyyah (MacEoin and Al-Shahi, 1983: 63), an arrangement which excluded the 
Jaaliyyin as unreliable. 
 
     Incorporation of the Southern Frontier and the Role of the Jallaba  
 
Forces linking southern Sudan to regional and international spheres in the 19th century 
were largely economic, geo-political and cultural. During the Turco-Egyptian period the 
penetration and the subsequent exploitation was mostly economically motivated, despite 
the Egyptian fascination with opening a “gateway to the interior” and advance up the 
river Nile (Gray, 1961: 203). As mentioned earlier, these economic incentives were 
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largely due to depletion of slaves and ivory, amongst other commodities, in the more 
easily accessed regions of southern Darfur, southern Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. After 
opening up of the southern frontier in Bahr al-Ghazal, the Upper Nile and Equatoria, the 
extraction of local commodities escalated due to local, regional, and international 
demand in the north-central Turkiyyah, as well as in Egypt, Libya, the Ottoman markets, 
Arabian Peninsula, and Europe.  
 
During this time, contacts with peoples beyond the White Nile grew significantly. The 
official slave raids soon gave way to equally violent private commercial ventures. This 
was in part due to Ali’s abandoning of state monopoly, but also the idea of creating a 
slave army because of diminishing supply of Blacks, their perceived lack of resistance 
to stress and disease, and their local resistance and rebellious nature to cause uprisings 
(Ibrahim, 2000: 4). According to Ibrahim (2000: 5, 6-7),  
Their [the Shilluk] determination to maintain . . . political institutions against the 
imperialists’ plans . . . [to] . . . replace them was crucial factor for the deeply-
rooted tradition of resistance to foreigners in the South . . . [becoming] a major 
stumbling block for the Turkish [Egyptians] and subsequently European 
attempts to explore the upper reaches of the river [Nile] . . . [and] . . . Their 
daring resistance had in the end brought this imperialist advance in the South to 
a virtual and disastrous end.  
Thus, as long as the southern societies were able to uphold their traditional political 
structures and manpower, they retained the ability to repel the attempts of foreign 
domination. 
 
By the 1850s, foreign presence in parts of the southern frontier became increasingly 
permanent as the administration established fortified trading posts up the Nile. 
According to Gray (1961: 46) “The Arab servants [of the Europeans] settled, obtained 
wives and slaves from the neighbouring tribes, and established themselves as a ruling 
caste . . . ”. According to Ibrahim (2000: 8), “. . . their frequent resort to violence and 
reported contemptuous attitude towards the African population succeeded, with other 
important actors, in nurturing the distrust and fear that today dominates relations 
between the northern Sudan and those so-called marginalized regions, the South in 
particular”. Thus, as figureheads of the foreign intrusion, the jallaba extended the 
Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy in the southern frontier. 
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The growing presence and violent activities of many jallaba in the southern frontier and 
their attitude towards locals made them the living representation of foreign oppression 
in the eyes of many Nilotics, already during the Turkiyyah. Ibrahim (2000: 8) argues 
that 
The jallaba played an important role, and perhaps pioneering too, in extending 
the frontiers of Arabic and Islam in the south, Darfur and the Nuba mountains. 
But their frequent resort to violence and reported contemptuous attitude towards 
the African population succeeded, with other important actors, in nurturing the 
distrust and fear that today dominates relations between the northern Sudan and 
those so-called marginalized regions, the South in particular. 
This is in part because southern elites ensured that the legacy of slavery remained in the 
collective memory of the local communities mainly through oral histories.74 
 
The jallaba benefited economically from the new political order in a number of ways, 
which boosted their social status. For instance, they often served as middlemen between 
the administration and the population, providing currency for taxpayers to meet 
contributions to be paid in cash. At times, the jallaba joined military raids to the 
southern frontier and purchased captives from soldiers who were paid in slaves partly 
due to the lack of liquid currency. This enabled the jallaba, to a certain extent, to dictate 
the prices of slaves (Warburg, 2003: 16). This tied many jallaba increasingly to the 
slave trade because the administration accepted slaves as a form of tax payment (Fegley, 
2008), and they often became the middlemen between the population and tax collectors. 
 
Particularly the cattle herding Baggara nomads, who mostly live in the Sahelian 
transitional zone in southern Kordofan and Darfur, became dependent on the jallaba. 
This was because their possibilities to obtain cash diminished as a result of the end of 
cattle shipments to Egypt in the 1840s (Warburg, 2003: 13). As a result, a peculiar form 
of transactions emerged: The Baggara first sold their cattle to the jallaba for currency, 
and then the jallaba resold the cattle to the Baggara for slaves, which was considered a 
more precious commodity (Warburg, 2003: 13). In Kordofan, the trade was more 
straightforward since the Baggara provided the jallaba with a constant supply of slaves 
largely obtained from the Nuba Mountains. It should be noted that their increasingly 
                                                 
74
 This affirmation is based on the author’s interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 
22 September 2008. 
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powerful role in society laid a foundation for their importance in the future, to the extent 
that rich jallaba patronized and influenced some “northern” Sudanese political leaders 
after de-colonization. 
 
Consequently, some of the jallaba, such as the famous slave lord Rahman Mansour al-
Zubair, became powerful enough to control territory in southern Sudan. This took place 
beyond the state’s reach through the coercive power of private slave armies (Gray, 
1961: 69; Niblock, 1987: 9-10). By the 1860s, jallaba settler communities evolved 
increasingly around the zeriba75 fortified trading posts that had been used to facilitate 
the expansion of administration and commercial exploitation southwards along the Nile 
River (Rolandsen, 2005: 23). A rudimentary administration was put in place, but its 
influence was limited to sections of the Shilluk (Rolandsen, 2005: 23). This created a 
growing hostility and destruction as the southern communities fought back against what 
they viewed as foreign intrusion, and the accompanying robbery and violence (Gray, 
1961: 69). 
 
The impact of this violent reinsertion with incomplete authority and control was that 
local resistance extended widely in the southern frontier. While attempts were made to 
consolidate government authority, the evidence presented above suggests that the local 
collaboration with the authorities, or intruders, was limited to sectors of some riverine 
communities and the southern frontier remained largely ungoverned by Turkiyyah but 
continued to be controlled rather by powerful local groups or private actors, such as the 
slave lords, established in the area. 
 
Moreover, the inability of the Turkiyyah’s outposts to establish government authority in 
the southern territories played a role in the end of European commercial interests in 
these areas. According to Gray (1961: 203), this was because European entrepreneurs 
“Confronted with reality [they] saw that private individuals, without an imperial 
intervention, had no hope of establishing a legitimate commerce in Equatoria”. While 
the European commercial interests faded, nonetheless, the private ventures and 
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 First introduced as fortified government military and trading posts during the invasion of Sudan, some 
zeriba later became bases for merchants and slave lords in the southern frontier where the administrative 
presence of the regime was largely absent. 
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commercial and military interests of Arabized merchants and slave lords from north 
remained intact.  
 
In contrast, Nilotic populations organized counter expeditions to recover people and 
commodities lost in raids, which created fear in Arabized frontier communities. An 
anonymous writer of the period asserts that “The Dinka, in great strength, also raid the 
Arabs as far as al-Rusayris and sometimes up to the neighbourhood of Sennar, killing 
and destroying everything they meet, committing atrocities and carrying off the cows 
that they find and all human beings who have not been able to escape” (Ibrahim, 2000: 
6). However, as the southern social order became increasingly disrupted in the latter 
1800s due to the violent commercial incursions from the north, the counter raids 
gradually weakened and fighting between the Nilotics intensified. This is owed in part 
to external manipulation to divide local alliances (Ibrahim, 2000: 6), which Turkiyyah 
and private actors used to gain influence in the southern frontier. Conversely, while the 
southern resistance was localized and involved mostly different subgroups lacking 
broader political alliance, some leaders, such as Zemio, Bafuka, and Hamas Musa who 
recognized the power of external actors, used strategies of extraversion to their 
advantage against local rivals. 
 
The violence in the southern frontier was characterized essentially by a three-way 
struggle. It ensued mainly between the Turkiyyah soldier-administrators attempting to 
assert themselves, powerful slave lords often beyond official control, and resistance by a 
fluctuating number of local groups manifested in war parties and uprisings (Gray, 1961: 
120-5; Sconyers, 1978: 17). By the turn of the 1880s violence and destruction was a 
prevalent feature of interaction in the southern frontier. As Gray (1961: 125) points out: 
The zeriba district had the ‘aspect of a country destroyed by fire’; granaries were 
empty and harvests ruined; ‘thousands and thousands’ of natives’ had fled for 
refuge to the Azande of the inaccessible swamps of the Dinka; many of the 
armed slave troops had scattered through the country establishing themselves as 
petty tyrants or . . . had fallen in the hands of the Arab frontier tribes . . . thus 
formidably increasing the strength of these virtually independent tribes; and, 
apart from this destruction and upheaval, about four thousand Arabs . . . hoped 
to continue their [commercial] activities as before. 
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Here, the author refers to “Arabized” groups near the southern frontier as “Arabs”, 
although they are mixed peoples who uphold “Arab” culture as they have developed to 
take pride in it through its connotation with higher social status.  
 
In sum, the evidence presented here shows that during the Turkiyyah, the 
administration’s attempt to expand its control to the southern frontier largely failed due 
to its inability to subdue local resistance and impose order over private actors, such as 
slave lords and merchants. This demonstrates that centralized administration was never 
extended effectively to the southern areas and the attempted external domination 
became manifested in prolonged violence and disorder. This created a legacy of 
resistance, mistrust, and fear, in southern territories of what became the contemporary 
Sudan.     
 
     Decline and Demise of the Turkiyyah 
 
The determinants for the decline and eventual collapse of the Turkiyyah include an array 
of regional and international factors, and internal aspects of administration. Suppression 
of slavery, economic stagnation, high taxation, official religious doctrine, the so-called 
“civilizing” or “modernization” mission,76 were all among these factors, as were as well 
the eroding legitimacy of the administration in the eyes of subjects in the northern rural 
areas due to corruption, and a divide and rule strategy which dispersed social elements 
and favored principally the Khatmiyyah leadership and sections of the Shaigiyyah (Holt, 
1958: 24-5; LOC, 1991). These factors are briefly reviewed below. 
 
First, during Turkiyyah taxation of the local populations was conducted either by 
employing the bashi bozuq or religious (principally Khatmiyyah) or communal leaders 
willing to collaborate with the regime in exchange for tax exemption. On lands under 
irrigation, taxes were collected on a fixed rate based on the number of saqiyyah, water 
wheels, which favored labor-intensive agricultural production, while in other cultivated 
areas, land tax was imposed based on the size of land rather than obtained level of 
production. This encouraged the use of slaves or migrants to maximize production. Both 
methods of taxation were generally regarded as heavy and generated discontent. When 
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 Ali’s grandson and a successor Khedive Ismail defined his attempt to emulate Europe and introduce 
new reforms in Egypt and Turkiyyah as a “civilizing” or “modernization” mission. 
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faced with the new tax regime, people, such as a number of the jallaba, left their land, 
leaving other villagers to pay for their collective share of taxes, which resulted in further 
economic hardship for their home communities (Warburg, 2003: 14). A practically 
insurmountable burden was added in 1877 when taxes were increased to fill the severely 
stretched coffers of the Egyptian government due to a prolonged war against Abyssinia 
(Holt, 1958: 29) 
 
Second, the British used their international leverage with the Ottoman Sultan to 
encourage Khedive Ismail to suppress the slave trade. They persuaded him to recognize 
Ismail’s territorial acquisitions since 1866 and to grant him and his successors the 
dominion over the ports of Sawakin and Massawa on the east coast of Turkiyyah, but 
also pressured for abolitionist measures in Egypt to suppress the slave trade in the Red 
Sea and managed the appointment of British officers as Turkiyyah administrators to 
implement the policy (Holt, 1958: 25-32; Warburg, 2003: 15). Finally, after 
negotiations in which Ismail’s attempted to seek Britain’s support in the face of other 
European creditors, Egypt and Britain signed a Convention for the Suppression of Slave 
Trade in 1877 (Warburg, 2003: 15; Ibrahim, 2000: 7).77 Yet, Ismail was forced to resign 
in 1879 before the treaty became fully effective, which resulted in the sharp decline of 
resources to the Turkiyyah administration, leaving more room for the slave trade and 
less reserves to counter challenges to the regime (Warburg, 2003: 15). 
 
On the other hand, there also existed strong local interests in support of slavery and the 
slave trade, which constituted part of a regional and international supply-demand 
network. During this time, many jallaba grew in influence, attained education, and 
achieved administrative positions as high as the level of provincial governor (Warburg, 
2003: 16). However, they had built their livelihoods on profits from commerce, and 
often with an emphasis on the slave trade in which they played an important role 
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 However, this provoked objection among the Arabized peoples since not only was slavery a permitted 
institution in their interpretation of Islam and common practice for centuries before Turkiyyah, but at the 
time many depended on it and could not comprehend that Samuel Baker, a foreign non-Muslim inspired 
by abolitionist thought in Europe, was appointed to contain one of the most lucrative and important 
economic ventures (Holt, 1958: 26). Subsequently, Charles George Gordon was appointed as the 
Governor in the Southern Equatoria province in 1873 in an attempt to extend government authority, end 
the slave trade, and encourage legitimate commerce in the region (Holt, 1958: 27; Sconyers, 1978: 16). 
Although Gordon was more successful than Baker, his efforts, and the policy in general, were 
unsuccessful, as shown by the deterioration of the situation in Equatoria after he accepted the Governor 
General’s position in Khartoum in 1877 (Gray, 1961: 108-111; Sconyers, 1978: 16-17; Ibrahim, 2000: 8-
9).  
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(Warburg, 2003: 16). As a result, the general reaction among Arabized population 
towards anti-slave trade measures was negative. Particularly many of those jallaba, who 
were among the protagonists in the trade, willingly embraced an anti-regime rhetoric by 
the 1870s (Warburg, 2003: 15).   
 
Third, economic factors that debilitated Turkiyyah were external and internal, including 
principally economic stagnation and corruption. Externally, after the opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1869, Britain and France became eager to secure it. Consequently, faced 
with increasing debt crisis and looming general bankruptcy, Ismail was pressured to 
accept an Anglo-French debt commission to manage Egypt’s fiscal affairs in 1873. The 
commission interfered in Egypt’s internal affairs, such as the contest for succession of 
the Egyptian crown and its policies in Turkiyyah. As a result, Ismail was persuaded to 
leave power to his son Tawfiq, who subsequently ruled Egypt until 1892 under British 
tutelage (Henze, 1991: 31; LOC, 1991). Yet, Tawfiq’s appointment angered many 
Egyptians who deemed him as a European puppet, which motivated a killing of 50 
Europeans in June 1882 disturbances in Alexandria, providing an excuse for British 
invasion and occupation of Egypt in September 1882 (Gray, 1961: 152). Consequently, 
by 1890 British imperial policy in the region became increasingly linked to the Nile as it 
became recognized as the lifeline of British occupied Egypt (Collins, 1990: 105).   
 
Moreover, the general bankruptcy in Egypt that peaked in 1875 had an incapacitating 
effect on the administration. For instance, heavy taxation resulted in declining revenue 
from the Turkiyyah since it discouraged economic growth. In terms of government 
revenue, the inefficiency in tax collection and related corruption resulted in the loss of 
almost EG£1million in 1869-79, while in 1878 alone it was calculated that five out of 
eleven provinces were governed at a financial loss (Warburg, 2003: 14). Meanwhile, the 
lack of finances meant that the envisaged economic reforms came to a standstill. 
 
Finally, Khedive Ismail’s “civilizing” or “modernizing” mission was largely an attempt 
to introduce Western inspired reforms in Egypt and Turkiyyah and to create politically 
centralized administration with a “European” type economy. However, there were no 
resources for this project in the long term and effective control by the administration did 
not reach much further from the north-central and eastern areas, which impeded 
economic transformation. Elsewhere, in northern and particularly southern territories, 
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small military garrisons or fortified posts were in charge of vast territorial extensions 
and unable to impose sustained control without reinforcements in case of local 
uprisings. Moreover, the state’s legitimacy eroded further due to a lack of supervision of 
the bashi bozuq who roamed the countryside and arbitrarily pocketed taxes, while 
unemployed soldiers engaged in illegal activities, often creating a criminal and corrupt 
environment (LOC, 1991). It was thus largely these growing local grievances and the 
declining state power and legitimacy, accompanied as well as partly caused by 
economic crisis, which led to the emergence of violent challenge to the Turkiyyah.  
 
These abovementioned factors gave impetus to Mahdism, which began as a regional 
movement in Kordofan. A holy man, Muhammad Ahmad ibn as Sayyid Abd Allah, 
from near Dongola, realized the malcontent among the illiterate population during his 
travels, and proclaimed himself as the prophet Mahdi in 1881, preaching against the 
Turkiyyah and advocating Islamic purity and simplicity (LOC, 1991). Lacking capacity 
and considering Muhammad Ahmad’s preaching against the regime initially harmless, 
the administration in Khartoum did not react to the early inciting, in spite of Ahmad 
claiming to be the personification of the expected Mahdi, al-Mahdi al-Muntazar (the 
awaited guide in the right path), calling for the holy war, jihad, against the Turkiyyah, 
and promoting Islamic nationalism for purer Islam and end corruption (Henze, 1991: 
31; IAO, 2004). It was not until the Mahdi’s rapidly increasing followers stopped 
paying taxes that an order for his arrest was finally issued (LOC, 1991; Henze, 1991: 
31). However, he escaped capture by returning to Kordofan and continued mobilization. 
The Mahdi was joined in his travels by Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, the son of a Taaisha 
Baggara leader from southern Darfur and his later successor, who assisted him in 
gaining support among religious leaders. 
 
Muhammad Ahmad attracted followers, primarily among Arabized Baggara78 and the 
Jaaliyyin, his followers becoming the Ansar and devoted to fulfilling his aim of 
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 The Mahdist Ansar drew largely from the Baggara, principally from Kordofan and Darfur, but also 
extend westwards along the Sahelian belt. Similarly to a number of other Muslim groups in contemporary 
Sudan, the Baggara have manufactured genealogies for generations that trace their lineage back to 
Muslim ancestors, and, in spite of being mixed peoples, they embrace Arab culture due to its deemed high 
status (Cunnison, 1971: 186-96). However, their receptiveness to the Mahdist cause was not only because 
they were Muslims, but also because of Abdallahi’s and other sectors of the Baggara elites’ ability to 
mobilize them based on grievances towards the Turkiyyah. They were the first supporters of the Mahdist 
cause, provided part of the manpower for the army, and after the conquest became increasingly connected 
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restoring justice and righteousness in the world, preparing the second coming of the 
Prophet Isa, and replacing the Turkiyyah regime with a true Islamic community (Henze, 
1991: 31; Weiss, 1999: 1). In the prevailing opportune conditions, facilitated by the 
improved communications network, the Mahdi used his politico-religious propaganda to 
mobilize the Ansar and organized an uprising that spread quickly from Baggara 
inhabited areas of Kordofan to other regions, such as the southern frontier, Darfur, and 
the east, where more anti-regime elements joined the rebellion.79 It was not only the 
Mahdi’s personal appeal that made the Baggara and Jaaliyyin to join the Mahdist cause, 
but they also resented Khatmiyyah and Shaigiyyah favoritism and hoped to establish a 
new political order. 
 
Finally, the Mahdist forces overwhelmed the Turkiyyah. However, Turkiyyah’s legacy 
lived on in the established centralized administration. Indeed, it was during the 
Turkiyyah that the foundations for the narrow-based riverine ruling clique of post-
colonial Sudan was laid, educating exclusively cadres of regime collaborators and 
establishing Arab culture and Islam as the governing socio-political forces. This way the 
Turkiyyah regime “manipulated the minds” of local peoples and supported the 
continuity of stratified social hierarchy from earlier times.80   
 
 
 
 
5. Mahdist Wars 
 
This section focuses on the developments during the Mahdist period and highlights its 
contribution to the emergence of “northern” Sudan and the further consolidation of the 
political order of the marginalizing state.   
 
                                                                                                                                               
to the central riverine area due to their involvement in the administration and the army. The Baggara 
remain as the core constituents of the contemporary neo-Mahdist movement. 
79
 Mahdism expanded rapidly in the rural areas in northern and western Turkiyyah. It fed on the 
resentment of rival Arabized and Muslim groups towards the regime collaborators, and apart from the 
Baggara as the main constituency, the movement drew its followers from rural communities, among Beja 
people of eastern Sudan, and the jallaba, and other riverine groups, such as sectors of the Jaaliyyin and 
Danaqla, whose livelihoods were linked to the slave trade that the Turkiyyah regime sought to suppress 
(MacEoin and Al-Shahi, 1983: 63; LOC, 1991; Henze, 1991: 31). 
80
 This paragraph is based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba. 
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     Administration, Economy, and Legacy 
 
The Mahdist Ansar engaged the regime’s military in violent confrontation and since the 
small armed forces were scattered, suppressing the spreading revolt was an 
overwhelming task. This led to the Mahdist conquest of most of the area previously 
controlled by the administration. 
 
After driving out the former masters, the Mahdi initiated an attempt to consolidate his 
rule. In the course of the rebellion the objective of the Mahdist protest movement had 
become to establish a militant Islamic state (Holt, 1958: 100). Weiss (1999: 12-14) 
points out that the Mahdi endeavored to revive an ideal community and constitute an 
Islamic theocratic state through religion and transformation of the social order, and 
asserts that he encouraged violent social transformation because “In general, jihâd, [the 
Islamic Holy War] according to Mahdist theory, was the method of an armed struggle 
whereby a perfect social order ought to be brought into being”. However, in January 
1885, the Mahdi died of typhus and power fell to his successor Abdallahi, one of three 
Khalifas, who became the ruler of the Mahdist Sudan and Amir Juyush al-Mahdiya, 
Commander of the Mahdist Armies (Holt, 1958: 104). As a result, it became 
Abdallahi’s task to complete the Mahdi’s dream for an Islamic state (Beshir, 1974: 16). 
 
After the Mahdist conquest, many of the officials who had been working for the 
previous regime were employed by the Mahdist state, which used the centralized system 
of administration created during Turkiyyah to consolidate the power of its ruling elite. 
Subsequently, the new regime engaged in an unsuccessful attempt to eliminate Sufi 
orders, particularly its main rival, the Khatmiyyah, which took refuge in exile in British- 
held Sawakin until the end of the Mahdiyyah (‘Abd al-Rahim, 1970: 240). However, the 
Mahdist regime was more lenient towards the Shaigiyyah whose educated cadres were 
needed for the administration in the absence of a sufficient number of qualified Ansar 
who in general had lesser education and experience in and with the centralized 
administration. 
 
C. Outmost Limits of the Mahdiyyah 
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Source: LOC (1991) 
 
This resulted in continuity of a particular type of state formation and governance 
drawing on the earlier Turkiyyah experience. According to Holt (1958: 246), 
Faced with the prospect that the brief unity of the northern Sudanese would 
again dissolve, the Khalifa from the outset endeavoured to restore the 
administrative system. He could do this only by bringing back the men and 
methods of the old régime and thereby much of the corruption, dilatoriness, and 
oppression which the Mahdi had hoped to sweep away. 
Further efforts were undertaken through the imposition of self-promulgated laws in an 
attempt to impose centralized rule by debilitating and co-opting rural strongmen (LOC, 
1991; Ibrahim, 2000: 7-9; Warburg, 2003: 55).81 The evidence here points to the 
continuation of strategies of co-optation and centralized administration to unify 
heterogeneous communities under consolidated rule, tactics the British and even some 
post-colonial governments adopted later.  
                                                 
81
 Mahdi also transformed the five pillars of Islam according to his vision of a perfect Islamic community. 
For instance, a true believer had to show loyalty to him as the representative of God’s prophet, pilgrimage 
to Mecca was replaced with an obligation to jihad, and almsgiving as a religious tax became a system of 
state taxation (LOC, 1991; Weiss, 1999: 18-22). 
110        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
  
Largely due to a constant state of regional wars and internal dissidence that consumed 
most of state’s resources, economy deteriorated and remained based on subsistence 
agriculture. The Mahdiyyah lacked infrastructure and became relatively isolated from 
the world economy, while competing with its neighbors and imperial powers (Tignor, 
1987: 181; Warburg, 2003: 51-2).82 Apart from the Mahdiyyah’s inability to maintain 
the infrastructure inherited from Turkiyyah, policy measures such as invalidation and 
subsequent confusion about currency, together with inadequate responses to a drought 
that plagued Sudan in the early 1880s, all played a role in the decline of domestic trade 
as a market economy continued to function only in a scattered manner in some urban 
centers (Niblock, 1987: 10-1). 
 
Two legacies of this era are particularly relevant to later periods. First, it witnessed the 
rise of the Mahdist movement as a new social constituency for Arabized elites and the 
continued prominence of riverine groups, and second, the history of Mahdiyyah 
significantly contributed to the construction of “northern” Sudan. With the regards to 
the former, the Mahdist order allowed rural northern and western areas dominated by 
the Baggara to become a new enduring social constituency that has since provided its 
elites with a firm claim to political and economic power in Sudan.83 In addition, 
elements of riverine groups, such as Jaaliyyin, Shaigiyyah, and Danaqla, continued to 
maintain a prominent position as administrators and merchants during the Mahdiyyah, a 
status further heightened through collaboration with the regime during the following 
Anglo-Egyptian period. 
 
In respect to the latter, the Mahdist conquest was glorified among the tribal and 
religious elites in the Muslim territories and forged part of a created “northern” regional 
identity. Lesch (1998: 28-9) points out that “Thus, the Mahdiyya was reconstructed in 
the national imagination of the north as a period of liberation and assertion of cultural 
values . . . [,] . . . invigorated their [the Arabized Muslim elites’] national image and 
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 Trade with Egypt had seized after the Mahdist conquest and the commercial activities that had 
previously connected Turkiyyah to the outside world diminished drastically (Holt, 1958: 255-7). Part of 
the reason was limited access to international markets, since major transportation nods, such as the port of 
Sawakin and the railroad that linked Wadi Halfa with Egypt, remained under Egyptian and British 
control. However, a small amount of trade in camels in Egyptian markets, and informal exports of gum 
arabic and ostrich feathers took place through Sawakin (Niblock, 1987: 10). 
83
 Its main manifestation has been the Umma party. See Chapter IV for more on the early development of 
the Umma party. 
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held positive symbolic significance as a golden age”. It has provided historical evidence 
for the Arabized elites to justify “northern” Sudan as a regional entity as it brought 
together various sectors of the heterogeneous Muslim society of the “northern” 
territories during the Mahdiyyah to challenge the rule of foreign masters. In this way it 
served nation-building by advancing the idea of “northern” Sudan as a region. The 
importance of the Mahdist conquest can be observed in the manner in which it has been 
interpreted by “northern” Arabized intellectuals. For instance, to Beshir (1974: 15) the 
Mahdist movement was the only nationalist movement of the 19th century Africa that 
emerged successfully against imperialism, and it confirmed the power of the Sudanese 
religious orders to mobilize the population and form a state on Islamic principles. Such 
a view, which sees Mahdism as inherently Sudanese, has buttressed the power of 
Arabized Muslim religious and tribal elites in the “northern” Sudan84 and contributed to 
a perception of Sudanese nationalism based on Arab culture and Islam. This is in sharp 
contrast with southern elites’ perceptions of what constitutes Sudan. 
 
     Mahdist Wars and the Southern “Frontier” 
 
In the mid-1880s the Mahdist conquest spread to the southern frontier and deeper into 
Darfur, largely through alliances with local leaders. For instance, Bahr al-Ghazal 
became increasingly plagued by violence between the loose alliance of Dinka, Nuer, 
and Shilluk groups, and the Rizaigat subgroup of the Baggara, against the remaining 
Turkiyyah military (Gray, 1961: 155-59). However, such alliances were temporary at 
best. Instead, many Nilotics with ties to Darfur and Kordofan joined the Mahdist cause, 
while others further south also participated in erasing the remaining regime outposts 
(Sconyers, 1978: 18). Moreover, many Danaqla and Jaaliyyin, mostly jallaba residing 
in the southern frontier, joined forces with the Ansar because in their view government 
policies, such as suppressing the slave trade, went against their established livelihoods 
(Holt, 1958: 34; Collins, 1962: 22-3). Thus, it would clearly appear that Mahdism 
gained only limited support in the southern areas through alliances of enemies with the 
same strategic objective.  
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 Based on author’s interviews conducted in November 2005 in Khartoum and Nuba Mountains, and 
October 2008 in Juba. 
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Soon, events related to the rebellion challenged the official governance of the 
southernmost Equatoria region. First, more confident after the liberation of Bahr al-
Ghazal from the Turkiyyah, the Agar Dinka leadership mobilized their ranks against the 
Ansar, albeit unsuccessfully (Collins, 1962: 44-5). Although the Turco-Egyptian 
garrisons in Equatoria were well manned, the fall of province after province weakened 
morale and resulted in desertions of the Danaqla to the side of the Mahdi (Gray, 1961: 
160; Collins, 1962: 46). Yet, the first Mahdist invasion of Equatoria was delayed until 
January 1885 due to a revolt of black jihadiyya85 southern slave soldiers, often hostile 
towards their masters and tired of harsh treatment by the Mahdists (Collins, 1962: 47; 
Sconyers, 1978: 19). After moving forward, the Mahdists, joined by the Danaqla, made 
steady progress in Equatoria despite fierce resistance, and almost occupied the province 
until news of yet another jihadiyya revolt in Bahr al-Ghazal led to Mahdist withdrawal 
(Collins, 1962: 49-50). After suppressing the rebellion in Bahr al-Ghazal, the Ansar 
departed for Darfur and left the province virtually without a presence, and it 
subsequently succumbed into inter-communal feuds between the largely debilitated 
local populations (Collins, 1962: 54, 138). This shows that the Mahdist wars not only 
debilitated local societies but also altered power relations among and within their 
constituencies and inspired violent contest.  
 
Absorbed by warfare against Abyssinia and Egypt, it took more than three years for the 
Mahdists to return to southern territories. In summer 1888, alarmed by news of a 
European force under explorer Henry Morton Stanley sent to help Mehmet Emin Pasha 
(Isaak Eduard Schnitzer), the Turkiyyah Governor of Equatoria, Abdallahi ordered the 
conquest of the territory (Collins, 1962: 55, 1990: 74). Although eradicating the 
Turkiyyah from the southern frontier was clearly set as the principal objective, 
Abdullahi’s decision was also driven by a personal commercial and military interest in 
obtaining slaves and jihadiyya, as well as a response to the pressure exerted by the 
increasingly powerful central riverine Danaqla and Jaaliyyin who were eager to restore 
normality in their trading activities (Collins, 1962: 56-8). This points to the increasing 
political and economic importance of sections of central riverine groups that later 
became the majority in the power elite of “northern” Sudan.    
                                                 
85
 Jihadiyya is a common name used for black southern slave soldiers (often riflemen) who were used by 
Turkiyyah and by the Mahdists, forming an important part of each army. After the abolition of slavery, 
the tradition of the jihadiyya endured until the British period during which black riflemen served in 
imperial campaigns and World Wars.  
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In spite of defeating the remaining Turco-Egyptian opposition in Equatoria in 1888-9, 
the Mahdists faced difficulties in bringing the province under their authority. For 
instance, Sconyers (1978: 21) states that 
The main Mahdist garrison in Rejaf found itself in the midst of a congeries of 
private slave armies led by mutineers, deserters, renegade Turks and ex-
Jihadiyya. All of them were heavily engaged in the ivory trade, extensive slave-
raiding, and picking of small detachments of Mahdists caught unaware.  
All these groups were acting in a remote territory surrounded by local populations with 
shifting alliances, which at times used military collaboration with the Mahdists in 
pursuit of their own particular objectives. As a result, the Mahdist administration was 
unable to bring the southern frontier under centralized control, and the area remained 
largely out of reach of state authority until, and to some extent beyond, the Anglo-
Egyptian colonial period (Rolandsen, 2005: 23). 
 
There existed mistrust between many Arabized Mahdists and their Nilotic collaborators. 
Although the southern troops initially played an integral part in the Mahdist army, in the 
longer-term, the animosity harbored by some jihadiyya resulted in violent revolts. 
According to Sconyers (1978: 21), this was largely because “Convinced that they [the 
blacks] had been created by God as slaves with no redeeming qualities, the Mahdist 
forces began to act on those convictions”. Similarly, Collins (1962: 72) claims that 
The sophisticated Arab with a culture and tradition centuries old felt . . . that he 
was superior to the simple African who was created by Allāh to be a slave . . . 
[while] . . . the general Arab treatment of Negroids in Equatoria appears to bear 
out this relationship, which still exists and is the most unfortunate legacy of the 
Mahdīya in the Southern Sudan. 
 
This attitude by many jallaba and Mahdists generated apprehension and hostility among 
many southern groups. Many of them resisted the attempt of external rule, nor were 
many interested in Islam or Mahdism (Collins, 1962: 73). Consequently, when the last 
remnants of the Turkiyyah withered away, Mahdists experienced difficulties in subduing 
local resistance and hardly controlled areas beyond the outposts near the Nile, in spite of 
generating widespread fear in southern Sudan (Collins, 1962: 72, 75). The Mahdist 
presence was considered as the continuation of the attempt to dominate southern 
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societies from north initiated by the Turkiyyah. This period fixed a collective memory 
that the northerner was the primary source of danger (Lesch, 1998: 29).   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that the 19th century historical experience and developments are 
essential to the understanding of contemporary Sudan and the historical legacies 
manifested in the conflict in southern Sudan. As demonstrated by the above, a number 
of historical factors and processes are important to the emergence of a marginalizing 
polity in Sudan. 
 
First, during the 19th century the core of what constitutes contemporary Sudan was 
administered as one political entity for the first time and the peripheral areas, including 
the southern frontier, were integrated only to various degrees. This polity was a product 
of external forces (aspirations of regional and international actors) together with 
interests of some local elites, particularly in the Arabized Muslim areas, where 
particular leaders were able to use the new political reality to their advantage. While the 
central administration was consolidated in the central Nile valley, where it found some 
of its main local collaborators, government influence hardly penetrated the southern 
periphery, a major source for the violent extraction of resources, mainly slaves. State- 
building was thus largely based on an exclusionary incorporation of the periphery, 
manifested in regional terms through the use of religion, race, and language to define 
group boundaries and inclusion within the dominating socio-cultural (political and 
economic) discourse of the Arabized elite. Over time, this deeply-rooted historical 
center-periphery division evolved into a structural condition of state and society as 
adherence to Arab culture and Islam defined access to power, much as had previously 
been the case in smaller political entities pre-dating the Turkiyyah and Mahdiyyah.   
 
Second, during the 19th century the Arab-Muslim dominated social hierarchy 
championed by the regime collaborators, namely the heads of sectarian groups and 
communal leaders, was consolidated. They used Islam politically to maintain 
prominence and as a unifying force, which enabled the eventual projection of an image 
of “northern” Sudan as a region in which Arab culture and Islam prevailed. This of 
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course was illusionary and its artificial nature is demonstrated by the dissidence of non-
Arabized elements within “northern” Sudan.      
 
The Mahdist period also witnessed the birth and strengthening of the Ansar movement 
to counter the Khatmiyyah and Shaigiyyah which had been favored by the Turco-
Egyptian administration. This prepared the power elites of the two competing 
movements for assuming prominent socio-political and socio-economic role during later 
periods. At the same time, violence in the southern frontier culminated and its 
continuation, in part perpetrated by the northern jallaba, became a source of fear and 
mistrust in the southern territories as the memory of the period remained. This adhered 
to the interests of those sectors of the southern elites willing to use antagonism towards 
intruders for mobilization. 
 
In sum, the major legacies of the 19th century history that impact contemporary Sudan 
are the inheritance of centralized administration from Turkiyyah, the construction of 
“Arab” as the dominating social category extended mostly in the “northern” part, and 
the impact of slavery, which has continued to affect perceptions of “northern” and 
“southern” Sudanese. These three are powerful forces that continue to dictate social, 
economic, and political realities of what became a particular kind of marginalizing 
polity in Sudan. The next chapter shows how the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
colonial period contributed to the establishment of this polity and resulted in the 
construction of what is being called in this dissertation the “marginalizing state”. 
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Chapter III. Colonial Administration: Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter focused on those elements in the 19th century history of the region 
of contemporary Sudan that have been particularly relevant to its southern insurgencies. 
This chapter, however, builds on those pre-existing dynamics by concentrating on the 
following Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period. It shows the continuity of the 
centralized administration, ruling methods, and favoritism towards some of the 
prominent elements of the Arabized Muslim and particularly Sufi groups. This guiding 
line for sociopolitical organization emerges from earlier periods and combines with new 
administrative structures and policies during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. It is 
argued here that the colonial state that emerged from this combination of the pre-
existing and the newly imposed social reality laid basis for the post-colonial 
marginalizing state. 
 
The consolidation of the Anglo-Egyptian co-dominium was through violent conquest 
and military campaigns led under the pretext of “pacification”. The colonial policies 
were aimed at maximizing extraction and minimizing uprisings; centering on the 
economic growth pole strategy and extending the pre-existing “divide and rule” 
principle of governance to the colonial periphery. This paved the way for growing 
poverty, contributed to political instability, and set the stage for insurgency formation in 
these areas. Such policies, which for decades differed in the administratively separated 
southern regions, maintained the previous social stratification, fostered ethnic politics 
and divisions, and enforced economic imbalances between and within groups and 
regions. The result of ‘differentiating’ policies was that the sentiment of southern (and 
northern) regionalism became more pronounced and extended, and that group based 
horizontal inequalities increased.  
 
The colony’s particular co-dominium status not only prepared the state for an ongoing 
schism between Britain and Egypt as they sought regional power and influence within 
Sudan, but converted specific narrow sections of the Arabized elite into the main 
economic and political power-holders excluding others. The main sociopolitical and 
118        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
powerful Sufi movements, principally the neo-Mahdists and the Khatmiyyah, became 
major actors in this power struggle, with sections of associated riverine groups, such as 
elements of Jaaliyyin, Shaiqiyyah, and Danaqla, also growing in power. Meanwhile, 
Britain, as the main administrator of the colony, separated its southern parts and isolated 
them from the dynamics of the colonial state. This was because access to education and 
the limited participation in colonial administration became almost exclusively an issue 
of the most prominent groups of what became known as the “northern” Sudan. Finally, 
Britain’s hegemony over Sudan set the stage for an Anglo-Egyptian rift in the process 
of de-colonization, which led to rapid self-determination for Sudan. As such, the 
dynamics and policies of the colonial state laid the foundation for the marginalizing 
state in Sudan and to the political realities which have provided preconditions for 
insurgencies in the “southern” Sudan. 
 
2. Insertion of the Region in British Colonial Empire   
 
This section shows how the region of contemporary Sudan was incorporated into the 
British Empire. This was the prelude of the period of Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, a 
particular co-dominium arrangement during which the first borders of the colony were 
forged and the marginalizing centralized administration was institutionalized.    
 
     Anglo-Egyptian Conquest 
 
After overcoming the Napoleonic threat in the early 19th century, Britain established 
itself as a major world power largely through its control of world’s seas. It also exerted 
extensive economic control through its commercial fleet and the navy, which further 
fostered its overall influence. During the first half of the 19th century British 
immigration to southern Africa had increased considerably, but its attention was 
diverted to northeast Africa after the inauguration of the Suez Canal that provided a new 
route from Europe to Asia. As a result, the British sought to control the Canal, which 
meant controlling the Egyptian administration. In 1875, the British government bought 
Khedive Ismail’s personal 44% share of the Suez Canal and in 1882 the Egyptian 
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nationalist confrontation with European influence86 gave London a justification to 
occupy Egypt militarily. Although the French had a claim to the Suez Canal, British 
strength persuaded the French rivals and other competing powers to settle for a Treaty 
within the 1888 Convention of Constantinople. Consequently, the Canal was declared 
neutral territory but de facto controlled by the British who maintained a military force 
stationed in Egypt until 1954. 
 
Meanwhile, the 1884-5 Berlin Conference had initiated a “Scramble of Africa”, which 
forced Britain to review its imperial policy in northeastern Africa. London sought to 
protect Egypt and the Suez Canal and this made British officials consider an occupation 
of the Mahdiyyah to create a protective buffer and control the Nile waters, which came 
to be perceived as Egypt’s lifeline. For Nicoll (2004), this argument at least partly 
justified the invasion of the Mahdiyyah, as did also Charles George Gordon’s death in 
Khartoum during the Mahdist wars, which had created a public uproar in Britain.        
 
As a result, by the late 1880s the Mahdiyyah had become of interest to British, French, 
Belgian, and Italian European imperial powers, all endeavoring to extend their influence 
in the region. These three first powers sought control of the upper Nile; Britain desired 
to expand its African dominion as a continuous belt from Cairo to Cape Town,87 the 
French aspired to control territory from the Atlantic coast to the Red Sea, and Belgium 
desired to expand its dominion over the source of the Nile. Consequently, in 1889 an 
Anglo-Egyptian army under Horatio Kitchener initiated a military campaign bringing 
Mahdiyyah to its defeat on 2 September 1898 at Battle of Omdurman.  
 
Britain endeavoured to thwart the threat presented by the Belgian and French claims.88 
In 1893-1902, the Mahdists faced Belgian-Congolese invasions in the southern frontier 
after Leopold II of Belgium seized the opportunity to extend the Congo Free State into 
the Equatorian Nile valley. These attempts resulted in continuous confrontations by 
expeditionary forces and featured local groups allied with or opposed to the Mahdists 
and the Belgian-Congolese (Collins, 1962: 109-77). This further weakened the Mahdist 
                                                 
86
 A joint Anglo-French commission oversaw Egyptian finances during the country’s bankruptcy, which 
many Egyptians perceived as foreign control and practical overrule, leading to the emergence of 
nationalist elements (Izzedin, 1981: 2). 
87
 Cecil Rhodes, who sought a “Cape to Cairo” railroad connection, was the main architect of this plan. 
88
 Based on an interview a prominent southern Sudanese, 24 September 2008 in Juba. 
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regime and contributed to its eventual collapse against the Anglo-Egyptian army.  
Alarmed by the news that French had occupied Fashoda in the southern region, the 
Anglo-Egyptian troops confronted the French who eventually gave in after the “Fashoda 
incident” almost triggered war between Britain and France.  
 
Once the French threat and Mahdist opposition had been removed,89 the British sought 
to consolidate their claim over the conquered territories. On 19 January 1899, an 
agreement between Britain and Egypt was signed, which established joint colonial rule 
over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 32). The hybrid nature of 
the agreement was a carefully thought outcome of correspondence between officials in 
London and Evelyn Baring (later referred to as Lord Cromer), the British Consul 
General in Cairo, in an attempt to deal with Egyptian opposition to the conquest of the 
Mahdiyyah and ward off criticism of other European powers regarding British colonial 
expansion (Daly, 1986: 11). However, Egypt’s function was also to cover the financial 
costs of governing the colony; a task the British parliament was unwilling to assume 
(Abdel Rahim, 1969: 30-1). Hence, the agreement enabled Britain, which controlled 
Egypt, to become the de facto ruler of newly conquered territories without high 
administration costs to itself.       
 
The agreement designed by Britain stipulated those areas south of the 22nd parallel as 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. While it established the northern boundary with 
Egypt, a pact with France dividing central Africa in the spheres of influence defined the 
border between the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium and the French dominion in the 
west. Later, the eastern border with Eritrea was agreed upon with the Italians, but the 
border agreement with Abyssinia and Uganda was only reached in 1913 (O’Ballance, 
1977: 25). According to Kebbede (1999: 12), “Within the first two decades, most of the 
country’s border was defined and nearly all territory of today’s Sudan came under the 
firm control of Britain”. Thus, similarly to other African colonies, the Condominium’s 
                                                 
89
 In 1902 the remaining Mahdist military in the southern frontier gave way to Anglo-Egyptian 
domination by retreating towards Darfur, its influence withering away (Collins, 1962: 172-3, 176-7).  See 
illuminating accounts and reports related to the conquest of the Mahdist regime and the “Fashoda 
incident” in for instance Abdel Rahim (1969), Bates (1984), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), Daly 
(1986), Henze (1991), Holt (1958), New York Times (1899), Ruay (1994), Tignor (1987), Vandervort 
(1998), Warburg (2003), and Weiss (1999). 
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borders were drawn to a large extent by the colonial powers according to their geo-
political aspirations, irrespective of local ethnic and geographical boundaries.90 
 
D. Early Borders of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
 
Source: H.W. Mardon, Memory Map Atlas, George Philip & Son Ltd.,  
The London Geographical Institute (1903) 
 
     Administrative Structures and Early Policies 
 
After the Anglo-Egyptian conquest it took decades for the new masters to establish their 
control over the territory. In the northern areas, there were communal uprisings, such as 
those of the Funj in 1919, the Garidi in 1925, and Eliri as late as 1929 (Ruay, 1994: 34). 
Darfur was granted an autonomous tributary position, but when Sultan Ali Dinar sided 
with the Ottomans in the World War I and turned against the British in 1915, Anglo-
Egyptian forces conquered the Sultanate, killed Dinar, and annexed the territory in 
1917.  
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 These new political boundaries affected populations in most parts of the condominium border.  
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In the southern territories, however, the campaigns to consolidate colonial authority 
continued in the form of punitive patrols extending to the 1930s. This effort to bring the 
southern frontier under centralized administration was initiated in 1918 (Johnson, 2003: 
9-10). Thus, the southern frontier continued in isolation from the centralized 
administration until well in the 20th century.   
 
During the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, areas which became known as “southern” 
Sudan and Darfur, influenced but hardly controlled by Turkiyyah and Mahdiyyah, were 
annexed to the centralized colonial polity through conquest. As a result, they became 
formally part of such a wider polity. Focusing on monopolizing political power for 
administration, the British introduced a paternalistic and bureaucratically authoritarian 
colonial government in charge of a provincial system under a Governor-General based 
in Khartoum (Tignor, 1987: 188). The administration relied partly on the legacies of 
previous Turkiyyah and Mahdiyyah, particularly in terms of governance, including the 
“divide and rule” logic, encouraging politically competitive ethnicity through 
“tribalism”, fomenting or reconfiguring ethnic and sectarian divisions among the 
subjected groups, and favoring only particular prominent sectors of society 
economically, socially, and politically (Tignor, 1987: 196-7; Daly, 1991: 396). In fact, 
according to El Zain (1996: 525) British governance accentuated the effects of ruling 
methods initiated during the Turkiyyah to the extent that “ . . . the tribe became 
‘tribalist’, the sect became ‘sectarianist’, and culture became a source of domination and 
racism”. The British sought to prevent any unity that could pose a threat similarly to the 
Mahdiyyah, or nation formation through convergence of political identity, and 
employed the “divide and rule” principle to encourage the “tribalization” of political 
identities to minimize such possibility. However, these efforts were conditioned by the 
pre-existing ethnic, cultural, and religious realities drawing from the dynamics of 
domination and racism, together with a highly exclusive Turkiyyah political system rife 
with favoritism, corruption, and mismanagement, marginalizing most sectors of the 
society (Daly, 1991: 395-6, 398). This legacy of governance and ruling methods 
reinforced during the Anglo-Egyptian period was later inherited by the post-colonial 
Sudan. 
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The British monopolized political power around the figure of the Governor-General91 
and political advisors who acted on behalf of the colonial government.92 The Governor-
General reported to the British Consul in Cairo and the Anglo-Egyptian administration, 
together with its counterpart in Egypt, acted under the supervision of the British Foreign 
Office, instead of the Colonial Office. This was owed partly to the fact that Egypt, 
which was an equal partner in administering the colony, was still legally under Ottoman 
authority (Tignor, 1987: 188). However, the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium was in 
practice a British colony and it is important to note that this monopolization of political 
authority through exclusive governance set the precedent for the political dynamics that 
prevailed in post-colonial Sudan despite efforts to create representative government 
during de-colonization.  
 
The organization of territorial governance was a result of an earlier experience. It owed 
much to the experience drawn from Dongola area, where during the Anglo-Egyptian 
conquest a type of military administration had been employed.93 Drawing on the model 
applied in Dongola, the British instituted a provincial system dividing the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium initially into six provinces, Dongola, Barbar, Kassala, Fashoda, 
Kordofan, and Khartoum. However, after World War I the number of provinces was 
increased to fourteen before it was finally cut back to nine, including Bahr al-Ghazal, 
Equatoria, and Upper Nile in the south (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 49; Daly, 1986: 72). At the 
early stages, a British military officer, assisted by British inspectors at district level, 
governed each province, while the Egyptian mamurs occupied lower level posts and 
were assisted at local level by local “tribal” leaders (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 49). However, 
the policy of indirect rule based on native administration, or rule by local leaders 
appointed by the government at the grassroots level did not become the core of the 
governance before the 1920s, and until then the local leaders did not receive pay (Abdel 
                                                 
91
 This official was always a British officer and held the supreme authority in the colony that he 
administered largely independently. The Governor-General officially served Egypt and was appointed by 
the Egyptian court with British recommendation, but he could neither be appointed nor dismissed without 
British approval (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 33). 
92
 In 1910, a practice of bringing together experts to make decisions on technical issues was 
institutionalized in a Governor-General’s Council, which consisted of an inspector general, civil, 
financial, and legal secretaries, and 2-4 other British officials appointed by the Governor-General (Abdel 
Rahim, 1969: 47). The council, over which Governor-General had veto power, took decisions on majority 
rule basis and was responsible for dictating ordinances, laws, regulations, and budget issues, and 
implementing policies to maximize benefits and minimize costs of the administration of the colony.     
93
 This had been based on a leadership of a commander, mudir, and divided into three areas and eleven 
districts, as it had been during the Turkiyyah, with British trained Egyptian military mamur in charge of 
each administrative unit (Daly, 1986: 71). 
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Rahim, 1969: 50-1). In the southern provinces the British military administrators dealt 
directly with the local leaders. The lack of employing Arabized individuals as 
administrators, or later allowing their movement in southern Sudan, reduced interaction 
and contributed to the maintenance of local animosities towards “Arabs”. Other colonial 
policies fomented these sentiments further. 
 
E. Provinces of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium 
 
Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection,  
University of Texas at Austin (2009) 
 
The type of administration established was a deliberate choice. In Africa generally, the 
colonial state had to be “all-powerful and arbitrary” (Ake, 2000: 35). Mazrui (1975) has 
called this type of concentration of political power “ethnocratic” since it seeks to 
monopolize power to one group by excluding others. In colonial Sudan, this group 
consisted originally of a reduced number of British and Egyptian administrators who 
represented state power and legitimacy over the vast territory with minimum resources 
by exploiting local alliances through nepotism and exclusive favoritism. Furthermore, 
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the British, who sought not to repeat the mistakes of the Turkiyyah, wanted an efficient, 
all powerful, and inexpensive government. 
 
At the highest level, British military personnel gradually gave way to a handful of 
highly educated civil servants. Initiated in 1905, the latter were the Sudan Political 
Service (SPS), mainly Oxford and Cambridge educated officials who became an 
Arabic-speaking ruling elite numbering approximately 140, and governing over 9 
million subjects (Meredith, 2005: 5; Collins, 2008: 35, 38). The colonial 
administration’s initial policies were aimed at consolidating its rule, having to rely 
largely on Egyptian personnel many of whom had served the Turkiyyah. Partly with the 
idea of curbing the threat of religiously incited revolution, exemplified by the 
Mahdiyyah, the British committed themselves to separating Church and State and 
diverting the attention of leading religious movements, such as the Khatmiyyah and neo-
Mahdists,94 away from politics and religion by granting them economic concessions 
(Sconyers, 1978: 38; Tignor, 1987: 197). In addition, criminal and penal codes were 
secularized following the Indian model, and the civil and religious laws were kept 
separate, while in the personal matters of the Muslim population customary law 
subjected to “Mohammedan” sharia courts was applied (Daly, 1986: 38-9, 61). Yet, the 
colonial state was authoritarian and exclusive, and the Governor-General exercised 
arbitrary power to appoint the judges of the religious courts along with other officials. 
 
3. Colonial Rule and Emergence of Nationalism in “Northern Sudan” 
 
This section deals with the colonial rule’s consolidation of the Arabized Muslim power 
elites in what became known as the “northern Sudan”, and the emergence of nationalism 
during the Condominium period. It shows how opportunities were created primarily for 
the prominent sectors of the central riverine Arabized groups some of whom embraced 
the opportunity to collaborate with the regime in order to elevate further their socio-
economic power and political importance. 
 
 
                                                 
94
 The term “neo-Mahdist” is commonly acknowledged and refers to the Mahdist movement after the 
Mahdiyyah under leadership of Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi. It is used here henceforth to refer to the 
Mahdist movement since the Anglo-Egyptian conquest.  
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     Emergence and Consolidation of Power Elites 
 
In the course of the Condominium rule both accumulation of economic wealth and 
reinvestment became growingly important in defining socio-economic power within the 
colonial polity. Since the British were aware that part of the reason for the demise of the 
Egyptian colonial rule over Sudan during Turkiyyah had been heavy taxation of the 
population, they oriented extraction of government revenue towards taxing cotton. As a 
result, Condominium subjects were lightly taxed in relation to a number of other 
African colonies, and prominent subjects were able to accumulate significant fortunes 
that enabled them to increase their socio-economic status and political influence.  
 
As cotton growing became concentrated in large schemes, small farmers became more 
and more excluded, resulting in uneven socio-economic patterns. For instance, the 
Gezira scheme hardly had an effect on most people who were subsistence-oriented 
farmers (Daly, 1986:  428). In contrast, the socioeconomic effects of the large cotton 
schemes favored the economic prominence of chiefs and other heads of communities 
who controlled the land in the area where schemes were located. According to Niblock 
(1987: 15), “Large landowners (mostly tribal leaders) were able to obtain a significantly 
larger share in the scheme than smaller landowners or those without land”. Since many 
village leaders were also able to register communal land as their private property, they 
became large landowners and able to accumulate wealth within the schemes. They often 
benefited from government economic favors oriented to minimize possible security 
threats of traditional leaders with their influence over the local populations.  
 
Consequently, a major socioeconomic implication of early British policies was the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the already prominent social actors, which 
gradually increased their importance. Holding economic power often meant gaining 
political influence, particularly for those who were socially well established. The pattern 
of economic power that emerged in the early Condominium period therefore led to two 
kinds of economic inequality that had deep political implications (Niblock, 1987: 49). 
The first was socio-economic, allowing those who benefited from the Condominium 
rule to reinvest and strengthen their economic and political status, while the second was 
“regional”, referring to the deliberate concentration of economic development to the 
central riverine areas, leaving other areas largely untouched. Niblock (1987: 49) states 
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that these inequalities “ . . . were crucial: together, they have given Sudanese politics its 
particular dynamics”. This is because they have concentrated the political power for the 
privileged groups in the center and created grievances in the marginalized periphery.     
 
Moreover, the British policies encouraged the strengthening of an economic elite which 
played an important role in the process of de-colonization and later in national politics. 
The most significant groupings within this were religious and ethnic leaders, merchants, 
and high civil servants or politicians (Niblock, 1987:  50). However, the Condominium 
policy also pushed the majority of subjects to become increasingly economically 
marginalized, and permitted for instance the exploitation of slave labor to continue 
(Niblock, 1987: 49; Daly, 1986: 234).    
 
Religious leaders were among the best positioned to benefit economically from the 
Condominium rule. This was particularly the case with the leading families of the Sufi 
orders, the neo-Mahdist and the Khatmiyyah movements.95 The British initially 
supported the Khatmiyyah, the rival of the neo-Mahdist movement having taken refuge 
in Sawakin during the Mahdiyyah, but after realizing its pro-Egyptian proclivities 
shifted towards endorsing the neo-Mahdists (Tignor, 1987: 197). Egypt, in turn, sought 
to support the Khatmiyyah, which projected the dualism of co-dominium rule in the 
local context.96 Referring to the leader of the neo-Mahdists, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-
Mahdi, Beshir (1974: 141) notes that “On Aba Island alone he had a labour force of 
about 4500. He was in 1936, by any standards, economically prosperous and politically 
important”.  
 
As a result, rivalry between the movements persisted as their economic power helped to 
increase their following. Each required extensive economic resources to feed their 
patron-client networks and social bases (Tignor, 1987: 197). Aware of his, the British 
played the one against the other to minimize the risk of uprisings, while both 
                                                 
95
 This owes to them having played an important role in pre-Condominium politics, having strong 
centralized organizations and commanding large amount of followers, and the British being eager to 
divert their attention from political and religious agitation against the regime by favoring them with 
privileged treatment and economic concessions. 
96
 For instance, the British initially endorsed the economic standing of the head of the Khatmiyyah, 
Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, who received substantial allowances including land in the Red Sea area and 
elsewhere in the northern provinces to develop agriculture, while the Condominium government also 
gave land to the leader of the Mahdist movement, Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi, and converted a 
substantial loan made to him in 1926 into a gift (Beshir, 1974: 141; Niblock, 1987: 52). 
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movements used strategies of extraversion through their domestic and international 
leverage, shifting between collaboration and opposition in response to colonial policies.  
 
Although the religious leaders were the protagonists of the struggle for economic and 
political power, leaders of local groups in the cotton producing areas also played a role 
in the formation of the economic elites. Integral to the system of native administration 
that guaranteed the British policy of indirect rule in the remoter areas, they grew in 
importance (Niblock, 1987: 53-4). Particularly after mid-1920s nationalist uprising the 
local leaders in administration became pronounced because the British expulsed many 
Egyptian civil servants and deemed younger educated Arab-Muslims and “detribalized 
Blacks”97 as unreliable as substitutes (Sharkey, 2003: 78-80). In 1927, the Powers of 
Sheiks Ordinance gave the local leaders a growingly prominent role as they were 
granted legal authority over tribal courts and local policing to enforce customary law 
(Johnson, 1991; Sharkey, 2003: 81). This also entailed economic benefits since the 
government backed them in collecting taxes and when the influence of these strongmen 
extended over semi-urban areas in the northern provinces, inhabited mostly by 
merchants, they were able to accumulate prosperity through control over trade licenses 
and commercial activities (Niblock, 1987: 53).  
 
Historically, merchants had played a prominent social and economic role in the area. 
Many of them benefited from the Condominium rule as the relative political stability, 
renewed economic growth, and expansion of cash economy allowed opportunities 
particularly in export trade. Although the Condominium period witnessed the arrival of 
Greek, Lebanese, and Syrian traders, similarly to the Turkiyyah,98 local jallaba, headed 
by the al-Shaykh Mustafa al-Amin family, occupied a significant role in the export 
business (Tignor, 1987: 195-6).99 Thus, in the southern provinces and elsewhere in the 
periphery trade remained among the most lucrative activities for accumulating wealth, 
but it was largely controlled by the jallaba and foreign companies and individuals 
(Niblock, 1987: 146). This strengthened the position of those jallaba participating in the 
regional and international trade networks, and benefiting from high gum arabic prices 
                                                 
97
 Sharkey (2003) calls those southerners who have to an extent been assimilated to “northern” social 
order as “detribalized Blacks”.   
98
 For instance, Condomichalos & Co., George Haggar Company, and M. D. Bittar family company. 
99
 While British and Greek companies dominated the import trade, the jallaba largely organized the 
exportation of gum arabic, livestock, and oilseeds (Niblock, 1987: 55-7). 
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and the booming exports after the construction of the railroad to El Obeid (Daly, 1986: 
217-8). In addition, by the 1940s and 1950s the exportation of livestock, principally to 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, together with a flourishing oilseed trade, became concentrated 
in the hands of gradually more prominent merchants, who due to their increasing 
financial wealth, were in a position to reinvest (Niblock, 1987: 56-9).100 Some jallaba 
also invested in education, which contributed to certain individuals gaining a significant 
role in the Arabized power elites. 
 
The fourth group or individuals that gained prominence during the Condominium period 
were civil servants in high positions and professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and 
engineers who became part of the power elites.101 However, it was not until the 1950s 
when individuals from this group began “ . . . to acquire urban real estate, and a small 
number were investing in mechanised dry farming, pump schemes and contracting 
businesses” (Niblock, 1987: 60). Thus, it took until independence before civil servants 
and professionals were in a position to exercise their newly acquired political and 
economic power. 
 
Finally, it is important to note here that southerners residing in the northern provinces 
also continued to work in this area, where most of the economic development took 
place. Although a large part of this labor, who as slaves made up one 1/3 of the 
population of the northern provinces by 1898 (Spaulding, 1982), the government was 
generally unwilling to free slaves because it would have agitated prominent sectors of 
Arabized Muslims, but also because the colony suffered from a labor shortage (Daly, 
1986: 235-9). Apart from slaves, the labor shortage was partly alleviated by West 
African Muslim migrants, fellata, who largely settled around the Blue Nile and worked 
primarily in agriculture with low pay (Daly, 1986: 238). Also, many Darfurians 
migrated to the area. In other words, economic growth in central regions during Anglo-
Egyptian period, similarly to earlier times, was based on labor from the marginalized 
peripheries under supervision of an Arabized Muslim middle and upper class, and a 
British political elite.    
                                                 
100
 Many expanded their commercial networks, engaged in food processing, or petty manufacturing, such 
as flour milling, printing, or production of consumer goods such as soaps, soft drinks, and sweets, 
extending their power in the local economic structures (Niblock, 1987: 58-9; Tignor, 1987: 195-6). 
101
 This took place after a Condominium government committee instituted in 1946 made a plan in 1948 to 
Sudanize slightly over 62% of the positions held by foreign administrators within 14 years (Abdel Rahim, 
1969: 158). In the end, this was undertaken much faster, which became highly contentious. 
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     Colonial Policies, Social Hierarchy, and Construction of “Northern Sudan” 
 
The British policies reinforced institutionalized cultural rift by emphasizing differences 
between Arabized Muslims of the northern provinces and the Nilotic and non-Nilotic 
Blacks in the southern territories by favoring parts of prominent sectors of the 
significant groups. When implemented with the Southern Policy, which isolated the 
three southern provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile102 administratively 
from other parts of the colony, the administration subjected them to a distinct policy that 
hindered a formation of common political consciousness.  In addition, a policy of 
“tribalism”, or creating new boundaries of ethnic politics by reshaping groups and their 
leadership, became “ . . . largely responsible for the legacy of backwardness in the 
South and for magnifying the superiority/inferiority syndrome which characterized 
relations between South and North” (Ruay, 1994: 42). Thus, the cultural labeling 
encouraged two forms of cultural domination and racism, relevant to the Anglo-
Egyptian policies and the colonial society.  
 
First, British colonial racism, influenced by 19th century Victorian intellectual currents 
emphasizing of social and cultural progress, initially affected the Condominium as a 
whole. But soon it came to categorize between the northern “Arabs” and the southern 
“Blacks”, or “detribalized Blacks” of southern origin living in northern part of the 
colony providing labor (Sharkey, 2003: 20-1). Despite the emergence of abolitionist 
ideas “ . . . the second half of the 19th century saw increased ideological elaboration of 
white supremacist attitudes, supported by pseudoscientific arguments associated with 
social Darwinism and related ideologies” (van Dijk, 1993: 55). This is important partly 
because the colony became to be considered semi-civilized relative to what was seen as 
its more sophisticated neighbor, Egypt, while southern provinces were deemed largely 
savage, legitimizing the European over-rule that was deemed instructive and civilizing.  
 
Indirect rule, native administration, and later Southern Policy that sought to isolate 
southern provinces from northern political and cultural influences, were all based on 
“tribalism”.103 This policy neutralized homogenizing forces of state centralization and 
                                                 
102
 This policy was also applied to the Nuba of the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordofan. 
103
 Eriksen (1993: 88) argues that “Contemporary ethnicity, or ‘tribalism’, is not . . . relic in the past but a 
product of modernization processes leading up to the present”. 
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encouraged identity and cultural distinctions and segregation through exclusionary 
politics. Such ethnic politics became the order of today in Sudan with far reaching 
consequences. 
 
Second, coexisting with “tribalism”, the generations old northern socio-cultural attitudes 
and racism towards the southern peoples continued throughout the Anglo-Egyptian 
period. Once slaves became more accessible commodity and prevalent in the northern 
provinces, the sphere of activities dedicated for slave labor increased, and even poorer 
northern riverine families could hold one or two slaves (Sharkey, 2003: 19). Spaulding 
(1988) points out that the persistence of slavery constituted the principal context 
through which the constructed “social race”, as socio-cultural Arab-Muslim led 
domination and subjugation, was manifested (Deng, 1995a: 369-400, 484-5). Despite 
the gradual curbing of slave trade, the attitude of supremacy of the Arabized Muslim 
peoples over the southern Blacks was reinforced by continuing domestic slavery, to 
which the British initially turned a blind eye, concentrating on eradicating international 
slave-trade (Daly, 1986: 232-239; Jok, 2001: 6). In addition, slave raids still took place 
and slaves were smuggled through the largely uncontrolled western and eastern borders, 
for instance, to French Sudan and Ethiopia (Daly, 1986: 444-5; Jok, 2001: 95). Despite 
occasional crackdown of slave traders, the practice was not suppressed and slave labor 
was even encouraged by the Sudan Government at times when faced with rising labor 
costs in cotton schemes (Daly, 1986: 442-5). According to O’Fahey (2002: 56), “ . . . 
the very intimacy of this small-scale slave-owning created a very peculiarly Sudanese 
form of racism”, and unable and unwilling to eradicate the widespread practice of 
domestic slave holding in “northern Sudan”, the British simply dealt with it by calling 
slaves “servants” and owners “masters” (Daly, 1986: 239; Sharkey, 2003: 18). Thus, 
during the colonial period and in contemporary Sudan, this racial categorization in 
which “African” is deemed subordinate to a superior “Arab” ensured power of the 
Arabized elites and allowed subjugation to continue (Jok, 2001: 7).  
 
Moreover, slavery became more and more a structural condition and slaves as major 
provider of labor when the prominent sectors of the Arabized Muslim elites 
monopolized the nationalist political movement and later national politics, imposing 
their own cultural identity and racial views buttressed by the colonial order particularly 
in “northern Sudan” which became increasingly viewed as a “regional” entity as 
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opposed to the southern provinces. When sectors of these elites came to power after 
colonization, these views became integral part of institutions and policies of the 
marginalizing state. 
 
Consequently, racism and enslavement of southerners form part of constructed 
“northern” Arabized Muslim identity dictated by those in power. The perceived Arab 
superiority is also linked to a particular interpretation of glorifying Arab history of 
conquest and with colonial policies, which the British oriented deliberately in favor of 
Arabized Muslim elite collaborators granting them almost exclusive selective access to 
economic opportunities and higher education in Gordon College in Khartoum (Sharkey, 
2003: 21, 23, 24). Over time growingly employed in the colonial administration, these 
elites became familiar with the dynamics and governance practices of the colonial state 
that marginalized the large majority of the population through economic exclusion. A 
cultural and racial justification of superiority was important part of this deliberate 
creation of poverty as a mechanism to control the masses by a reduced ruling clique 
during colonialism (Munene, 2001). Consequently, sectors of the Arabized Muslim elite 
in power in post-colonial Sudan applied this culturally legitimized concept, along with 
its knowledge of the dynamics of colonial governance, in its exclusive policies that have 
continued to create poverty and marginalize the majority of the population until today.  
  
Partly because of the elite interest to maintain hegemony, the issue of slavery as a 
justification for differentiation and the prevailing social hierarchy has continued to 
persist as intimately related to the Sudanese “Arab” identity. According to O’Fahey 
(2002: 56),  
Virtually every Sudanese . . . [has experienced] discrimination in Egypt and 
elsewhere in the Arab world. The discrimination they [Arab Muslim 
northerners] impose on their Southern or Western co-citizens is imposed upon 
them as they go down the Nile.  
Thus, it has become increasingly important for the Arabized populations to emphasize 
their “Arab” identity. According to Jok (2001: 77) part of this identity is manifested in  
. . . a conception that Arabism has a superior rank to Africanism, based on the 
way they view the racial hierarchy. A problem, however, arises when it comes to 
those Northerners with physical features such as pigmentation, shape of the 
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nose, and hair texture that are typically African. Most people in the North share 
these features with Southerners, and yet regard themselves as Arab. 
Hence, it has been necessary to use other means to justify this constructed “Arab” 
identity, identified with social, economic, and political prominence, which has resulted 
in embracing correct Arabic language, attained through education, and “pure” Islam, 
and creation of ethno-history through Arab or Muslim genealogies (Eriksen, 1993: 94; 
Jok, 2001: 77; Johnson, 2006: 95). As a result, the northern Sudanese racism towards 
the southerners is part of constructing and asserting their “Arab”-Muslim identity that 
dominates the social hierarchy, and distinguishes the southerners as marginalized 
others, justifying the exclusive political and economic power of the Arabized Muslim 
elites through the logic of cultural superiority. This view of Arab cultural superiority 
has become an important element in the construction of “northern” Sudan perceived as 
one Muslim region according to the interests of the Arabized elites in central areas that 
seek to dominate it.104 
 
     Nationalism and Political Consolidation of “Northern” Power Elites 
 
In March 1919, a nationalist revolt in Egypt against British overrule105 caused an abrupt 
change in the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. This resulted in 
British reactionary policy because officials feared Egyptian incitation of the educated 
Arabized riverine nationalists through a “Unity of the Nile Valley” and other political 
currents (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 24; Collins, 2008: 37) to which some attached 
themselves through their social networks and educational attainment in places such as 
the Gordon College, Cairo, or Beirut.106 However, they did not prevent disturbances in 
northern areas of the colony organized by members of Arabized riverine elites in 1920-
4,107 which buried large-scale Sudanization of public administrations for decades and 
deteriorated the relations between the government and the educated cadres well into the 
                                                 
104
 Based on author’s interviews and observations in the riverine region and Khartoum in November 
2005. 
105
 According to Abdel Rahim (1969: 58), “ . . . resentment of the formal declaration of their country as a 
British protectorate, the apparent success of the Arab Revolt of 1916, and President Wilson’s fourteen 
points and doctrine of self-determination greatly stimulated the already-growing sentiment of nationalism 
in Egypt”. 
106
 Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. 
107
 These first nationalist protests in 1920-4 were led by politically active Arabized Muslims of the 
Sudanese Union Society (SUS), which consisted of junior government officials, army staff, merchants, 
workers, clerks, and judges. 
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1930s (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 65; Daly, 1986: 292-6). Among the most prominent 
nationalist leaders during this time were Ali Abd al-Latif of Dinka origin and Obeid 
Haq al-Amin who together founded the White Flag League (WFL).108 Al-Latif’s 
prominent role in the early nationalist movement provides evidence of the flexibility of 
ethnic and “tribal” boundaries among the educated sectors of the society, and shows to 
an extent that the widely argued incompatibilities between the “northerners” and the 
“southerners” are not inherent or primordial but constructed, and often manipulated and 
politicized to serve particular purposes of elites.  
 
At least two major developments emerged from the nationalist uprisings. While having 
first claimed that Egypt had legitimate rights over the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 
the British now attempted to disconnect it from politically turbulent Egypt and the 
influence of its nationalists. The first step was to minimize the reliance on Egyptian 
personnel through Sudanization of public administration since compensating with 
additional British officials would have been too expensive.  
 
Secondly, in 1920 indirect rule through native administration was made a doctrine. It 
was applied in part as a remedy to minimize Egyptian influence and curb those elites 
affected by nationalism, by reinforcing power of traditional leaders along “tribal” logic, 
creating divisions between the nationalist clique and connected Sufi movements, and 
largely less educated rural “tribal” leadership to minimize challenges to the British 
overrule (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 67; El Zain, 1987: 17-23, 1996: 525; Daly, 1991: 413). 
Thus, apart from their already existing tax collecting duty, the judicial and 
administrative power of “tribal” leaders increased and their responsibilities were 
extended to tax assessment, and road, well, and other water storage facility 
maintenance, while they were granted the right to exercise customary law at the local 
level, whenever it did not substantially contradict British interests, and encouraged to 
expand their following through amalgamation and homogenization of communities by 
reaching over ethnic boundaries (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 68-70; Ruay, 1994: 40-1; El Zain, 
1996: 526). This benefited also the leaders themselves who strengthened their position 
                                                 
108
 In May 1923, Ali Abd al-Latif of Dinka origin, and Obeid Haq al-Amin founded the WFL upon al-
Latif’s release from prison, after having been jailed because of writing a controversial article calling for 
Sudanese self-determination, the WFL accounting for a wide support in the northern provinces and 
becoming the earliest manifestation of coherent nationalism with ability to carry out demonstrations (Abu 
Hasabu, 1985: 45-6; Deng, 1995a: 104-5; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 24). 
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and found more opportunities to extravert benefits from the British administration (El 
Zain, 1996: 526). According to El Zain (1996: 525, 526) the promotion of “tribalism”, 
originating in the Turkiyyah period when the Egyptian administration converted the Sufi 
leaders and local shayks as the intermediaries of its policy of extraction, was 
institutionalized in the governance structures and “ . . . within the power relations of the 
colonial system . . . ” and “ . . . governs power relations in Sudanese politics today”, 
making “tribalism” and sectarianism “ . . . the two pillars of the Sudanese political 
system”. This institutionalization of colonial governance practices, characterized by 
creation of “tribal” ethnic divisions that politicized geographical and psychological 
boundaries along regional, ethno-cultural, and religious lines, developed strong political 
and economic networks that have allowed the “tribal” logic to withstand attempts of 
creating non-ethnicized local administrative structures.109  
 
However, in the 1930s the northern nationalists found new room for maneuvering. This 
was largely due to regional and international events that affected local context because 
in 1935 Italians who had been in Libya since 1911 invaded Abyssinia and threatened 
both British position in northeastern Africa and Egyptian interests in the Nile. This 
prompted, on 26 August 1936, a Treaty of Alliance between Britain and Egypt, inviting 
Egyptian military and civilians back to Sudan, reinitiating the Anglo-Egyptian 
competition over local and regional influence (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 84-5, 120-1). 
Exploiting this rivalry through political and economic extraversion, the local 
nationalists found renewed space to express their demands and in 1938 the Gordon 
Memorial College graduates founded the Graduates’ General Congress (GC) that 
consisted exclusively of educated Arabized Muslims and assumed the role of a 
mouthpiece of “Sudanese” nationalism (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 25). Thus, the 
kind of nationalism advocated became equal to the identity of this power elite.   
 
In the course of the late 1930s the government restored its education policy, originally 
marked by the foundation of the Gordon Memorial College, and aimed at expanding the 
educated class. This led to the establishment of the GC as the leader of nationalist 
                                                 
109
 At the local level, “tribalism” became paramount enduring political system and has endured efforts of 
implementation of new forms of local government that have chronically lacked sufficient economic basis 
and incentives to co-opt prominent local actors, and thus stimulated “tribal” leader opposition and 
empowered “tribalism” (El Zain, 1996: 523, 526).    
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political activity and claiming to represent the interests of the Sudanese, which in turn 
culminated in 1942 in a twelve-point memorandum submitted by the GC to the 
Condominium government. In the memorandum it demanded self-rule, more 
educational opportunities, increased participation in the administration, reversal of the 
Southern Policy through abolition of the Closed District Ordinance and the restrictions 
on trade and movement, and cancellation of subventions to missionary schools in charge 
of education in southern provinces and adhering their syllabuses with those in the 
northern provinces (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 109; Ruay, 1994: 49). This Arabized Muslim 
intelligentsia perceived the barriers as “ . . . typical machiavellian devices aimed at 
prolonging the British rule and to separate the South from the North” (Ruay 1994: 49), 
and claimed the southern provinces as an integral part of the “northern Sudan” largely 
due to historical and economic reasons. The southern issue was paramount in 
consolidating alliances within the central Arabized elites, which hoped to extend their 
power over the southern provinces, resume the extraction of commodities and resources 
from the area, and advance Arab-Muslim cultural assimilation.  
 
However, the authorities responded initially with an attempt to split the nationalist 
movement. The administration claimed initially that the GC’s demands were not 
justified because it represented only a fraction of the society. It continued to provide 
deliberate uneven support to nationalist factions, which tore the movement along two 
lines, the neo-Mahdists raising the slogan ‘Sudan for Sudanese’ and the pro-Egyptian 
Khatmiyyah that promoted the “Unity of the Nile Valley” (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 109; 
Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26). Although many sources indicate this factional 
rivalry being the order of the day, it only involved privileged cadres of the Arabized 
Muslim elite who defended common interests in “regional” issues.  
 
4. Colonial Power in Southern Sudan 
 
This section shows how colonial power articulated generally in the periphery creating 
“regional” imbalances and more specifically in southern Sudan through the British 
Southern Policy. It demonstrates how poverty and incompatibilities were created in the 
course of economic development and based on the 19th century memory.  
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     Increasing “Regional” Imbalances  
 
Policies during the Condominium period deepened the development divide between 
distinct territories and contributed to the establishment of persistent socio-economic 
inequality between different groups of the population. However, differences in the level 
of economic development, political awareness, social and cultural reality, and distinct 
status had already been established before the British engaged in such deliberate policy 
of differentiation (Johnson, 2003: 8). Since the British had originally conquered the 
Mahdiyyah for external reasons rather than due to the interest in the region itself, they 
had little interest in developing it (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 23) except towards 
economic self-sufficiency to cover administrative costs. However, increased gum arabic 
and cotton exports, which made the colony an important producer even in terms of the 
world market, and improved communications laid a foundation for “growth pole” 
pattern of economic development that became concentrated on the north-central areas, 
the Nile Valley of the Three Towns area and north of Khartoum, Gezira between the 
Blue and White Nile immediately south of Khartoum, central Kordofan, and the 
southern part of Kassala province (Niblock, 1987: 143; Kebbede, 1999: 12). As 
Warburg (2003: 140) affirms, “Thereby Greater Khartoum, with only 6 per cent of the 
population, contained 85 per cent of all commercial companies; 80 per cent of all banks; 
seventy three percent of all industrial establishments and 70 per cent of all industrial 
labour”. These areas central to the colonial political economy contained the 
administrative centers and the major agricultural schemes, with privileged sectors of the 
population benefiting exclusively from higher education and more elaborated health 
services. 
 
However, in the absence of serious development schemes elsewhere, significant 
investment was not directed to other parts of the colony, Gezira being the only 
exception.110 This pattern of economic concentration caused general underdevelopment 
of remote parts (Dhal, 2004: 15). As a result, the population in more remote territories 
                                                 
110
 The imbalance of the economic development was of such magnitude that by 1955-6 Khartoum, 
Northern, and Kassala provinces received 60%, the three southern provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, 
and Upper Nile 5%, and the west, Kordofan and Darfur 12% of the overall private, governmental, and 
public corporation investment (Harvie and Kleve, 1959: 88). This was demographically disproportionate 
since at that the time the combined population of Khartoum, Northern, and Kassala provinces was 
approximately 2,319,000, while that of the southern provinces was an estimated 2,783,000, and that of 
Kordofan and Darfur 3,091,000 (Niblock, 1987: 144). 
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was marginalized in terms of economic opportunities and remained subsistence 
oriented, while the central areas experienced economic growth.111 Also, since the vast 
majority of the peripheral populations were poorly educated, they were deprived of 
public positions, which favored the central riverine groups whose elites became to 
dominate the public employment through reinvigorated Sudanization process during late 
colonial period (Markakis, 1998: 111; Jok, 2007: 81-2). Many sources fail to mention 
that this generated grievances specifically among some of the elites in the peripheral 
areas and also maintained the local populations of the remote territories without a 
possibility to participate in the centralized state or gain benefits from its services.  
 
These regional economic differences had demographic and political effects. While the 
British sought to use divide and rule strategies to minimize the development of common 
political and economic grievances, the policies produced urbanization and migration to 
more prosperous areas and at times stimulated regionalist political sentiments among 
local elites in the peripheries since economic development and job opportunities in 
these marginalized areas were scarce (Niblock, 1987: 143-7; Markakis, 1998: 108). This 
was particularly the case of the southern provinces during the last years of the colonial 
era in which the emerging local elites perceived their cultural differences, slavery, and 
prevailing social hierarchy, as causes for their marginalization and sufficient reasons to 
justify mobilization for a regionalist political movement.  This was less so in other parts 
of the periphery of the colonial state because they were largely Muslim, partly 
Arabized, and more integrated to the politics and economics of the central areas through 
their leadership or voluntary labor migration.  
 
The condition of marginality in relation to the colonial state in which the peripheral 
populations continued to live in, fed already existing hostile attitudes towards the 
central administration among some groups. According to Niblock (1987: 147), “Their 
main contact with the state was through those organs which sought to tax, administer 
and control them” and the absence of education and services or tangible social contract, 
these populations were not in a position to benefit from state provided education and 
social services that concentrated in the north central administrative centers. When 
                                                 
111
 The standard of living varied greatly between provinces. While the three northern provinces and the 
Blue Nile summed 33 and 42 Sudanese pounds (S£) per capita by 1955-6, respectively, the three southern 
provinces produced only S£14 (Harvie and Kleve, 1959: 80). 
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awareness of these imbalances and unequal treatment became more widespread, it 
generated animosity particularly in the southern provinces where the local educated 
elites instrumentalized such sentiments to serve their political objectives. 
 
Finally, an interaction between social, historical, and cultural realities and economic 
deprivation contributed to a specific political trajectory in the periphery. The presence 
of alien but extractive central administration, uneven development, and socio-economic 
deprivation relative to the core, all contributed to the emergence of discontent.112 This 
took place when the elites in these regions regarded themselves ethnically or racially 
different in response to the politicized Arabized Muslim cultural project of the central 
riverine power elite, and constructed and reinforced the sense of difference propelled by 
the history of conflict and slavery with sections of the Arabized population and the 
differential treatment by the Condominium government.           
 
     Anglo-Egyptian Rule in Southern Sudan 
 
During the early Anglo-Egyptian period, resistance in the southern territories against the 
centralized administration took a pattern similar to the 19th century.113 Military 
expeditions against Dinka resistance were not completed until 1927 and even then some 
of the Dinka posed a threat to the colonial administrators until 1932 (Mawut, 1983: 21-
39; Meredith, 2005: 4). Moreover, the British organized their last military campaign in 
all Sub-Saharan Africa from 1928 to 1930 that resulted in the effective colonization of 
the Nuer in southern provinces (Hutchinson, 1996: 115). The conquest of the main 
Dinka and Nuer groups, which paved way for colonial control of the main areas in the 
southern provinces, was made possible in part by conflicts among various groups of the 
Dinka themselves, which were encouraged, and continuing warfare and raiding activity 
involving sections of Dinka, Baggara, Murle, and Nuer, which weakened all of these 
groups in the face of the British colonial consolidation (Mawut, 1983: 46). However, it 
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 For instance, regionalist movements surfaced later in the periphery among those groups excluded from 
the economic benefits generated during the Condominium, such as the Fur in Darfur, the Nuba of 
southern Kordofan, the Beja of Kassala, and the Equatorians in southern Sudan (Niblock, 1987: 146). 
113
 According to Alier (1990: 13-4) two types of leaders were significant in the resistance: “One of these 
was the religious man who gained his following through the administration of his spiritual powers to 
members of the community in need. He was either prophet or in possession of supernatural powers . . . ” 
and  “The second category of leaders of resistance gained community respect . . . through . . . acts of 
bravery and courage . . . settlement of disputes in the community and improvement in its welfare and yet 
others through inheritance from ancestors”. 
140        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
was also collaboration with local leaders that enabled the British to extent their 
influence in the area. 
 
Yet, many parts of southern territories remained without effective government presence. 
Ruay (1994: 34) has even argued that “ . . . it was doubtful whether there was any real 
submission to the foreign rule”. Similarly to other parts of British Africa, the colonial 
administration’s power was established and largely maintained from larger population 
centers through occasional military patrols and native administration (indirect rule), 
rather than effective state presence or supervision of the local administration. However, 
not many resources were forwarded to administer or develop southern areas 
economically, as the motivation to extend Anglo-Egyptian administration southwards “ 
. . . depended not on a desire to develop the resources or to meet the needs of the area 
itself, but on the decision to safeguard the Nile’s waters as an inevitable extension of the 
British occupation of Egypt” (Gray, 1961: 203). Consequently, territories that became 
the southern provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, were incorporated 
to the colonial system as a marginal part in the periphery.  
 
As one reaction to the Egyptian and Sudanese nationalist uprisings the British 
implemented the Southern Policy. However, although dictated by the Closed District 
Ordinance Act of 1920, the Passport and Permit Ordinance Act of 1922, and Permits to 
Trade Ordinance Act of 1925, this policy was not fully implemented until 1930 (Abdel 
Rahim, 1969: 75-6; Daly, 1986: 413, 1993: 8; Niblock, 1987: 153-4; de Chand, 2000: 
15). It was designed to replace the punitive patrols through isolated local administration 
curbing northern influences, brought by the jallaba, nationalism, and cultural 
assimilation through Arabization and Islamization, which some British viewed as 
detrimental to the southern provinces, and encouraged “tribalism” through native 
administration, established security apparatus based on territorial command, and 
promoting mission education, Christianity, English, and vernacular languages, despite 
rudimentary Arabic being spoken in parts of the southern territories, and considering a 
possibility of annexing southern provinces to other British colonial possessions in East 
Africa (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 71, 75-83; Woodward, 1995: 94; Keen, 2001: 223). 
 
The southern provinces were to become a buffer obstructing the spread of Arabic and 
Islamic influence to Sub-Saharan East Africa. The British perceived it as an area that 
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had to be protected and developed along its more “natural” direction through the system 
of indirect rule by native administration that was perceived cost-effective, with the 
missionaries allowed to Christianize and educate small numbers of southerners 
(Sharkey, 2003: 81; Rolandsen, 2005: 24). The missionary involvement was not only 
seen as more desirable than the spread of Arabic culture and Islam, but it was perceived 
to satisfy to an extent the government promotion of development initiatives. It resulted 
in interaction with outsiders that defied common hostility of a number of local 
communities towards external influences.114  
 
Although historically divided along a number of ethnic affinities, the Condominium 
Southern Policy considered southern provinces as one loose entity subjected to same 
general policy of differentiation from what the authorities viewed as the “northern” 
region. Markakis (1998: 107) notes that 
. . . colonial rule in . . . Southern Sudan promoted a degree of regional 
integration through the establishment of institutions and processes linking the 
various districts and ethnic groups within each region, and provided them with a 
common vested interest in the existence of these institutions and processes. 
This contributed to the perception of southern areas as “the South”, a politically defined 
“native” or “Black” and inherently “African” and “savage” cultural and regional entity 
opposite to the more sophisticated “Arab” and “Muslim” “North”. 
 
The colonial authorities set up a system of indirect rule along Lugardian principles115 
and southern provinces were isolated from northern areas. This was undertaken not only 
as a response to nationalist currents, but also aimed to suppress slave trade, curb the 
political influence of the two religious movements, the neo-Mahdists and Khatmiyyah 
that were becoming increasingly powerful, and to minimize a remaining threat posed by 
two southern leaders, Ngundeng and Ariadhdit (Alier 1990: 17-8). Elimination of Arab 
and Islamic influence in the southern provinces became an objective to protect Sub-
Saharan regions, favoring Christianity and mission education as “civilizing” forces 
according to Lugard’s proposals, promoting English and vernacular languages, and 
consolidating “tribalism” as a tool of governance similarly to the northern provinces 
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 Based on an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese, 24 September 2008 in Juba. 
115
 This was a product of Frederick Lugard’s views of how to conduct colonization outlined in his The 
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922). 
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(Abdel Rahim, 1969: 73-5, 79).116 Since the southern provinces were seen to play an 
important geo-strategic role to “ . . . block out Arabism and Islam from Black Africa” 
(Ruay, 1994: 38), by 1920 it was argued that they were to be separated from the rest of 
the colony (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 75). In coherence with such thinking was an idea that 
circulated among the British authorities of an eventual incorporation of southern 
provinces to British East Africa due to their supposed closer cultural affinity than with 
northern areas (Sconyers, 1978: 58).  
 
This idea gained intensity as a result of a Milner Commission report. The report 
suggested measures of decentralization and its directive statement in 1930 was issued to 
prepare the southern provinces to be annexed to the British East Africa (Sconyers, 1978: 
58; Niblock, 1987: 153). Yet, this policy was never implemented, in part because it 
would have required redrawing colonial boundaries and was rejected by the British 
administrators in East Africa who were not interested in annexing the unproductive 
South to their territories (Niblock, 1987: 157). Another factor was Egyptian and 
northern Sudanese nationalists’ resistance because both wanted to secure their own 
economic and political interests, the former hoping to control the Nile waters by 
eventually annexing Sudan, and the latter to extend political influence and resume 
economic activities in the region. Still, during later 1920s a decision was reached about 
isolating the three southern provinces from the northern Arabic and Islamic influences 
(Daly, 1986: 406), which “ . . . was to deepen and enhance the differences between the 
Southern and Northern parts of the Sudan” (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 73). 
       
As a result, the British sought to subject the southern provinces exclusively to Western 
influences117 and withdrew military units composed of Arabized Muslim soldiers. The 
British military administrators of the southern provinces, the “Bog Barons”, who 
considered that such troops spread Arabic and Muslim influence, decided to create a 
local military force officered by the British. Consequently, the Southern Equatoria 
Corps (SEC) were founded and the last northern soldiers were removed in 1917 
                                                 
116
 Kitchener’s memorandum from 1892 describes the general sentiment among the leading British cadres 
as it claims that “Unless the Christian powers held their own in Africa, the Mohammedan Arabs will I 
believe step in and in the center of the continent will form a base from which they will be able to drive 
back all civilizing influences to the coast, and the country will then be given up to slavery and misrule as 
is the case in the Sudan at present” (quoted in Collins, 1971: 17).   
117
 However this was not altogether coherent as in 1932 a dispute between the British and Egyptian over 
construction of a mosque for the jallaba who remained in Juba resulted in the former to agree to build it. 
Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba.   
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(Niblock, 1987: 153). This created a largely independent regional military force and 
paved way for two parallel security apparatuses (Beshir, 1968: 38; Sarkesian, 1973: 6). 
The effect of this development has been lees documented, but is important because it 
fomented a sentiment of southern regionalism in response to fears of northern 
domination among the troops that later became subjected to political instrumentalization 
by sectors of the southern elites. It also helped to establish army service as a desired 
occupation for many southerners embracing warrior tradition, gaining respect for having 
a uniform and a gun, and a way to secure a personal income.118   
 
The British perceived southern communities fragile and receptive to northern 
influences. Thus, it was decided that southern area could not stand by itself politically 
or economically (Sarkesian, 1973: 7). Unlike central regions of the colony, the British 
administrators described it largely “primitive” with no prospects for economic 
development (Ruay, 1994: 37), which also justified unwillingness to invest in the 
region. The higher-level officials repeatedly frustrated economic development 
initiatives in the southern provinces deeming private enterprise as a threat to the 
governance and economic hegemony of the authorities, while the administration 
promoted only a few selected economic development schemes, of which the most 
famous was the Zande Scheme (the Nzara Agro-Industrial complex), initiated in mid-
1940s in Nzara near Yambio (Sanderson, 1985: 106-9; Daly, 1991: 181-2). Instead, the 
region was put under “care and maintenance”, subjected to peaceful living and tax 
collection (Markakis, 1998: 108). This economic policy maintained pastoralism and 
subsistence farming as predominant livelihoods in the southern provinces, as the 
southerners were encouraged to maintain the traditional economic activities for cultural 
conservation.119 It formed also part of larger geo-political strategy aimed to secure 
control of the Nile, deeming local development unnecessary despite of a sentiment 
among some officials that economic development and the well being of the people 
should have been promoted (Sanderson, 1985: 106-17).  
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 Based on an interview with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba. 
119
 As Heraclides (1987: 217) puts it, the British forced “ . . . the Southerners to develop at their own pace, 
along their own lines, under the administration of the legendary British ‘Bog Barons’, who ruled the 
South in splendid isolation, with a twist of paternalism coupled with a certain admiration for the defiant 
tribesmen”. This admiration of the southerners, owed partly to the British administrators’ glorification of 
the southern resistance to the 19th century encroachment. 
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The implementation of the Southern Policy aimed at isolation and control. It sought “ . . 
. complete separation in educational, socio-economic and political development . . . ” 
(de Chand, 2000: 15). For instance in Bahr al-Ghazal and Darfur border this translated 
into military posts set up to protect the Dinka from Rizaiqat raids aimed to gain access 
to pastureland (Mawut, 1983: 46). According to Markakis (1998: 108)    
The South remained outside the framework of the colonial economy, producing 
nothing new, exporting little more than it had during the pre-colonial period, but 
importing more, including food, to meet the requirements of the non-productive 
population that gathered around the colonial administrative centers . . .  
This affected the urban centers in the southern provinces, which consequently generated 
few opportunities that would lead to urbanization. As a result, in contrast to a number of 
flourishing centers in the North, Juba, the South’s largest town, had a population of only 
9,000 by the time of independence in 1956 (Markakis, 1998: 108). Thus, it could be 
argued that the creation of poverty in the South as elsewhere in the colonial periphery 
formed part of an attempt to assert and maintain control. 
 
The Southern Policy was formally fully adopted in 1930 and became characterized by 
an effort to implement indirect rule by using traditional institutions. According to the 
1930 Memorandum on Southern Policy that dictated policy guidelines for provincial 
governors the government’s aim was to: familiarize all British administrators with the 
local beliefs, customs, and languages of the people they administered; produce non-
Arabic speaking administrative, clerical, and technical staff; diminish the amount of 
traders from northern Sudan, favoring Greek and Syrian merchants instead; and use 
English wherever communication with vernaculars was impossible (reproduced in 
Sconyers, 1978: 268-72).  
 
Thus, the Southern Policy generated a growing regional identity as a response to the 
northern “region” with a pretext of conserving its traditional cultural environment. 
Therefore, the British purposefully created and fostered different cultural setting than 
that which prevailed there. It was stated that “The policy of the government in the 
southern Sudan is to build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units with the 
structure and organization based on whatever extent the requirements of equity and 
good government permit upon the indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs” 
(quoted in Said, 1965: 30). As a result, as of 1930 the Southern Policy reconstructed and 
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reorganized “tribal” formations, and allowed local government, as long as it did not 
interfere with British ambitions, through traditional customs and beliefs (Abdel Rahim, 
1969: 244-9; Albino, 1970: 19). This was in part inherited from the Turkiyyah 
experience but now extended to the southern provinces. Although the policy could be 
viewed as contradictory to the overall “civilization mission”, it had more utilitarian 
objective in maintaining colonial control, while preventing expansion of nationalism, 
Arab culture and Islam, and slave trade latter three of which had negative connotation 
among some cadres of the British elite. Its impact, however, was the reconfiguration of 
ethnic communities, recreating their boundaries and traditions, and fomenting 
competition for political influence, through a process in which the selection and 
implantation of convenient “tribal” leadership for the Condominium administration 
became paramount.    
 
The Condominium authorities also sought to eradicate slave trade in the southern 
provinces, which had contributed fragmentation of social order of many local 
communities in the 19th century. Yet, only the international dimension of slave trade 
was largely suppressed, while the British tolerated domestic slavery despite denouncing 
it publicly and the memory of slave trade was deliberately kept alive, which heightened 
local animosity against Arab cultural and Islamic influence (Daly, 1986: 232-9; Ruay, 
1994: 37; Jok, 2001: 90-5). Local leadership, of which some was mission educated, 
became instrumental in fomenting the memory of slave trade as part of history of 
“northern” domination to advance collective “southern” identity. This narrative has had 
a deep influence on numerous local communities and has served the leadership to 
mobilize against the “Arab domination”, “subjugation”, and “marginalization”.120    
 
Mission education emerged important in the process of shaping the attitudes of sectors 
of the southern elite. The British encouraged a proliferation of Christian missionary 
activity and education to counter “northern” influence to which they found the 
southerners particularly prone (Niblock, 1987: 150-1). In 1928, Rejaf language 
conference laid guidelines for the southern language education. At the elementary level, 
local languages were used as the media of education, while higher education was 
conducted in English (Niblock, 1987: 152). The administration excluded Arabic from 
                                                 
120
 Based on interviews and author’s observations in Khartoum and the Nuba Mountains (2005) and Juba 
(2008). 
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the southern education because it was seen to advance Islamization and Arabization 
(Beshir, 1968: 44). It should be noted that this proved contradictory to a later policy to 
maintain Sudan as one political entity under Arabized Muslim hegemony.  
 
Encouraged by the policy a number of Christian missionary societies arrived to the 
southern provinces. While they were not allowed to proselytize in the northern 
territories because the government prevented them from converting Muslim populations 
in the fear of both local reaction and that of the Muslim world, the southern territories 
were divided in spheres of missionary activity between different Christian 
denominations (Beshir, 1968: 31; Abdel Rahim, 1969: 72; Ruay, 1994: 43-4). 
Moreover, because the government itself did not provide education initially in southern 
areas it hoped the missions to emphasize social and educational work in more secular 
terms, but they pursued agendas of conversion to Christianity (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 72).  
 
Locally, access to education remained limited since the missionary orders had no 
capacity to cater for the educational needs of the population,121 contrasting wider 
educational opportunities in north-central areas that included the Gordon Memorial 
College in Khartoum. The southern educational system was based on “bush schools” for 
grade 1 and 2 education in vernacular languages followed by Central District School for 
grades 3 and 4 in English, after which the pupils who excelled in an exam were sent to 
an intermediate school beyond district level where they interacted with boys from 
distinct ethnic groups, developing common consciousness as “complete southerners”.122 
They were then employed as clerks, medical assistants, or other junior officials, or went 
on to attain university education in East Africa. This initially mission-led process only 
resulted in the formation and extension of an idea of the “South” or “southern” region 
that the mission-educated elite has extended and sought to manipulate as a strategic tool 
for political prominence and economic benefit. 
 
Until the 1940s, the Southern Policy articulated through missionary education went 
through two stages. The first stage during the first two decades of Condominium rule 
                                                 
121
 For instance, by 1926 the entire southern region summed 31 elementary, two intermediate, and one 
trade school, and by 1930 one more elementary and intermediate schools had been established, while the 
first government school opened in Atar in the late 1940s (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 83; Niblock, 1987: 152). 
Meanwhile, the Gordon Memorial College in Khartoum had been functioning since 1902. 
122
 Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. 
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was characterized by the missionary societies being solely responsible for the Western 
type education and the educational policy by dualism between stagnation and progress 
(Daly, 1993: 8; Ruay, 1994: 44). On the one hand, it was oriented towards maintaining 
order and reinforcing “tribalism” by reinvigorating social formations by building them 
anew and using them to create distinctions between communities with an attempt to 
introduce little stimulus for change. The policy of fostering “tribal” culture was also 
aimed to inhibit the spread of northern Arab and Islamic cultural influences, and united 
with an idea of discouraging higher education to prevent an emergence of intellectuals 
capable of challenging the colonial masters as had happened in Egypt and the northern 
provinces (Niblock, 1987: 152; Warburg, 2003: 138). Secondly, however, by the 1920s 
the Condominium government began to subsidize missionary education with a vision to 
train locals to replace more costly foreign administrators, while education became 
gradually seen as essential in preparation of southern societies to withstand the effects 
of “civilization” (Niblock, 1987: 152; Daly, 1993: 8; Ruay, 1994: 45). This policy 
allowed the emergence of a small missionary educated southern elite.  
 
The effort to revive and maintain “African” identity and introduce Christianity 
culminated when the Southern Policy was imposed in its strictest form. For instance 
during 1930-46, Sunday was made the day of rest in the South, while Arabic dress, 
customs, and names were banned, northern merchants and officials removed, 
intermarriage discouraged, and a no man’s land between the southern provinces and the 
northern territories was maintained (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 78, 73; Niblock, 1987: 153, 
155). This fomented “southern” identity through the encouragement of local and 
Christian cultural symbolism and polarized it against the promoted image of the 
“North” as “Arab” and “Islamic”. One key ingredient of this separation was the 
Condominium language policy because it had serious consequences during the 1940s 
and 1950s Sudanization process of public positions and preparation of Sudan for self-
rule, marginalizing the southern educated elites in search of administrative posts. 
 
The overall effects of the Southern Policy were manifold. It reinvigorated southern 
social life after the 19th century violence, but the relative peace brought by the 
Condominium rule after 1930 caused restructuring of local leadership structures guiding 
them increasingly towards heterogeneous “tribal” order, creating and encouraging 
ethnic divisions between communities. The Southern Policy also encouraged the 
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perception of “North” and “South” as separate but socio-politically homogeneous 
entities. However, although sectors of local elites used such perception to establish 
prominence, local populations remained highly diverse and heterogeneous. Finally, the 
Southern Policy accentuated differences, laying ground for economic and political 
grievances that culminated in separatism among sectors of the emerging mission-
educated southern elite.123 These became later a homogenizing force as local elites 
organized regional political movements around them, partly based on resistance to the 
perceived “Arab” domination and to counter the “northern” nationalist movement. The 
promotion of Christianity and English also encouraged the emergence of regionalist and 
separatist tendencies because they became two cultural values embraced by the mission-
educated elites to contrast northern cultural traditions. 
 
5. Political Effects of Co-dominium Order 
 
This section highlights those political effects of the co-dominium order that stimulated 
preparation for de-colonization and led to the marginalization of the southern elite. In 
this process, a combination of local, regional and international factors was paramount.  
 
     Egyptian Influence and Establishment of Power Elite Political Hegemony 
 
From the beginning of the colonial period the British were aware of the effect Egypt had 
in the Condominium. This influence centering in the importance of the Nile culminated 
in cultural and trade links, with many prominent Arabized Muslim individuals either 
studying in Egypt or having Egyptian teachers, together with the presence of Egyptian 
administrative personnel dating back to the Turkiyyah and some harboring the memory 
of the Turkiyyah as a “natural” extension of Egypt (Yohannes, 1997: 262; Warburg, 
2000: 75-6). However, Egypt had to settle for a separating colonial border.   
 
In addition, Egypt had particularly strong influence on the local military officers who 
were largely from Arabized central riverine communities. Thus, as nationalist 
demonstrations of the 1920s culminated following the assassination of the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium’s Governor-General Oliver (Lee) Stack in November 1924 in 
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 Confirmed by an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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Cairo, they inspired a junior officer uprising of part of the 11th Sudanese battalion in the 
Khartoum Military Academy (Burr and Collins, 1999: 55). This was suppressed, but 
resulted in government reprisals and a complete crackdown of the nationalist 
movement, providing also an excuse to proceed with abovementioned anti-Egyptian 
policies (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 24-5). 
 
By the mid-1940s factional struggle in the re-emerged nationalist movement had 
become the order of the day. The Condominium government’s concessions to the 
demands expressed in the 1942 CG memorandum stimulated the drive for de-
colonization. This led to the creation of the Advisory Council for Northern Sudan in 
1943 as the first step to allow formalization of the nationalist movement,124 and 
permission of registered political parties. As a result, the pro-Egyptian Khatmiyyah 
faction identified with the Ashiqqah party founded by Ismail al-Azhari in 1943, later 
forming the National Unionist Party (NUP) with other three organizations with similar 
interests, while the neo-Mahdist’s founded the Umma party in 1945 (Sidahmed and 
Sidahmed, 2005: 26).125 According to Woodward (1997: 97), “That rivalry of Islamic 
movements, which also incited the alienation of southern politicians, was to be at the 
heart of party politics during the periods of liberal democracy in post-independence 
Sudan”. 
 
Faced with external and internal pressure, the British bowed to study the prospect of 
more important role of locals in the administration. This led to the Sudan 
Administrative Conference (SAC) in 1946, which laid foundation for the Legislative 
Assembly126 established in 1948 to act as the parliament, with the Advisory Council for 
Northern Sudan setting the precedent to its social composition. It was privileged sectors 
of four Arabized Muslim social groupings, religious notables, prominent local leaders, 
merchants, high-level civil servants, and professionals, which formed the core of the 
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 Along with the Governor-General, who acted as the president, and the civil, financial, and legal 
secretaries, it included 18 members from provincial councils in the northern provinces, 8 appointed by the 
Governor-General, and 2 from the chamber of commerce (Niblock, 1987: 159). 
125
 Describing the nationalist movement and its effect Woodward (1997: 97) notes, “ . . . the postwar 
[WWII] movement was to be not united secular movement, but one in which the Western-educated 
nationalist politicians of northern Sudan were mainly members of the neo-Mahdist Ummah Party of the 
Khatmiyyah-backed Unionists, later to become the National Unionist Party (so-called because of their 
links with Egypt, i.e., against Britain and the Ummah Party)”. Allegedly, the Umma was to an extent of 
British making. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba. 
126
 The terms Legislative Assembly, Constituent Assembly, and Parliament found in the literature all refer 
to the same institution. 
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economic elite and became dominant forces in national politics through northern 
sectarian political parties. According to Niblock (1987: 60-1), “This shows how 
economic prominence and social status served to gain political influence. In the first 
parliament . . . some 70-75 per cent of the members of the House of Representatives 
came from one of these four groupings, and between 75 per cent and 85 per cent of the 
members of the Senate”. As a result, the social actors that dominated Sudanese political 
processes were largely from socio-economically prominent background, which made 
them overwhelmingly Arabized Muslims from the central riverine communities. One of 
their unifying interests was to extend political hegemony to the southern territories 
(Ruay, 1994: 49). 
 
     Reversal of Southern Policy 
 
Intertwined external and internal determinants contributed to the decision to revise and 
subsequently reverse the Southern Policy.127 The external reasons were largely due to 
post-World War II international environment that affected regional dynamics as the 
world order was gradually succumbing into Cold War between the United States (U.S.) 
and Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.), which were critical of European imperialism and eager to 
impose their political and ideological hegemony, permitting many nationalist 
movements in Africa to gain strength (Campos Serrano, 2000: 20, 28). In this context, 
Britain found itself torn by tensions within its imperial discourse,128 negotiating with 
Egypt about post-war arrangements for the Condominium, pressured to undertake 
policy changes in part due to growing anti-colonial momentum from the Middle East 
forming anti-colonial block in the United Nations (U.N.), and was faced with increased 
expenses to administer its colonies due to decreasing international prices of their 
exports (Daly, 1991: 234-7; Austen, 1996; Campos Serrano, 2000: 28, 30).  
 
Thus, Britain was pressured to find a solution for the Condominium. Egypt, which 
became major regional force partly because of its growing influence after WWII, sought 
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 A combination of international and regional (f)actors was paramount to the political concessions to 
nationalists, including international pressure for de-colonization involving the anti-colonial block in the 
U.N., the U.S.-U.S.S.R. superpower competition, self-determination principle based on the 1941 Atlantic 
Charter, and economic doubts of viability of colonies. 
128
 According to Cooper and Stoler (1997: IX), such tensions emerged, “between the universalizing 
claims of European ideology and the particularistic nature of conquest and rule, the limitations posed on 
rulers by the reproduction of difference as much as by the heightened degree of exploitation and 
domination that colonization entailed”. 
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increasing role by promoting the “Unity of the Nile Valley”, and the re-incorporation of 
southern provinces to ensure sufficient Nile water for its own use which was best 
secured by annexing them to northern territories where Egyptian influence was greater 
(Warburg, 2000: 76-81). This became troubling to the British who at the same time 
hoped to avoid losing Egypt’s support, and facing the nationalists more and more 
justified the annexation of the southern provinces by deeming them unviable as an 
independent entity (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 169; Alier, 1990: 19; Daly, 1991: 236-8).  
 
However, the Civil Secretary James Robertson sought to prolong de-colonization. This 
was aimed to curb Egypt’s regional power by allowing the local elites to decide their 
future relationship with Egypt through internationally supervised plebiscite despite 
Egyptian and U.S. pressure, the latter seeking to secure northeastern Africa through 
extension of Egypt’s sovereignty (Alier, 1990: 19; Daly, 1991: 167, 235-6; Hanes, 
1995: 134-6). Still, the British felt obliged to create national institutions to demonstrate 
their goodwill to their internal and external allies. Such concessions were aimed also to 
appease the neo-Mahdists, who had developed wide following in parts of the northern 
provinces partly because the British had most consistently supported them against pro-
Egyptian sections of the nationalist elite.  But, above all, the British sought to appeal to 
Egypt and the U.S. by convoking the 1946 SAC as the first formal occasion to discuss 
the future of the southern provinces. However, it was also the first of a series of 
occasions in which this future was discussed and decided upon without inviting local 
representatives (de Chand, 2000: 16). Yet, such undertaking would have been difficult 
because it required a recognition of who could speak for the heterogeneous southern 
communities, particularly because this was more apparent in “northern” areas where the 
educated Arabized central riverine nationalist elite linked to the main sectarian 
organizations was deemed as the representative of the ethnically diverse population. 
 
The SAC established a subcommittee on central government and on local government.  
The central government subcommittee was monopolized by members of the riverine 
Arabized Muslim elite with minority British participation, and thus made the 
incorporation of the southern provinces a major issue, visiting the area to explore ways 
for closer association of locals with the central administration (Daly, 1991: 236; Ruay, 
1994: 50). After the tour, the subcommittee recommended that the southern provinces 
should be annexed and that governance of the colony should be unified, reflecting the 
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agenda of the Arabized political elite aimed to integrate and assimilate the southern 
provinces (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 167). Consequently, a report called for the setting up of 
Legislative Assembly and a conference to discuss the future status of the southern 
provinces, also demanding the abolition of the Permit to Trade Order that would enable 
the majority of the jallaba to resume their economic activities in the area, the 
unification of the educational system between the regions, and the adoption of Arabic 
teaching in all schools (Ruay, 1994: 50; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26).129 This 
reflects the earlier demands of the GC and was based on the interests of the reduced but 
increasingly powerful sectors of the Arabized Muslim elite that sought to extend their 
newly established political hegemony to the southern provinces by converting it a 
marginalized part of the unified polity. 
 
     End of Southern Policy, Marginalization of Southern Elite, and Regionalism 
 
Experiencing regional and international pressure, also channeled through the imperial 
policy, the Condominium government adhered to the collective demands of the 
Arabized nationalist elite and began to justify the reversal of its Southern Policy. In 
May 1946, briefly after assuming his position, Robertson, claimed that the southern 
provinces were unable to represent themselves in the Advisory Council and needed time 
or special arrangements to prevent from becoming helpless prey to the educated 
Arabized elite, the main political force in the northern provinces (Daly, 1991: 236; 
Ruay, 1994: 50). However on 16 December 1946, he drafted a Memorandum on 
Southern Policy to abolish it, which stated that 
The policy of the Sudan Government regarding the Southern Sudan is to act 
upon the facts that the peoples of the Southern Sudan are distinctively African 
and Negroid, but that geography and economics combine (so far as can be 
foreseen at the present time) to render them inextricably bound for future 
development to the middle-eastern and arabicized Northern Sudan: and therefore 
to ensure that they shall, by educational and economic development, be equipped 
to stand up for themselves in the future as socially and economically the equals 
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 In 1947 a Farouk school in Arabic was established in Juba from which the brightest pupils went on to 
al-Azhar. This and the Juba mosque issue indicate Egypt’s growing influence on the British condominium 
government despite the closed district policy. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 
September 2008 in Juba. 
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of their partners of the Northern Sudan in the Sudan of the future (reproduced in 
Sconyers, 1978: 275). 
Thus, the future of the southern provinces was largely decided upon since the British 
disregarded other possible political arrangements than its full incorporation to the 
northern territories (Rogier, 2005: 9). Although Robertson stated that development of 
the southern provinces to catch up was one policy objective, it was implemented in less 
than ten years before independence and was inadequate.130 It is questionable that he 
believed in its success, and the self-rule was nearer than the British has initially 
expected.  
 
The government also felt obliged to improve education in the southern provinces and 
harmonize it according to the Arabized elite’s demands. This is why it assumed the 
main responsibility of education from the missionary schools (Dhal, 2004: 25-6; Ruay, 
1994: 44). The new policy applied from 1946 was to establish a secondary school, to 
provide higher education at the Gordon Memorial College for talented students from the 
southern provinces, and to introduce Arabic as a subject from the intermediate level to 
prepare the local youth to become part of northern provinces (Miner, 2003). While this 
is often viewed as proof of British goodwill towards the southern provinces, it was 
merely a strategic move, as education remained confined to small sectors of the 
population.131 After prohibiting Arabic for years and introducing it in the few 
intermediate schools in the southern provinces to serve millions of southerners was not 
enough to boost significantly the collective knowledge and Arabic skills.  
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 Niblock (1987: 156) notes that this was undertaken by “ . . . conditioning southerners to increased 
contacts with northerners, drawing the South into national political institutions, and making southern 
education compatible with the educational system established in the North”. These policy measures 
coupled with the establishment of agricultural and industrial schemes paralleled the northern elite’s 
agenda of assimilating the southern provinces. Although cotton cultivation had already been introduced in 
the area between 1925 and 1930 for educational purposes to convert the “natives” into “economic men” 
who would buy imported consumer goods to improve their material life, in the late 1940s the 
development efforts were stepped up. For instance, cotton production was stimulated in Maridi and 
Zande, setting up a ginnery, and founding an oil mill processing cotton-seed, along with a soap factory 
manufacturing scheme, and sawmills at Katire, Gilo, and Loka (Ruay, 1994: 48, 57; Dhal, 2004: 19). In 
the process, the Zande Scheme (Nzara Agro-Industrial complex), established in 1946 and managed 
through Equatoria Projects Board, became the most elaborate development project in the southern 
provinces, producing cotton and cloth. Later, in the early 1950s, other economic ventures such as Yirol 
sesame oil mill and an electric power unit using charcoal were built (Dhal, 2004: 19, 22). However, all 
this came few and late to boost southern development. 
131
 By 1948 there were only 45 boys and 26 girls elementary schools, and three intermediate schools, 
serving 6,600 and 549 pupils respectively, while in 1950 a secondary school was established in Rumbek 
(Niblock, 1987: 152-3). 
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Hence, largely due to late timing and short time span, the economic development and 
education policies aimed to create a “southern” educated class to be able to defend its 
regional interests within unified state structure failed. Yet, having subjected the 
southern provinces to a separate policy had encouraged the emerging local 
mission/government school educated intelligentsia to identify itself not only through 
ethnic affiliation, but more and more as “southern” relative to what was perceived as the 
“Arab” and Muslim North. This was in part because in district level schools, boys began 
to interact with each other across ethnic and “tribal” lines and developed a common 
spirit that became gradually recognized as “southern”.132 Thus, education produced an 
elite that was able to overlook ethnic distinctions and promote southern regional 
identity, but it has not often done so due to particular or “tribal” interests that have at 
times been deemed more important.   
 
After the SAC decision initiated the process of annexation of southern provinces to the 
North, the British military Bog Barons, voiced their collective concern. They submitted 
a joint letter accepting the general conclusions of the SAC but denounced the ‘selling-
out’ of the southern provinces to what they envisioned as the Arabized Muslim elite, 
arguing that the southerners had not been heard on the issue (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 170; 
Daly, 1991: 237). In response to their joint complaint, Robertson decided to organize a 
conference in June 1947 in Juba, to hear concerns of southern chiefs and civil servants 
on the issue (Daly, 1991: 238-9; Ruay, 1994: 51). However, although it was later 
suggested that the annexation should take place under safeguards and a period of 
trusteeship, the decision to unify the colony had already been taken and the conference 
in Juba was merely to justify that selected representatives of the southern elite agreed to 
the project already in process (Alier, 1990: 21; Daly, 1991: 237-8). 
 
Meanwhile, a handful of mission-educated youth had been employed in the colonial 
service as assistants and junior officials. Aware of receiving less pay than their “Arab” 
counterparts, on 25 March 1943 they had staged a strike in the Malakal Hospital 
demanding equal wages. According to Collins (1983: 41), this had been initiated by an   
. . . inferiority complex, which their northern fellow workers took every 
opportunity to reinforce and which seemed confirmed by the government paying 
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 Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008, Juba. 
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them less . . . [due to which] . . . the southerners felt a bitter sense of injustice . . 
. But the tumergi strike was a visible symbol, of a practical and personal nature, 
of the differences between north and south upon which discontent of the 
educated southerners could focus on a regional, and therefore a specifically 
southern issue. 
There was a growing sentiment among the southerners that their rights had been denied 
and that they should face the masters because they were still perceived as slaves and not 
credited properly for their work.133 Thus, it is important to note that unequal treatment 
in which racist perceptions drawing from the legacy of slavery stimulated southern 
regionalism in a particular way that did not happen in other parts of the colony’s 
periphery.  
 
This mobilization led to the founding of the Southern Sudan Welfare Association134 
(SSWA), the first southern professional organization formed in November 1946, with 
headquarters in Juba and branches established in the following years in Wau, Malakal, 
Kapoeta, Torit, Yei, Amadi, Maridi, and Yambio (Akol, 2007: 41). Akol (2007: 41-2) 
contributes the issue of wages raised in the Juba Conference to the SSWA and notes that 
despite not involved in politics it provided experience to some later prominent southern 
politicians involved, such as Stanilaus Paysama and Paul Logale. These emerging 
members of the “southern” elite had been previously shaped by mission education, 
which contributed to their overall view of the “Arab” and the “southerner” that were 
later confirmed by the Condominium policies and their personal interaction with the 
Arabized Muslim elite. Thus, they projected a view of a “southern region” unified in its 
resistance to “Arab” oppression in which the memory of slavery and 19th century 
atrocities was instrumental. Yet, at this stage general political awareness hardly 
existed.135       
 
Subsequently, the Juba Conference convened on 12 June 1947 in a situation in which 
the Condominium administration had already decided upon the future of the southern 
provinces and the embryonic intelligentsia in the region had become aware of the 
prevailing economic imbalances and inequality. As a result, the British insisted that the 
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 Based on an interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
134
 The SSWA leadership included Lino Tombe, president, Renato Ondzi Koma, vice-president, Gordon 
Apec Ayom, secretary-general, and Paul Logale, treasurer. 
135
 Based on an interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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purpose of the conference was to explore the most adequate manner in which the 
southern region would be incorporated to the future Sudan (Ruay, 1994: 51). In 
addition, since there were no provincial councils to appoint representatives for the 
southern provinces, the conference provided an opportunity to assess the political 
capacity of handpicked members of the southern elite and their proficiency to represent 
“the South” in the future national institutions (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 146). Convoking the 
conference on “North” and “South” grounds the British also hoped to create a rivalry 
that could be manipulated for political support and portray both diverse and 
heterogeneous territories as regional cultural and political entities. It is important to note 
that this was an illusion because neither the narrowly based Arabized Muslim elite nor 
the emerging mission educated leadership and local chiefs136 could claim to legitimately 
represent a diverse and numerous ethnic groups of Sudan. Thus, the power of these 
elites has been persistently contested and political instability and conflicts within both 
“regions” have been recurrent. While in the “North” the non-Arabized peripheral 
regions have proved most problematic to the hegemony of central riverine groups, in the 
“South” there has been less consistent exclusive leadership which has resulted in severe, 
and sometimes violent, power competition among local elites. 
 
The two-day Juba Conference came too late to lay basis for any reconsideration of the 
political process already taking place. Attending the conference were British 
administrators, including civil secretary and assistant civil secretary, governors of the 
southern provinces, and director of establishment, together with six prominent members 
of the Arabized riverine elite and seventeen representatives of the southern provinces, 
seven chiefs and ten junior officials (Ruay, 1994: 51). Judge Mohamed Shingiti led the 
highly trained “northern” delegation, while Clement Mboro, who later became a 
prominent politician, headed the “southern” representation with less education 
credentials (Collins, 1983: 289-90; Baraja, 2004). The first day of the conference was 
characterized by diverging opinions since representatives led by Mboro “expressed deep 
fears of the North”,  “rejected the idea of closer association”, and insisted both that 
“development should be accelerated” and that “the South should have its own Advisory 
Council like the North before joining the proposed Legislative Assembly” (Ruay, 1994: 
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 Although Simonse (1992: 138) has claimed that the network of chiefs in the southern provinces was 
the main legitimate interlocutor for the South, his example of chief Lomiluk form Tirangore falls short of 
covering the heterogeneous southern provinces.   
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52). For instance, in one intervention chief Lolik Lado stated, “The ancestors of the 
Northern Sudanese were not peace-loving and domesticated like cows. The younger 
generations claim that they mean no harm but time will show what they will in fact do” 
(RJC, 1947: 12). In addition, chief Buth Diu, who also became a prominent politician, 
expressed the generalized suspicion among the representatives of the southern provinces 
by stating that “Northerners claim to have no desire to dominate the South, but this . . . 
[is] not enough and there . . . [has] to be safeguards” (RJC, 1947: 13). The fear and 
mistrust of “Arab” intentions were apparent (Sarkesian, 1973: 7). 
 
However, the second day brought a sudden reversal of the position of the southern 
representatives. They abandoned prior views and accepted the view of the “northern” 
delegation, but the abrupt and radical change of heart was unexpected even to the 
British (Daly, 1991: 240; Ruay, 1994: 52).137 Although authors consider that part of this 
sudden change of opinion could be attributed to their inexperience, some southern 
intellectuals and politicians have later alleged that their delegates were bribed, 
threatened, and blackmailed by the northern representatives the night between the 
sessions, and manipulated to believe that the unity was not constitutional but merely 
administrative (Eprile, 1974: 19; Ruay, 1994: 52-3). Others claim that southern opinion 
was not respected.138 Indeed, according to Collins (1983: 290) and Daly (1991: 240) 
there is evidence that Shingiti had worked late until night to ensure a change of the 
southern position by talking to Mboro, which allegedly led the latter state the next day 
that it was in the best interest of the southerners to join the Legislative Assembly. James 
Tambura, one of the southern delegates, has alleged that “Judge Shingeiti had said that 
if they did not participate, they would have no say in the future Government of the 
Sudan” (quoted in Collins, 1983: 290). Despite these claims it is possible that some 
southern delegates were inclined to adhere to the northern position as Said (1965: 72) 
and Howell (1973: 164) appear to maintain, but the situation was complex and it would 
be necessary to investigate the Juba Conference unofficial interaction further to make 
definite arguments.  
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 British interpretations of the sudden change of the opinion of southern delegates ranged widely. While 
some suspected the change of heart as “fear of losing improved terms of service”, others interpreted it as 
“pathetic defencelessness against plausible thugery [sic]” (quoted in Daly, 1991: 240). 
138
 Based on an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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The Juba Conference was used to accelerate the process of unification. Despite the 
suspicions of some of the southern delegates, the British administrators used it to 
legitimize unity by arguing that it was the wish of all “southerners” articulated through 
their delegates to become part of one Sudan, and that at least 13 representatives elected 
by provincial councils should represent “the region” in the future parliament, education 
would be unified and trade and communications between “the regions” would ensue 
(Abu Hasabu, 1985: 146-7). However, at that time it was also the opinion of the British 
administrators to grant safeguards until the “southerners” could consider themselves 
socially and economically equals to the “northerners”, which initially satisfied those 
British administrators and southerners who had defended “the region” despite the 
British knowing that it would be difficult to convince the Arabized nationalist elite 
about such measures (Daly, 1991: 241-2). Consequently, all the barriers put in place 
during the Southern Policy were quickly eradicated during the remaining part of 1947. 
 
Finally, the Juba Conference left a bitter sentiment in the southern provinces as an 
important event in the constructed “southern” historical narrative. It is claimed to have 
reinforced the Arabized elite’s view of the “southern” inferiority.139 Although the unity 
of Sudan had been decided already before it took place, the conference was criticized, 
the southern representation qualified as poor, and the allegations of persuasion and 
bribery were cemented in the “southern” historical narrative. These views were 
complemented by the legacy of slavery and the established social hierarchy perpetuated 
by the perception of “Arab” superiority and local inferiority, fostered by the British and 
the Egyptians also in the northern provinces, and affecting social organization, 
mobilization, and inter-group relationships. It was in both “regional” power elites’ 
interests to endorse such views because to support their aspirations either by projecting 
southern inferiority or animosity and grievances against the “Arabs” of “the North”. The 
gross categorization between “the North” and “the South” also projected an image of 
large regional entities dominated by the narrow elites in question, providing incentive 
for other elites to compete for “regional” hegemony within these constructed entities. 
This became an important factor in the political instability of post-colonial Sudan. 
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 Ruay (1994: 53) claims that it contributed to a view among the Arabized elite of southerners generally 
being easily corrupted and naive. This view draws from the established social hierarchy. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium continued the earlier experience of external 
domination and introduced exclusive governance aimed to minimize costs and 
maximize economic extraction. It was based on divide and rule strategy through 
deliberate building on the tradition of “tribalism”, by manipulating, reinventing, 
strengthening, and politicizing ethnic identities, attempting to play local groups against 
each other and favoring the most established social groups in the north-central Sudan as 
its main collaborators. This helped to consolidate those elites collaborating with the 
regime, while poverty was deliberately created in the periphery for control. By 
integrating southern provinces in the colonial polity at the same time isolating them and 
encouraging distinct political, economic, and social trajectory as opposed to the 
northern provinces, the colonial marginalizing state and its policies contributed in the 
creation of “the North” and “the South”, forging political, economic, social, and cultural 
cleavage that could not be overcome in the process of de-colonization. 
 
Whereas the Arabized power elites in the northern provinces forged an illusion of 
common “northern” identity based on Arab culture and Islam that projected the area as 
one politico-cultural entity reaching southwards, in response the emerging missionary 
educated sectors of southern elites reconstructed differences with the northern provinces 
based on their own identities, interests, and visions for the “South”. Such dynamics, 
containing the legacy of slavery and subjugation, led to the making of the idea of the 
“northern region” as opposed to a “southern region”, both portrayed as relatively 
homogeneous regions as opposed to the relative other, but within which various elites 
struggled for “regional” prominence in the context of the competition at the national 
level.       
 
During the period, the colony was influenced by Egypt. This conditioned British actions 
although the co-dominium, de facto British rule, was organized according to indirect 
rule and native administration to establish control of the vast extensions of the 
peripheral areas and to curb Egyptian influences, but external actors and forces 
influenced the local order and contributed its transformation in the 1940s.  
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By this time, political and economic marginalization of southern provinces and its elites 
had become increasingly apparent relative to the favoring of the more central northern 
riverine and cotton producing areas. Such imbalances became more and more 
permanent part of the governance structures and ruling methods of the colonial state 
particularly after the Arabized Muslim regime collaborators reached higher-level 
positions in the colonial administration in the 1940s and 1950s. They continued this 
exclusive governance of the marginalizing state in the post-colonial period.  
 
Finally, as we will see in the following Chapter IV, a combination of international, 
regional, and local pressures forced the British to grant political concessions to the 
northern nationalist movement by adhering to demands to maintain Sudan’s unity as 
one colonial entity. They reversed the Southern Policy, reincorporating southern 
provinces as subservient to the administrative structure of northern Sudan without 
preparation in terms of development or granting effective political representation at the 
national level. In the context of de-colonization dealt with in the next chapter, this 
marginalization became significant in the process of formation of violent uprisings in 
the southern provinces.         
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Chapter IV. De-colonization: Emergence of the First Insurgency 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter analyzes the process of de-colonization and the events that led to the first 
insurgency in southern Sudan. It shows how the situation in southern Sudan became 
increasingly volatile, while the authorities did little to diffuse tensions particularly in 
Equatoria, a region which became the hotbed of anti-northern sentiments. As the 
political processes resulted in continued marginalization of the emerging southern 
political forces in Arabized Muslim governing elite’s hegemony, this elite failed to 
recognize the general sentiment towards its narrowly based rule that destroyed hope of 
improved political, economic, and social position in southern provinces of post-colonial 
Sudan. Marginalizing governance and institutional structures passing from the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium authorities to what was viewed by many in the southern 
leadership as “Arab” elite in control of the political scene, was perceived as subjecting 
the southern provinces and its people to domination, subjugation, inequality, and 
underdevelopment. 
 
The political processes that prepared Sudan for self-rule culminated in the southern 
insurgency. While the international, regional, and local contexts were conducive to the 
abandonment of the Southern Policy, the process of preparation of Sudan for self-rule 
was exclusively an affair between the Arabized nationalists, the British, and Egyptians. 
In the process, the social hierarchy, deriving from slavery, determining political and 
economic power and opportunities became institutionalized in the political structures in 
the post-colonial state. In this situation, fear of domination as anti-northern sentiment 
became a powerful mobilizing force particularly in Equatoria, which some local leaders, 
frustrated by inability to capture individual and collective gains through political 
process, capitalized upon by contributing to demonstrations that led to uprisings and an 
army mutiny. In the process, the government securitized the situation in the southern 
provinces and mistakes in dealing with these incidents led to further local animosity that 
became conducive to support an insurgency after the Abboud regime took power and 
implemented forced Arabization and Islamization policy in the area as a remedy to 
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suppress local opposition and dissidence. This led to a full-fledged rebellion in 
Equatoria but spreading later to Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile.     
 
Moreover, it is shown here how the exclusivity of the socio-culturally and racially140 
derived political and economic power and its concentration in one narrow group became 
a key feature in developments after independence, buttressing the dynamics of what had 
become a marginalizing state. This has propelled political instability between competing 
elites in and between the center and the periphery, its main manifestations having been 
the rebellions in the southern Sudan. In this, the perceptions and sentiments towards 
what many southerners perceive as “Arab” regimes are important because they have 
fuelled political regionalism and secessionism, which in turn the governments have 
‘securitized’ as the “Southern Problem”. 
 
2. Process of De-colonization 
 
This section highlights the beginning of formal political domination of the narrow 
Arabized intelligentsia as the commanding force of the post-colonial marginalizing state 
over the majority population by demonstrating the intertwined nature of external and 
internal factors. It shows how external actors influenced internal politics of de-
colonization in Sudan, contributing to the continuity of the marginalizing state by 
promoting the dominance of the leading Arabized social groups and excluding the 
southern elite. 
    
     Regional Political Developments Accelerating De-colonization 
 
By the late 1940s, the power struggle between Britain and Egypt over future status of 
the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in the international context of emerging superpower 
competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had become the main pressure 
accelerating de-colonization of the colony. Egypt’s historical links with Sudan, both 
peoples united by the River Nile and interacting for centuries, Egypt having been the 
regional power, and Egyptian historians claiming Sudan as integral part of Egypt, made 
the relationship between the two peoples particularly intimate (Warburg, 2000: 75-6). 
The waning of Britain’s power in the Middle East and the rising pan-Arab nationalism, 
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an ideology that the northern Sudanese nationalists readily adopted from Egypt, 
reinforced this sentiment (Yohannes, 1997: 262).  
 
In addition, ensuring rights to the Nile waters became growingly important in Egypt’s 
foreign policy.141 Egypt had sought to regain influence in the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium by reaffirming the 1899 co-dominium agreement through the 1936 
Treaty of Alliance, which reversed the 1920s policy of de-Egyptianization of public 
service and military (Abu Hasabu, 1985: 47; Holt, 1961: 141). However, in the longer 
term this did not satisfy Egyptian nationalists who sought to annex the colony and 
affirm control over the sources of the Nile, which led to intensifying competition with 
Britain over patronizing the most powerful Arabized Muslim political-sectarian 
movements because Britain preferred independent pro-British Sudan (Abdel Rahim, 
1969: 120-2; Daly, 1991: 50-61, 82). Consequently, Egypt intensified its backing of the 
local nationalist movement by guiding groups that were for the “Unity of the Nile 
Valley”, while the British increased their support to the “Sudan for the Sudanese” 
faction.  
 
This reflects the growing gap between the co-dominium allies. Egypt claimed that any 
process aimed at self-governance would be against its interest since it considered 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium as integral part of its territory and subject to its authority 
(Ruay, 1994: 60). The British rejected such claims and propagated that the local 
nationalists themselves should decide about their future, with the hope of maintaining a 
quasi-monopoly over the economy and influence over post-colonial Sudan through 
equipping it with pro-British administration and pressuring it to become a member of 
the Commonwealth (Yohannes, 1997: 261, 263). This shows evidence of the British 
attempt to pass the colonial political and economic order to post-colonial Sudan. 
 
By 1947, Britain had committed itself to the process of preparing Sudan to self-rule, 
which attracted the attention of the U.S. that became a major player forcing de-
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 Egypt’s concern of ensuring enough water for irrigation and other uses emerged already in the 1920s 
when Lord Edmund Allenby threatened, without consent of his superiors, in response to Sudan Governor-
General Stack’s assassination in Cairo that the British would permit Sudan to use as much of the Nile 
water as required without a need to take into account the interests of Egypt. This led the Egyptian 
politicians to focus on ensuring sufficient amount of Nile water in the future, which became an important 
factor behind their insistence on the “Unity of the Nile Valley” instead of self-determination for Sudan 
(Warburg, 2000: 76-7). 
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colonization through an accelerated political process that led to the first insurgency in 
the southern Sudan. The U.S. was concerned about Anglo-Egyptian rivalry, maintaining 
stability, and filling a regional power vacuum left by the waning British power, which 
might allow Soviet advances in the Middle East142 and North Africa, and compromise 
Western strategic interests (Yohannes, 1997: 261).  
 
In August 1947, after unsuccessful Anglo-Egyptian negotiations Egypt presented its 
claim against Britain in the United Nations (U.N.). However, although unsuccessful, 
Egypt remained initially adamant about its demands although the British allowed larger 
political role of the local Arabized nationalists. In October 1951, Egypt decided to 
pressure Britain by abrogating the 1899 and 1936 co-dominium agreements, opposing a 
proposed Constitutional Amendment Commission (CAC), rallying for support within 
Sudan, and issuing decrees proclaiming its King Farouk I as the King of Sudan with the 
right to draft its new constitution (Ruay, 1994: 61-2). 
 
Yet in July 1952, the Egyptian monarchy came to an end in a coup by free officers loyal 
to the half-Sudanese General Muhammad Naguib, which contributed to the accelerated 
de-colonization of Sudan. The coup was partly inspired by increased anti-British 
sentiment over a military base in the Suez and Egypt’s impotence over the 
Condominium (Daly, 1991: 280; Woodward, 2006: 29). As a tactical maneuver, the 
new Egyptian military regime compromised with the British and those Sudanese 
nationalists opposing Egypt over the issue of sovereignty, because its leadership saw 
benefit from the declining British influence by persuading Sudan for unity or securing 
its future accession to the Arab League in longer term (Ruay, 1994: 64-5; Yohannes, 
1997: 264; Warburg, 2000: 77). Consequently, aware of the growing U.S. interest in the 
region to prevent Soviet political incursion, the new regime in Egypt separated the 
dispute over British troops in the Suez Canal from the Condominium’s future. Egypt 
moderated its position by indicating willingness to allow the Sudanese nationalists to 
decide between union with Egypt and independence, which decisively reversed the U.S. 
support of British policy of delaying Sudan’s self-rule, it fearing armed sectarian 
conflict in the increasingly polarized northern Sudan, and perceiving a need to appease 
Egypt to prevent it from drifting to Soviet sphere of influence (Niblock, 1987: 203; 
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 The following year Soviet Union recognized Israel and later supplied it with Czech military material 
(Lyons, 1978: 8). 
Chapter IV. De-colonization: Emergence of the First Insurgency        165 
 
Yohannes, 1997: 264, 266; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 27). The U.S. desired to 
extend its hegemony over the region and obstruct leftist tendencies of Arab nationalism, 
considering both neo-Mahdists, who by now were influenced by nationalist currents and 
the political developments in the neighboring Libya and Eritrea, and the Khatmiyyah, as 
the protagonists of de-colonization in Sudan (Yohannes, 1997: 265). This could be 
attributed to the potential of the religious political movements of the Arabized elite to 
use strategies of extraversion for further consolidation. 
 
Consequently, although the British had withstood Egypt’s demands, they became 
growingly pressured by the U.S. to grant Sudan self-determination. In December 1950 
the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution requesting more extended powers, which 
the British had been compelled to accept, leading to the founding of the CAC in March 
1951 calling on the administration to prepare Sudan for self-rule through a Self-
Government Statute that was promulgated in the following year (Daly, 1991: 280-2; 
Ruay, 1994: 61, 63; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 26). This process shows the 
weakening of the British position but also their attempt to minimize Egyptian influence 
through facilitation of preparation for independence. 
 
At the same time, the Egyptian support became paramount to the local unionists. It 
contributed to the strengthening of the unionist movement, facilitated the unification of 
the parties, and the formation of the NUP under the leadership of al-Azhari, while 
attempting to convince the neo-Mahdist Umma of union (Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 
2005: 27). This involvement reinforced the main Arabized religious movements’ 
domination over the national politics (Niblock, 1987: 203; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 
2005: 26). It appears that Egypt and Britain only recognized the Arabized nationalists 
over whom they had most leverage, considering them as the voice of “Sudan” and 
completely excluding representatives of other groups. 
 
Moreover, on 10 January 1953 Egypt concluded the Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement in 
Cairo with representatives of the Arabized nationalists. The agreement recognized the 
Sudanese right for self-determination, called for an international commission to 
supervise the forthcoming elections, a Governor-General’s commission to aid in policy 
issues, a commission to supervise the final steps of the Sudanization, the schedule of the 
removal of British and Egyptian troops, and removing the southern safeguards from the 
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draft of the Self-Government Statute (Abdel Rahim, 1969: 213-5; Niblock, 1987: 203; 
Ruay, 1994: 66; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 27). The removal of the southern 
safeguards reflected the view of the nationalist elite, as southern representatives were 
excluded from the negotiations on the grounds that they had no registered political 
parties or organizations despite the existence of political formations in the southern 
provinces (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 21; Ruay, 1994: 66; de Chand, 2000: 23). This set 
the standard of marginalizing the southerners in national politics.  
 
The U.S. supported the Egyptian-Sudanese agreement and pressured Britain to sign the 
1953 agreement for political transition in Sudan within three years. However, the U.S. 
was also aware that by pressuring Britain to leave Sudan, and attempting to keep it 
within Western sphere of influence through external politics, they would risk a rebellion 
in the southern provinces (Yohannes, 1997: 267), but this was viewed as more 
acceptable in strategic calculations than losing Egypt to the Soviet camp. At the same 
time, the British still hoped to secure “the South” for the time being and two documents 
appeared signed by the southerners demanding either federal organization for the 
country or the maintenance of special powers of the Governor-General aimed to protect 
them (Yohannes, 1997: 268). The Americans considered such pleas initially as of 
British making and only after the U.S. Liaison Officer in Sudan, Joseph Sweeney, 
submitted his report of a fact-finding mission to the southern provinces based on 
approximately 200 interviews of southern politicians did they realize that the threat of a 
secessionist uprising was imminent (Yohannes, 1997: 269). Yet, the U.S. assessment of 
the situation was that accelerating self-government would keep the issue away from 
regional politics and the Suez problem, internalizing the southern issue so that the 
British would have no reason to hold on to the colony (Yohannes, 1997: 267). This was 
yet another factor in marginalizing the southern political movement and subjecting 
southern provinces to the hegemony of the Arabized power elite, forcing southern 
representatives to participate with minimal preparation and representation in the 
institutions of a state they felt was alien and whose policies they could hardly influence 
(Deng, 1995b: 77-8).  
 
Finally, the British signed the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on self-government and self-
determination on 12 February 1953. According to the agreement, Sudan would opt for 
the self-determination the British had advocated as a strategic move in the late 1940s 
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and early 1950s to counter Egyptian propaganda. By accepting the agreement, they won 
independence for Sudan as opposed to union with Egypt, but ignored the southern 
safeguards that they had previously defended. However, according to Burr and Collins 
(1999: 56), the agreement “ . . . opened the floodgates for unlimited and visible 
Egyptian influence in which the Sudanese army and particularly its intelligence services 
were the principal recipients”. It also contributed to the formalization of the Arabized 
power elite domination as Sudan was handed essentially to a narrow elite of families.143  
 
     Formalization of Arabized Power Elite Domination 
 
The process of preparation of Sudan to self-government was officially initiated in 
December 1948 through the formation of the Legislative Assembly. The southern 
representatives144 became the only non-Arabized nationalist elite constituency, but their 
small number and lack of support in north-central Sudan deprived them of a possibility 
to alter a national political trajectory dictated by the latter through economic and social 
policies reflecting exclusively its own interests (Niblock, 1987: 61-81). The southern 
safeguards the British had initially considered necessary had been the first conflictive 
issue dealt with by the assembly because a large part of the Arabized nationalists were 
collectively against any concessions to the southern provinces they sought to dominate. 
Some British in the SPS “ . . . envisaged a short federal status for the South, which was 
to be expressed for the time being through the Governor-General’s reserved powers . . . 
” (Ruay, 1994: 54) in Legislative Assembly Ordinance until southern leaders had 
become influential and numerous enough to be able to stand for southern regional rights 
at the national level. Arguing that “Without protection the Southerners will not be able 
to develop along indigenous lines, will be overwhelmed and swamped by the North and 
deteriorate into a servile community hewing wood and drawing water”, they were faced 
by those who asserted that the southern territories should not enjoy any special status 
because that would “ . . . only arouse old suspicion in the North and intensify a wound 
that is beginning to heal” (Duncan, 1957: 197-8). This undermined the British position 
and under pressure from the U.S. supporting Egypt’s position to secure the Suez Canal 
and the Middle East, and Egypt hoping to claim Sudan as part of an Arab dominated 
unitary polity, the safeguards were left out of the Executive Council and Legislative 
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 Confirmed by an interview with a prominent southern Sudanese on 24 September 2008 in Juba. 
144
 The total number of representatives of southern provinces became 13, a minority amongst the 52 of the 
Arabized nationalist elite (Niblock, 1987: 159). 
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Assembly Ordinance of 1948, the founding document for the Sudanese parliament 
(Alier, 1990: 21; Daly, 1991: 242, 265-6; Hanes, 1995: 134-5; Louis, 2006: 657). This 
decision was made without the participation of the southern intelligentsia, who were 
considered to already have been sufficiently consulted in 1947 in Juba. 
 
The reaction among the southern elite was a widespread objection as the growing fear of 
“Arab” domination extended. Until the rejection of the safeguards it had been 
understood that the British administrators had been committed to protecting the 
southern provinces during the unification. This assessment was valid to an extent that 
some administrators, particularly in the southern provinces, favored such safeguards. 
However, this did not prevent disappointment after the government answered to the 
demands for revision of the ordinance by explaining that the population of the northern 
provinces opposed any special treatment of the southern territories (Ruay, 1994: 55-6). 
Nothing was done to diffuse southern fears, nor were the southern representatives 
included in any aspect of the process of de-colonization (Rolandsen, 2005: 24). It was in 
part because of this that southern elites came to an understanding that the British bowed 
to pressure from the Arabized elite and Egypt, which fostered the reconstruction of 
historical narratives of apprehension towards the “Arab”. This in turn promoted 
southern popular mobilization, in part due to fears of renewed slave-raiding, against 
what was perceived as an attempt of domination of southern Sudan by the Arabized 
elite.  
 
Policies drafted by the Legislative Assembly came to reflect the collective objectives of 
the dominant part of the Arabized elite. One principal objective that united the Arabized 
intelligentsia beyond its immediate riverine core was the consolidation of its hegemony 
in “northern Sudan” and extension of its domination to the southern provinces, 
encouraging commercial extraction, Arab language, and Islam. This included the 
deliberate marginalization of the culturally distinct southern political representatives to 
minimize challenges to its hegemony, with the initiatives put forward in the Legislative 
Assembly by the southern representatives to improve the conditions in the southern 
provinces being consistently voted down and often ridiculed (Ruay, 1994: 56-7). 
 
The Legislative Assembly and the Executive gradually acquired full powers, while the 
Governor-General and the SPS became a lesser force in national politics. However, the 
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newly established political institutions faced difficulties regarding the unification of the 
northern and southern provinces. Efforts at overcoming differences were undertaken by 
encouraging the movement and transfer of personnel between the regions, allowing the 
Governor-General to take specific decisions over the southern territories, and ensuring 
token southern representation in the ministerial councils (Alier, 1990: 22). The minority 
participation of southern representatives in the ministerial councils and the Legislative 
Assembly set the precedent of the Arabized elite using minimal southern participation 
in most governments and the parliament to provide an impression of effective southern 
participation in the national decision-making processes. However, this was generally 
not the case as southern representation hardly affected policies.   
 
Secondly, the government began to pursue unified educational policies to recover the 
southern provinces as part of the Arabized and mostly Muslim state. The result was a 
complete reversal of the education policy in the southern territories where English and 
Christianity had been encouraged, while the education system in northern areas 
remained unaltered to accommodate the annexation of the three provinces. In 1948, the 
education ministry more and more influenced by sectors of the Arabized elite 
introduced Arabic as a subject in southern secondary schools as it was claimed that the 
government should “ . . . take such immediate steps as it thinks necessary to ensure that 
Arabic is taught as a main subject in the schools of the Southern provinces as soon as 
possible” (Legislative Assembly Proceedings quoted in Ruay, 1994: 57-8). Contrary to 
the colonial policy to fend of Arab and Islamic influences detailed in Chapter III, this 
was a major step to impose Arabization and Islamization in the southern provinces 
(Miner, 2003), without deeper consideration of the impact of such policy.  
 
Three major procedures were put in place to secure these government objectives. The 
schools administered by missions had to contract proficient Arabic teachers by 1951, 
Arabic was to be encouraged as the spoken language in all schools, and school 
authorities themselves were encouraged to learn Arabic (Ruay, 1994: 58). Although the 
education minister attempted to explain that the purpose of the policy was to make the 
southern population proficient in Arabic so that it could work anywhere in the country, 
the policy strengthened the existing local fears of “Arab” domination. Moreover, the 
conduct of public life in Arabic marginalized the southerners, while some in the 
Arabized elite sought to produce an “Arabized” underclass through token measures in 
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the southern provinces. This politicized the issues of culture, language as the majority in 
the southern elites sought to impede the Arabized power elite’s perceived aspiration to 
extend its authority and legitimacy to the southern periphery through Arabization and 
Islamization. 
 
To minimize the impact of competing elites, the Arabized riverine nationalist power 
elite preferred to negotiate exclusively with the colonial masters. This marginalized the 
southern elites despite their political organization, leading to “ . . . the transfer of the 
colonial structures intact from Britain [exclusively] to the northern Sudanese 
nationalists” (Johnson, 2003: 22). Thus the strategy of the leadership of the Arabized 
nationalists targeting Egypt to consolidate themselves as the main recognized voice in 
Sudan was successful, as Egypt embraced the nationalists as a means of increasing its 
own strength in the co-dominium political struggle against Britain. As a result, Egypt’s 
strengthened negotiation position due to local nationalist support, and the U.S. pressure 
that the Arabized nationalists also sought to stimulate, compelled even those British 
initially for the South to recognize the Arabized nationalists as the main political group 
by excluding other elite groupings from political power. This allowed the political and 
economic hegemony of the Arabized nationalists to prevail, marginalizing the southern 
elites in the process. 
 
     1953 Parliamentary Elections 
 
The first parliamentary elections took place in November-December 1953 preceded by 
an electoral campaign heavily influenced by Egypt.145 It rallied to support the NUP, 
headed by Ismail al-Azhari, which was a product of unionist groupings with Egyptian 
support in 1952 and officially promoting the ‘Unity of the Nile Valley’. The NUP 
gained advantage over its main rival, the Umma, due to Egypt’s support and because it 
was better organized, feeding also from the rising anti-British sentiment in the northern 
                                                 
145
 The electoral campaign was characterized by competition among the political parties principally of the 
dominant Arabized forces. Allegedly, “It was a situation of political wrangling, coaxing, excitement and 
all forms of flattery, bribery not excluded” (Ruay, 1994: 69), in which Britain, Egypt, and the local 
administration were heavily involved (Daly, 1991: 356). Egypt played an important role in supporting the 
NUP, although it had previously agreed as part of the Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement to ensure a neutral 
electoral atmosphere free of Egyptian influence (Daly, 1991: 356-7). For instance, Cairo appointed a 
Special Minister for the Sudanese Affairs, used radio propaganda, granted money gifts, sponsored local 
nationalists to visit Egypt, sent representatives to the Condominium, and provided grants to local private 
schools to encourage vote for the NUP (RCIDSS, 1955; O’Ballance, 1977: 37; Ruay, 1994: 68-9).  
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provinces affected by Arab nationalism (Yohannes, 1997: 275). Meanwhile, the Umma 
had been weakened by defection of some non-Mahdist communal leaders forming the 
Social Republican Party together with a small number of intellectuals (Niblock, 1987: 
202). This competition within the nationalist political movement served the British who 
still harbored hopes of slowing down Sudan’s transition to independence. They sought 
to use the southern issue to justify continued colonial rule (Yohannes, 1997: 268-9). 
This increased polarization in the North-South elite relations for potential political 
instability.  
 
During the election campaign, Egypt attempted to persuade people of the southern 
provinces to vote the NUP. According to Ruay (1994: 69), among their promises were, 
“ . . . that Southerners would be able to occupy all the senior posts in the government 
that were occupied by the British in the South and that, in general, they would have a 
quarter of the jobs in the Sudan”. These pledges were backed up by a paper signed by 
al-Azhari, which outlined the party’s election strategy claiming that Sudanization of 
public administrations would give priority to the southerners in the southern provinces, 
encourage competent southerners to find employment at a high level in the central 
government, local government institutions, and development committees (NUP election 
manifesto reproduced in Howell, 1978b: 123 and Ruay, 1994: 69).146 Overall, Cairo 
made a considerable effort to sway local opinion towards union with Egypt.   
 
The 1953 elections were largely decided upon in terms of the Arabized nationalist neo-
Mahdist Umma independentists supported by Britain, and the Khatmiyyah influenced 
unionist NUP backed by Egypt. In the end the NUP triumphed by taking 46 of the 92 
seats available in the Legislative Assembly’s House of Representatives (SEC, 1954: 
27).147 The election outcome was largely a result of the Khatmiyyah leadership’s 
mobilization of al-Azhari’s NUP following and control of the NUP from within, and 
                                                 
146
 Among the most significant efforts to convince southerners for the unity with Egypt was a tour by a 
high level Egyptian official, Major Saleh Salem, to the southern provinces. In meetings convoked, Salem 
promised repeatedly that the 40 senior government posts occupied by the British in the southern provinces 
would go to the locals (O’Ballance, 1977: 37). In addition, he sought to convince the southern public that 
southerners would acquire technical positions, disregarding the fact that these required expertise and 
specialization that the great majority of local people did not have (Ruay, 1994: 69). In one occasion, in an 
attempt to convince some locals for the unity with Egypt, Salem joined a Dinka dance half naked 
(Collins, 1983: 448).  
147
 Umma gained 23, Southern Party 9, and other parties 11 seats of the overall total (Bechtold, 1976: 
181). The NUP claimed 5, Southern Party 9, and other southern political formations 8 seats respectively 
of the 22 allocated for the southern provinces (SEC, 1954: 27). 
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made it the dominant force behind the first Sudanese government headed by al-Azhari 
(Niblock, 1987: 207; Warburg, 2003: 134-5). Although O’Ballance (1977: 37) and 
others have indicated that the outcome was also due to the aggressive campaigning by 
Egypt for NUP support in parts of the southern provinces where the election process 
was less understood among the illiterate and suspicious population, the NUP’s success 
in the South owed instead largely to the strategies adopted by part of the southern elite 
to join the NUP to advance the southern regional rights within the existing Arabized 
elite monopolized political scene. This strategy was a likely consequence of a number of 
members of the southern elite realizing the difficulty to attract support for southern 
parties at the national level and particularly in central and northern Sudan. However, the 
sources above lack emphasis on the importance of Egypt’s position, and the paramount 
role of the Arab nationalist and anti-British sentiments in the process.   
 
In the southern provinces, a growing mistrust characterized the aftermath of the 
elections. The promises made during the election campaign had a significant effect on 
southern people’s hopes for the future.148 Particularly the assurances related to 
government jobs were important because public employment was perceived as a path to 
prosperity and higher social standing. However, the promises made in the South 
remained unfulfilled and local leaders became growingly dissatisfied, which was 
reflected in the sentiments of their followers.149 This was particularly contentious in the 
context of de-colonization and the heightening discontent towards perceived northern 
domination in southern provinces. 
 
 
 
                                                 
148
 According to Ruay (1994: 69), “The impact of all these [electoral] promises on the Southerners was 
nothing short of extreme feeling of satisfaction, happiness and the desire to kick out the British from the 
country as quickly as possible”. 
149
 Although many had voted NUP, the growing grievances threatened the party’s position in the southern 
provinces after the elections. This was largely because increasingly influential mission educated sectors 
of local leadership positioned themselves against union with Egypt, a sentiment which was further 
exacerbated by a visit of Umma politicians and southern representatives in Khartoum to the southern 
territories in mid-1954 during which they criticized the NUP government (Sarkesian, 1973: 9). Al-Azhari 
granted three ministerial positions to southern politicians, but the move that benefited mostly those 
politicians and had little impact on the southern opinion did little to alleviate the growing discontent. It 
appears that Al-Azhari overestimated the local influence of the selected southern politicians in Khartoum 
at the time, whose constituencies were reduced to “tribal” affiliations and, if assumed that they and their 
constituencies favored the government they joined, seem not to have affected the southern opinion 
collectively.  
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3. Emergence of the “Southern Problem” 
 
This section focuses on the emergence of the “Southern Problem”, which culminated in 
the insurgency in southern Sudan. It highlights the process of emergence of the southern 
intelligentsia as a local political elite founding its project on regionalism (and 
secessionism) by extending its vision of “the South” distinct from “the North” as one 
region. It is also shown here that in Khartoum such a regionalist political movement was 
perceived as a threat to unity and the aspirations of building a nation based on the 
Arabized elite’s agenda of Arabization and Islamization. This securitized the southern 
issue, converting it into a “Southern Problem”. Thus, it can be asserted that Britain and 
Egypt bear a significant moral and political responsibility for the problems leading to 
1955 disturbances.150 
 
     Regionalist Political Movement in Southern Provinces 
 
The Southern Policy had not only fostered a distinct cultural and regional identity in the 
southern territories, but it had also isolated them from the nationalist processes. These 
had been captured by the religious-political movements forging an alliance principally 
with the Gordon College graduates from the central riverine Arabized groups. This was 
facilitated by the British favoritism since the administration needed the collaboration of 
this elite to legitimize its authority, allocating economic resources to the leadership of 
the collaborating Arabized religious movements (Woodward, 1995: 95; Keen, 2001: 
222). In contrast, the emerging mission educated southern political intelligentsia hardly 
had any resources, which contributed to its inability to build a vibrant political 
movement (Woodward, 1995: 95).  
 
However, the legacy of fear, resistance, and racial subjugation as part of the memory of 
the 19th century, together with regional inequality based on uneven development served 
as grievances for sectors of the embryonic educated intelligentsia and their followers in 
the South. These elements also explain why the aggrieved elites in the South reinforced 
local sentiments towards the “Arab” government and to mobilize collective action along 
ethnic or “tribal” lines, but also occasionally beyond ethnic affiliations and political 
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 Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba. 
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boundaries. Still, despite the existence of common grievances and common subjection 
to the Southern Policy, local identities remained strong in part due to the non-existence 
of strong homogenizing forces and gave rise to distinct, and at times competing, 
political reactions and projects in contrast to the perceived Arabized elite domination. 
The existence of these strategies is contrary to the claims of a number of authors in the 
British tradition of Sudanese scholars who tend to portray the early southern 
intelligentsia as incapable and lacking political ideology.151 
 
Importantly, the emerging political elite in the southern provinces in the course of the 
1940s and 1950s was different from the traditional local leadership and its counterpart 
in the northern provinces. It had received a largely western education, had for the most 
part not been affected by Arab nationalism and Islamic teachings, and had absorbed the 
created North-South cleavage which allowed defining its loose collective identity 
beyond ethnic affiliations. Unlike the Arabized elites, which absorbed cultural and 
ideological influences largely from Egypt and other Arab regions, the southern 
intelligentsia emerged mostly deprived from such outside currents and it did not initially 
identify with the nationalist thought that came from Arab states. The southern 
intelligentsia became more interested in safeguarding the position of the southerners and 
their “region”, having depended largely “ . . . upon the tutelary temperament of the local 
administrator or missionary” (Howell, 1978b: 55). This suggests that the British and 
missionary influence on this emerging educated cadre had been fundamental in shaping 
its worldview and attitudes towards “the Arab”.152 As noted above, it was clearly in the 
interest of the British and the missionaries to manufacture and reinforce southern 
incompatibilities with the northern “Arab” Muslims during the Southern Policy, which 
was enforced at the time the core of the emerging southern intelligentsia was being 
educated.   
 
This education was integral to the shaping of the attitudes, morals, and identity of the 
emerging southern elite. Local cultures encouraged by the Southern Policy combined 
with westernization became to an extent a cultural distinction that differentiated the 
educated southern elite from its Arabized counterpart in “the North”, producing a 
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 See i.e. Niblock (1987), Daly (1991), and Ruay (1994). 
152
 For instance, one northern scholar alleges that “In mission schools the boys were taught that their 
brothers from the North were the source of all their hardship. In the teaching of religion and history every 
opportunity was taken to keep the memory of slavery alive” (Makki, 1989: 76). 
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Christianized cadre that had better dominion of English than Arabic. As a result, 
Christianity was introduced and reinforced as a unifying force in the southern provinces, 
although many locals became only superficially Christian at best with local religions 
remaining dominant (Beswick, 2004: 205). What is also evident is that the missionaries 
not only educated but also backed directly or through church organizations at least some 
members of the southern elite, particularly after being expelled from southern Sudan in 
the 1960s, providing moral support and financial aid for the southern political cause 
principally through Father Saturnino Lohure who became an important figure in the 
southern political struggle against stated “Arab” domination (O’Ballance, 1977; 2000, 
Heraclides, 1987: 226-7; Gray, 2002: 120). This has led Gray (2002: 120) to assert that 
“ . . . the fact that a Catholic priest [Lohure] played so prominent role in the emerging 
conflict undoubtedly strengthened Khartoum’s conviction that the influence of foreign 
missionaries was a major obstacle to achievement of national unity”. The presence of 
the missionaries also facilitated securitization of the southern issue, the Arabized elite 
government portraying them as being responsible for southern political regionalism, the 
missionaries being pointed to as menace to the nation. This was despite southern 
regionalism providing only a limited threat to the Arabized elite domination, principally 
by hindering the extension of the Arab Muslim nation building project to “the South”. 
 
It should be noted here that the emerging African nationalism also became a factor in 
the political orientation of part of the southern elite, but mainly in the context of the first 
insurgency in southern Sudan from the late 1950s. While the de-colonization model 
concentrating power in the hands of the Arabized elite was perceived as unacceptable 
by many in the southern intelligentsia (Deng Ajuok, 2008: 136), the violent struggle that 
broke out in the 1950s against the central government fed the sentiment of “Africanism” 
in contrast to what was generally viewed as “Arab” coming from the north. 
 
Furthermore, the emerging mission-educated southern elite suffered from the lack of 
communication and infrastructure to facilitate movement over the vast territorial 
extensions. Difficult terrain discouraged gatherings, political clubs, or societies. This 
was one factor that encouraged ethnic politics as the scattered intellectuals extended 
their influence over constituencies that were defined primarily along ethnic lines, a 
development that the British policy of “tribalization” and indirect rule had encouraged. 
In fact, it was in 1947 in Juba where the handpicked representatives of the dispersed 
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southern elites153 came together officially for the first time (RJC, 1947: 26). This 
marked the beginning of southern political movement as they decided to participate in 
the national political institutions as the best way to secure interests of “the region” 
instead of pressing for the suggested temporary tutelage (Howell, 1973: 164).  
 
Consequently, the minority of 12 southerners represented the three heterogeneous 
southern provinces in the Legislative Assembly. However, despite representing “the 
South” at the national level, the southern representatives in Khartoum remained largely 
marginalized, dispersed, drew support almost solely from their local constituencies, and 
differed from the vast majority of southerners who had low educational attainment and 
political consciousness (Howell, 1973: 164-5),154 within structures of the contemporary 
state. Having been marginalized in the process of de-colonization, their agendas focused 
on pressing economic development for the southern provinces and erasing inequalities. 
 
Although political organization had existed in the southern provinces at least since the 
Southern Officials’ Welfare Committee rallied successfully for equal pay, it was not 
until 1951 that southern political cadres began rallying for a political group at the 
national level. Disgruntled at being repeatedly voted down by the Arabized political 
forces, Buth Diu, the only southern member in the Constitutional Amendment 
Commission, decided to establish a political party together with Stanislaus Paysama and 
Abdul Rahman Sale in 1952 to represent “the South” (Badal, 1994: 105; Ruay, 1994: 
66-7). In 1953, in preparation for the first Sudanese parliamentary elections, and 
overcoming ethnic differences purging southern interests within one political formation, 
the three educated southerners, a Nuer, a Dinka, and a southern Muslim, respectively, 
had founded the Southern Party (Howell, 1973: 165; O’Ballance, 1977: 36). While the 
initial demand of this group of southern intelligentsia was for the independence of 
Sudan to be delayed so that the southern provinces could catch up, the organization’s 
later objectives focused on full Sudanese independence and special treatment of the 
South within the unified Sudan (Ruay, 1994: 67; Markakis, 1998: 111). This change in 
the agenda was in part due to the persuasion by the Arabized nationalists who needed 
support of at least some prominent southerners for the success of their demands.  
                                                 
153
 The emerging Western educated southern elite was weaker, less politically experienced, narrowly 
based, scattered, and culturally distinct from the Arabized intelligentsia (Niblock, 1987: 156-7). 
154
 Indeed, author’s interviews in Juba and Kampala confirm this as it appears that until and shortly after 
1955 general awareness remained very scattered as communities interacted largely within themselves.  
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Finally, the Southern Party was registered before the upcoming elections in 1953. It ran 
for southern agendas and independence opposing union with Egypt, which its members 
viewed partly responsible for the southern marginalization and exclusion from the three-
party negotiations on Sudan’s self-determination involving Britain, Egypt, and 
representatives of the Arabized elite (Sarkesian, 1973: 8; Eprile, 1974: 20; Ruay, 1994: 
64-7). However, the party remained weak during its early years, as it was largely 
manipulated by the dominant sectarian parties eager to co-opt southern representatives 
(Howell, 1973: 165) who often swayed away from a collective southern position to 
challenge agendas of the Arabized elite and force concessions due to divisions and 
floor-crossing inspired for instance by bribery.155  
 
This dynamic set the precedent for the Arabized political forces to create strategic 
alliances with some individual southern representatives to gain minority constituencies 
in southern Sudan. These alliances were aimed at dividing the southern leadership and 
generating support for the faction of the Arabized elite in question. This became a 
persisting approach by the Arabized elite and has since been used to portray an 
elaborate southern representation at the national level. However, since de-colonization 
southern representatives have had no power to alter key government policies 
particularly because the Arabized elements have sought to capitalize upon fissures 
within the southern leadership.  
 
The Arabized elite strategy to co-opt southern leaders has also led to a strategy to 
consciously subject to the manipulation of Arabized political forces. This strategy has 
been adopted by some individual southern politicians throughout the history of post-
colonial Sudan and it has benefited them personally in material or other terms. 
However, it has undermined the prospect of unity among the southern leadership, 
according to the “divide and rule” logic imposed by the Arabized elite collectively. 
 
In 1954 the Southern Party advocating independence sought to expand its constituency 
to counter the NUP. It changed its name to Liberal Party (Howell, 1973: 166) and 
convinced many southern independents and former NUP supporters to join, but was 
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 For instance according to Paysama, “The money was there, a great amount of money, from the 
Government and the Umma Party, and every time elections [voting] came, they [the Southerners] are 
destroyed like this” (quoted in Badal, 1994: 105).       
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unsuccessful in attracting support in the northern provinces, which led the liberal party 
change its name first to Southern Liberal Party and then back to Southern Party 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 36-7). Meanwhile, NUP members in the southern provinces engaged 
in propaganda to undermine the Umma, deeming its behavior locally as treasonable and 
pointing out that it was composed of descendants of slave raiders (Sarkesian, 1973: 9). 
While the inability of southern parties to gain support in the northern provinces can be 
attributed largely to the prevailing attitudes, the political bickering among parties of the 
Arabized nationalists in the southern provinces weakened their local appeal.  
 
     Processes Leading to 1955 Southern Disturbances  
 
The political developments in the aftermath of the 1953 elections fostered fear and 
mistrust of “Arab” intentions in sectors of the southern population particularly in 
Equatoria. These sentiments were further enforced by broken electoral promises and the 
announcement of the results of the Sudanization process resulting in growing presence 
of those viewed as “Arabs” by the locals.  
 
After formal annexation of the southern provinces the growing presence of northern 
civil servants and traders, who had limited knowledge of local realities, aggravated the 
situation in the southern provinces. Although those scattered jallaba who had remained 
in the southern provinces for longer to dominate trading activities maintained good 
relations with the locals, the arrival of new northerners after the annexation changed the 
attitudes of many156, as intermingling with southerners was increasingly viewed as 
undesirable and despised (Ruay, 1994: 75). Many of them began to show a collective 
unwillingness to interact with locals in equal terms, projecting a superior attitude, 
forming social groups limited to those embracing Arab culture, language, and customs, 
and a projecting subjugating attitude towards southerners deemed wild, primitive, and 
godless (Deng, 1995a: 136). In response to the influx of those considered “Arabs”, 
mistrust among the locals grew and relations deteriorated.  
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 Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. As 
noted in the previous chapter some jallaba had been present in places like Juba even during the Southern 
Policy to engage in trade and provide commercial services, which the British perceived essential. 
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Not surprisingly, this invoked negative feelings among many locals. This was owed 
largely to the northern perception of a social hierarchy rooted in slavery, but also to the 
British attitude placing the northerners above locals, and was further exacerbated by the 
Umma party’s effort to gain support in southern provinces by accusing the jallaba of 
exploiting southerners (RCIDSS, 1956: 20). The southerners continued to be viewed as 
abeed (slaves) following the historically forged social hierarchy, and constant remarks 
were expressed accordingly (Ruay, 1994: 74-5). This attitude of many jallaba could be 
observed in daily business in situations such as always sitting in the front seat, skipping 
queues in the local administrator’s office or hospital, and keeping locals waiting in line 
deliberately while casually chatting with officials (Ruay, 1994: 75), all of which they 
appeared to enjoy.157 Many of them were the most influential “Arabs” in the southern 
provinces and the racial attitudes and interests they adopted became largely reflected in 
local responses.  
 
The local attitudes in the southern provinces became more and more inhospitable 
because of the accelerated process of Sudanization following the elections, which 
fuelled mistrust and fear. According to the 1953 Anglo-Egyptian Agreement a 
Sudanization Committee had been instituted to distribute the remaining British occupied 
government jobs. On 20 February 1954, the five-member committee, which was 
composed of a British, Egyptian, NUP, Umma, and Pakistani members, was established 
and four months later it announced that some 800 senior positions were to be filled 
(Howell, 1973: 166; Daly, 1991: 370; Markakis, 1998: 111). However, to claim more 
positions for its constituents, the newly elected NUP government replaced the Umma 
member with another unionist, giving the NUP-Egyptian coalition deciding power in 
the Committee (Daly, 1991: 370). 
 
The process became highly exclusive. The Sudanization Committee dictated that the 
criteria of recruiting and promoting personnel were composed of three main elements: 
seniority, experience, and qualifications (Niblock, 1987: 216). The authorities adhered 
to the three categories so that the newly recruited personnel would not undermine the 
efficiency of the civil service that according to their view formed an important part of 
maintaining good administration (Ruay, 1994: 71). The process filtered out the large 
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 Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. 
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majority of southerners because they did not manage Arabic due to the Southern Policy, 
which became the new official language for the whole of Sudan and preferable for 
government employment. Although some southerners had occupied a reduced number 
of junior government posts, this did not lead to an expansion of public hiring policy to 
include a significant amount of southerners. 
 
Under the pretext of efficiency, southerners were systematically turned down and 
prominent members of Arabized central riverine were favored. Those southerners who 
felt qualified for government jobs considered themselves victims of a process 
characterized by favoritism and patronage. In an attempt to conserve administrative 
posts for their constituents, which also spoke against improved efficiency, factions of 
the Arabized elite promoted a number of head clerks several levels up to deputy 
governors in the northern provinces, while southern administrative personnel that 
occupied junior posts was largely left without promotions (Albino, 1970: 33; Ruay, 
1994: 71). Thus, rather than a procedure of technical quality, the Sudanization of public 
employment was inherently a political process that ignored social tensions in the 
southern provinces, while the ruling factions focused on wrangling amongst themselves. 
 
Consequently, the marginalization of the southerners in the Sudanization process 
evoked further feelings of bitterness, discontent, and fear. The southerners obtained 6 of 
the 800 ‘Sudanized’ posts (Taisier and Matthews, 1999: 203), resulting in an influx of 
northern administrators, teachers, and senior army and police officers to the southern 
provinces. After announcement of the appointments of senior civil servants to conclude 
the Sudanization in October 1954, which only granted 4 assistant district commissioner 
positions to southerners, general restlessness spread rapidly inspired by sectors of the 
southern intelligentsia that had been marginalized in the process. In response, many 
southern independents and members of the NUP, who lost the prospects of government 
posts that had lured many to the party, joined the Liberal Party (Howell, 1973: 166; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 38). The state had failed to accommodate the local leadership. 
 
Many southern leaders viewed the Sudanization process generally as Arabization, or 
internal colonization. Some of its members fed the fears of “Arab” domination and 
made some even believe that another era of slavery by “the Arabs” was at hand (Ruay, 
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1994: 72; Markakis, 1998: 111, Rogier, 2005: 10; Jok, 2007: 79-82).158 These fears 
were further inspired by the disappointed majority of southern political cadres, which 
made such sentiments widespread among constituencies in various parts of “the South”. 
Characterizing the general feeling of “Arabs” taking over the administrative positions, 
one southern merchant stated that “The results of Sudanization have come with a very 
disappointing result . . . Well as it appears, it means our fellow northerners want to 
colonize us for another hundred years” (quoted in Collins, 1975: 65). The shattering of 
hopes of expected political representation, jobs, prosperity, and development, 
encouraged the sentiment of despair further, together with the sight of arriving “Arab” 
administrators and jallaba to the southern provinces. The anxiety was so widespread 
that the situation became a threat to state’s security (Ruay, 1994: 72), as local animosity 
organized around an attitude to face the “masters” to correct a perceived social injustice, 
particularly in Equatoria.159 This points to colonial type attitudes and subjection 
crystallized in the somewhat controversial concept of “internal colonialism”. 
      
A significant response to Sudanization among the southern political cadres was the call 
for federalism, raising tensions between the government and sectors of the local 
leadership. Disappointed with the process, in October 1954 the Liberal Party decided to 
convene a meeting in Juba for June 1955, and in April 1955 convoked southern 
representatives over party lines to form a Southern Bloc to demand political 
concessions, concluding that the best solution for the southern provinces in those 
circumstances was the call for a federal status (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 22-24; 
Sarkesian, 1973: 9; Alier, 1990: 23; Ruay, 1994: 76; Markakis, 1998: 111). Southern 
politicians also asked their constituents to get ready for sacrifices (Said, 1965: 173), 
which provides evidence of organization of dissent leading to the southern disturbances. 
 
In the context of such tensions the government securitized the southern issue. After the 
NUP victory al-Azhari had become prime minister and had decided to visit the South. 
However, he had received a cold welcome with many locals either booing or ridiculing 
him (RCIDSS, 1956: 21). The spreading anti-government sentiment in the southern 
                                                 
158
 Individuals such as chief Lomiluk, also a politically influential ‘rainmaker’ opposed annexation of the 
South and fired from the government service in May 1955 by the northern district commissioner for his 
subversive activities, were important in this process (Simonse, 1992: 118-119).   
159
 According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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provinces alarmed al-Azhari to the extent that he implemented measures to raise salaries 
of local prison custodians, police officers, and clerks to the level of northern provinces, 
but the southern opinion did not improve and the government became inclined to apply 
repressive measures to keep the southerners in line (RCIDSS, 1956: 21; Ruay, 1994: 
74). The government informed that it was aware of the conspiracies weaved in “the 
South” and would use “force of iron” against any southerner who would “dare attempt 
to divide the nation” (quoted in Ruay, 1994: 73). It ordered the administrators who were 
almost all from the northern provinces to introduce stricter measures to control the 
southerners, transmitting such instructions through the public Radio Omdurman so that 
they also made their way to locals (Ruay, 1994: 74). At this point, sectors in the 
Arabized elite perceived views expressed within the southern political cadre as a 
challenge to its aspiration to extend hegemony in the southern provinces, converting the 
southern issue into a “problem”.   
 
However, the recent government policies had already elevated a sentiment of division 
by provoking a feeling of resistance and separatism within sectors of the southern 
political cadres. Threats of use of force fed the sentiments for dissent. In this situation, 
the call for federalism united many southern leaders and became a persisting item in 
their “regional” political agenda (Markakis, 1998: 111-2).      
 
The Sudanization policy had also resulted in northerners occupying higher positions in 
the army. This had important implications in “the South” since both police force and the 
SEC, the latter being a contingent composed of southerners under a mix of British and 
northern officers, now became officered by the northerners (RCIDSS, 1956: 24-5). For 
instance, 24 of the total of 32 officers of the SEC became northerners, while 8 officers 
were southerners, and the former were entirely in charge of detachments of the southern 
units in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile (RCIDSS, 1956: 24-5). Among the troops in 
Equatoria there were more southern junior officers, which facilitated later dissent.   
 
In this atmosphere many southerners began to feel that they were about to be subjected 
to northern rule as second-class citizens or slaves. Beshir (1968: 73) notes that at this 
time “Political agitation and organization developed and began to take shape under the 
leadership of the educated Southerners . . . [as] . . . Southern Sudanese became 
convinced that their regional interests were of greater value than the larger association 
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with the Sudan as a whole”. While there were a small number of those who decided to 
collaborate with the central government, the majority in the southern political class was 
disappointed and perceived itself as marginalized. Many sought to foment and reinforce 
these sentiments to mobilize constituents for opposition and pressuring for political 
concessions for southern region. 
 
In these circumstances, the government became increasingly preoccupied by the 
situation in southern Sudan. As a result, al-Azhari sought to prevent the conference 
convoked by the southern political forces in Juba (RCISSD, 1956: 86),160 but such 
actions compromised the administration’s legitimacy, especially in Equatoria province, 
and generated riots as a local member of the Legislative Assembly161 was arrested and 
the local work force at the Zande Scheme in Nzara was downsized.162 In response, the 
                                                 
160
 The government portrayed the image that most southern leaders were against the conference by 
commissioning the northern district commissioner and his deputy in Yambio to tour their district in 
Equatoria province and pressure local chiefs to sign in support of the government that sought to prevent 
the meeting (Eprile, 1974: 40). In fact, the assistant district commissioner convinced 13 local Tembura 
Azande chiefs to sign a telegram declaring that they sided with the government and objected to the Juba 
conference (RCIDSS, 1956, 21, 87-8; Eprile, 1974: 40). Finally, after obtaining the signatures, he sent a 
telegram to Khartoum claiming that the southerners were generally against the conference and Radio 
Omdurman was subsequently used to spread propaganda against the conference (Eprile, 1974: 40; Ruay, 
1994: 76). This shows that some local chiefs collaborated with the government, while the latter feared 
that unified southerners could undermine the unity of the state and aspirations of its Arabized power elite.   
161
 They had initially a desired effect for the government as they provoked a confrontation between the 
chiefs who had signed the telegram and and Elia Kuze, the representative of Yambio in the Legislative 
Assembly who supported the conference (Ruay, 1994: 76). On 7 July 1955 in a public meeting in Yambio 
it was decided that the chiefs who had signed the telegram should be dismissed and Kuze’s position as the 
peoples’ representative at the national level was affirmed, but instead of accepting the decision which 
would have stripped them from community leadership, the chiefs sought the support of the administrative 
district commissioner behind the plot and demanded Kuze’s arrest and trial (Eprile, 1974: 40; Ruay, 1994: 
77). Consequently, on 25 July Kuze was arrested and sentenced initially to 20 years in prison for criminal 
intimidation (Eprile, 1974: 40). However, the trial was a dubious affair because it violated the legal 
immunity of the members of parliament and the sentence was ten times the maximum described in the 
penal code for criminal intimidation, but even more importantly because the chiefs were both the 
plaintiffs and the judges (O’Ballance, 1977: 40, Ruay, 1994: 77).Upon the announcement of the sentence, 
which was adjusted to 2 years adhering to the penal code, a crowd of 700 following the trial demonstrated 
calling for Kuze’s release and small groups gathered in the Yambio market and raided a jallaba shop and 
assaulted other individuals considered “Arabs” (Eprile, 1974: 40).     
162
 26 July 1955, a demonstration started when a petition of 60 employees for higher wages was under 
consideration and 250 workers of the Weaving and Spinning Mill left the factory and grouped outside the 
General Manager’s office (O’Ballance, 2000: 7; Ruay, 1994: 78). Carrying sticks and tools, which they 
used to break windows of the offices, the crowd shouted “go back to your own country” and was soon 
joined by others, equipped with bows, arrows, and spears, swelling the crowd to between 700 and 1,000 
(RCIDSS, 1956: 102; Eprile, 1974: 41; Ruay, 1994: 78). Although possibly inspired by the Kuze trial, the 
demonstration was also related to the dismissal of 300 Equatorian workers in June and early July from the 
Zande Scheme, the only major economic project in the southern provinces (RCIDSS, 1956: 22; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 40; Daly, 1991: 385). Despite the dismissal of the local workers having been at least in 
part an economic decision with little consideration of its consequences, the southerners who were alarmed 
by the recent developments became convinced that it was inspired by “Arab” colonialism to deprive the 
locals of their livelihoods, particularly because the decision had been made after more northern staff had 
been hired (RCIDSS, 1956: 22; Ruay, 1994: 78; O’Ballance, 2000: 7).  
184        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
government attempted to regain authority by force, but this resulted in many deaths.163 
The Yambio and Nzara incidents were significant in strengthening the anti-government 
sentiment in Equatoria, resonating also elsewhere in the southern provinces.164 This 
gave sectors of southern politicians particularly in Equatoria a growing leverage for 
mobilization for dissidence and violent action.  
 
After the Nzara disturbances, the government became concerned that the anxiety and 
tension in the region would result in a major breakdown of order. This resulted in 
pressure to send northern troops to the region, as it had become clear that when needed, 
the security forces had almost no control over southern territory, nor could the 
government count on the reliability of a southern military and police that were 
increasingly consumed by the local sentiments. Indeed, the Nzara incident had affected 
the SEC and on 7 August a plot was revealed, after an attempt by a politically active 
southern soldier Saturlino Oboyo to kill a northern assistant post master had provoked a 
search of his premises, uncovering documents indicating a plan to kill northern officers 
in southern provinces (RCIDSS, 1956: 25-7; O’Ballance, 1977: 41; Daly, 1991: 385-6; 
Ruay, 1994: 79). The investigation also revealed a network of connections linking the 
Liberal Party and the SEC to the conspiracy,165 which the government sought to use 
against the southern political leadership.   
                                                 
163
 Upon receiving news about the demonstration the district commissioner dispatched a unit to the scene. 
It consisted of 11 soldiers and 5 policemen under the authority of the assistant district commissioner, but 
by the time it arrived the situation had become increasingly threatening and two jallaba shops had been 
looted (RCIDSS, 1956: 102; Ruay, 1994: 78). Ill-prepared to handle the situation, the authorities 
attempted to disperse the crowd first by warnings and tear gas, but after it appeared impossible, and faced 
with overwhelming odds, the troops were ordered to fire at the crowd (RCIDSS, 1956: 102; Ruay, 1994: 
78). The shooting, which was joined by two jallaba merchants with their own guns, dispersed the mob 
but left six Azande demonstrators dead and several injured, while two other drowned in panic (RCIDSS, 
1956: 22, 80; Eprile, 1974: 41; O’Ballance, 1977: 40; Daly, 1991: 385; Ruay, 1994: 78-9).   
164
 According to the RCIDSS (1956: 102), “ . . . the [Nzara] incident itself had a bad effect on the minds 
of the Southerners and was regarded by them as the beginning of a war; and if there was some confidence 
left in the administration, it had then disappeared completely”. The events in Yambio also fed this 
perception (Ruay, 1994: 79). In fact, what took place in Nzara received no investigation from Khartoum, 
but rather resulted in an ultimatum that was broadcasted and circulated (Eprile, 1974: 41). For instance, 
the later Commission of Inquiry in the Disturbances in the Southern Sudan came to a conclusion that the 
situation in Nzara was mishandled, and defined the government’s dealing with the events of summer 1955 
as a series of blunders (RCIDSS, 1956: 21-2, 102). Even worse, “The endless plunders by the 
administrators and the Jallaba in the South, and the threats of use of force from Khartoum, had made the 
Southerners high-strung and violence prone. Any slight incident was enough to explode the situation 
anywhere any time” (Ruay, 1994: 78). 
165
 During the investigation it was also discovered that Oboyo’s intent had been to kill the northern acting 
officer in charge of the SEC; that he was a member of the Liberal Party and in contact with politically 
oriented clerks in Juba; that he knew about government plans to send northern troops to the South and 
believed they would come to kill southerners; that he had spread propaganda among southern troops and 
planned a systematic killing of northern officers in the three southern provinces in early August 1955; that 
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Local administrators acted upon the threat. A decision was made to ask Khartoum for 
more troops and law enforcement was asked to arrest the civilians involved in the plot 
(RCISDD, 1956: 30), but this provoked further riots.166 The threatening situation drove 
the administrators to call for troops to be sent to maintain order in the South. However, 
in Khartoum the situation was neither understood nor was its severity appreciated, 
which led the government to ignore the initial pleas (Eprile, 1974: 41). However, on 10 
August 1955 Khartoum responded, airlifting a detachment of 500 soldiers to Juba 
(RCISSD, 1956: 31; O’Ballance, 1977: 41; Ruay, 1994: 79). Meanwhile the anxiety and 
fear had reached such level that upon the arrival of soldiers from the north, many locals 
left Juba because they though that the soldiers were sent to kill them (RCISSD, 1956: 
31; Ruay, 1994: 79; O’Ballance, 2000: 7). Yet, the government’s real intention was to 
maintain order and neutralize the threat posed by the SEC by transferring troops based 
in Torit to Khartoum.167  
 
Sections of southern leaders in Equatoria fomented the fears further by circulating a 
false controversial telegram168 and encouraging rumors that the southern troops would 
be eliminated.169 Northern officers evacuating their families from Torit on 14 August 
                                                                                                                                               
he had listed a total of 24 conspirators within the SEC placed in Torit, Malakal, Kapoeta, Trek, Juba, and 
Leave; and finally that he had intended to persuade southern junior officers to join the plan by firing on 
arriving northern troops and capturing strategic locations in Juba. However, after the junior officers 
declined he had pleaded resignation from his position as the president of southern corps and the military 
leader of the conspiracy from the Liberal Party Committee in Juba (RCIDSS; 1956: 25-7). 
166
 Due to the government’s limited capacity and decreasing legitimacy in the South, which complicated 
making arrests in the SEC, it settled for investigating the extent of conspiracy among the troops, while 
detaining two civilian clerks, Marco Rome and Daniel Jume, on 8 August in Juba which again provoked 
demonstrations (RCISDD, 1956: 30; Eprile, 1974: 41). The situation grew tense the following day as a 
crowd demanded for the release of the two accused, and although the district commissioner was inclined 
to compromise and send the accused to Torit for investigation, the crowd assaulted him. He escaped and 
tear gas bombs were used to disperse the crowd, but no arrests were made (RCISDD, 1956: 30; Eprile, 
1974: 41). 
167
 On 16 August 1955, the government ordered the No.2 Company of the SEC in Torit to prepare for 
transfer to Khartoum. The unit was to participate in the parade to celebrate the withdrawal of colonial 
troops from Sudan (RCISSD, 1956: 32, 105). However, the No.2 Company, along with other sections of 
the SEC was consumed with fear of northern subjugation due to the rumors circulated by some southern 
politicians and the recent events that had dissolved government legitimacy in the region (RCISSD, 1956: 
84-102; Ruay, 1994: 79). 
168
 This highly publicized document had been circulating in the southern provinces since July 1955. 
Allegedly signed by Prime Minister al-Azhari, but which originated from an unidentified politically 
active southern clerk in Juba, it stated “. . . Do not listen to the childish complaints of the Southerners. 
Persecute them, oppress them, ill-treat them according to my orders. Any administrator who fails to 
comply with my orders will be liable to prosecution . . .” (RCISSD, 1956: 82; Ruay, 1994: 79; 
O’Ballance, 2000: 7). 
169
 To add to other rumors, including that the southern troops would be disarmed, Second Lieutenant 
Taffeng Ladongi, one of the nine junior officers in the SEC, spread word among his men that the order 
was a trap to let northern troops to do what they wanted with the women and children of the southern 
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was taken as a sign that the northerners were preparing to exterminate the SEC 
(RCISSD, 1956: 105). It is in these circumstances that the southern troops became 
consumed by fear and anxiety and more prone to disobey orders from northern officials 
and provoke violent confrontation.170 
 
Despite knowing about the possibility of a mutiny the orders for transfer to Khartoum 
were imposed. This was done disregarding the mounting political tension in 
circumstances in which the northern officers of the SEC and administration had lost 
their legitimacy and were increasingly viewed as enemies among many southerners, 
provoking a mutiny in Torit.171 
 
The outrage spread first in Torit and then to other parts of Equatoria, before extending 
to Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. In other garrison towns of Equatoria, in Juba, Yei, 
Yambio, and Maridi, a total of 190 southern soldiers revolted (O’Ballance, 1977: 41, 
2000: 7; Markakis, 1998: 112). In Equatoria, the disturbances affected practically all the 
province as northerners were systematically rounded up, imprisoned, and then executed, 
their property looted, variably sparing women and children (RCISSD, 1956: 47-66). 
                                                                                                                                               
soldiers while they would be executed in Khartoum (RCISSD, 1956: 106; Markakis, 1998: 112; Ruay, 
1994: 80). 
170
 In this, their links to civilians and some southern politicians was apparent. It became widely known 
that when the No.2 Company was to be transported to Khartoum, it would disobey the order (RCISSD, 
1956: 106). 
171
 Shortly after Captain Yuzbashi Salah Abdel Magid addressed the soldiers in a threatening manner that 
they would be killed by northern troops if they mutinied, the No.2 Company soldiers broke into the 
armory and fired upon two northern officers, killing one of them (RCISSD, 1956: 33-4; Albino, 1970: 
38). Although the mutineers began to hunt down other northern officers, some of them escaped while 
many southern civilians joined the revolt and began looting jallaba shops provoking a situation which led 
to the drowning of an estimated 55 southerners while crossing river Kinyeti when trying to escape the 
violence (RCISSD, 1956: 34-5; Eprile, 1974: 42). The next morning, the violence and looting continued. 
More jallaba shops and houses of northerners were looted by the mutineers enraged by exaggerated news 
spread by southern junior officers Renaldo Loleya and Mandiri Onzaki that northern troops had 
massacred many southern soldiers and civilians in Juba, the exact number being four (RCISSD, 1956: 35, 
53; Eprile, 1974: 42). On 20 August, the havoc continued although Loleya had been thought to be in 
charge and the mutineers killed several northern jallaba merchants, their families, and northern officials 
and officers. For instance, the mutineers killed some jallaba and their families who had taken refuge in 
prison cells by firing at them through ventilation windows and doors after the prison warden had denied 
them the keys (RCISSD, 1956: 35-6; Eprile, 1974: 42). Later, 11 of the northern survivors in Torit were 
taken to hospital, some escaped, others were used to clean the blood from the cells, and yet others to load 
and unload dead bodies on a truck after which they were rounded up and a majority shot dead, with 3 
being able to escape (RCISSD, 1956: 36; Eprile, 1974: 42). Other atrocities committed included further 
arbitrary killings and executions of northerners. For instance, the 11 northerners who had sought refuge in 
a hospital run by missionaries were joined by two northern officers, but after demands of the southern 
officers they were taken to army cells and on 25 August the two officers were executed by a brother of 
Ladongi who thought his brother had been killed in Juba (RCISSD, 1956: 36; Eprile, 1974: 42). Two 
northern merchants released to bury them were also shot dead before a missionary took the remaining 
northern prisoners to the mission (RCISSD, 1956: 36; Eprile, 1974: 42-3). 
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Despite there having been some southerners who attempted to save northern lives, many 
of them were either tricked or forced to give way (Eprile, 1974: 43). In other words, 
what seems to have been a planned scheme of successive mutinies provoked by 
systematic propaganda was joined by thousands of tribesmen and hundreds of southern 
police officers and prison wardens transforming it into a general uprising against 
perceived northern “Arab” domination (Ruay, 1994: 81; O’Ballance, 2000: 7-8).172 On 
20 and 21 August, the mutineers also made plans to fight the northern troops and invade 
Juba, but in the midst of general disorder and in the absence of help that they hoped 
from the British in East Africa many deserted, deeming such action impossible 
(RCISSD, 1956: 42-5; Collins, 1975: 67). It appears that the expected support from the 
British was due to fabricated beliefs that they would support southern political cause, as 
had the Bog Barons during the process of de-colonization. 
 
The breakdown of order that ensued was characterized by brutality against anything 
“Arab”. In fact, despite the seeming chaos, there was little damage done to non-northern 
property, while only two non-northern foreigners were killed and people of mixed races 
were spared (Daly, 1991: 386).173 This suggests coordinated action and that the 
mutineers were led. The disorder became of such a scale that it practically isolated 
Equatoria from the outside world and the main northern military contingent, the No.5 
Company Camel Corps, stationed at Juba was able to maintain order only around Juba 
airport (RCISSD, 1956: 37, 53).  
 
Although the government control broke down in all Equatoria except Juba, the effects 
of the mutiny did not reach the same extent in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. Some 
disturbances occurred in both but only in Rumbek and Malakal did they result in 
casualties (RCISSD, 1956: 80; Ruay, 1994: 81). This was partly due to the success of 
administrators and some non-Equatorian southern leaders loyal to the government in 
calming the population, and maintaining the loyalty of security forces largely made of 
southerners. Northern administrators left Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal, suspending the 
administration, which calmed the situation until the arrival of northern army units at the 
end of October 1955 (RCISSD, 1956: 66-77; Daly, 1991: 386). This appears to show 
                                                 
172
 Confirmed by an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala, as the 
1955 disturbances were allegedly organized by those who had little experience of political dissent. 
173
 For instance, one interviewee’s jallaba father was killed in Torit, but his southern mother and himself 
as a mixed youngster, were spared. Interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba. 
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the limited extent of the influence of mainly Equatorian dissident politicians on ethnic 
groups in other areas of southern provinces. 
 
When the government found out about the scale and extension of disturbances in which 
hundreds died174 it became confused over appropriate responses. In fact, most northern 
politicians in Khartoum were ignorant of the local realities and situation in the South.175  
It was hard for many northerners to understand why the southerners had rebelled against 
their perceivably socially superior northern Arab-Muslim administrators.176 However, 
once news, stories, and rumors of what had happened, which highlighted the brutality of 
the southerners, reached Khartoum, a feeling of revenge emerged (Ruay, 1994: 82).  
 
This view of a hostile and ‘uncivilized’ South contributed to the government’s decision 
to resort to violent measures. On 19 August, Khartoum gave out news about the mutiny, 
declared a state of emergency in the southern provinces, and sent reinforcements 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 41; Daly. 1991: 386). Yet, the initial measures of the government to 
end the disturbances were unsuccessful. Al-Azhari attempted to convince the mutineers 
to surrender, but his demands were answered by a counter demand to immediately 
remove northern soldiers from southern provinces and either for the British to intervene 
or the U.N. to investigate. The mutineers felt that the northern “Arabs” were not to be 
trusted177 and that the northern army would attack them (RCISSD, 1956: 37-40; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 42; Ruay, 1994: 82).  
 
Those involved in the mutiny’s leadership were aware of the political situation and the 
international context. Telegrams were sent to the British Prime Minister and the 
                                                 
174
 The overall number of known casualties in the southern disturbances was 336 of which 261 were 
northerners and 75 southerners. According to official sources the casualties by location were the 
following: Torit, 78 northerners and 55 southerners who drowned; Zande District (Yambio and Nzara), 45 
northerners; Eastern District (Kapoeta), 35 northerners; Yei, 32 northerners and 1 southerner; Moru 
District (Meridi), 27 northerners; Loka, 17 northeners; Kateri, 9 northeners and 6 southerners; Malakal, 1 
northener and 9 southerners; Terakeka 7 northerners; Tali, 6 northeners; Juba, 4 southerners; Lainya, 3 
northerners; Rumbek, 1 northerner (RCISSD, 1956: 80). 
175
 Echoing northern ignorance of the local realities in the South, Collins (1975: 66) states “No one 
lounging in the cool of the evening on the veranda of the Grand Hotel [informal meeting point still 
favored by the northern elite] or sipping tea in the sūq of Omdurman would ever have predicted that the 
tempest would rage for seventeen years”. 
176
 See Deng (1995a), Jok (2001, 2007) for more on the superior attitude of Arab-Muslims in Sudan. 
177
 At the time such sentiment, promoted by elements of the southern elite, had already developed among 
the southerners due to perceived northern disrespect of a growing number of agreements and 
commitments with the southerners since the 1940s. Abel Alier’s Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements 
Dishonoured (1990) focuses on them. 
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headquarters of the British troops in Sudan in hope of support, while the northern 
opposition politicians, Egypt, ex-Bog Barons, and the southern Liberal Party demanded 
British or joint British-Egyptian military intervention to resolve the situation 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 42; Daly, 1991: 386-7). However, the British government did not 
interfere on the side of the mutineers because it feared a spread of Egyptian influence 
and undermining independent Sudan as its regional counter force (Daly, 1991: 386-7). 
 
And yet, Khartoum received support from the British. After news of the disturbances 
reached the Governor-General of Sudan, Alexander Knox Helm, who had departed for 
Britain, he returned and brought transport planes airlifting 8,000 northern troops to the 
South while engaging in negotiations with the mutineers (RCISSD, 1956: 40; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 41; Ruay, 1994: 82). On 25 and 26 August, Helm dispatched two 
messages backing al-Azhari and demanded the mutineers disarm, guaranteeing they 
would be rightfully treated as military prisoners, promising a full investigation into 
southern grievances, and sending his advisor, a British official, to oversee the surrender 
in Torit (RCISSD, 1956: 40-1). Faced with these conditions the mutineers accepted on 
27 August, but the mistrust and fear again became significant factors as all the rebels 
except Loleya and a handful of others, convinced of being killed, abandoned Torit 
before the northern units moved in (RCISSD, 1956: 42). Although in his 
correspondence with the mutineers Helm had used a strategy of exploiting the trust the 
southerners had towards the British, his influence could not prevent the mutineers from 
taking refuge in the bush or in the neighboring countries without turning in their 
weapons (O’Ballance, 1977: 42; Ruay, 1994: 83; ICG, 2002: 9).178 It appears that this 
was the beginning of anti-government insurgency in the southern provinces and the 
flow of refugees to the neighboring countries generated by wars in Sudan.  
 
Internationally, the southern disturbances required official British and Egyptian 
response. The British government belittled the situation to prevent Egyptian 
involvement, and in turn accelerated de-colonization preferring to leave the problem for 
the Sudanese (Daly, 1991: 387; Johnson, 2003: 29; Rogier, 2005: 10). In contrast, the 
Egyptians suggested that British military should remain in Sudan to maintain order and 
                                                 
178
 On 3 November it was announced that 959 mutineers had surrendered, while an estimated 360 
remained at large, and over 3,000 southerners, including 140 mutineers, had fled to Uganda fearing 
government reprisals (Daly, 1991: 387; O’Ballance, 2000: 8). 
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that Egyptian troops should be sent there as well (O’Ballance, 1977: 42). However, both 
Britain and Khartoum rejected the Egyptian plan, the latter being keen on withdrawal of 
foreign troops from Sudan as the NUP hoped to maintain its independent power. 
 
By the end of October 1955 order was restored and the army recovered the control of 
the major towns where disturbances had taken place. The surrendered mutineers were 
put on trial despite the initial promises, leading to many executions.179 The British had 
also attempted to negotiate the return of mutineers from Uganda, but, pressured by the 
U.S. keen to calm Egypt despite the situation in the South, they abandoned Sudan and 
decided that it would now be the Sudanese who would have to resolve the “Southern 
Problem” that the British predicted would continue to persist (Daly, 1991: 387-8; 
Yohannes, 1997: 269; Woodward, 2006: 29). In this way, international geo-political 
considerations weighed more than Sudan’s internal difficulties in the process of de-
colonization, which points to shared responsibility by the colonizing powers and other 
international actors for the dysfunctional conditions in which marginalizing state in 
Sudan acquired independence. 
 
Yet, the mutiny caused violent government repression to regain authority and extend 
legitimacy. Apart from the trials of the mutineers, schools were closed, political 
prisoners were taken and torture committed, many southern officials, police and prison 
warders were killed, and approximately 2,000 southerners were transported to northern 
labor prisons (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 33).180 Many southerners believed that the 
following reprisals that extended for months, largely outweighed the southern brutality 
during the disturbances (Eprile, 1974: 48, 54-55). This generated bitterness particularly 
among younger, and potentially more radical, cadres of southerners some of whom 
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 Although al-Azhari attempted to hold back pressure to seek revenge for the atrocities committed 
during the disturbances, the trials of the surrendered mutineers were conducted in an atmosphere of 
retaliation, in part because a number of northern survivors, including the district commissioner and 
assistant district commissioner of Yambio, sat in the tribunal (Albino, 1970: 38; Ruay, 1994: 83). 
Consequently, the civil courts issued 147 death sentences by mid-December 1955, out of which Helm, 
who departed from Sudan permanently on 15 December, authorized 121, and judges from the Arabized 
elite ordered further death sentences in 1956, also executing Loleya to whom Helm had promised 
personal safe conduct and fair trials for his men (Eprile, 1974: 47; O’Ballance, 1977: 42-3, 2000: 8; Daly, 
1991: 387; Ruay, 1994: 83). 
180
 Based also on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. 
According to Albino (1970: 38), “Life became very cheap, and people passed away daily in firing squads, 
from random shooting, torture in prisons, or in secret night arrests”. 
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participated in sabotage and joined the rebels (Simonse, 1992: 177).181 In the 
consequent cycle of violence, which included putting down a demonstration over pay in 
February 1956,182 hatred became a sentiment among many southerners, particularly in 
Equatoria, whose political consciousness centred growingly on a perception of the 
“Arabs” as enemies.183 Fed by northern ignorance of the South,184 an attitude of 
superiority, and playing down the southern political elite, the southern mistrust and fear 
of the northerners were taken up by the southern elite to continue the building of a 
“southern” political project. This undermined the Arabized elite’s assimilationist project 
in the South that would have rendered the southerners second-class, or socially lower, in 
any Arab-Muslim defined Sudan based on the Arabized elite’s attitudes derived from 
slavery (Jok, 2007: 3, 4-5). It should be asserted that these were paramount forces in the 
escalation of the situation towards support of violent dissent. 
 
Finally, several policy measures were introduced that added to the discord. For instance 
army troops composed of Arabized northerners were made responsible for maintaining 
order in the South, abolishing the SEC, which heightened the feeling of mistrust and 
Arab colonization and resulted in desertions within southern units upon their dispersal 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 42; Jok, 2007: 79, 81-2). Moreover, southern soldiers and 
students185 were prohibited to enlist in the armed forces until 1956 and the two 
secondary schools in Juba and Rumbek were moved to the North (O’Ballance, 1977: 
                                                 
181
 For instance, many school pupils returning to school found out that their role models (i.e. familiar 
police officers or officials) had been killed and that northerners had taken over in schools and 
administration. They were also more present in the streets enjoying their time with southern women. This 
generated bitterness particularly among the youth. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the 
University of Juba, 22 September 2008.  
182
 From 18 to 21 February 1956 demonstrations of some 700 tenant farmers from Guda cotton project 
(Guda Agricultural Scheme) in Kosti took place, the farmers demanding equitable pay for their labor in 
form of increase in the share of profits, more efficient auditing, and a role in formulating management and 
sales policy (Yohannes, 1997: 293; O’Ballance, 2000: 6). Clashing with the demonstrators a reinforced 
police force also suffered casualties but killed 18 and imprisoned either 334 or 281 involved of whom 190 
or 192 died in custody due to suffocation and heat stroke (Yohannes, 1997: 293; O’Ballance 2000: 6). As 
a result, the press demanded the al-Azhari government’s resignation, but the government outlived the 
crisis after being questioned on the incident (O’Ballance, 2000: 6). 
183
 Talk about the situation spread the awareness. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the 
University of Juba, 22 September 2008.  
184
 The Southern Policy had contributed to this ignorance and prevented a phasing out of attitudes based 
on slavery, which affected northern behavior and government policies leading up to the 1955 
disturbances. Based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba. 
185
 A plan existed among students to enlist in the army to learn military skills and then fight for the South. 
Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.  
192        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
43). This led to exodus of students to Kenya, Uganda, and Belgian Congo, which spread 
awareness to these neighboring countries of the unfolding situation.186  
 
4. Effects of Abboud Regime in Southern Sudan 
 
This section demonstrates the importance of the policies of the Abboud regime in the 
strengthening of southern opposition. Particularly the counter-insurgency measures and 
Arabization and Islamization had far reaching consequences as they radicalized many 
southerners further. 
 
     Abboud Regime’s Arabization and Islamization Campaign 
 
Sudan had acquired independence on 1 January 1956. This was followed by a 
constitutional debate in which the most extreme demands were those for an Islamic state 
and southern calls for federalism. In the aftermath of 1958 general elections the Umma-
People’s Democratic Party (PDP)187 coalition headed by Abdullah al-Khalil formed a 
government and the NUP moved to the opposition,188 but the leading forces experienced 
political wrangling mainly about foreign policy orientation, with Umma preferring the 
West and PDP and NUP Egypt and Arab countries, American aid issue, and domestic 
economic difficulties due to unsold cotton exports. In addition, political forces in the 
Sudanese periphery, many rallying behind the southern cause, had gained enough 
strength to pose a challenge to the political hegemony of the increasingly divided 
Arabized power elite which had difficulties with renewing the deal on Nile waters with 
Egypt due to the western orientation of al-Khalil. This debilitated the Umma position. 
As a result in the 1950s environment in which military coups had occurred in the 
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 Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.  
187
 Beginning in October 1955, al-Mirghani pressured for non-sectarian and secular al-Azhari’s 
replacement. He masterminded a breakaway of 3 ministers and 18 parliamentarians leading to an internal 
division in the NUP that culminated in the formation of the People’s Democratic Congress (PDP) on 30 
June 1956. The PDP composed of anti al-Azhari ex-NUP elements, which unlike al-Azhari who broke 
with Egypt in support of Sudanese independence, maintained relations with Nasser’s Egypt and its patron, 
the Soviet Union. It reached over sectarian lines to act in concert with al-Rahman to depose al-Azhari 
(Niblock, 1987: 208-10; Yohannes, 1997: 285; Hasan, 2003: 172). 
188
 The Umma-PDP effort accounted for 62 and 26 seats, leaving the NUP with 42 seats in the Parliament 
(Niblock, 1987: 212; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 30). O’Ballance (1977: 46) gives slightly different 
numbers: the Umma 63, the NUP 45, the PDP 27, the Southern Bloc (Federal Party) 37, and the Anti-
Imperialist Front 1. Niblock (1987: 215), quotes numbers from Bechtold (1977: 190) and presents the 
following results: the Umma 63 and 14, the NUP 44 and 5, the PDP 26 and 4, the Southern Liberals 40 
and 7, of the total seats of the House of Representatives (173) and the Senate (30), respectively. Finally, 
Hasan (2003: 172) accounts the Umma 63, the NUP 45, the Southern Liberals 38, the PDP 27. 
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Middle East and Egypt, al-Khalil, a former army general, engineered an army 
intervention (Hasan, 2003: 174; Collins, 2005: 205), to disrupt democracy by setting up 
an authoritarian regime with the view of promoting Umma’s hegemony, dismantling the 
threat of regionalist movements, and preventing Sudan from becoming Egypt’s and the 
U.S.S.R’s client (First, 1970: 229-30; Niblock, 1987: 217-8; Woodward, 1995: 95-6; 
Yohannes, 1997: 290, 291; Hasan, 2003: 173). After initial hesitation the U.S. accepted 
the plan, being convinced that Egypt was about to take over Sudan, and a bloodless 
military coup was staged in the morning of 17 November 1958 which brought a regime 
headed by Ibrahim Abboud to power (First, 1970: 225, 228-30; Yohannes, 1997: 291; 
O’Ballance, 2000: 12). Although Beshir (1968: 80) has argued that the coup was not a 
northern conspiracy, this appears to have been the case in an attempt to preserve 
exclusive political hegemony and the southern elite along with the general population 
grew aggrieved. 
 
Ibrahim Abboud became the figurehead of the authoritarian regime.189 He embarked on 
a plan to centralize the state and administration further, concentrating more power in the 
presidency for more exclusive regime control to curb opposition and dissent (First, 
1970: 231; Niblock, 1987: 222; Yohannes, 1997: 292; Hasan, 2003: 181-2). Pressured 
by the U.S. and respecting its ties with the Umma, the regime, which was formed 
around personal ties among the Arabized power elite,190 attacked the political left 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 49; Yohannes, 1997: 292-4).191  
 
After the military coup general anxiety in the South increased. This is because it was 
viewed as an attempt to avoid political concessions (Oduho and Deng, 1963: 35; 
Albino, 1970: 44), and result in further repression. After the regime’s local 
                                                 
189
 He assumed the title of Commander-in-Chief, presiding over the twelve-member SCAF that became 
the supreme political authority exercising all constitutional powers (O’Ballance, 2000: 12; Hasan, 2003: 
175). A cabinet of Ministers was formed to assist the SCAF, seven of whose members, including Abboud, 
belonged to the SCAF, while another six were civilians, including Santino Deng as the only southerner 
(First, 1970: 232; O’Ballance, 2000: 12; Hassan, 2003: 175). 
190
 For example, early on these were based on a family relationship between the former Prime Minister al-
Khalil and General Ahmad Abd al-Wahab, his son-in-law, who initially became Deputy Commander in 
Chief, Minister of the Interior and Local Government, and a member of the SCAF (Yohannes, 1997: 291; 
O’Ballance, 2000: 13). 
191
 However, political wrangling and two Arab-nationalist and anti-Western coup attempts resulted in the 
incorporation of anti-western elements and it sought consolidation orienting increasingly towards Egypt 
with which it concluded the Nile Waters Agreement in October 1959 (Albino, 1970: 44; Collins, 2005: 
205). This raised the Sudanese water allocation from the 1/22 stipulated in the previous treaty to 1/3, or 
18.5 billion m3, respective to Egypt’s 55.5 billion m3 (Niblock, 1987: 221, Warburg, 2000: 78). 
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consolidation it turned its attention to the “Southern Problem” by radicalizing the 
cultural assimilation policies adopted by the al-Azhari and al-Khalil governments192 
according to the widespread opinion within the Arabized elite cadres that the southern 
dissent could be quelled through Arabization and Islamization and eradicating language, 
culture, and religious differences, but also sought to reassert authority locally using 
repressive means to strengthen the Arabized elite dominated centralized administration 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 52; Niblock, 1987: 223-4; Daly, 1993: 14; Jendia, 2002: 64-5).193 
The imposed policy together with violent counterinsurgency measures resulted in 
growing local hostility (O’Ballance, 1977: 51; Niblock, 1987: 224). 
 
The regime staged another wave of northernization of personnel in all the principal 
administrative posts. Although some privileged southerners had acquired a number of 
civil servant positions in the southern provinces during the democratic period, now, 
apart from banning southern political representation overall, all southern governors and 
district commissioners were replaced by northern inspectors and southern junior 
officials were transferred to the North, army and police in the South became 
overwhelmingly northern, and provincial and executive councils were put under direct 
supervision and control of northern officials (Collins, 2005: 207). Moreover, the 
northern dominated administration in the South was to be consolidated by cultural 
Arabization and Islamization relying on coercive power of the security forces, which 
was to give the latter local legitimacy in long-term (Collins, 2005: 207-8). However, 
this policy backfired as the increased repression led to an escalation of the conflict.  
 
                                                 
192
 According to Collins (1990: 304), “After the dissolution of parliament, the military government sought 
to quell southern dissent by the bonds of Sudanese nationalism, expressed in Arabic language, Arab 
culture, and the Arab past fused with the traditions of Sudanese history and the deep emotions of 
Sudanese Islam. These are strong and dynamic themes in the northern Sudan. They have less relevance 
among the southern Sudanese, who had frustrated the ambitions of the Mahdi and the efforts of the 
Khalifa ‘Abd Allahi at the end of the nineteenth century to advance Islam up the Nile and in the twentieth 
century, supported by British imperial policy, formed an African bastion against Islam”. 
193
 For instance, the regime initiated a school building program, backed by United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) that was funneling money to the Sudanese economy during the time 
the Americans considered the anti-Communist Abboud regime heading to the right direction, establishing 
schools to learn Qur’an, a number of intermediate, and one secondary, Islamic institutes, while 
conversion to Islam was encouraged especially among students and Arabic replaced English as the 
medium of instruction in the southern intermediate schools (Beshir, 1968: 81; Niblock, 1987: 224; 
Johnson, 2003: 30; Yohannes, 1997: 294-5). The government also built mosques, replaced Sunday with 
Friday as the official day of rest, and subsidized Muslim propaganda in the South through Department of 
Religious Affairs (Niblock, 1987: 224; Jendia, 2002: 65; Collins, 2005: 209). 
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In Khartoum, the Christian missionaries were viewed as troublemakers contributing to 
the “Southern Problem”.194 They were deemed remains of colonialism representing 
external interests and disruptive to Arabization and Islamization and accused of 
supporting the mutineers and inciting southern dissent (O’Ballance, 1977: 51; Niblock, 
1987: 224; Jendia, 2002: 56). This led to progressive restrictions on Christian 
missionary and religious activity,195 but increased the number of converts in the South 
as many southerners adopted Christianity largely due to the growing insecurity because 
it was presented as a counterforce to the imposed Arabization and Islamization. 
 
In the latter 1950s, scattered violent incidents targeting government personnel and 
installations took place in Equatoria. This owed to the scattered mutineers escaped in 
1955 that caused sufficient concern for the regime to trigger an unprecedented level of 
repression including killings, torture, bombardment, and the burning villages accused of 
sheltering them196 (Eprile, 1974: 55-6; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 13). Although the rebels 
posed a localized threat to the regime (Howell, 1978a: 425), the impact of their activity 
was initially small.197 However, weak but oppressive counter insurgency and 
Arabization and Islamization efforts generated an upsurge of southern opposition that 
escalated the cycle of violence. In this escalating violence many southerners were 
caught between the ‘outlaws’ and the army troops who both threatened and mistreated 
them (O’Ballance, 1977: 51). 
 
                                                 
194
 While many prominent members of the Arabized elite, such as Siddig al-Mahdi and Islamists, are 
known to have advocated the spread of Islam to deal with the “Southern Problem”, the missionaries 
continued to see themselves as a bastion of Christianity to curb the Islamic encroachment in the South 
(O’Ballance, 2000: 15). 
195
 In 1961 religious gatherings outside the churches and catechetical teaching became forbidden and 
missionaries became increasingly harassed (Collins, 2005: 209). In the following year, on 15 May 1962, 
the regime decreed a Missionary Societies Act, which limited their mandate from proselytizing to basic 
religious functions. Johnson (2003: 31) has noted that “Ironically, conversions to Christianity increased 
dramatically once the churches were subjected to this government assault”. 
196
 These were aimed to regain coercive dominance, appeasement, and assimilation by force through 
arrests, tortures, and other retaliatory measures, but this facilitated development of southern military and 
political movements inspired by the 1955 disturbances (Eprile, 1974: 55-6; O’Ballance, 1977: 52; Daly, 
1993: 13-4; Johnson, 2003: 31; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 81). For instance in 1957, the government 
troops destroyed 700 huts in Yei district, as a punishment for collaborating with the rebels (O’Ballance, 
1977: 51). 
197
 For instance, O’Ballance (1977: 51, 59) asserts that  
. . . the ‘rebels’, or ‘outlaws’ as the Khartoum Government officially designated them, were few 
in number and they lacked cohesion, organization and central direction; their scarce firearms 
were the old British rifles, sten-guns they had taken with them when they had deserted” and “ . . . 
their hatred of northerners manifested itself in the occasional ambush, shooting incident or minor 
attack. 
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By 1960 the conflict began to disrupt local living conditions. This affected the lives of 
the local people at least in two ways. First by 1960, the fear of both government 
retaliatory raids198 and those of the foraging rebel bandits forced displacement 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 52-3, 57; Niblock, 1987: 225). Second, in 1960 and 1962 in the 
midst of other disturbances and rumors about the formation of a guerilla force, 
demonstrations took place in southern schools that led to boycotts to protest the 
repressive policy, provoking further reprisals by the authorities (O’Ballance, 1977: 52; 
Niblock, 1987: 225).199 Evidence shows that southern pupils staged school strikes in 
solidarity with the southern cause to the extent that it could be claimed that the political 
leadership of the school movement formed the best organized opposition group.200  
 
Growing insecurity and disrupted livelihoods encouraged displacement because those 
who stayed were bound to suffer.201 Thus, many discontinued their traditional sedentary 
crop cultivation or cattle herding because they feared both the army and the ‘outlaws’. 
This created more dependency on alternative forms of subsistence, such as fishing, 
hunting, and gathering, which were often not enough to sustain families. Chief Thon 
described that  
Whenever the boys came in the middle of the night, they would find food, they 
would find cattle, they would find a goat, they would eat but then leave . . . That 
is how we lived, avoiding one another, crossing our paths, each man coming and 
another going (Quoted in Deng, 1978: 168-9).  
However, because of the growth of such activities available local resources became 
easily exhausted. Consequently, displacement and labor migration emerged as 
alternatives. 
                                                 
198
 According to Niblock (1987: 224), “The violence employed by the police and armed forces in 
suppressing dissent caused growing numbers of southern civilians to escape from government control, 
either by fleeing into exile or by absconding into the bush”. 
199
 O’Ballance (1977: 52) alleges that pupils began boycotting schools either in the fear of becoming 
targets of the government or the rebels. 
200
 For instance awareness in schools led to coordinated, repeated, and annual strikes to which the 
authorities responded heavy handedly, including dismissing the brightest students. In contrast, those 
students interacting with northern teachers unnecessarily were considered traitors. Based on an interview 
with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008.  
201
 Replying to the question of what war meant, Chief Thon Wai said, “Our brothers [the Northerners], in 
their anger with us, harassed all those people who remained at home, including their chiefs. Even if the 
people of the forest [the rebels] had only passed near a camp, they would come and say, ‘They are here 
inside the camp.’ They would proceed to destroy the camp. Children would die and women would die. 
The chief would only stand holding his head. If you tried force, you fell a victim. Whatever you tried, you 
fell a victim. Nothing made it better. You just sat mourning with your hands folded like a woman” 
(quoted in Deng, 1978: 167). 
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Although labor migration had formed part of the traditional economy in Sudan, the 
increasing amount of displacement due to the situation in the South complemented the 
expansion of capitalist agriculture. The conflict resulted in migration from the South not 
only to the neighboring countries, but also to northern Sudan where the displaced 
southerners allegedly worked in slave-like conditions as agricultural laborers or in other 
low positions (Duffield, 1992: 52).202 Although the migration northwards during the 
1950s and 1960s was not as extended as during the later southern insurgency, more than 
a million southerners lived in the North, forming a pool of labor that induced the 
government to pursue policies to extract such labor for agriculture by fomenting further 
violence in the South (Woodward, 2002: 9-10; Johnson, 2002: 2). 
 
By 1960, the regime began targeting the southern political elite. Although previously it 
had warned the southerners not to voice opinions about federation or secession, in 
December 1960 the regime plan to imprison southern elites to disrupt the southern 
political movement came to light (Eprile, 1974: 21, 92; O’Ballance, 1977: 53). This 
initiated an exodus of prominent southerners and contributed to a decision to transfer 
the remaining southerners serving as officials to the North.203 
 
The example set by the southern elite escalated the wave of migration from the South.204 
This was initiated by some of those few administrators or teachers with secondary or 
higher education, while a less educated group led by secondary school students and 
junior government employees such as prison warders and policemen went into hiding in 
the southern forests (Niblock, 1987: 224). By the mid-1960s there were about 70,000 
Sudanese refugees in the neighboring countries (Bariagaber, 2006: 70), while by the end 
of the conflict the number had reached over half a million (Beshir, 1968: 84). 
 
 
 
                                                 
202
 Duffield (2001) discusses this in the context of the second southern insurgency. 
203
 Dominic Muerwel, a former southern member of the Legislative Assembly, had attempted to leave the 
country already in 1959 to establish an exile political movement. However, William Deng, a Dinka from 
Bahr al-Ghazal and the assistant district commissioner of Kapoeta, was prominent among those seeking 
exile after the plot, claiming having been victim of obstruction and nepotism (Eprile, 1974: 92; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 53). 
204
 Many southerners began to flee to Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, the CAR, and DRC (Eprile, 1974: 92; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 53), as many found support among ethnic kin across the border in the neighboring 
countries. 
198        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
5. The Founding and Consolidation of the Anya Nya 
 
This section highlights the rise of the armed and political opposition which, despite 
often being considered to have started as two separate forces, had connections between 
them. It is also shown how the Anya Nya, the umbrella of armed bands was 
consolidated and the rebellion grew more and more regional.   
 
     Emergence and Consolidation of Armed Opposition 
 
In the course of the late 1950s, the ‘outlaws’ caused only minor damage to the 
government and staged occasional attacks, ambushes, and shootings.205 They had 
sustained themselves through banditry, organizing the force of approximately 500 
fighters into small bands according to ethnic and regional lines, which all exercised 
military discipline in order not to disintegrate in the face of pressure by the government 
troops (O’Ballance, 1977: 57, 59). The movement, which in 1955-9 period centered on 
the figure of chief Lomiluk (Simonse, 1992: 119), was decentralized into largely 
independent commands under provincial commanders-in-chief which operated and 
recruited locally among young men, and imposed authority on individual villages 
(Howell, 1978a: 425, 426; Wakoson, 1984; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 15-6). Since the 
government was unable to destroy the insurgents, impede recruitment, or access to 
arms, the guerrilla warfare was bound to continue (Howell, 1978a: 426). In fact, harsh 
government measures stimulated recruitment further. 
 
By 1960 the rebel forces continued largely dispersed. This “guerilla survival period” 
was characterized by an aggressive foraging of food whose motivations centered on 
perceived and experienced injustices rather than clear political agenda (O’Ballance, 
2000: 18). Moreover, they hardly possessed firearms, having approximately 200 old 
weapons in the early 1960s, and were mainly armed with arrows, spears, and machetes 
(O’Ballance, 2000: 18). Johnson (2003: 31) points out that, “The guerillas . . . had no 
external military support, arming themselves mainly by theft from police outposts, the 
occasional ambush of army patrols, or through the defection of Southern police or 
                                                 
205
 According to Simonse (1992: 313) between “ . . . 1955 and 1959 a series of attacks was carried out 
against government targets and against chiefs who were regarded as collaborating with the government . . 
.”. These were individual incidents in which single soldiers were killed but larger confrontations were 
avoided. Based on an interview with a prominent member of the University of Juba, 22 September 2008. 
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soldiers”, but in the early 1960 this changed. Fleeing government repression, growing 
numbers in Equatoria including many of the 800 southerners jailed after the 1955 
mutiny and released in 1961 joined the rebellion (O’Ballance, 1977: 57; Woodward, 
1995: 97; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 13). This led to a formation of a more coherent and 
politically oriented force in 1963 that led to the founding of a single umbrella 
organization, the Land Freedom Army, LFA (O’Ballance, 1977: 59; Woodward, 1995: 
97; O’Ballance, 2000: 19).  
 
The LFA engaged in guerrilla warfare. The force was organized according to British 
military model in territorial units run by regional commanders under the loose authority 
of the Commander in Chief, Emilio Tafeng (O’Ballance, 1977: 59, 2000: 19). Soon the 
LFA adopted the name Anya Nya206 to boost morale and established base camps and 
training facilities207 in the difficult to access terrain of the neighboring countries 
bordering the South (O’Ballance, 1977: 59, 2000: 19-20). But, until the end of 1963, the 
rebel operations consisted largely of scattered assaults on isolated government posts, the 
most significant taking place in Pochalla, Upper Nile.208 This convinced many civilians 
in Upper Nile of Anya Nya’s capacity to attract volunteers and helped to spread the 
movement’s Nuer branch to all parts of the province (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 15). 
Gradually, the Anya Nya commenced a concerted campaign to destroy bridges, block 
roads, ambush northern troops, and punish southerners who were either unhelpful or 
collaborated with the administration, which caused government counter-raids on 
ordinary people (O’Ballance, 1977: 60, 2000: 20). This escalation generated further 
displacement as people left to find refuge in forests, neighboring countries, or northern 
Sudan.   
 
The first major Anya Nya maneuver was its unsuccessful attempt to take Wau, the main 
town in Bahr al-Ghazal.209 This failure paralyzed the Anya Nya’s attack capacity and it 
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 Anyanya means ‘snake poison’ or ‘venom of the Gabon viper’ in a number of local Equatorian 
languages. 
207
 According to Chan and Zuor (2006: 13), “In late 1963, the first training centers outside the country 
were opened in Zaire at the villages of Bangadi and Nyangera with Captain Marko Bangusa as the person 
in charge of training. The camps started out with such weapons as spears, swords, pangas, sticks, and 
etc.”. 
208
 In Pochalla, the rebels, recruited and organized in Nuer refugee camps in Ethiopia, killed all northern 
jallaba except one female and occupied the post for a week (Eprile, 1974: 96; O’Ballance, 2000: 20; 
Chan and Zuor, 2006: 14-5). 
209
 On 11 January 1964 a force from a Dinka branch of the movement under Captain Bernandino, armed 
with British rifles, sten guns, and Molotov cocktails, unsuccessfully attacked the government defenses 
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concentrated on recruiting, training, and reorganization while receiving guns from the 
Congolese Simba Rebels from August 1964 to 1965 when the Anya Nya also seized 
arms sent to the Simba by Egypt and Algeria through Khartoum (Eprile, 96-7; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 60-1; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 14). By 1965 when the Simba where 
defeated, the conflict in the DRC, in which independent Uganda was also involved, had 
produced 4,000 refugees in Equatoria, which increased to 9,000 by 1969 (Musa, 1988: 
457). 
 
The Anya Nya had become a threatening force by the mid-1960s,210 although it 
continued to suffer from a number of weaknesses.211 Moreover, by 1964 the political 
opposition initially separated from the armed insurgency212 was developing links with 
the movement’s Bahr al-Ghazal command, as it appears that Bernandino had carried out 
the Wau attack according to Deng’s orders (O’Ballance, 1977: 60-1). However, these 
links did not become obvious until September 1964 when part of political opposition 
changed from a non-violent approach to attempt to gain control of the Anya Nya 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 61). In fact, although both having their roots in the regime 
repression, sections of the political and armed opposition differed initially considerably 
with the armed struggle being led by defected junior officers and lower level security 
personnel who were not necessarily fond of the political organization.    
 
     The Rise of Political Opposition 
 
The deliberate targeting of southern intelligentsia led to political organization behind a 
common “southern” cause largely separate from the early armed opposition. In 1961 the 
                                                                                                                                               
and Bernandino and sixty men were captured (Eprile, 1974: 96; O’Ballance, 2000: 20). Consequently, 
Bernandino along with two of his men were hanged, the rest imprisoned. 
210
 While by early 1964 most of Sudan’s army of 18,000 was operating in the South, by September there 
were thousands of Anya Nya recruits to be trained and by the end of the year the Anya Nya military force 
already counted 2,000, which forced cutting recruitment due to a low availability of firearms (Eprile, 
1974: 96; O’Ballance, 1977: 61-2; Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006: 81). 
211
 According to Eprile (1974: 97) who has compiled a list of observer accounts, the rebels experienced “ . 
. . smallness of the educated elite; lack of discipline; personal misuse of money; poor sense of 
organization; poor time sense; little combat experience; poverty; inferior military equipment; shortage of 
external sources of supply; lack of support of neighbouring African countries; no developed resources to 
sell in return for foreign backing; an extremely high death rate from disease; poor to non-existent 
communications and transport; lack of knowledge of techniques used by other guerilla movements”. All 
this, of course, added to ethnic diversity and differences that were difficult to overcome (Eprile, 1974: 98; 
Chan and Zuor, 2006: 15-6). 
212
 The SANU President Joseph Oduho initially condemned the rebellion, disconnecting the political 
movement from the insurgents in 1960 (O’Ballance, 1977: 53-4). 
Chapter IV. De-colonization: Emergence of the First Insurgency        201 
 
Sudan Christian Association had been founded to counter Arabization and Islamization, 
but due to an initiative of Captain Joseph Lagu, a Madi from Equatoria, in February 
1962 it was transformed into the Sudan African Closed Districts National Union 
(SACDNU) engaging in diplomacy to spread awareness of the cause and demand 
independence (Albino, 1970: 44; O’Ballance, 1977: 53; Markakis, 1998: 117; Chan and 
Zuor, 2006: 16). Equatorian politicians were the early protagonists of the “southern” 
cause,213 as the SACDNU leaders214 assumed a prominent role in the southern political 
opposition. This in part explains the later animosity towards growing Dinka influence. 
  
In an April 1962 meeting in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) SACDNU’s name was changed to 
the Sudan African National Union (SANU). It was headquartered in Kampala from 
1964 where a community of southern refugees already existed, with a factional base 
under Deng in Leopoldville (Albino, 1970: 44; O’Ballance, 1977: 54; Markakis, 1998: 
117; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 16, 17).215 By this time many in the SANU leadership were 
affected by the emerging African nationalism, which in the case of Sudan could be 
harnessed into a southern liberation struggle from the perceived northern “Arab” 
domination and “internal colonialism”. By 1964 factionalism deepened216 and resulted 
in Deng, advocating a federal solution as opposed to the position of the secessionist 
SANU-in exile majority,217 moving to Khartoum to found SANU-inside to compete 
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 These Equatorian leaders included Lohure, a Lotuka, Jaden, a Pojulu, Oduho, a Lotuka, Rume, a 
Kuku, Ezbon Mondiri, a Moru, Albino Tombe, a Lokoya, Tafen Lodongi and Lazaru Mutek, both 
Lotukas, Benjamin Loki, a Pojulu, Elia Lupe, a Kakwa, Elia Kuze, a Zande, and Timon Boro, a Moru. 
214
 Lohure was linked to the Catholic Church becoming major patron of the SACDNU, while Joseph 
Oduho became the first president, Marko Rume the vice president, Deng the secretary general, and 
Aggrey Jaden the deputy secretary general, (Eprile, 1974: 92; O’Ballance, 2000: 17; Chan and Zuor, 
2006: 16). 
215
 The SANU continued diplomacy and earlier propaganda through publications, but its leadership 
consisted of prominent individuals of different ethnicities and regions many of which had played part in 
the emerging southern political movement. Consequently, it remained divided between federalism and 
independence, and personal ambitions and competition (Eprile, 1974: 92-3; O’Ballance, 2000: 17-8; Chan 
and Zuor, 2006: 16-7).   
216
 First major disagreement had occurred between Oduho and Deng over the movement’s name. When 
the leadership was voted upon during the first SANU convention in 7-16 November 1964, Deng was 
absent in Europe on a diplomatic mission, resulting in him being deliberately sidelined. This led to an 
offshoot as Deng responded positively to al-Khatim al-Khalifa government’s request for negotiations 
against the will of the rest of the movement (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 17). In 1964, the Abboud regime 
collapsed in the October Revolution under pressure from the sidelined Arabized elite’s opposition and the 
Sudan Communist Party (SCP) that had mobilized their civilian constituencies in northern Sudan against 
repression, nepotism, corruption, deteriorating economic conditions, and the deepening “Southern 
Problem”. It was replaced by al-Khalifa’s caretaker government, which sought to negotiate with the 
southern opposition. See Hasan (2003) for an excellent account on this.  
217
 Many exiled southern politicians advocated independence as a solution to northern domination. An 
interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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with the Southern Front (SF).218 Thus, distinct political visions, personal competition, 
factionalism, and “tribalism” weakened the southern political movement already from 
early on. 
 
The southern political opposition in exile emerged largely in response to regime 
repression. The imposition of Islam and Arabic culture and restriction of Christianity 
created conditions in which the southern political opposition was able to mobilize its 
constituents (Markakis, 1998: 117). The SANU focused initially on efforts to gain 
political recognition and alliances by resorting to a rhetoric of oppression of Black 
Christian “Africans” by repressive and racist “Arab-Muslim” regime.219 It informed the 
press and sent appeals to the U.N. and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the 
latter founded on 25 May 1963 as the culmination of pan-Africanism but based on a 
charter prohibiting involvement in the internal affairs of states (O’Ballance, 1977: 53-4; 
Alier, 1990: 73; Markakis, 1998: 117; Jendia, 2002: 114; Murithi, 2005: 2, 3, 23). 
Moreover, it contacted church organizations and missionaries for support, leading to 
international protests against the regime and contributing to further targeting of 
Christians by the regime (Markakis, 1998: 117; ICG, 2002: 93-8). In this way, race and 
religion became more politically instrumentalized as the regime imposed Arabization 
and Islamization, while the SANU relied on Africanism and Christianity as counter-
forces. In fact, the role of Christian organizations in supporting southern dissent 
requires further impartial research. 
 
     Regionalization of the “Southern Problem” 
 
Initially, the Abboud regime sought international recognition for legitimacy and to 
extravert material resources for internal consolidation in the bipolar Cold War 
environment that proved receptive to this aspiration. In this effort, the regime 
recognized China, negotiated two trade agreements with the Soviet Union in 1961 and 
1963, one valued US$18 million, obtained aid, loans, and credits from Britain, West 
                                                 
218
 The SF was a southern political organization with constituency among the displaced southerners in the 
northern provinces (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 17). Mboro from near Wau in Bahr al-Ghazal and Abel Alier, a 
Bor Dinka, were among its leading members. The existence of the SF may have influenced Deng’s 
decision to go to Khartoum.  
219
 According to Markakis (1998: 117), an attempt was made to “ . . . solicit support abroad, particularly 
among Africans, portraying the conflict as racial, and relying heavily on the theme of Arab oppression of 
black Africans”. 
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Germany and the U.S., and as a member of the World Bank (WB) since 1957, acquired 
a loan from the International Development Association to develop rail and water 
transportation systems in 1958 (O’Ballance, 1977: 50; Heldman, 1981: 65; World Bank, 
2003). 
 
The regime also sought to improve the relationship with Arab countries and particularly 
its neighbor, Egypt. After concluding the Nile Waters Agreement and other bilateral 
treaties and expressing its reliance on Egypt as a protective force, the Abboud regime 
improved relations with other Arab states such as Algeria, Libya, Syria, Iraq, North 
Yemen, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, and showed solidarity towards Palestine (Jendia, 
2002: 121). It also supported Iraq’s and Syria’s pan-Arabist aspirations by channeling 
arms to Eritrean rebels (Woodward, 2003: 120). However, in 1963 Khartoum stopped 
supporting Eritreans and negotiated a defense treaty with Ethiopia to curb possible 
Ethiopian support to the Anya Nya, while seeking to maintain good relations with the 
Arab states that were increasingly confrontational towards both the U.S. backed Israel 
and Ethiopia (Zartman, 1985: 83; Jendia, 2002: 114; Woodward, 2003: 120). 
 
By mid-1960s the “Southern Problem” became more regionalized. One element on this 
was SANU’s search for international recognition by demanding a plebiscite and 
claiming that southerners were being exterminated (O’Ballance, 1977: 60, 63). Also, 
Deng sought unsuccessfully to gain the attention of the U.N. by encouraging a series of 
armed raids on police posts in the South from the neighboring states in 1963, and 
traveled to Geneva to publicize the SANU cause, resulting in a £175,000 grant for 
Uganda to alleviate southern refugees (O’Ballance, 1977: 60-1, 63, 64). While this 
shows that Deng exerted influence over sections of the Anya Nya, the SANU’s 
diplomatic effort did not attract support at the level of the U.N. or the OAU.  
 
In fact, African countries were reluctant to officially support the southern rebellion. This 
was largely due to the OAU charter (Alier, 1990: 71-3; Jendia, 2002: 114). Yet, from 
1963 southern politicians related the Anya Nya were in contact with Israeli embassies in 
Uganda, Ethiopia, DRC, and Chad to make arrangements to channel Israeli aid to the 
rebels through those countries (Beshir, 1975: 91). Also, despite a 1963 defense treaty 
with Khartoum, Ethiopia, which had large southern refugee camps in its territory, gave 
covert support to the Anya Nya, while in the late 1960s Ugandan army under Idi Amin 
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aided the rebels, briefly facilitating Israeli support through its territory, and the DRC 
and Kenya lent vague, the latter principally moral, support (Jendia, 2002: 114, 117-9; 
Akol, 2007: 107-8). Whereas this shows that links between the political and armed 
opposition already existed in the early 1960s, the evidence here also reveals that the 
“Southern Problem” was not contained within Sudan but was a regional issue.      
 
Meanwhile, the regime sought foreign support to contain the insurgency and accused 
organizations and neighboring countries of supporting the rebels. Supplied militarily 
and financially by Arab states, the regime moved closer to the Soviet Union (Heldman, 
1981: 65; Jendia, 2002: 114). The Arabized political elites in charge began to perceive 
the strengthening rebellion as a Christian crusade in which the ‘outlaws’ served the 
designs of Ethiopia, Israel, and the World Council of Churches (Sikainga, 1993: 81), 
and the regime resorted in various repressive measures. First, it increased the army 
contingent to 8,000, or 40% the army’s of the total strength of 20,000 (O’Ballance, 
2000: 21), to engage the rebels mostly unsuccessfully, rather often destroying 
communities suspected of aiding them (Markakis, 1998: 117). The regime also 
imprisoned many minor southern officials, police, and prison staff or transferred them, 
although many defected and joined the Anya Nya (O’Ballance, 1977: 62).  
 
Second, Kartoum removed all the remaining missionaries and put restrictions on foreign 
merchants in the South. After the army claimed that the missionaries were behind the 
Wau assault on 27 February 1964, the regime supplanted the approximately 300 foreign 
missionaries220 with Sudanese clergy while asserting that there was evidence beyond 
doubt that they were inciting the southern insurgency (Eprile, 1974: 85-6; O’Ballance, 
1977: 62; Niblock, 1987: 224). However, this drove the Christian organizations to 
support southerners in exile in light of what was viewed as persecution (Alier, 1990: 
75). Similarly suspected of helping rebels, foreign traders, mostly Greek and Syrian, 
were only allowed to reside in the southern provincial capitals (O’Ballance, 2000: 21). 
 
Third, the regime accused its neighbors of fomenting the “Southern Problem”. It blamed 
the DRC for harboring rebels and Israel for providing training in a military facility in 
Uganda (O’Ballance, 1977: 62-3). This led to incursions across borders such as an 
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 The exact number of the deported varies between 300 (272 Roman Catholic and 28 Protestant) and 
335 (O’Ballance, 1977: 62; Niblock, 1987: 224). 
Chapter IV. De-colonization: Emergence of the First Insurgency        205 
 
attack on an Anya Nya camp on 8 May 1964 over the border in the DRC, from where 
Khartoum claimed the assault on Wau had been organized (O’Ballance, 2000: 21). 
However, the regime was more reluctant to enter Uganda, which remained a British 
protectorate until 1967 and whose position towards the Anya Nya remained contentious 
since it accepted refugees but harassed southern politicians (O’Ballance, 2000: 21).221 
 
Finally, the relationship between Ethiopia and Sudan was affected by the situation. This 
was because large numbers of refugees began to arrive in Ethiopia, which contributed to 
it support to the Anya Nya (Jendia, 2002: 114) together with its collaboration with the 
U.S. and Israel. On 3 May 1964 Sudan signed an extradition treaty with Ethiopia to cut 
Anya Nya from support (O’Ballance, 1977: 63, 2000: 22; Jendia, 2002: 114). The treaty 
was never implemented and Ethiopians relieved their refugee burden by spreading 
rumors locally about an alleged Abboud-Selassie cooperation that initially caused mass 
exodus from Ethiopia to Uganda and Kenya (O’Ballance, 1977: 63, 2000: 22).222 
Overall, by 1964 the number of refugees in Ethiopia and Uganda had reached tens of 
thousands and the flow of people was largely from Ethiopia to Uganda, which became 
the main receptor of southern Sudanese refugees until the end of war (Bariagaber, 2006: 
70). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the process of the de-colonization of Sudan, the co-dominium powers sought to use 
the southern issue to their advantage to consolidate their exclusive power over the 
marginalizing state, while the U.S. pressed for de-colonization knowing that it would 
likely lead to rebellion. These factors deteriorated the situation in this process which left 
southern Sudan subject to the rule of the Arabized power elite dominated central 
government and provided the southern political elite with token opportunities and few 
incentives or resources to act as an integrating force in the process of re-annexation of 
the southern provinces to the state. This led to grievances among many in the southern 
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 In fact, Uganda did not provide military aid initially to the Anya Nya in part because it hoped to gain 
U.N. financing with the excuse of the southern refugees which it obtained in May 1964. Moreover, 
Uganda tracked down southern politicians such as Joseph Oduho who was arrested in February 1964 in 
Kampala on charges of recruiting Anya Nya fighters from the refugee camps soon after assuming the 
leadership of the SANU from Deng after the latter’s departure to Europe (O’Ballance, 1977: 63). 
222
 Allegedly this exodus was also partly due to SANU’s engagement in a propaganda campaign, claiming 
that fourteen refugee camps in Ethiopia had been attacked by the government soldiers and that Ethiopia 
was to extradite thousands of refugees (O’Ballance, 1977: 63). 
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elites and their constituencies, particularly when northerners took over the local 
administration in the South. Coupled with a history of violent incursions to the South, 
slavery as highlighted in Chapter II, and the Southern Policy that had isolated the South 
from northern influences analyzed in Chapter III, these dynamics served as unifying 
forces against the “North” in the “South”. Additionally, the influx of northerners placed 
in locally high positions appeared for many southerners as a resumption of the 19th 
century domination and colonization. This led to the “Southern Problem” as the 
government sought to securitize the issue to silence southern opposition. 
 
External processes and dynamics played an important role during the era of de-
colonization in influencing local actors and dictating political and economic trajectories. 
However, the exclusive governance transferred from colonial authorities to sections of 
the narrowly based Arabized nationalist elite that has sought to extend its political 
project to the country by converting it into a political rational behind state policies. This 
became contested particularly by those sections of the mission-educated southern elite 
that felt marginalized or outright excluded and sought to extend their political visions, 
interests, and views of southern Sudan and promote them nationally. This emerged as an 
opposition to the exclusive vision and governance of the Arabized elite through calls for 
“southern” rights principally via secession or autonomy. 
 
Moreover, the violent manifestation of the “Southern Problem” was triggered in Torit 
and initially mostly contained to Equatoria province, the home of the most prominent 
conspiring southern leaders. The early armed opposition was scattered until the 
insurgency regionalized, which facilitated consolidation of the Anya Nya. Armed 
opposition was connected to political leaders since the beginning despite often been 
considered as separate in the early stages.  
 
Finally, the policies of the Abboud regime were an important factor inspiring the 
growth of the armed movement and the tenacity of the southern exile political 
opposition. Not only did they lead to a growing polarization between the “North” and 
the “South” due to an assault on the “southern” identity through forced Arabization and 
Islamization, but also contributed to rebel enlistment due to the impact of the violent 
counter-insurgency measures. In these conditions the Anya Nya acquired a growing 
amount of arms and the southern political opposition was able to attract some material 
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and moral support for the insurgency. This led to the extension of the “Southern 
Problem” into a full-fledged insurgency, as shown in Chapter V, with devastating 
consequences in the South. Not until the end of the 1960s would the momentum for 
peace began to gather. 
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Chapter V. From War to Peace   
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter the emphasis is on political developments during the latter part of the 
first insurgency in southern Sudan, the origins of which were detailed in Chapter IV. 
This chapter demonstrates how incomplete peace efforts were unable to address the war 
situation, which led to a wave of deepening violence. This changed only when a 
combination of interlinked local, regional, and international dynamics related to regime 
change became conducive to peace negotiations and settlement in the early 1970s.  
 
This chapter shows how a more moderate leadership following the fall of the Abboud 
military regime conducted the first unsuccessful negotiated efforts to resolve the 
“Southern Problem”. However, it was not until another military regime assumed power 
in 1969 that momentum for peace gathered. Consequently, a renewed attempt for peace 
convinced the leadership of the southern rebel movement of the viability of peace. 
While external forces were a factor particularly in the latter stages of the first 
insurgency in southern Sudan, it was principally the internal political dynamics that led 
to the peace settlement and the first era of limited political autonomy for the South. 
 
In short, this chapter shows how southern Sudan and its elites have continued to be 
largely marginalized and excluded from political and economic power at the state level 
even while granted token state positions and a regional government for the South. This 
owes largely to the persisting dynamic of the marginalizing state that maintains the 
narrow Arabized elite’s exclusive concentration of political and economic eminence.  
 
The chapter also points out that despite political violence and conflict there exists no 
primordial or inherent incompatibility between the constructed “northern” and 
“southern” identity that impedes peaceful interaction within the framework of a single 
state. Rather, it is argued that conflicting identity differences are constructed and 
reinforced by the circumstances of large scale violence and political competition for 
power and resources.  
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2. Failed Peace Efforts 
 
This section focuses on the unsuccessful efforts to deal with the “Southern Problem” 
after Abboud’s downfall. It shows how the government which succeeded the military 
regime was unable to find compromises that would satisfy the demands of a fragmented 
southern opposition.   
 
     Al-Khalifa Transitional Government 
 
In the course of the early 1960s the support of the Abboud regime had declined in the 
northern provinces. This was largely due to its authoritarian policies, deepening 
economic malaise, and the war in the South, which inspired popular opposition. By 
1964, the organization and extension of the popular opposition had reached such level 
that it joined powerful northern opposition political parties with professional, labor 
union, and student organizations. The same year a wave of popular demonstrations 
swept the northern provinces, which culminated in a general strike and the much 
celebrated civilian October Revolution that toppled the military regime.223   
 
On 30 October 1964, the caretaker government of al-Khatim al-Khalifa took over the 
administration224 and strengthened its hold on power after some initial difficulties, 
including the army’s reluctance to give up power and an attempted SCP takeover 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 66-7, 2000: 24-5). The government that inherited power after the 
October Revolution was composed primarily of a wider spectrum of the Arabized elite 
opposition. The opposition forces had used the sentiment of disaffection due to regime 
repression, economic deterioration, nepotism and corruption, and the worsening 
“Southern Problem”, to take down the regime that had lost its legitimacy. However 
now, as the new leaders of the marginalizing state, they confronted political and 
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 For the details of the downfall of the Abboud regime, see i.e. Hasan (2003). 
224
 Al-Khatim al-Khalifa, was head of the Khartoum Technical Institute, a former assistant under 
secretary of education in the South, and respected individual independent from political parties. He 
formed a transitional government composed of 14 cabinet members, out of which five were from the 
northern parties (Umma, NUP, PDP, SCP, and Muslim Brothers), two were southern representatives 
(Clement Mboro and Alfred Wol, soon replaced by Ezboni Mundiri) from the SF formed in the same 
month, the remaining being representatives of the Professionals’ Front, the SCP, professional 
organizations, public servants, and universities, who all had played a vital role in the October Revolution 
(Holt and Daly, 2000: 156; Collins, 2008: 81). The process culminated in the formation of a five man 
Council of the Sovereignty (former SCAF), which included one southerner, Luigi Adwok (O’Ballance, 
1977: 67; Alier, 1990: 26)     
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economic obstacles faced by the earlier regime. The leadership took measures to 
provide political stability,225 but again succumbed into the dominance of the Arabized 
elite parties that sought to wrestle power from the radical forces and reshuffled the 
cabinet. This rearrangement resulted in the Umma and NUP re-consolidating their 
hegemony, while the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) arose as a new significant 
constituency.226 The better-established sectors of the Arabized elite regained their 
leadership of the marginalizing state. 
 
The fall of Abboud regime was generally well received in the South since it appeared to 
signal that the worst of the repression had now subsided and reconciliation efforts were 
gaining momentum. Many southerners were also pleased about been represented both in 
the cabinet and the Council of Sovereignty by their own representatives, and al-Khalifa, 
also well respected in the South, was a welcomed leader (Alier, 1990: 26). However, 
despite al-Khalifa’s calls for refugees and the SANU to return, most exile leaders 
expressed concerns about the real intentions of the new government (Beshir, 1968: 89; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 68; Alier, 1990: 26-7). The SANU was also embroiled in a 
leadership struggle with ethnic overtones between Deng in Europe, Lohure in Nairobi, 
and Oduho and Jaden in Kampala, the latter taking the presidency from Oduho in the 
November 1964 party elections (Alier, 1990: 27; Johnson, 2003: 32).   
 
Meanwhile, a coalition of Arabized elite parties attempted to reinforce relations with 
Arab states in part to deal with the “Southern Problem”. Concluding arrangements with 
Algeria and Egypt, Sudan allowed Russian arms to be transported through its territory 
to the Simba and the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which had emerged in 1961 and 
1964 respectively (Grundy, 1971: 123; Eprile, 1974: 96; O’Ballance, 1977: 71, 79, 
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 The transitional government restored the old provisional constitution suspended by the military 
regime, dismantled the council system, released 32 southern political prisoners and declared that Sunday 
and Christmas Day were again official holidays, abolished censorship, legalized political parties, re-
established the autonomy of the university, and took anti-corruption measures (O’Ballance, 1977: 68, 
2000: 27; Holt and Daly, 2000: 156). 
226
 The Professionals’ Front was composed of radical elements and established political parties willing to 
maintain the prevailing socioeconomic and sociopolitical order. These collided as the established political 
parties were eager to push for elections to restore their exclusive control over national politics while the 
Professionals’ Front argued that as long as there was state of emergency in the South elections should not 
take place (Holt and Daly, 2000: 156). Some radical proposals produced offshoots in the Professionals’ 
Front, while the confrontation was brought to an end by an Ansar demonstration in Khartoum that 
triggered the resignation of the cabinet on 18 February 1965 (Holt and Daly, 2000: 156). Subsequently, 
al-Khalifa was asked to form a new cabinet, which he did five days later, but the new cabinet was 
dominated by the Umma, the NUP, and the ICF, leaving the SCP and the PDP associated with the 
professional elements in minority (Holt and Daly, 2000: 156-7; Warburg, 2003: 147). 
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2000, 34; Sherman, 1980: 73-4; Collins, 2005: 221).227 However, these arrangements 
backfired in war against the Anya Nya because the rebels captured arms shipments.228 
The Arabized elite parties suspended the arms deliveries in January 1965 after 
allegations that five planeloads had been delivered to the Simbas but resumed their 
support of the ELF which was later permitted to open offices in Sudan when the new 
government elected in 1965 shifted its focus to arming Chadian insurgents instead of the 
Simba (Burr and Collins, 1999: 56; O’Ballance, 2000: 30; Deng and Zartman, 2002: 
26). This dynamic established Sudan as a supply route and sanctuary for the Congolese, 
Eritrean, and Chadian rebels, supported by a number of Arab states. Thus, it further 
consolidated the Arabized elite’s culturally oriented political alignment with Arab 
countries, which inspired “African” external relations orientation of the southern 
opposition leadership. As a result, it became attractive for Uganda, Ethiopia, and DRC, 
but to a lesser extent also the CAR and Kenya, to endorse the Anya Nya in response to 
the “Arab” support of some the rebel groups in their territories. This facilitated 
development of regional networks beyond those dictated by ethnic affinities,229 and 
fomented the perception of the insurgency in southern Sudan as “African” fight against 
“Arab” domination. As such, it hindered possibilities for peaceful resolution of the 
insurgency and polarized northern and southern “regional” identities further. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
227
 In April 1965, two ministers, one from the ICF and another from the NUP were accused of smuggling 
weapons to the ELF, and later 18 tons of Czechoslovakian arms originating from Syria destined to the 
ELF were seized in the Khartoum airport. Four military officers were made scapegoats, although 
Khartoum itself was implicated (Beshir, 1975: 29; O’Ballance, 1977: 77, 2000: 34; Jansen, 1979: 126). 
This resulted in a low point in Sudan’s relationship with Western states, particularly with the U.S., which 
perceived its aid to the ELF as an effort to undermine its military presence in Eritrea (Yohannes, 1997: 
301). 
228
 The rebels obtained arms by ambushing the deliveries going through the South and relieving the 
defeated and fleeing Simbas of their arms in early 1965, obtaining an estimated 6,000 guns this way and 
beginning to receive arms from the DRC government willing to avenge the Sudanese support for the 
Simbas (Eprile, 1974: 96-7; Johnson, 2003: 31; Collins, 1975: 85, 2005: 221-2). 
229
 These are found, for instnce, among the Nuer in Upper Nile and western Ethiopia, the Acholi in 
Equatoria and northern Uganda, the Zande in Equatoria and northeastern DRC and eastern CAR, and 
among other major groups in Equatorian southern Sudan such as the Madi, the Kakwa, the Lugbara, the 
Mortu (all extending to DRC and Uganda), the Karamojong (Uganda), and the Toposa (Uganda, Kenya, 
and Ethiopia).     
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     Failed Peace Efforts 
 
Consequently, due to the strengthening of the Anya Nya230 attention was increasingly 
focused on negotiated resolution the “Southern Problem”. As a result, an attempt was 
made to reconcile with the main southern political forces the SANU and the SF, latter of 
which was composed of a small number of highly educated southern civil servants led 
by Mboro in Khartoum (Beshir, 1968: 89; Johnson, 2003: 32; Collins, 2005: 219). 
While Mboro, who was appointed the Minister of Interior of al-Khalifa government, 
was encouraged to negotiate a cease-fire and appeal for peace in the South, Mundiri was 
sent to Uganda to sign an agreement to repatriate Sudanese refugees and begin 
negotiations with the SANU.231 This made the SF integral to the formation of the 
transitional government’s southern policy, including the ‘southernization’ of local 
government positions (Beshir, 1968: 89; Johnson, 2003: 32; Collins, 2005: 219-20). 
 
Meanwhile, Deng had unilaterally addressed the al-Khalifa with a letter proposing a 
constitutional conference on the southern issue. While Deng sought SANU’s return as a 
legitimate political force within Sudan, promoting a federalist orientation and the return 
of the refugees, exile politicians, and missionaries (Beshir, 1968: 88-9; Alier, 1990: 28), 
his views did not represent the position of those majority elements in the SANU 
leadership that demanded secession. Still, envisaging the possibility of bringing 
southern politicians back within the limits of government control, the government acted 
in response to Deng’s demands. In December, after returning from a two-day trip to the 
Southern provinces with Mboro, al-Khalifa declared an unconditional amnesty for all 
southerners who had left Sudan since 1955, called for freedom and equality and putting 
aside all racial, religious and political differences, and offered southern leaders federal 
autonomy while encouraging them and the refugees to return (Beshir, 1968: 89; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 2000: 27-8). However, majority SANU leadership rejected the 
offer. 
 
                                                 
230
 It should be mentioned that due to its growing size and continuing internal divisions, the Anya Nya 
experienced constant desertions, individualism, and indiscipline, which led to local armed struggles and 
infighting along ethnic lines, murders, arson, and theft of cattle, goods, produce, and women (Collins, 
1975: 85-6; 2005: 222; O’Ballance, 1977: 98).  
231
 The SF visited Nairobi and Kampala to meet with the SANU leaders to hear their views and on 12 
November 1964 Mboro persuaded the Anya Nya to agree to a one-month cease fire while he toured the 
South on a fact-finding mission (O’Ballance, 1977: 68, 2000: 27; Alier, 1990: 26-7).   
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Yet, despite reconciliation efforts, the political situation remained tense and resulted in a 
riot initiated by southerners in Khartoum in December 1964.232 It came to be called 
“Black Sunday” because it was the first time the “Southern Problem” in violent terms 
was felt in the capital and caused an immediate migration of many southerners back to 
the South. Although this event reinforced the sense of urgency for a political resolution, 
some intellectuals within the Arabized elite continued to consider the difference 
between the two regions as insurmountable (Holt and Daly, 2000: 157; Collins, 208: 
83). 
 
The government faced growing difficulties in reconciling with the southern exile 
leadership because of these polarizing opinions. After Khartoum presented an offer for 
federal autonomy the SANU spokesman stated on 5 January 1965 that “SANU must use 
all means to eject the Arabs from the South Sudan. Negotiations have failed; the next 
step is force” (quoted in O’Ballance, 1977: 69). However, the movement remained 
divided.233  
 
Deeming Deng as the main interlocutor and with an attempt to weaken the SANU 
capitalizing on its internal divisions, the government began to favor him exclusively. On 
25 December 1964, after consulting Deng, Khartoum announced that the SANU had 
agreed to general elections in March 1965 (O’Ballance, 1977: 70). However, Deng 
worked rather independently, while promoting the impression that his views on the 
“Southern Problem” represented the SANU position (Collins, 2005: 220).234 Satisfied 
                                                 
232
 On 6 December, when a plane that was to bring Mboro back from his tour in the South was late, the 
southerners who had come to receive him became increasingly restless (Alier, 1990: 27). This was largely 
due to rumors, which included a claim that the northerners had murdered him (O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 
2000: 28; Holt and Daly, 2000: 157). As a result, an angry crowd amongst the up to a million southern 
laborers now living in the northern provinces initiated a riot, damaging property and targeting northerners 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 69; 2000: 28). Northerners countered by attacking them with sticks and stones, and 
after the police had been able to disperse the crowd the following day, nine southerners, four northerners, 
and one Greek had been killed, and over four hundred people injured (O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 2000: 28). 
Yet, the absolute number of casualties is difficult to establish as estimated deaths range everywhere from 
seven to hundreds (Alier, 1990: 27; Collins, 2005: 220, 2008: 82). 
233
 While in it first convention in November 1964 in Kampala the posts of the President and the Secretary 
General were abolished and cabinet was formed, two of its prominent leaders, Deng and Oduho, pursued 
their individualistic aspirations because Deng, an advocate of the federalist approach in a unified Sudan, 
continued to speak for the SANU and claiming to be Secretary General. When Oduho lost the presidency 
to Jaden he stepped aside and moved to Kenya (O’Ballance, 1977: 69, 2000: 29). 
234
 For instance, he wrote a series of proposals addressed to the government for a federal constitution for 
the South, which was against the SANU policy for separation, suggesting that Sudan should withdraw 
from the Arab League, of which it had been a member since 1956, remain a member of the recently 
formed OAU, and restore the Equatoria Corps. Deng also demanded that southerners should again be 
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that Deng opted for federal autonomy over secession, the government promoted this 
view and adhered to his proposal to set up a Round Table Conference to address the 
constitutional southern grievances. But the SANU in exile demanded that any such 
conference be held in a neutral territory outside Sudan, observed by the international 
community and that the return of southern delegates would be conditional to conference 
conclusions (Albino, 1970: 50-1; Alier, 1990: 28; Holt and Daly, 2000: 157). Juba was 
agreed as the conference venue, but its celebration in February 1965 was subjected to a 
government guarantee of the safety of the SANU delegation, commitment to a cease-
fire, and the lifting of the state of emergency in the South (Alier, 1990: 28; LOC, 1991; 
O’Ballance, 2000: 30; Holt and Daly, 2000: 157; Collins, 2005: 220). 
 
The SANU’s preparatory meeting in January in Kampala was inconclusive as it 
remained divided between the two positions. Without a solution, in the following month 
when the conference was to be celebrated, Deng parted for Khartoum and announced 
that the SANU was ready for the conference, hence drawing the divided organization 
into the process largely unprepared (O’Ballance, 1977: 70; (Alier, 1990: 28; Collins, 
2005: 220).235 It is difficult to assess to what extent Deng was influenced by the 
government seeking to weaken the southern position,236 but his individual ventures were 
detrimental to achieving unity and a common stand in the southern political movement. 
 
The Round Table Conference was delayed. However, this was not only because of the 
problems within the SANU but also because the government itself was weak and 
divided and the security situation around Juba worsened (Holt and Daly, 2000: 157). 
Khartoum was suggested as an alternative venue, but declined by SANU-in exile, and 
SF proposed a third country, which the government rejected (Beshir, 1968: 91; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 70-1; 2000: 30; Holt and Daly, 2000: 158). Finally, Deng’s presence 
in Khartoum forced the other southern factions to bow to Khartoum as the venue 
                                                                                                                                               
appointed to the government service and the police, and advocated that southern politicians should have 
freedom to campaign in ‘normal circumstances’ for the next elections (O’Ballance, 1977: 70: 2000: 29). 
235
 Collins (2005: 220) states, “Deng’s precipitate action divided the southerners and destroyed their 
solidarity. Indeed, the failure of southern leadership to remain united and the propensity of southern 
politicians to follow the dictates of their own egos and interests remained a principal factor in prolonging 
the problem of the South and may well be decisive in its future”.    
236
 Encouraging southern disunity, the government initially invited only SANU to the conference. This 
deliberately challenged the SF, claiming to be the only legitimate political organization for the South 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 70). It also invited southerners that had opinions different from the SANU and the SF 
(Collins, 2005: 220). 
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(Beshir, 1968: 92; Holt and Daly, 2000: 158; Collins, 2005: 220). The Arabized elite 
had again exploited southern factionalism successfully (O’Ballance, 1977: 73, 2000: 31; 
Collins, 2005: 220). 
 
During the period of the preparation of the conference in early 1965, new “southern” 
parties emerged. While remaining small, many emerged from disagreements among 
southern leaders. Principal among these the Southern Unity Party of Santingo Deng, a 
southern representative during the Abboud regime, the resurrected Liberal Party of 
Stanislaus Paysama and Buth Diu, and the Southern Peace Party (Albino, 1970: 57; 
O’Ballance, 2000: 31). However, is also likely that Khartoum, or sectors of the 
Arabized power elite, were involved in the founding or endorsing of some of these new 
“southern” factions as a counterforce to the more established southern political 
organizations. One indication of this could be that the leaders of many of the new 
parties were from the older generation of southern politicians with background of 
collaborating with the earlier governments. 
 
However, the northern political parties were also divided between different views on the 
political arrangement for the South. The left wing parties, such as the SCP, the Anti-
Imperialist Front, and pro-Egyptian elements, were prepared to allow a higher degree of 
autonomy to appease and stabilize the nation, while the traditional parties advocated 
more restricted political arrangement (O’Ballance, 1977: 71, 2000: 30). The 
heterogeneous northern political forces managed to organize a relatively unified 
delegation prepared to allow some limited constitutional compromises towards regional 
government strictly within a unified Sudan, but also recognized that its concessions 
offered would not be sufficient for many of the highly divided southern leaders (Beshir, 
1968: 93; Daly, 1993: 15).  
 
The Round Table Conference was finally held in 16-29 March 1965. It consisted of 45 
participants of which 18 represented northern political forces and 27 various southern 
political factions, and included observers from Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Algeria, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt until 1971) (Beshir, 1968: 92; 
Albino, 1970: 50; Alier, 1990: 29). Southern representation remained divided over 
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Deng’s position237 and the competition between the SANU-in exile and SF secessionists 
(Beshir, 1968: 92, 95; Albino, 1970: 51-2, 54; O’Ballance, 1977: 73, 2000: 30). During 
the conference, southerners demonstrated their mistrust, having witnessed the brutality 
of the Abboud regime, and remained divided (Markakis, 1998: 117; Rogier, 2005: 
11),238 while the Arabized elite delegation was largely influenced by its traditional 
attitudes (Alier, 1990: 29; Daly, 1993: 15; Warburg, 2003: 147).  
 
As a result, divergent positions emerged. Many of the southern delegates, including 
some more unity-minded, advocated that Sudan as one entity had failed, while the 
northerners insisted on regional government for the southern region within unified 
Sudan (Deng, 1995b: 87; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 66). Meanwhile, the northern 
delegation reiterated that the problem should be resolved within a united Sudan because 
imperialist aspirations, which in their view had created the problem, should not prevail 
(Albino, 1970: 52). They also disputed the common position of southern politicians that 
the South should be treated as one region, fearing this as a first step towards secession 
and preferring to treat the region as several administrative districts (Collins, 2008: 84). 
This intentionally undermined the unity of the southern delegation and weakened its 
“regional” position.   
 
Ultimately, the diversity of southern positions hindered the possibility of reaching a 
settlement. Nevertheless, the dominant SANU-in exile and the SF were able to make 
clear their demands of a referendum for unity, federalism, or separation to be held in the 
South under the supervision of the observers to the conference (Beshir, 1968: 94-5; 
Albino, 1970: 54; Daly, 1993: 15). In contrast, adamant to preserve the South as part of 
Sudan, reasserting their Arab-Islamic agenda, and demonstrating willingness to accept 
only a limited autonomy based on a regional government system, the northern 
delegation rejected such demands (Beshir, 1968: 93; O’Ballance, 1977: 74; Rogier, 
2005: 11). This prevented a comprehensive settlement, although a reform plan to 
normalize relations between the two “regions” was agreed upon including government 
                                                 
237
 Deng remained as controversial figure. The SANU delegation reluctantly accepted him as a member, 
while Deng himself insisted that he was the leading representative of the SANU. The government 
deliberately avoided declaring his exact status (Albino, 1970: 52; O’Ballance, 1977: 73, 2000: 31). 
238
 Such political factionalism exists in the South today and continues to debilitate regional political 
coherence (Badal, 1994: 105-24; Mateos, 2007: 18-9). 
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measures to address some local grievances.239 In addition, it was agreed that although 
there was an impasse in the constitutional status of the South, the debate over the 
southern issue should continue in another conference in three months.240  
 
Finally, while the northern political forces were careful not to pronounce the conference 
as a failure, the southern participants remained skeptical. This was because the 
government sought to project the perception amongst conference observers that 
negotiations were continuing in order to minimize the possibility of intensifying Anya 
Nya activity and SANU and SF support before the coming elections, which the 
announcement of failure could have generated (Alier, 1990: 31). It is likely that 
Khartoum also sought to divert international attention from the “Southern Problem”. On 
the other hand, none of the southern participants believed that the promised measures 
would be implemented and many deemed that the Arabized elite had only tested the 
capability of the southern negotiators and sought the surrender of the Anya Nya 
(Albino, 1970: 56; Alier, 1990: 32). Many in the South saw no credible evidence that 
the dynamics of the marginalizing state would be altered.   
   
The Round Table Conference was followed by parliamentary election.241 Southern 
politicians quickly announced a collective boycott and the government decided that 
elections in the southern provinces would not be undertaken due to security reasons 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 75; Johnson, 2003: 34; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 31). A later 
Supreme Court decision allowed 21 southern candidates to claim their seats by default, 
which enabled 14 jallaba to enter the Legislative Assembly (Albino, 1970: 58; Beshir, 
1968: 99; O’Ballance, 1977: 75, 2000: 32). Johnson (2003: 34) has argued that, “The 
                                                 
239
 These included resettling southern returnees, the ‘southernization’ of administration, police, and prison 
officers, equalizing salaries, establishing a university and girls’ secondary school, religious freedom, 
allowing the free movement of Christian priests, establishing a commission for socioeconomic planning, 
and dedicating increased funds for development in the South (Beshir, 1968: 95; Albino, 1970: 55; Alier, 
1990: 32; Daly, 1993: 15). 
240
 An appointed twelve-man committee, composed of six northerners and six southerners, had to first 
report the resolutions of the conference and implement them (Albino, 1970: 56; O’Ballance, 1977. 74, 
2000: 32; Alier, 1990: 31-2; Holt and Daly, 2000: 158).  
241
 Participation in the May 1965 elections in the North was low and some incidents of violence occurred. 
However, they were conducted successfully in April 1965 and resulted in the victory of the Umma, which 
reportedly gained 76 seats of the total of 173 ahead of the NUP 54, the SCP 11, the Beja Tribal 
Association (later Beja Congress) 10, the Islamic Charter Front (ICF) 5, the PDP 3, and Independents 15 
(Daly, 1993: 15; O’Ballance, 2000: 32). Again, some discrepancy over exact results exists as Holt and 
Daly (2000: 159) give a slightly different allocation of seats: the Umma 76, the NUP 54, the Beja 
representatives 10, the SCP 8, the Nuba Mountain Federation of Independents 7, independents 7, the ICF 
5, and the PDP 3. 
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Southern parties were not only ignored at the [round table] conference, but were 
effectively denied voice in the parliament”. The political culture and dynamics of the 
Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state had again prevented southerners from 
gaining effective representation at the center of the political system. 
  
Soon after the election the Umma and the NUP made an amendment to the transitional 
constitution. This granted al-Azhari the permanent presidency of the Supreme Council 
(Alier, 1990: 41; Holt and Daly, 2000: 159), and allowed the main parties of the 
Arabized elite to reclaim their paramount role in the political scene. The move had 
significant repercussions in 1966-8 period because it gave al-Azhari power over the 
government and direct command of policy. Hence, the election results allowed Arabized 
elite’s political forces to prevail and ensure the continuation of a status quo of power 
relations by marginalizing the new forces that had been prominent in the transitional 
government (Daly, 1993: 15). The failure of the round table conference and the political 
exclusion of the main southern political forces contributed to the intensification of the 
insurgency in southern Sudan. 
 
3. Nimeiri Assumes Power 
 
This section shows how after failed peace negotiations the successive Arabized elite 
governments resumed the search for military solution to the “Southern Problem”. 
However, in 1969 they were brought down by another military coup, which first 
intensified the conflict but also led to a peace agreement in the regional and 
international context that influenced the regime strategy.    
 
     The Coup and its Aftermath 
 
In July 1965 the new Umma-DUP coalition government under Mohammad Ahmed 
Mahgoub took office and leftist elements that had been prominent in the transitional 
government were pushed into opposition. However, the following three years the 
political situation remained volatile as result of bickering between the Umma and the 
NUP, an internal power struggle within the Umma leadership which split the party into 
two, the polarization of the political scene between government and opposition, and the 
conflict in the South (O’Ballance, 2000: 22; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 31). 
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The conditions in the South worsened in 1966-8 as the government sought to curb rebel 
support through foreign policy overtures towards the Eastern Bloc and applied 
repressive measures locally242 which resulted in continued atrocities.243 However, this 
strengthened rather than weakened the insurgency, although both southern political and 
armed opposition remained factional.244 Together with economic deterioration, it 
contributed to the Free Officers’ Movement (FOM) conspiring against the 
government.245 In the morning of 25 May 1969, the FOM staged a coup that brought a 
military regime inspired by socialist ideology and headed by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri to 
power.246 
 
The regime leadership addressed the nation in the morning of the coup. It stated having 
claimed power to change the course of the country whose history had been a series of 
catastrophes, to end the rule of self-interested political parties in the name of the 1964 
October Revolution, and declared the founding of the Democratic Republic of the 
Sudan (O’Ballance, 1977: 103; Alier, 1990: 43; Holt and Daly, 2000: 166). Such 
appeals were viewed as essential to minimize opposition to the military takeover and 
ensure civilian support for the profound transformation of the national political scene 
(Alier, 1990: 43). While the Arabized elite party leadership denounced the coup, in part 
because it was removed from politics and the SCP was allowed back to national politics 
                                                 
242
 The policy came in response to the worsening security situation and the objective was to eliminate the 
opposition in the South, both the armed factions and unarmed intelligentsia, collaborate with southerners 
interested in unity, and continued policy of Arabization and Islamization of the region (Beshir, 1968: 99, 
1975: 26-7; Collins, 1975: 84, 2005: 221; Alier, 1990: 33). 
243
 Many accounts mention manifestations of this violent repression, which included targeting old 
southern political leaders and murders of Lohure and Deng. See i.e. Beshir (1968, 1975), Eprile (1974), 
Collins (1975, rep. 2005), O’Ballance (1977, 2000), and Johnson (2003).  
244
 Power struggles within the southern political opposition became manifested increasingly through 
ethnic or “tribalist” terms as politicians sought to form political-military constituencies through control of 
the ethnically and regionally divided Anya Nya armed groups. As a result, political-military organizations 
emerged, main ones being the Azania Liberation Front (ALF), the Southern Sudan Provisional 
Government, SSPG [later Nile Provisional Government (NPG) that suffered an offshoot the Anyidi 
Revolutionary Government, ARG], and Sue River Revolutionary Government (SRRG), some of which 
were able to control territory in the South and function as rudimentary administrations raising taxes and 
providing services. See Eprile (1974), Beshir (1975), Collins (1975), O’Ballance (1977), Markakis 
(1998), and Johnson (2003). 
245
 The FOM responsible for the 1969 coup was inspired by its Egyptian counterpart. It was first founded 
in the 1950s as a Sudanese version of the group of officers behind the 1952 Nasser coup, but rather than 
introducing social and economic change, its initial policy was to improve the efficiency of a government 
dominated by sectarian interests, and which in its view was responsible for the deteriorating economy, 
absence of constitution, and lack of ability to deal with the “Southern Problem” (Collins, 1975: 94, 2005: 
227; Niblock, 1987: 235).  
246
 There have been accusations surrounding Prime Minister Mahgoub’s private connections to military 
leaders of the Hashimab clan, which might have facilitated the coup (Alier, 1990: 42). There were also 
plans by regionalist political organizations from the periphery to take power, which failed (Eprile, 1974: 
133-5).  
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after being purged in the 1966-8 period, it was well received among the general public 
(Alier, 1990: 43). 
 
The FOM took immediate repressive measures to consolidate its leadership. The 
provisional constitution in vigor was suspended along with the Supreme Council of the 
State and the Constituent Assembly, the public service commission and electoral 
commission were dissolved, and public gatherings banned and newspapers closed 
temporarily before being allowed to reopen only under regime censorship (Holt and 
Daly, 2000: 166). Moreover, to end the sectarian dominance, leaders of the main 
political parties, including al-Azhari and Mahgoub, were imprisoned, the parties were 
outlawed, their property confiscated, and army officers posing threat to the new regime 
retired (LOC, 1991; Holt and Daly, 2000: 166). This concentrated power in the FOM-
led military sectors and collaborating forces of the Arabized elite under Nimeiri. 
 
Initially aligned with the Soviet Bloc, the regime pursued a socialist model for 
economic development. It reformed the main political institutions accordingly, but 
maintained them in the control of the Arabized elite sectors made of high-level army 
officers and the SCP, Arab socialist, and Arab nationalist politicians. The Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) and the Cabinet became the main political institutions.247 
Headed by Babikir Awadallah, an influential leftist with pro-Egyptian and Eastern bloc 
tendencies and earlier involved in the overthrow of Abboud, the Cabinet outlined the 
Nimeiri regime’s foreign policy in the early stages. It helped to model the new socialist 
domestic economic policy according to Egyptian example of centralized socioeconomic 
planning through heavy public sector involvement (Alier, 1990: 44-5). Two southerners, 
Joseph Garang and Abel Alier, both members of parties active in Khartoum, the SCP 
and the SF respectively, served as Minister of Supplies and Minister of Housing, in line 
with the usual southern token representation in the government since 1954. Meanwhile, 
                                                 
247
 The RCC was first to be composed of the six officers behind the coup and Awadallah, but three more 
young officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Babikir al-Nur, Major Abu al-Qasim Hashim, and Hashim al-Ata, 
were included for it to reach 10 members (Niblock, 1987: 241; Holt and Daly, 2000: 166). The inclusion 
of the latter was intended to reinforce the regime as al-Nur and al-Ata were associated with communists 
and al-Qasim Hashim had links with the Arab nationalist, Nasserist, clique closely related to Egypt 
(Niblock, 1987: 241; Alier, 1990: 45). The Cabinet was the regime’s executive branch deliberately 
composed of politically radical elements, including a total of 23 members from the SCP, the Arab 
socialists with links to the Iraqi Baath party, the Arab nationalists of whom some had links to the DUP, 
some PDP members, and independent radicals such as those linked either to the Professionals’ Front or 
had served in the Transitional Government in 1965 (Niblock, 1987: 242; Alier, 1990: 45; Holt and Daly, 
2000: 166-7). 
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the head of the SF, Mboro, was jailed on charges of corruption (Alier, 1990: 45; 
Johnson, 2003: 36). This illustrates the continuing marginalization of southern political 
representation, allowing opportunities for the few prominent individuals willing to 
collaborate with Arabized elite governments. 
 
In addition, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) was instituted as the sole party in the 
center of the political system. This was aimed to transfer the political and economic 
power away from the traditional establishment of the religious movements (Niblock, 
1987: 263; Collins, 2008: 115-6). Nimeiri aspired to use the SSU, a centrally structured 
mass organization of radical elements consisting of basic units with an elected 
committee exercising power at the local level, to abolish native administration based on 
nazir and shayk leaders associated with conservatism and the sectarian groups in the 
northern provinces, and consolidate the regime over the religious parties (Niblock, 
1989: 259, 264; Alier, 1990: 46; Holt and Daly, 2000: 173). This led to elaborate 
bureaucratic structures concentrating power in the presidency,248 while the state’s 
relation with its periphery remained largely unchanged. 
 
However, soon after Nimeiri assumed power differences emerged within the governing 
military civilian alliance leading to political squabbles within the regime.249 The regime 
used repressive measures against those not aligned with its policy as part of an attempt 
to eliminate challenges from the northern political forces and help Nimeiri to 
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 Above the local structure branch (village or rural), district, sub-provincial, and provincial party 
committees and party conferences (councils) were installed copying Egypt, Tanzania, and Yugoslavia, 
while the SSU was to serve as the socialist vanguard and have 50% representation of farmers and workers 
in its committees or conferences (Niblock, 1989: 259, 264; Holt and Daly, 2000: 173). In this highly 
hierarchical system of centralized administration, geographical delineation replaced ethnic boundaries at 
the local level, and the regime appointed chairmen to the provincial councils, asserting its control, while 
the institutions below provincial level were allotted no resources to undertake administrative change, 
leading them to become redundant (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173). At the national level, there were the 
People’s Assembly (or National Congress, former Constituent Assembly), the party presidency, the 
secretariat-general, the central committee, and the political bureau, which were all subjected to the 
decision-making of Nimeiri in varying degrees particularly after he began to purge the opposition 
(Niblock, 1987: 259). The system was deemed highly bureaucratized and inefficient (Holt and Daly, 
2000: 173). 
249
 This was initially because the SCP leadership split due to its leader’s Abd al-Khaliq Mahgoub’s 
cautious approach towards the new regime; the “conditionalists” including al-Ata, al-Nur, Farouk Osman 
Hamadallah, a leading Arab Baath socialist, and Muawiyah Ibrahim’s and Ahmed Suleiman’s 
“unconditional” supporters of the regime prepared to dissolve the SCP and join the SSU (Niblock, 1987: 
253; Alier, 1990: 61-2). Also, the RCC was affected by Egypt and composed of a number of pro-Arab 
Federation officers which led to an intensified attempt to expel Mahgoub’s “conditionalists” to avoid the 
difficulties faced by Egypt in the early stages of Nasser’s revolution (Alier, 1990: 62). 
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consolidate his personal position,250 blaming for instance the SCP for the ailing socialist 
economic experiment (Yohannes, 1997: 303; Holt and Daly, 2000: 167). This 
reinforced the dynamic of the marginalizing state and its policies. 
 
The regime consolidation measures were applied also in part as a response to an 
allegedly U.S. financed251 March 1970 Mahdist coup attempt to recover power from the 
military. Imam al-Mahdi had staged riots in Omdurman and armed many Ansar 
demanding Nimeiri step down, which triggered a regime attack with 40,000 troops and 
air support against the Mahdist stronghold in Aba Island where 30,000 Ansar had 
assembled, destroying the uprising by killing Imam and 3,000 Ansar (LOC, 1991; Holt 
and Daly, 2000: 167; O’Ballance, 2000: 59). The suppression of the uprising removed 
the immediate threat by the religious movements and pushed their leadership into exile, 
but it is likely that the alleged Western support was exaggerated, since the failed coup 
attempt contributed to a foreign policy shift towards the West in Khartoum’s search of 
new external allies.  
 
By early 1971 the regime’s effort to curb the communist influence had escalated into an 
attempt to dismantle the SCP and allowing the SSU as the only legal political 
organization. The SCP and its mass constituencies being banned, part of the SCP 
leadership was co-opted to the SSU and the government, and the remaining leaders were 
tracked down and arrested (Yohannes, 1997: 303). Only Joseph Garang, now the 
Minister of Southern Affairs from the non-conformist SCP faction, survived this regime 
onslaught (Niblock, 1987: 255; O’Ballance, 2000: 60-1; Johnson, 2003: 36) because he 
was used to seeking rapprochement with the southern opposition factions. 
This inspired an SCP coup attempt on 19 July 1971, which Mahgoub who had returned 
from exile helped to organize. Army officers under his influence executed the plan 
                                                 
250
 Already in October 1969, the government reshuffle resulted in Awadallah’s and four SCP related 
ministers’ destitution, followed by the SCP leader Mahgoub’s arrest in April 1970 and three-month 
deportation to Egypt. Further destitutions took place in November 1970 involving members associated or 
sympathizing with the SCP, such as al-Nur, al-Ata, and Hamadallah latter of which was one of the six 
free officers behind the 1969 coup. In addition, communists were dismissed from the army, government, 
and administration. This way Nimeiri assumed also the prime minister’s position to complement 
presidency (Niblock, 1987: 254-5). 
251
 Such unconfirmed allegations of US$18 million Central Intelligence Agency plot involving Israel, Idi 
Amin, Roman Catholic organizations, British intelligence and mercenaries, are based on the testimony of 
German mercenary Rolf Steiner during his trial in August 1971 in Khartoum. Steiner was first sentenced 
to death for his subversive activities against the state, but the sentence was then commuted to 20 years in 
prison. Steiner later became ill and was transferred to Germany (Beshir, 1975: 94-5; Howell, 1978a: 428-
9). 
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which led to a three day coup during which Nimeiri was imprisoned (Niblock, 1987: 
256; O’Ballance, 2000: 61; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 32). However, the coup 
failed due to Libyan and Egyptian intervention, a large part of the army remaining loyal 
to Nimeiri (Alier, 1990: 61, 62; Deeb, 1991: 76; Holt and Daly, 2000: 168-9).252 
Khartoum alleged that the coup had been supported by the Soviet Union, although 
severing relationship with the U.S.S.R. and the eastern bloc was against Nimeiri’s 
immediate interest because of Sudan’s reliance on its support (Yohannes, 1997: 304).253 
In reality, this appears to have been a call for the Western powers to take over the Soviet 
role as the main patrons of Sudan. This foreign policy shift in turn justified the purging 
of the SCP elements within the regime which potentially threatened Nimeiri’s personal 
position. In this manner, foreign policy was used to tighten the regime’s hold of the 
marginalizing state.   
 
In continuation, Nimeiri pursued his policy shift towards the West. He showed his new 
Western orientation by reducing regime reliance on the communists and Arab socialists. 
Nimeiri blamed the Soviet Bloc for conspiring against the regime, reduced the number 
of Soviet and eastern European diplomats, and accused Eritreans of having taken part in 
the 1971 coup attempt, which justified ending support to the ELF and negotiating with 
the U.S. ally Ethiopia about curbing its, and Israel’s, assistance to the Anya Nya (Deeb, 
1991: 77; Yohannes, 1997: 303). At this point, the lack of external support to finance 
the counterinsurgency, which reportedly cost one million pounds per month, pressured 
ending the war in the South (Eprile, 1974: 32; Alier, 1990: 63; Rogier, 2005: 13). This 
converged with U.S. geo-political interests as it sought to absorb Nimeiri as part of a 
Western alliance in the Horn of Africa, and allegedly withdrew CIA support from the 
Anya Nya in an attempt to force it to negotiate with Khartoum (Howell, 1978a: 434). 
This shows how Nimeiri sought to benefit from the superpower competition, but also 
how the U.S. was able to influence Sudan’s domestic politics by contributing to the 
pressure for a negotiated solution to the “Southern Problem”. 
                                                 
252
 Although the coup was never approved by the majority of the SCP’s decision makers, it gave Nimeiri 
an excuse to execute the party’s leadership after regaining power on 22 July 1971. This included 
Mahgoub, Garang, and Shafi Ahmad al-Shaikh (secretary general of the SWTUF), together with the 
officers, al-Ata, al-Nur, and Hamadallah, all allegedly behind the coup attempt (Niblock, 1987: 256; 
Alier, 1990: 61, 63; Korn, 1993: 85-8; Johnson, 2003: 36). In succession, Nimeiri appointed Alier as the 
Minister for Southern Affairs (Johnson, 2003: 36).  
253
 For instance, Sudan’s main export article, cotton, had been used as credit to acquire Soviet financing, 
collaboration, and arms. The heavy reliance on the USSR had severed the ties with the West, which could 
not be quickly recovered despite the purging of local communists. See i.e. Eprile (1974: 32).  
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After the SCP had been violently dismantled from being a major political force and 
Nimeiri’s personal position reaffirmed, the regime was obliged to seek a new major 
domestic constituency in the context of a foreign policy shift towards the West. This 
changed the domestic political landscape considerably as the main Arabized elite 
constituencies apart from the military were exiled, and Nimeiri decided to bring in the 
southern political forces to fill the gap. The changing foreign policy orientation and in 
the absence of any considerable opposition by the traditional forces of the Arabized elite 
to negotiate with the deemed “outlaws”, Nimeiri decided unilaterally to negotiate with 
the southern rebels. However, still threatened by the exiled northern political parties he 
put forward a referendum on his presidency, which returned 98.6% favorable vote and 
encouraged a more personalized system of power concentrated on the army, the RCC, 
and the SSU (Alier, 1990: 63; Holt and Daly, 2000: 169). The maintenance of this 
neopatrimonially structured political organization was conditioned to a degree by 
resources extraverted from the exterior through the regime’s foreign policy oriented to 
benefit from the bipolar Cold War international context. 
 
This was an important factor in the regime’s ideology for economic organization and 
development. However, the state’s initial reforms aimed to build a socialist centrally 
planned economic order proved largely counterproductive.254 Although the wide range 
of nationalizations and confiscations255 influenced by Nasserist reforms centralized and 
concentrated the Sudanese economy under the regime control (Yohannes, 1997: 302), 
they and the association with socialist and Arab countries brought little relief. Instead, 
as the establishment of the new economic order coincided with the change of Sudan’s 
                                                 
254
 During the first two years of Nimeiri rule the foreign investment declined S£0.3 and S£0.4 million 
respectively, while cotton remained the main export consisting of anywhere between 58.6% and 61.3% of 
the total export value in 1969-1972 despite an attempt to encourage other sectors (Mohamed Ali, 1989: 
56, 61). Similarly, although initially stable, the foreign trade balance turned drastically negative in 1974 
when it dropped to S£-125.5 million from S£0.4 million of the previous year (Mohamed Ali, 1989: 52). 
Finally, while military outlays consumed approximately 20% of the government budget in 1971-2, the 
Sudanese GNP per capita declined from US$442 to US$420, respectively (Henze, 1991: 102, 107).  
255
 See i.e. Niblock (1987: 243-4). Nationalizations were also aimed to minimize threat to the new regime 
by destroying the economic power of the traditional northern establishment through confiscation of the 
property of the Ansar and the Khatmiyyah, the latter being treated less harshly (Warburg, 2003: 159) due 
to its lesser capacity to challenge the regime and its ties with Egypt. By the end of 1970 over 80% of 
Sudan’s foreign trade was controlled by the state (Yohannes, 1997: 302) 
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foreign policy, the failure of the socialist economic experimentation inspired Khartoum 
to reinstate the capitalist economic system (Niblock, 1987: 284-6).256 
 
Although Khartoum’s relationship with the Eastern Bloc deteriorated after Nimeiri’s 
initial courting,257 relations with Arab states continued stronger. Closer regional 
collaboration tied Sudan increasingly to Egypt and Libya,258 as Khartoum continued to 
follow Egypt’s example by supporting the Palestinian cause against Israel (Alier, 1990: 
44), the latter influencing the regime and a large part of the Arabized northern 
population. Relations with other Arab states, except Saudi Arabia,259 were firm and 
allowed Sudan to draw military and technical support against the Anya Nya, which was 
unofficially endorsed by Ethiopia, Israel, and until early 1970s Uganda through Idi 
Amin260 (Alier, 1990: 67-8; O’Ballance, 2000: 75).  
 
To supplement such regional policy, Nimeiri initially adopted a pro-Arab view of the 
Eritrean situation. As a result, the regime facilitated the ELF’s use of its networks in 
Sudan and actively encouraged Arab and other states to help Eritrea (Yohannes, 1997: 
                                                 
256
 Among the first signs of this was Sudan’s borrowing with commercial rates from the West that 
elevated inflation to an unprecedented level with the counterinsurgency campaign in the South 
simultaneously requiring 60% more military spending (Yohannes, 1997: 303).  
257
 Ties had been forged with the Soviet bloc countries by recognizing East Germany and exchanging 
delegations in June and July 1969, Nimeiri touring China, Eastern Europe, and North Korea in the 
following year, which led to trade agreements and military, technical, and financial assistance (Reich, 
1980: 354-5; Niblock, 1987: 244-6; Mohamed Ali, 1989: 55; Alier, 1990: 44, 67; Holt and Daly, 2000: 
169). 
258
 Particularly, there was increasing interest in Arab affairs propelled by the Arab socialism embraced by 
Nasser and Qadhafi (Holt and Daly, 2000: 169). In this context, the relations with Egypt, and initially also 
with Libya, became among the most prominent in Nimeiri’s foreign policy, and already in July 1969 
Egypt and Sudan announced the formation of joint economic committee leading to the Economic 
Integration Agreement in September (Niblock, 1987: 246-7). Also, Qadhafi’s coup in September 1969 
induced Sudan to deepen relations with Libya. In December 1969 Egypt, Libya, and Sudan signed a 
Tripoli Charter to cooperate in defense, foreign policy, and economy, with a view to establishing a 
federation, which Nimeiri supported publicly despite domestic Arabized elite opposition (Niblock, 1987: 
247; Yohannes, 1997: 303; Holt and Daly, 2000: 169). This led to a Tripartite Economic Agreement in 
April 1970 and the constitution of a council for economic integration in Cairo, while in November further 
commitments were made towards integration (Niblock, 1987: 247). Nimeiri’s calculations in maintaining 
good relations with Egypt and Libya paid off when both intervened during the SCP coup attempt, 
contributing to preserve the regime.  
259
 Sudan’s turn eastwards had also enraged Saudi Arabia, which began collaboration with the Arabized 
elite political opposition parties exiled by Nimeiri. While it provided sanctuary to the main northern 
political groups, the Saudi cooperation promoting Islamic resurgence in the Arab world through financing 
strengthened principally the Muslim Brothers. 
260
 While Ethiopia and Israel had increased their support to the Anya Nya in the latter 1960s, Amin had 
become involved in the Israeli operations in Uganda in 1968 to help the southerners who had allegedly 
visited with Israeli officers. Amin came originally from the Sudan-Uganda border area and recruited 500 
southerners to overthrow Obote and 1,300 later to his army overall, which together with facilitating Israeli 
support encouraged him to side initially with the Anya Nya (O’Ballance, 2000: 74-5; Johnson, 2003: 36-
7). 
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303). These developments inspired the U.S. to contain Sudan by orchestrating a 
campaign through Israel261 and Ethiopia to supply the Anya Nya by arms, training, and 
sanctuary to undermine Nimeiri, contributing to its an unprecedented strength to counter 
the regime’s Soviet, Egyptian (LOC, 1991), and Libyan support.  
 
Southerners were generally outraged by the Arab integration policy,262 and many 
became relieved when Khartoum began to withdraw from the process in search of a new 
domestic constituency and external allies after SCP coup attempt.263 This led to Nimeiri, 
“ . . . lacking the active collaboration of any major political, sectarian or regional 
grouping, . . .  to turn away from the politics of the past” (Holt and Daly, 2000: 170). In 
an unprecedented manner from any northern leader, his independence from the 
Arabized elite religious constituencies allowed him to consider that southern political 
forces could provide the essential domestic support, which with sufficient political 
concessions would likely also end the southern insurgency (Johnson, 2003: 36). 
Becoming part of the Arab Federation would have undermined any plan for a negotiated 
agreement with the southerners and left the regime more exposed to any future attempt 
for overthrow by the exiled Arabized elite political forces. Thus, Nimeiri’s seeking of 
alliance with the southern political leadership was part of strategic calculations for the 
survival of the regime heading the marginalizing state integrally involving also a new 
foreign policy orientation.264 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
261
 Israeli training camps were established in Ethiopia, the DRC, and Uganda (O’Ballance, 2000: 74).    
262
 This was particularly the case after Nimeiri had stated in Cairo November 1970 that the tripartite could 
defend the Arab civilization in Africa, and southern students and youth groups submitted to him a joint 
memorandum denouncing the statement that defined Sudan as Arab, and undermined southern cultures 
and relations with the African states (Beshir, 1975: 87-88).    
263
 Egypt and Libya promoted immediate measures to form common political structure and foreign policy, 
but Nimeiri proposed a more gradual approach starting with economic integration (Niblock, 1987: 247-8). 
When in April 1971 Egypt, Libya, and Syria, which had joined in the process, announced their intention 
to form federal institutions, Nimeiri abandoned the project (Niblock, 1987: 248). The following July 1971 
SCP coup attempt left Nimeiri exposed in the domestic context to seek alliance with southerners and a 
new foreign policy oriented to the West.  
264
 The latter was pushed by Western oriented technocrats, who had replaced the communists in the 
aftermath of the July 1971 coup attempt as an influential grouping within the state apparatus, seeking to 
prevent the Arab Federation and repair the deteriorated diplomatic relations due to the 1967 Arab-Israeli 
War, the U.S. support for Israel, Israel’s aid to the Anya Nya, and Sudan’s nationalization of foreign 
banks and enterprises, most of them British (Niblock, 1987: 266; Alier, 1990: 67-8; Holt and Daly, 2000: 
169). 
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4. Remedying “Southern Problem” 
 
This section highlights Nimeiri’s strategies to tackle the “Southern Problem” through a 
wide-ranging approach that included external efforts oriented towards regional and 
international actors.      
 
     Nimeiri’s Initial Approach to the “Southern Problem” 
 
To strengthen the regime’s position over the marginalizing state, but also as part of the 
early socialist policy, Nimeiri’s approach to the “Southern Problem” differed from those 
of preceding governments. It combined coercive measures with incentives for 
cooperation to lessen marginalization and exclusion to convert southern leaders and 
population into new domestic regime allies. The policy mixed hard-handed military 
measures, development efforts, and political concessions, but continued to view 
secession as an unacceptable solution to the “Southern Problem” as Nimeiri stated in 
May 1969 that it would be a “crime” (O’Ballance, 1977: 115, 2000: 68). While the 
regime responded to the Anya Nya operations, which grew more organized and 
sophisticated by 1970-1, through more intense military action and foreign policy effort 
to cut external support, he also invited the southerners to accept peace through a special 
arrangement within united Sudan in a 9 June 1969 broadcasted policy statement265 for 
which southern politicians in Khartoum had provided groundwork (Alier, 1990: 48-9; 
Holt and Daly, 2000: 169-70). Although the policy statement was not followed 
immediately by any concrete action except the creation of the Minister for Southern 
Affairs position held initially by Joseph Garang, this demonstrates the regime’s wider 
liberty for maneuvering in comparison with earlier governments (Wai, 1973: 219-220; 
Collins, 2005: 227-8). 
  
The southern reaction to Nimeiri’s June declaration was mixed. It was the first time a 
minister working on the southern issue had been appointed despite similar initiatives 
                                                 
265
 It pledged recognition of the historical and cultural differences between the North and the South, and 
blamed British colonial legacy and traditional Arabized elite political forces for inequality in an 
unprecedented manner, and promised that, “The Southern people have the right to develop their 
respective cultures and traditions within a united Sudan”, describing a rudimentary Regional Autonomy 
Program for the South, including extension of the amnesty to those who would abandon rebellion, 
economic, social, and cultural development, training, and special budget and economic planning board for 
the South, which were all conditioned by participation in “a broad socialist-oriented democratic 
movement”, the SSU (Beshir, 1975: 72-3, 75;). 
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having already surfaced in 1951, and some southerners celebrated the statement in 
Khartoum on 12 June 1969 (Beshir, 1975: 75; Alier, 1990: 43, 49). In contrast, some 
political-military groups demanded secession, such as the NPG and the ARG, but other 
factions in exile headed by the ALF demonstrated interest to negotiate (O’Ballance, 
1977: 115, 2000: 68). Some southern factions perceived the June declaration as an 
opening to introduce themselves as political forces within the center of the political 
system. The NPG representatives stated it would change its stance if Nimeiri would 
agree to total independence, while other factions pronounced that they would not 
recognize any agreement between other southern factional governments and Khartoum, 
and the Anya Nya military movement remained silent (O’Ballance, 1977: 115; Johnson, 
2003: 33; Collins, 2005: 228). This indicates hesitation over reaction to the regime’s 
sudden turn for peace. 
 
Meanwhile, major military operations in the South had seized since April 1968 and the 
Anya Nya had also suspended large maneuvers. Although the movement continued as a 
loose umbrella of mostly autonomous units, Colonel Joseph Lagu, a Madi from 
Equatoria who had defected from the Sudanese army in 1963266 and had been regional 
commander of the Anya Nya Armed Forces (ANAF) in eastern Equatoria, established 
an independent command initially separated from the political opposition (O’Ballance, 
1977: 96). During this period, Lagu expanded his influence over the southern military 
and political leadership, largely due to his ability to control arms supplies from Uganda 
by challenging Tafeng’s authority over the ARG through an alliance with Colonel 
Samuel Abujohn, the Anya Nya commander of the SRRG in the western Equatoria 
(Zandeland) in February 1970, and later allying with James Loro, the commander of 
central region from Yei to Juba (Howell, 1973: 177; Wai, 1973: 164; O’Ballance, 1977: 
88, 116; Holt and Daly, 2000: 170; Collins, 2005: 228).267 
                                                 
266
 Lagu had attended army college in Khartoum and during a visit to see family he allegedly saw 
atrocities committed by the army that convinced him to join the Anya Nya. Based on an interview with an 
elderly merchant, 29 September 2008 in Juba. He fled to the Congo where he had become one of the 
exiles planning military operations against the regime, and been the commander of the Anya Nya in 
central Equatoria until 1965 prior to establishing himself in the east (Collins, 2005: 228). Due to his 
military training Lagu became a prominent member of the Anya Nya military leadership. 
267
 However, the Anya Nya never converted into a conventional force with sufficient power to challenge 
the army elsewhere than the South. Its leadership, along with southern politicians, understood that the 
movement lacked capacity to destroy any large army garrison or control a sizeable town in the long-term. 
Still lacking discipline, the ANAF continued as locally based with a low level of armament and training, 
and even Lagu’s High Command, under which other armed factions were increasingly co-opted, remained 
prone to factionalism. The relatively weak position compared to the army was also manifested in the 
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This calmer period encouraged some southern refugees to return. It was agreed that the 
World Food Program would provide US$435,000 in 1969 and US$11,427,000 in 1970 
in food aid for the refugees (Beshir, 1975: 75-7), which the regime used as an incentive 
for repatriation as it sought to cut southern opposition of its support base outside the 
country. This movement led to return of 49,500 refugees and 80,000 internally 
displaced in June 1969-December 1971 period according to the regime estimate (Beshir, 
1975: 106). However, the refugee situation remained complex.268 More incentives for 
southerners to give up arms followed with US$4 million dedicated to a development 
program, while southern intellectuals in Khartoum criticized the slowness of the 
implementation of Nimeiri’s new policy (Beshir, 1975: 79-80, 87).    
 
In late 1969, the Anya Nya reinitiated operations. These were in part a response to 
Joseph Garang’s failed efforts to force negotiations because of distrust based on his 
insistence that the “Southern Problem” could be resolved by erasing economic 
inequalities (Deng, 1995b: 91; Johnson, 2003: 36). Lagu’s leadership capacity and 
control of arms supplies from East Africa through eastern Equatoria unified the 
movement increasingly, and also improved troop discipline across the local commands 
(Eprile, 1974: 98-9). In November with larger external support including weapons, 
ammunition, and financing, the Anya Nya launched a campaign in Equatoria and Upper 
Nile consisting of attacks on convoys, destruction of bridges, and attacking remote army 
posts (O’Ballance, 1977: 116; Collins, 2005: 228). 
 
In response to the re-escalation of the Anya Nya activity the armed forces were 
reinforced.269 The effort consisted principally of acquiring military hardware and 
                                                                                                                                               
Anya Nya’s external dependence on a few suppliers of ammunition, medical supplies, and mostly 
antiquated military hardware, such as rifles and mines, while it sought continuously to be recognized 
among African states and by the Cold War powers, the southern propaganda dichotomizing the struggle 
between “Arabs” and “Africans” and giving the rebellion deliberately racial and anti-communist tone (see 
Howell, 1978a: 426, 427-30). This reflects the later media reports of rebellions in southern Sudan without 
recognition that the “Arab” and “African” are constructed and fluid categories rather than primordial 
manifestations of inherent incompatibilities, and that the problem in Sudan is rather the narrow 
distribution of political and economic power.  
268
 Obote, the former leader of Uganda installed in southern Sudan was seeking to overthrow Amin who 
took power in a coup in January 1971, which added to the complex refugee situation in which Sudanese, 
mostly Acholi and Azande, refugees with ethnic links to the neighboring countries, supported the Anya 
Nya and some of the Ugandan (Obote) and Congolese refugees in Sudan confronted their respective 
regimes. A similar situation unfolded between Sudan and Ethiopia where particularly the Eritrean 
refugees, but also those of other regions, played a role.    
269
 The Mahgoub government had previously failed to acquire helicopters and aircraft from the U.S. 
government but the government had concluded a cotton-for-arms barter agreement with the Soviet Union 
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strengthening the officer corps with Soviet assistance (O’Ballance, 1977: 117; Collins, 
2005: 228), and military assistance from Egypt.270 Consequently the newly equipped 
army swell from 26,500 in 1969 to 36,000 by 1972, of which 12,000 was deployed in 
the South in 1970 (Eprile, 1974: 108; O’Ballance, 1977: 118-9, 2000: 71; LOC, 1991), 
faced with an estimated 5,000-10,000 generally poorly equipped Anya Nya at the end of 
1971 (Eprile, 1974: 100, 134; LOC, 1991). 
 
By the end of 1969 Khartoum launched a large-scale retaliation offensive during which 
civilians and their material possessions were deliberately targeted as a 
counterinsurgency strategy.271 The intense fighting which continued until mid-1971, 
complemented with a propaganda campaign accusing Western powers and Israel of 
Anya Nya support (Collins, 2005: 229), was further fuelled by the external support for 
both sides, but also reflected the regime strategy to push for peace both through 
coercion and negotiation. The army also began a campaign of arbitrary kidnappings, 
instead of outright massacres, and murders targeting southern leaders that were blamed 
                                                                                                                                               
in August 1968 (O’Ballance, 2000: 70). Nimeiri benefited directly from the deal and in February 1970-
August 1971 the U.S.S.R. supplied the regime with modern military hardware, including 16 MIG-21 
fighter jets, five Antonov-24 transport planes, anti-aircraft guns, 150 tanks including T-55’s and T-59’s, 
and other armored vehicles with an overall value of US$150 million, with more support on its way 
(Eprile, 1974: 104; O’Ballance, 1977: 118; LOC, 1991; Yohannes, 1997: 303). 
270
 As a result, Soviet financing increased and the amount of advisors, instructors, technicians, and pilots 
along with eastern European personnel grew to anywhere between 200 and 3,000 until the July 1971 coup 
attempt after which Soviet presence began to diminish. Some of this personnel was located in the South 
(Eprile, 1974: 103, 104, 108, 112; O’Ballance, 1977: 117, 122; ICG, 2002: 10). Amin, who initially 
aligned himself with the Anya Nya channeling Israeli support, alleged that Obote had collaborated with 
Soviet instructors in northern Uganda to support Khartoum’s war effort (Eprile, 1974: 104; Alier, 1990: 
68). While waiting for military equipment from the U.S.S.R., the regime had sought military aid also 
from Egypt. Egypt assisted the air force to the extent that allegedly Egyptian and Soviet pilots flew 
missions in the South (Eprile, 1974: 105-6; O’Ballance, 2000: 70-1; Collins, 2005: 229). 
271
 The main objectives were Anya Nya bases against two of which the government attacked in 
December. In January 1970, international attention focused on unusually intense fighting in the South 
during which it was claimed that the government forces had committed numerous massacres. For 
instance, according to The Christian Monitor, 700 people had been machine-gunned in one incident, 
while 2,000 had been killed and their cattle captured on another occasion (O’Ballance, 1977: 121, 2000: 
72). While the Anya Nya had also treated civilians hardly, this had been on a different scale as in the 
course of 1970 reports of further army massacres in the South came to light (Eprile, 1974: 49-52). For 
instance, on 26 July the army shot and burned 27 people in a church in Banja, while 700 people were 
machine-gunned in Marial Aguog, reportedly with an estimated 3,200 civilians massacred and 100,000 
cattle killed or confiscated between April and August 1970 in Bahr al-Ghazal alone (Eprile, 1974: 50-2; 
Alier, 1990: 57). In September-November 1970, the government staged a large-scale offensive against the 
Anya Nya base in Mortu (prior headquarters of the ARG), near the Sudan-Uganda border, during which 
the rebels engaged the army in conventional warfare repulsing the government offensive in three 
occasions, but when the army eventually overran the base about 800 villagers perished and many women 
were raped (Eprile, 1974: 52; O’Ballance, 1977: 125; Collins, 2005: 229). This indicates the rebels’ 
increasing strength (O’Ballance, 1977: 125-6; Collins, 2005: 229). As the government was able to oust 
the rebels from Mortu it set up a refuge for Obote who sought to regain power in Uganda with a guerrilla 
force (O’Ballance, 1977: 137; Alier, 1990: 70). 
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on the rebels (Eprile, 1974: 53; O’Ballance, 1977: 138). This was accompanied by the 
most intensive aerial campaign of the war in 1970-1 involving aircraft, helicopters, 
Egyptian commandoes, and Russian air transported troops (Eprile, 1974: 105-6).272 
 
At this time, the ANAF, which was extending its influence on the political opposition in 
exile, appealed for international support.273 In 1970, it had become powerful enough 
that in its international efforts it claimed to speak for the South over other factions, 
while the southern opposition was able to attract further international support from the 
NGOs and private individuals.274  
 
After the July 1971 SCP coup attempt, the military operations overall were scaled down 
as the regime began to push for a negotiated settlement. Not only were secret 
negotiations with the insurgents encouraged, but strategic appointments to promote 
southern regime collaborators followed, including Alier as vice president and Logali as 
commissioner of Equatoria.  Mboro was released from prison and southerners were 
allowed positions in the army, police, and civil service and to participate in training 
ventures (Collins, 2005: 229-30). In addition, funds were forwarded for economic 
development of the South and the plans for an Arab Federation given up (Collins, 2005: 
                                                 
272
 For instance, in November 1970 a major air strike allegedly claimed lives of 800 people, followed by a 
number of attacks in January 1971 in which people, cattle, and infrastructure such as hospitals, were 
destroyed, leading to allegedly the most devastating air raid in February 1971 which reportedly killed  
1,000 people (Eprile, 1974: 105; O’Ballance, 1977: 122-3, 137). Finally, the aerial offensive, which did 
not prove efficient against the rebels in the densely vegetated South but was devastating to the civilians, 
was suspended in the summer 1971 after causing the number of southern refugees registered by the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to increase by 31,000 between April and September to a 
total of 176,000 of which 59,000 remained in the DRC, 20,000 in Ethiopia, 72,000 in Uganda, and 25,000 
in the CAR (O’Ballance, 1977: 122-3). 
273
 In November 1970, it sent letters to the U.N. Secretary-General and the General Assembly denouncing 
the Arab domination of the South, exclusion of the Africans from the government, religious persecution, 
social domination and discrimination, spread of famine and disease, absence of education and health 
facilities, and accusing the government of genocide. It also accused Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Kuwait, the 
U.S.S.R., and East Germany of supplying the regime against the South, which in a letter in December 
1970 it claimed the U.N. should end, which triggered a U.N. resolution for formal investigation of the 
southern claims and recommending a peacekeeping force. It appealed for an international committee to 
investigate the situation, and to the International Red Cross for food and medicine (see Beshir, 1975: 89). 
274
 This included rallying exile networks in Europe and Africa. In London, the Southern Sudan 
Association began publishing the Grass Curtain (1970-2), and influential political associations were set 
up in Italy and Norway that affected the public opinion and civil society organizations particularly in the 
latter (Beshir, 1975: 90). These groups were successful in publicizing the situation in the South and 
attracting some financial and material aid to the refugees through civil society and humanitarian aid 
organizations, such as Caritas, Church Relief Work, Action Committee for Africa, and Verona Fathers, 
and a number of wealthy and influential private Western individuals providing support in terms of arms, 
publicity, finance, and medicine (Beshir, 1975: 90-1). Allegedly, a company known as Southern Air-
Motive in Kampala, owned by British individuals, facilitated Israeli arms transfers to the rebels through 
their representatives in Europe, Addis Ababa, Kampala, Nairobi, and DRC (Beshir, 1975: 91).     
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230). Moreover, the government imposed a stricter code of behavior over its troops in 
the South, improved the security of the people in “peace villages”,275 reopened medical 
facilities, started agricultural projects, and initiated a program to build and repair roads 
and bridges (O’Ballance, 1977: 116-7, 130, 2000: 77). While these attempts were only 
gradually initiated because of a lack of funds and apprehension of many southerners, by 
April 1970 the regime had opened 40 resettlement areas in the South to restart 
agricultural activities and later announced that progress had been made by initiating 
rice, jute, and tomato schemes, and restoring coffee farms (O’Ballance, 1977: 117, 130, 
2000: 77-8). Medical facilities were also built or improved in population centers under 
government control such as Gogreal, Wau, Malakal, Nasir, Dodo, and Kodok, while 
little was done in the countryside (O’Ballance, 2000: 77). This was an attempt to gain 
grassroots support for peace and turn local communities against the rebels.  
 
Furthermore, in the latter 1971 Nimeiri intensified the diplomatic effort with Ethiopia 
and Uganda to neutralize external assistance to the Anya Nya. This aimed to curb the 
rebel supply channels and constituencies among refugees which allowed them to 
organize and plan operations, but was problematized by Sudan’s support of Eritreans 
and Obote supporters (O’Ballance, 1977: 139). However, when Nimeiri pledged to end 
support for Eritreans during mutual state visits with Haile Selassie in November 1971 
and January 1972, an agreement was signed to end aid to each other’s respective rebels 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 139; Howell, 1978a: 432). This had an impact on the external 
support of the Anya Nya in Upper Nile, where the guerrillas lost their main origin of 
ammunition and supplies in 1972 (Howell, 1978a: 433). 
 
In addition, Uganda’s Anya Nya support ended although this had little to do with 
Nimeiri’s efforts. After Amin had taken power in Uganda in January 1971, remnants of 
Obote’s Acholi and Langi forces had sought refuge in southern Sudan where they were 
given sanctuary and reorganized with Khartoum’s support to overthrow Amin, with 
Nimeiri providing a house for Obote in Khartoum North (Howell, 1978a: 433). 
However, Amin began an era of policy convergence with Sudan to neutralize the Obote 
threat (Howell, 1978a: 433), and adhered to Nimeiri’s petition to end Anya Nya 
                                                 
275
 Peace villages were army protected camps for internally displaced people from the South. 
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support, which led to a bilateral agreement in 1971 to refrain from supporting each 
other’s anti-regime forces (Howell, 1978a: 433; Rogier, 2005: 13).  
 
Amin’s decision to go along with Nimeiri was also influenced by his increasingly pro-
Arab and anti-Western policy, which improved Uganda’s relationship above all with 
Libya. This contributed to the curbing of Israeli support to the Anya Nya, a major 
supply route to Lagu’s main force, and diminishing facilities for the southern refugees, 
which all pressured the largest southern armed opposition faction to negotiate with the 
regime (Rogier, 2005: 12-3). Amin also expelled Israelis from Uganda on 24 March 
1972 and Obote’s few thousand strong forces were expelled from Equatoria to Tanzania 
from where he organized an assault on Amin’s regime in September 1972 (Howell, 
1978a: 434). This unprecedented pressure on Lagu’s force, which largely depended on 
the Israeli aid channeled through Uganda, contributed to his increasing willingness to 
settle for a negotiated end to the “Southern Problem”. 
 
     Unification of the Anya Nya Leadership 
 
By the end of 1960s the Anya Nya leadership had gradually unified around Lagu’s 
faction. In October 1969, the Anya Nya High Command Council was instituted with a 
purpose to bring together the movement, control and coordinate operations, obtain and 
distribute military equipment, and to engage in administration in areas under rebel 
control (O’Ballance, 2000: 79).276 
 
At this point, many southern exile politicians who remained separated from the armed 
movement still envisaged gaining control over it. However, their personal ambitions, 
competition over control of external aid, and low capacity all contributed to 
factionalism along ethnic lines, weakening the movement until Lagu’s ANAF finally 
absorbed the other main political-military groups in April 1970, rendering them defunct 
(Wai, 1973: 163-5; Beshir, 1975: 65). The escalation of warfare in 1970-1 facilitated the 
extension of Lagu’s influence as it accentuated the role of the Anya Nya military and 
pushed the southern politicians further aside (Collins, 2005: 229). Ability to control the 
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 Although the body was to meet annually, it was not until June 1971 when it was able to convene and 
even at that time logistical difficulties prevented all commanders from being present at the same time 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 133-4).  
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network of Israeli supplies from Uganda allowed Lagu to assert control over other 
armed constituencies by withholding supplies, which motivated many of them to join 
the ANAF and Lagu was able to use this leverage to counter disobedience, 
insubordination, and banditry:277 in April 1970 Lagu’s forces absorbed the ARG, 
pensioning off Tafeng who had left the main Anya Nya in July 1969, and after winning 
over Abujohn, Lagu brought the NPG under his control in July 1970 after which the 
ANAF claimed to be the only legitimate authority in the South (Wai, 1973: 164; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 134-6, 2000: 79-80; Johnson, 2003: 37; Collins, 2005: 228. 229). By 
1971 the military organization had also co-opted the southern exile political movement, 
which Lagu sought to rebuild by consolidating his position through concentration of 
power before convoking southern military and political leaders in January 1971 to 
officially launch the Southern Sudan Liberation Front, SSLF, which had already been 
taking shape since October 1969 (O’Ballance, 1977: 135; Johnson, 2003: 37, Collins, 
2005: 229-30). Lagu assumed both the political and military leadership of the SSLF, 
promoted himself as the Major-General, and renamed the group as Southern Sudan 
Liberation Movement, SSLM, a broader based movement including an ethnically 
diverse mix of soldiers and politicians.  
 
This allowed a more concerted effort to define the ideological basis and objectives for 
the southern struggle. The SSLM’s declared objective became to rid the South of 
northern colonialism, as it appeared to many southerners, by asserting that the struggle 
was a continuation of the 1955 mutiny to defend the southern identity and African 
values (Deng, 1995a: 141). Accordingly, the SSLM issued a document called “What 
We Fight For in South Sudan”, stating that 
“The goal of our struggle is . . . the right of self-determination for our people. 
We want our people to be able of its own free will and under no threat or fear, to 
determine its destiny, either to remain in a unitary Sudan as a truly autonomous 
region, or to have nothing whatsoever to do with the North and tie our future 
with that of our African brothers in their states on our Southern borders . . . Our 
specifically African—as distinct from Arab—identity and the common 
aspirations which unite all our tribes in a common struggle fully qualify us for 
nationhood and the right of self-determination . . . by rejecting the attempted 
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 However, the SSLM continued to suffer from the indiscipline that had characterized its predecessors 
and the rebel practice of killing captured government soldiers persisted (O’Ballance, 1977: 137). 
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arabization of Southern Sudan and by adhering to our African identity and 
heritage we exercise a basic human right which is bound to be recognized by 
everybody sooner or later . . . by waging our own war of Liberation we also 
block Arab and Russian imperialist expansionism southwards and protect our 
brothers in East and Central Africa” (quoted in Beshir, 1975: 66-7). 
This indicates that despite the generally low educational attainment of a large part of the 
southern leadership, the ideas behind the insurgency were more refined than has often 
been advocated.   
 
In early 1971, Lagu’s rhetoric moderated in response to the first contacts with the 
regime representatives offering negotiations within the framework of one Sudan and the 
waning external support. He asserted that the Anya Nya had been founded in 1963-4 to 
achieve political power without which it would be hopeless for the southerners to 
control their economic and cultural development (Eprile, 1974: 100). The effort to 
define ideology appears not only have been to explain why the insurgents were fighting, 
but also to boost the declining external support by emphasizing the international 
significance of the struggle. It should be emphasized though, that although in the 
literature it has been argued that still in the early 1970s the southern opposition 
continued to lack objectives in terms of a strictly defined political ideology, this 
dissertation argues otherwise because it is apparent that its goals of conserving the 
separate southern identity and reserve the right to decide upon its own destiny were the 
cornerstones of the struggle despite not adhering directly to any Western political 
ideology.  
  
Lagu used the SSLM political structure to reward those politicians willing to collaborate 
by allocating positions.278 Despite the war, a rudimentary civil administration using the 
British legal system was encouraged by establishing courts for communal and civil 
cases by 1971, and a number of medical centers and dispensaries including training, as 
well as cotton, soap, salt, and cooking oil production, and hundreds of basic elementary 
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 By 1972 the High Command consisting of Lagu, Brigadier Joseph Akwon, Colonel Frederick Maggot, 
and Colonel Emmanuel Abur was joined by the High Civil Authority under Elia Lupe, including the 
Commissioner of Equatoria, Elisapana Mulla, the Commissioner of Upper Nile, Antipas Ayiei, and the 
Police Commissioner, Dishan Ojwe (Eprile, 1974: 99; O’Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 82-3). In an effort 
for increasing internationalization, Lagu appointed Emissaries Mading de Garang in London, Lawrence 
Wol Wol in Paris, Dominic Mohamed in Washington, D.C., Angelo Voga in Kampala, and Job Adier in 
Addis Ababa (Eprile, 1974: 99; O’Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 82-3). The civilian administration in the 
South maintained the colonial district commissioner system (Eprile, 1974: 101-2).   
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schools were set up mostly around Juba and Yei area (Eprile, 1974: 101, 102; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 81, 82-3).279 The rebel administration and most of the 
services concentrated in Equatoria where the leadership of the rebel movement 
originated and Lagu’s influence was the highest. Hence, it could be argued that the 
rebels established a form of state-like authority structure along the principle of “social 
contract” in their administered areas.    
 
Despite the diminishing external support, the SSLM maintained pressure on the army 
throughout 1971. More ambitious operations facilitated by the unity and new equipment 
extended out of Equatoria, but leadership fissures soon appeared. Abujohn was 
dismissed after being accused of non-cooperation, lack of seriousness and disobedience, 
and rumored plotting against Lagu, and some officers remained reluctant to negotiate 
with the government despite Lagu’s inclination to do so (O’Ballance, 1977: 139; 
Johnson, 2003: 37). An offensive launched in response to the SSLM operations was 
gradually scaled back from December 1971 when negotiations gained momentum 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 140-1, 2000: 85; Alier, 1990: 84-5). 
  
5. Arrival to Addis Ababa Peace Accord  
 
This section focuses on the developments that led to the signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement that ended major hostilities in southern Sudan. In this process, an opportune 
and intertwined local, regional, and international context was instrumental for a 
successful treaty. 
 
     Towards Negotiated Settlement 
 
In 1971, Nimeiri’s strategy to convince southern leadership to provide him a new 
constituency had become interrelated with an attempt to decentralize Sudan in terms of 
economic development. This had been demanded by emerging regional movements in 
the northern provinces, such those representing the Beja and the Nuba, to remedy the 
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 Lagu sought to regularize the civil administration and appointed Mulla, a former principal, to organize 
it according to the British model and to establish a civil administration training center in Langayu near the 
Ugandan border where tax collection and legal administration were taught (Eprile, 1974: 101, 102; 
O’Ballance, 1977: 136, 2000: 81). By January 1972, the SSLM had founded 500 bush schools, each with 
200 pupils, organized through a system of community education in which teaching staff was 
supplemented by literate adults (Eprile, 1974: 101). 
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exclusive concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the Arabized 
elite (Warburg, 2003: 165). Nimeiri recognized that administrative decentralization 
would allow the regime to continue controlling national resources, while granting more 
organizational autonomy at the local level would help to appease many regionalist 
voices. This logic affected the later negotiations seeking to neutralize the “Southern 
Problem”.  
 
The regime’s search for a negotiated settlement in the South began with the diplomatic 
effort. Nimeiri visited the CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Zaire (Beshir, 1975: 83), 
and in August 1970, he reached an agreement for economic cooperation with Obote and 
in March 1971 signed a more extensive deal with Selassie oriented to curb mutual 
support to each other’s rebel movements, including respecting the OAU conventions 
and setting up a joint commission to inspect refugee camps for rebel activity in the 
territory of both countries (Beshir, 1975: 83-4; Rogier, 2005: 13).  
 
Yet Amin, who was initially pro-Anya Nya, soon overthrew Obote. This is why the 
Anya Nya aid flourished briefly before Amin reoriented his foreign policy towards the 
majority of the Arab states, gradually impeding the Israeli support for the SSLM which 
he had previously facilitated. Israel’s support for the Anya Nya had flourished in the 
late 1960s in the context of polarization of Arab-Israeli relations, as it had sought to 
support proxy forces against perceived “Arab” regimes such as that in Sudan. In the 
course of 1971 Nimeiri and Amin concluded bilateral agreement to cease support of 
each other’s rebels, similar to the one that was reached with Ethiopia, and by the end of 
the year Uganda had severed relations with the West, drifted towards the Arab nations 
in part due to growing Libyan influence in Uganda, and ended Israeli support to the 
SSLM. Amin’s change of policy undermined Lagu and pressured the rebels to negotiate 
(O’Ballance, 1977: 127-8; Howell, 1978a: 432; ICG, 2002: 11; Rogier, 2005: 13).  
 
In response to the agreement with Ethiopia, Nimeiri curbed Khartoum’s support to the 
ELF. He also ceased briefly the shipping of Arab military material to the Eritreans 
through Sudan, and transferred pro-Eritrean officials out of Kassala province, following 
his visit to Ethiopia in November and Haile Selassie’s reciprocal visit to Sudan in 
January 1972 (Alier, 1990: 91-2; Erlich, 1983: 65-6). Although Ethiopia remained a 
sanctuary for the southern refugees, providing an Anya Nya constituency until the end 
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of war, it became interested in facilitating peace negotiations. This was in part because 
of its Western patrons’ promises of aid, and it hoped that Sudan’s pledge to curb its 
support to the Eritrean rebels was genuine (Woodward, 2003: 121). Sudan’s 
demonstration of goodwill was aimed to curb the Anya Nya and to secure opportune 
conditions for the government in the peace talks with the rebels hosted by Selassie in 
Addis Ababa.     
 
By the latter 1971 the efforts for peace gained momentum. Nimeiri was increasingly 
threatened by the unified SSLM and needed a new domestic constituency that would 
complement Khartoum’s new foreign policy orientation and to minimize the threat of 
internal opposition. For its part, the SSLM was faced with diminishing external support 
(Alier, 1990: 66, 71; Rogier, 2005: 12-3). In this situation, Nimeiri was aware that the 
regime’s Western orientation would reduce the SSLM support further280 (Alier, 1990: 
68-9). To heighten popular support and to maintain power in the face of improved 
strength and cohesion of the rebel movement since mid-1960s became incentives for 
Nimeiri to reach an agreement with the South (Johnson, 2003: 37; Rogier, 2005: 12).281 
In fact, his approach to seek support of external adversaries to support his power 
struggle against close domestic rivals had been central to Sudanese politics since de-
colonization. 
 
On the other hand, the unification of southern factions under Lagu’s leadership 
facilitated a common position among the opposition. It forced southern politicians and 
officers fearing to be left out of the negotiation process to speak more and more with 
one voice, although many were wary about initiating negotiations based on the unity of 
Sudan, and some, among them John Garang the future rebel leader of the second 
insurgency, preferred to continue war (Johnson, 2003: 37; Rogier, 2005: 12).282 
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 Western NGOs supported southern refugees aware that rebels organized among them (Alier, 1990: 
58). 
281
 According to Daly (1993: 19), “ . . . Nimayri moved to settle the war in the South, in order to placate 
the army, enhance his prestige at home and abroad, and win for himself the Southern support that all 
Khartoum regimes had lacked since independence”. 
282
 John Garang has stated that “Late Brigadier Emmanuel Abur, Lewa (Major General) Joseph Kuol 
Amum – now with us, myself and many young officers, sat down, analysed the situation and decided to 
oppose the Agreement” because “ . . . its basic terms and the basis of Agreement were first to absorb the 
Anya Nya into the National Army, second to integrate it after absorption and third to destroy it” 
(Heritage, 1987a: 4). This was despite general sentiment for peace in southern Sudan. 
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Aiming to strengthen the regime and prepared to reduce the marginalization and 
exclusion of the South through limited political concessions, Nimeiri had sought to 
initiate secret contacts with the SSLM in the course of 1971. Alier, the minister for 
southern affairs, who was more trusted in the South than his predecessor was put in 
charge of the process, and he gained assistance from the World Council of Churches 
(WCC) and All African Council of Churches (AACC) that facilitated contacts with the 
exile leaders, while the UNHCR and the Western NGOs involved with the 500,000 
registered Sudanese refugees in the neighboring Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire, and Central 
Africa also endorsed attempts for peace (Beshir, 1975: 99; Alier, 1990: 56-9; Daly, 
1993: 19; O’Ballance, 2000: 86; Johnson, 2003: 36; Rogier, 2005: 12-3). In this context, 
the domestic, regional, and international context encouraged negotiations. 
 
The role of mediation was integral in reaching an adequate climate for negotiations. 
Alier had a prominent role in the preparation and initiation of the process, working 
closely with Nimeiri, assessing opinions within the northern political cadres, visiting the 
interested European governments and NGOs, encouraging contacts with the WCC and 
the AACC, and sending southern delegations to meet various groups of southerners 
within and outside Sudan (Beshir, 1975: 83, 99; Howell, 1978a: 432; Alier, 1990: 54-
84). Following Alier’s trip to Europe, the WCC and AACC visited Sudan in spring 
1971 and met government officials and southerners in various parts of the country 
(Beshir, 1975: 81, 99-100; Alier, 1990: 76).283 After the visit, church organizations 
began to contact southern leaders and targeting those who accepted government 
demands for negotiating on the basis of one Sudan,284 autonomy for the South, and 
peaceful resolution, with draft proposals circulated among them, and forwarded the 
demands of the consulted southern leaders to the regime in January 1971.285 As the 
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 During the visit the church representatives became convinced that the conflict was not purely religious, 
but might have combined also race, social, political, and economic factors, which in their view should be 
resolved through political process (Beshir, 1975: 81-2). 
284
 Madut Arop (2006: 21) argues that the role of the WCC and the AACC was controversial. Celebrating 
the regime’s willingness to negotiate, they pressured southerners to negotiate largely on the basis of terms 
dictated by the regime, which eventually led to an agreement that fell short of southern interests. Once the 
negotiations got underway, the southerners had no time to be consulted on the ground or educated about 
what was to be negotiated upon. In fact, the final peace agreement was to an extent imposed on the 
southerners, with Lagu being forced to accept the negotiations without having participated in much of a 
process he allegedly assumed to be borne out of genuine goodwill.  
285
 These included the full cessation of hostilities, the supervision of the cease fire by African or OAU 
team with unrestricted access, the release of Mboro and other political prisoners pleaded also by the 
WCC/AACC delegation, the recognition of the SSLM as the only negotiation partner, the talks being 
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regime met some of the demands the process continued,286 leading to the first secret 
meeting between the regime and the SSLM representatives in November 1971 in Addis 
Ababa287 in the aftermath of Nimeiri’s state visit to Ethiopia (Beshir, 1975: 83, 99; 
Howell, 1978a: 432; Alier, 1990: 54-84). In Ethiopia the regime recognized the SSLM 
as the representative of the South; adhered to the SSLM demands for negotiations to 
take place in a third country, made preparations to halt its military offensive and tone 
down anti-Anya Nya propaganda, and yielded to a cease-fire (Alier, 1990: 77-84, 90: 
Johnson, 2003: 37).288 
 
The formal negotiations took place in February 1972. Addis Ababa was chosen as the 
venue by the regime where it sent an experienced eight-member delegation289 that was 
matched by the SSLM negotiating team.290 However, apart from Albino and Mundiri, 
the leading southern politicians in exile did not participate in the negotiations because a 
number of them opposed Lagu’s leadership, while southern politicians from Khartoum 
became observers (Alier, 1990: 96-7). This potentially undermined the southern 
position.  
 
Despite committing to a single state solution, the SSLM remained adamant about 
including African observers and arbitrators. This shows not only its will to ensure the 
integrity of the process but also to demonstrate an “africanist” and “Christian” leaning. 
It preferred Haile Selassie’s personal participation, but it was agreed that his 
representative Nabiyelul Kifle would become an observer along with Leopoldo Niilus 
and Kodwo Ankrah from the WCC, Burgess Carr from the AACC, who also became the 
                                                                                                                                               
chaired by African country or the OAU, and the negotiations to take place outside Sudan (Beshir, 1975: 
104; Alier, 1990: 76). 
286
 It also made a symbolic gesture by returning a sacred spear of the Bor Dinka from Khartoum in 
August 1971 (Alier, 1990: 84). 
287
 In this meeting Alier and General Mohamed al-Baghir Ahmed, minister of the interior, met the SSLM 
representatives Wol, de Garang, Mulla, Job Adier, Anania Wolo, Paul Puok, and legal adviser Dingle 
Foot (Beshir, 1975: 105-6; Alier, 1990: 76, 79-84). 
288
 In December the Anya Nya handed over the passengers of a crashed Sudan Airways plane unharmed 
which improved its image among some northerners (Alier, 1990: 87-8). 
289
 The delegation consisted of Alier and al-Baghir, together with Mansour Khalid, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Gaafar Mohamed Ali Bakheit, the Minister of Local Government, Abdel Rahman 
Abdalla, the Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform, Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman Khalil, 
a nephew of former premier al-Khalil, Colonel Kamal Abashar Yassin, and ambassadors Ahmed Salah 
Bakhari from Addis Ababa and al-Amin Mohamed al-Amin from Nairobi, all of them familiar with the 
South and many with contacts with southerners (Beshir, 1975: 107; Alier, 1990: 91, 92-5) 
290
 This included Mundiri, Wol, de Garang, Maggot, Albino, Puot, Adier, and Lagu’s personal assistant 
Angelo Voga (Beshir, 1975: 107; Alier, 1990: 96). 
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moderator, and Samuel Athi Bwogo from the Sudan Council of Churches (Beshir, 1975: 
107; Alier, 1990: 97, 98).  
 
As the negotiations got underway, a number of controversial issues were discussed. 
These included a federal political arrangement, the role of Arabic language, three major 
territories removed from southern provincial jurisdiction, financial and economic 
stipulations important for enforcing the southern autonomy, regional political 
institutions and administration, and the armed and security forces (Alier, 1990: 98-105). 
While the federal arrangement was abandoned because the regime delegation claimed it 
had no mandate to establish a federal solution since this would affect the structure of the 
whole state, the southerners stated that they perceived Arabic language as an instrument 
of cultural and political domination. John Garang has stated that at this point the 
southern leadership’s paramount interest became political posts, military positions, and 
other jobs (Heritage, 1987a: 4), which were associated with wealth and higher social 
standing. However, although some in the leadership indeed became preoccupied with 
personal positions, the main objective of the SSLM negotiating team continued to be the 
southern cause.   
 
A number of issues raised during the negotiations became problematic. These included 
territorial North-South boundaries, and the structure of future security arrangements and 
forces in which the Anya Nya was to be integrated. First, the North-South boundary was 
controversial because Abyei, southern Blue Nile, and Hufrat al-Nahas border areas had 
been juggled between the two regions.291 Second, the security arrangements became an 
issue of heated debate. Contesting the integration of rebels into the national army, Cpt. 
John Garang, a newly-commissioned Anya Nya officer with only six months’ 
experience, proposed an alternative arrangement of two separate regional armies for 
Sudan and a national force drawn equally from the North and South for national 
defense.292 Moreover others, including Lagu, in their distrust of the government had 
also opposed the initial approval of the security conditions by the SSLM negotiators, 
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 For instance, Abyei of the Ngok Dinka had been part of Southern Kordofan from 1905 and then Bahr 
al-Ghazal until 1951 but removed due to the personal position of a local chief, while the southern part of 
Blue Nile, home of the Burun people, had belonged to Upper Nile until 1951 when it was removed due to 
difficult access. Hufrat al-Nahas was originally part of Bahr al-Ghazal but had been joined in southern 
Darfur in 1961 when the Abboud regime decided to affirm control over its copper and uranium deposits 
to attempt to neutralize this economic base and discredit secessionists (see Alier, 1990: 99, 101). 
292
 Interestingly this became reality about 30 years later as one of the main security stipulations of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 
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along with some other parts of the agreement, but felt obliged to accept the agreement 
as initially negotiated (Eprile, 1972: 15; Howell, 1978a: 434). This was likely due to a 
consideration that the rebellion had become increasingly unsustainable due to local 
demands for peace within the South and considerably diminished external support. 
 
The Addis Ababa Agreement was signed on 27 February 1972.293 It was the southern 
region composed of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile provinces alone that 
achieved a special autonomous status, which inspired further regionalist demands from 
the other marginalized areas consisting of the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, and the east 
(Alier, 1990: 100-1). Economically the South remained subordinate and dependent on 
the central government transfer payments, grants, and economic planning, but able to 
ensure the continuity of its cultures and languages, using English as the regional 
administrative language as opposed to Arabic at the national level, with the regional 
administration operating the school system (Beshir, 1975: 111; Alier, 1990: 101-2). 
Once the agreement had been signed, Nimeiri and Alier toured the South for ten days to 
project an image of the regime’s goodwill (O’Ballance, 2000: 87). The treaty was a 
victory for Nimeiri because it ensured many presidential powers over the South and 
transformed it into a new regime constituency, while the Arabic version of the 
Agreement was left deliberately vague and subject to future manipulation.294 
 
Finally, at this time, the most intensive period of the bipolar competition for client states 
in the Horn between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was at its initial stages. While the U.S. 
was heavily engaged in Vietnam, Khartoum’s and the Soviet Union’s relations had been 
severed after 1971. The U.S. hoped to stabilize Nimeiri after his turn to the West by 
pressuring the SSLM for peace by diminishing its support. The regional support for the 
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 The North-South boundary was demarcated along the provincial borders as they stood at the time of 
independence in 1956 and a right to referendum was agreed for those border populations who wished to 
join the autonomous Southern Sudan (Alier, 1990: 101). In addition, the southern demand for a separate 
regional army was abandoned and an agreement was concluded to form an army Southern Command of 
12,000 troops with half being recruited from the South. Moreover, the specific sources of revenues for the 
southern region were stipulated, despite allegations that the regime delegates had an interest in advancing 
southern poverty and consequent economic dependency on the regime (Alier, 1990: 102-3), which could 
thus maintain control over the region. Finally, the southern regional political institutions, the High 
Executive Council (HEC) and the Regional Assembly, the executive and legislative organs respectively, 
were accorded. It was also agreed that considering the disrespect of past agreements by the Arabized elite 
political forces, the final treaty was to be enacted into a Law for Self-Government in the Southern 
Provinces that could only be amended through 3/4 majority vote in the national parliament with 
confirmation of 2/3 majority vote in a referendum in the southern region (Beshir, 1975: 107; Alier, 1990: 
104-5). 
294
 According to an interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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rebels also waned and Nimeiri sought domestic consolidation. All this had facilitated 
the WCC and the AACC mediation for the final agreement. Thus, the Addis Ababa 
treaty would have hardly been possible without the domestic, regional, and international 
context that provided incentives for peace.295 Nimeiri had been able to reduce the 
marginalizing effect of the state in the South temporarily and create an atmosphere 
encouraging convergence over the “Arab-African” identity rift that had been reinforced 
by the conflict. 
 
     Responses to the Agreement  
 
Despite the outright rejection of the Addis Ababa Agreement as unacceptable sellout to 
the South by a number of exiled Arabized elite political factions, the regional and 
international response to it was an overwhelming acceptance. European, American, 
African, and Arab press reports praised the treaty along with the role of a number of 
African leaders and politicians, the OAU and the U.N., and Nimeiri was nominated for 
the 1973 Nobel peace prize (Beshir, 1975: 108-9; Graham, 1990: 132; Madut-Arop, 
2006: 18). As Nimeiri had calculated, the agreement extended his local popularity 
particularly in the South, facilitating consolidation of his national leadership (Awur, 
1988: 61-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 18). 
 
After signing the Addis Ababa Agreement the delegations returned from Ethiopia. 
Subsequently on 3 March in a political rally in Wad Nubawi, Nimeiri portrayed the 
treaty as a major success, declaring the day National Unity Day, announcing a cease-
fire, and signing the Regional Self-Government for Southern Sudan Act, which 
converted the agreement into law (Beshir, 1975: 107-8, 120; Awur, 1988: 61, 62; Akol, 
2007: 132; Collins, 2008: 111). Similarly, Lagu issued orders for the cease-fire the same 
day, but upon the SSLM delegation’s return from Ethiopia it faced fierce opposition 
from separatist southern politicians and officers who were reluctant to accept anything 
less than secession, a separate army and independent political and economic decision-
making powers (Howell, 1978a: 434; Akol, 2007: 132). 
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 Ethiopia played a major role in the peace process partly because its Western supporters offered the 
regime aid in exchange for facilitating peace efforts. In addition, after the change in Uganda’s foreign 
policy orientation by the end of 1971, Ethiopia became one of the most important forces supporting the 
SSLM and could use this position to its advantage in terms of the negotiations. Finally, it was in the 
context of the relationship between the local protagonists, the regional setting, and the international Cold 
War politics in which the peace treaty became possible. 
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As a result, mixed reactions took place among the Anya Nya. Whereas Lagu and his 
closest supporters had reached an agreement with the government delegation, 
converting him into a hero of the South, the news of the treaty did not reach the Anya 
Nya command of Bahr al-Ghazal until much later.296 Still, Lagu’s influence had been 
sufficient to convince his nearest Anya Nya commanders to abide by the cease-fire 
(O’Ballance, 2000: 87).   
 
However, a number of Anya Nya officers less influenced by Lagu planned to disobey 
the agreement. Meeting secretly in Loboke to assess their collective reaction, Emmanuel 
Abuur Nhial, Alfred Deng Aluk, Alison Manani Magaya, Habbakkuk Soro, Stephen 
Maduk Baak, Disan Ojwe Olweny, Kamilo Odongi, Paul Awel, Albino Akol Akol, and 
John Garang de Mabior, drafted a document rejecting the treaty and circulated it in the 
Anya Nya garrisons. This was an attempt to resist implementation of the Agreement and 
rally for Lagu’s destitution and replacement with a new leader (Madut-Arop, 2006: 19). 
However, Saturnino Arika, commander of eastern Equatoria, allegedly handed the 
document over to Lagu which led to Odongi’s and Ojwe’s arrest and the abandonment 
of the discovered plot, also because the southern public would not support the 
continuation of the war (Madut-Arop, 2006: 19-20). In an interview, John Garang also 
indicated that the officers wanted to give peace a chance because people desired it, 
although being aware that the root causes of the conflict had not been addressed and that 
the integration of the Anya Nya was an attempt at neutralizing the southern fighting 
capacity (Madut-Arop, 2006: 20).297 Consequently, the plotters returned to their home 
areas to wait for the absorption into the national army. 
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 For instance when the commander of Bahr al-Ghazal, Emmanuel Abuur Nhial, arrived to Kampala to 
inquire about the details of the negotiations from exiled Bahr al-Ghazal politicians, Lagu had already 
ratified the agreement in Khartoum and prepared his return to Juba. Bahr al-Ghazal politicians had 
rejected it as surrender to the “Arab” regime. In Lobone, the Anya Nya headquarters, Abuur understood 
that orders had been given for the Anya Nya troops to demobilize, relocate, and wait for absorption into 
the national army (Madut-Arop, 2006: 19). 
297
 According to Garang, “We calculated that the clique in Khartoum would erode the government in Juba 
because its basis for the Agreement was first to absorb the Anya Nya into the National Army, second to 
integrate it after absorption and third to destroy it. So you have the process of achieving a cheap victory 
over the Anya Nya forces . . . We also accepted to be absorbed because we knew that the North would 
dishonour the Agreement, and the south would be ready for war. Then we would be ready to launch a 
genuine movement, the people’s revolution (quoted in Madut-Arop, 2006: 20). 
 
246        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has attempted to capture the principal factors within the intertwined local, 
regional, and international spheres that led to the intensification and ending of war in 
the South. The second parliamentary period had been characterized by a return of 
factional feuds and bickering within the northern Arabized elite establishment over the 
control of political power and related material benefits. While the fall of the Abboud 
military regime had provided them with another opportunity to establish democratic 
rule, this failed because the Arabized elite political parties remained largely detached 
from society in general and remained principally concerned with their interests, 
channeling benefits to their narrow social constituencies, rather than putting forward 
any major political or economic reforms. In these circumstances, party leaders 
squabbled as part of personalized politics, sectional and sectarian competition involving 
widespread nepotism and corruption as the economy deteriorated further and the war in 
the South intensified, reinforcing identity polarization along the “Arab-African” rift.  
 
In this context, the marginalizing state remained strictly in the hands of sectors of the 
Arabized elite whose foreign policy orientation in the 1960s towards the Eastern Bloc 
and leftist-oriented Arab states perpetuated the conflict in the South. This fuelled Anya 
Nya support by external actors to counter such orientation by the central governments, 
which made the war increasingly part, and a shaping force, of regional dynamics. As it 
intensified, the conflict became ensconced as struggle between “Arabs” and “Africans”, 
which in turn had implications for identity (re)construction and reinforcement. While 
the military coup that installed Nimeiri in power supplanted the traditional forces of the 
Arabized elite, it transferred the power firmly to other sections of the same elite and 
only took in sectors of the southern elite when a new regime constituency was needed.  
 
However, the reaching of the Addis Ababa Agreement shows that there are no 
primordial differences between “northerners” as “Arabs” and “southerners” as 
“Africans” that prevent any peaceful settlement of armed conflict. Rather, these are 
constructed categorizations reinforced and used by local elites to portray their fight as 
“regional” as they seek to influence their constituents in the “North” and the “South”, 
respectively. Yet, these very same regionalist and national elites appear equally capable 
of seeing beyond such categorizations when settling their differences, as was the case in 
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Addis Ababa. This points to an existence of continuing adjustment in identity 
(re)construction, reinforcement, and emphasis relating to violence and peace.   
 
However, the Addis Ababa Agreement also shows that dismantling the exclusive 
political and economic governance of the marginalizing state is necessary, thereby 
allocating concessions to the southern elite in order to remedy the systemic conflict in 
the southern provinces. Mere promises for this were granted through the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, against a background of unprecedented opportune local and intertwined 
regional and international conditions which allowed the negotiated settlement to take 
place. 
 
This prepared southern Sudan for a new period in which its political elites were able to 
lead the southern provinces as a “region” for the first time. It provided them with 
opportunities for self-enrichment and extending influence, and challenges to politically 
unify the highly heterogeneous “region” for the first time since colonialism. 
 
Finally, the findings in this chapter suggest that genuine and appropriate political 
arrangements demonstrating goodwill through the dismantling of the structures and 
policies of marginalization and exclusion of the southern leadership, while allowing for 
a wider distribution of political and economic power, might have effectively prevented 
or contained the insurgency. Although this would have translated into improved security 
and wellbeing at the local level in the South, it should be recognized that such 
development was almost impossible due to the internal and external dynamics related to 
governance and the logic of the marginalizing state, as shown in the previous chapter. 
Thus, the political trajectory dictated by the exclusivist and marginalizing governance 
and political culture of highly contested political and economic power led to the 
insurgency.  
 
The next chapter demonstrates how the regime engaged in violating the commitments 
made in Addis Ababa and how the southern military elite gained power during the 
period of limited autonomy in southern Sudan. These factors reinforced the 
marginalizing dynamic again and led to the (re)deepening of the projected “Arab” vs. 
“African” identity rift, which would be instrumental in the process of resumption of 
large-scale armed hostilities in southern Sudan. 
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Chapter VI. Autonomous Southern Sudan 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement was a product of the protagonists’ converging 
agendas in an opportune international, regional, and local situation. Pushed also by 
external actors, it became the framework for peace in Sudan through a limited political 
autonomy and self-government arrangement for the southern region, encompassing 
Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Equatoria, and similar to the closed district policy of 
the Anglo-Egyptian period.  
 
However, despite creating the foundation for southern political institutions, the 
agreement lacked financial guarantees for the region, keeping it deliberately 
economically under regime control according to the dynamics of the marginalizing 
state. This was not an ideal starting point for southern autonomy as the competing 
regional elites succumbed to a struggle over power and resources. Regionally, the 
Islamic resurgence provided a context in which southern autonomy became increasingly 
contested, particularly due to its natural resources. In this, the ethnic card was again 
played by sections of the southern leadership, while the regime sought to exploit such 
fissures by maintaining the region weak and incapable of challenging its national 
hegemony. Despite the initial attempts to overcome identity polarization the growing 
discord led to the reconstruction of identities along “Arab”-“African” and “Dinka”-
“Equatorian” divide. While individual southern politicians continued to hold office in 
the central government and the parliament, their influence remained marginal and 
unable to affect the regime policies. The first southern Regional Assembly was the only 
southern political term fully completed as the regime intensified its encroachment on 
the southern autonomy as the 1970s drew to a close.      
 
It is shown in this chapter how the southern autonomy was instituted and implemented, 
resulting in its deterioration only a few years after the Addis Ababa agreement. The 
purpose is to highlight processes which, as shown in the next chapter, brought the 
southern autonomous government to its demise and led to a return to war. The focus 
here is on the early autonomous southern political scene which from the start was 
250        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
characterized by ethnic and religious identity politics that were exploited by sectors of 
the southern elite along with the national regime attempting to undermine the southern 
region, perceived as potentially too strong relative to the center, according to the logic 
and dynamics of the marginalizing state. In the process, the sentiments of Arab-Muslim 
domination, inequality, and disappointment of the autonomy due to the integration of 
the Anya Nya and lack of economic development fuelled the re-emphasis and 
reconstruction of grievances. These led to the organization of opposition to the regime, 
detailed further in the next chapter, which later culminated in the second rebellion when 
prospects for external support for armed opposition became more and more likely. 
 
2. National Political and Economic Context 
 
This section highlights the national political and economic context in which the limited 
autonomy of southern Sudan was practiced. It highlights the project to reduce 
marginalization and exclusion through more extensive incorporation of the South, 
although the limits of the autonomy hindered the attempt for lesser polarization.   
 
     From Exclusively “Arab” to “Arab” and “African”  
 
The 1972 agreement in Addis Ababa had brought the first war in southern Sudan to an 
end. It has been estimated that between 500,000 and 1.5 million civilians had died with 
one million people becoming refugees or internally displaced (Alier, 1990: 261, 
O’Ballance, 1977: 13).298 The agreement stipulated that the three highly diverse 
provinces of Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, considered as the South and 
unified by the armed opposition to the national government, would constitute the 
southern region. Accordingly, the southern region was to preserve its boundaries, 
discontinuously demarcated in 1956, with its capital based in Juba. In addition, the 
agreement specified the authority of the central government over critical aspects of 
political sovereignty and economic affairs, leaving the southern regional government to 
manage the relatively minor regional context. For instance, the central government was 
to be in charge of national defense, external affairs, currency and coinage, air and inter-
regional river transport, communications and telecommunications, customs and foreign 
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 However, the losses of the fighting forces were drastically smaller: an estimated 500-2,000 Anya Nya 
and equal number of government troops died fighting (Alier, 1990: 261). This reflects the extent in which 
oppressing and targeting civilians had been an aspect of rebel tactics and counter-insurgency measures.   
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trade, immigration, emigration, and naturalization, planning of education and economic 
and social development, and performing public audit.299 In contrast, the southern 
regional parliament was only allocated powers to legislate to safeguard public order and 
internal security, efficient administration and regional cultural, economic, and social 
development, detailed in 20 specific clauses and appendixes of the agreement.300 This 
shows that while an attempt was made to ally with the South by reducing exclusion and 
marginalization through recognition of its interests in the process of more extensive 
incorporation into the state structures, the autonomy was too limited to break the 
dynamics and the logic of the marginalizing state.   
 
Moreover, according to the agreement, two main political institutions were created in 
the southern region. These were the High Executive Council (HEC) exercising 
executive power, and the People’s Regional Assembly endowed with the legislative 
power. The HEC was composed of a regional president appointed by the president of 
the country with the recommendation of the Regional Assembly, which in practice 
meant that the national president was largely in control of the selection process of the 
regional leadership.301 The president of the HEC, in turn, chose the ministers of his 
cabinet with the decision being subject to the approval of the Regional Assembly. The 
ministers were responsible for the annual budgets of the ministries that were to be 
approved first by the Regional Assembly prior to presentation in the National 
Assembly. Finally, the Regional Assembly consisted initially of partly appointed (up to 
25%) and partly elected members, all of which in the later legislatures were to be 
elected directly by a secret vote.302 While these institutions created democratic political 
structures in the South, which potentially made the reconstruction of identities more 
porous and less polarizing through a prospect of political, economic, and social change, 
they also only allowed a reduced number of the southern leadership to be incorporated 
effectively into the state structures.  
 
The main security provisions of the agreement included the integration of the Anya Nya 
troops to the state’s security institutions. This was an important issue for the SSLM not 
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 Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter IV, Article 7. Available in Alier (1990) and Akol (2007) as an 
annex. 
300
 Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter IV, Article 11 and appendix B. 
301
 Akol (2001: 2) has claimed that this set the precedence of regime involvement in the regional politics 
and for the highly contested nature of the southern presidency among southern elite factions. 
302
 Addis Ababa Agreement, Chapter IV, articles 8-10. 
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only for Lagu to reward his troops for their efforts but also to serve as a security 
guarantee for the South. Although the security arrangements after the initial cease-fire 
had been the main impasse during the negotiations, the SSLM was pushing the South to 
have its own army while the government opposed such an arrangement. Haile Selassie’s 
proposal for a Southern Command totaling 12,000 and composed of 6,000 northerners 
matched with an equal number of southerners was adopted in the final agreement 
(Kulusika, 1998: 101; Collins, 2008: 111). The recruitment and integration was to be 
supervised by a Joint Military Commission composed of an equal number of senior 
northern officers and their southern counterparts, and initially designed to include 
international observers.303 This served as a minimal guarantee for the southern 
leadership to bargain with the central government, as many southern leaders and 
soldiers decided to collaborate with the regime hoping that marginalization and 
exclusion would be remedied in the context of the autonomous political arrangement.  
 
Finally, the agreement provided for unprecedented general amnesty of war-related 
crimes. All criminal acts committed during conflict were forgiven and prisoners 
released within 15 days of the ratification of the agreement, which led to the freeing of 
over 2,000 imprisoned in the South (Alier, 1990: 141). On 3 March 1972, a general 
amnesty provision was signed into a law as the Indemnity Act declared by Nimeiri 
(Alier, 1990: 141; Akol, 2007: 138).  This was another sign of Nimeiri’s initial strategic 
attempt to ally with the South and decrease its exclusion by a reduction of the dynamics 
and logic of the marginalizing state. It was aimed to incorporate the former rebels and 
southern opposition members and seek to reduce the identity polarization contributing 
to the insurgency.   
 
However, the agreement was plagued by weaknesses. For instance it was a largely 
internal treaty with no mechanism for external monitoring. It also excluded an external 
arbitration mechanism in case of violations of its provisions, which has been considered 
one of its major weaknesses (Kulusika, 1998: 103).304 It failed to provide financial and 
physical security for the South and did little to remedy a chronic dependency on the 
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 Addis Ababa Agreement, Agreement on the Cease-Fire in the Southern Region, articles 6 and 8. 
304
 The agreement was based on the 1965 Round Table Conference that had been unable to provide a 
solution to the “Southern Problem”, in part because the government delegation had only offered limited 
autonomy to the southern provinces and given the national government the ultimate authority in key areas 
(Jendia, 2002: 94). This was deliberate effort to keep the South in check due to its dependency on the 
center. 
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regime financing, the proliferation of modern weapons and continuation of human 
insecurity in terms of killing of civilians, the kidnapping of women and children, and 
cattle rustling, all which had been intense during the war but still continued on a lesser 
scale (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 120).305 As will be shown, these efforts were 
insufficient and lacked incentives from part of the state to remedy the southern 
dependency on the center particularly after Nimeiri’s shift of alliances in mid-1970s.  
 
Moreover, in 1970 Nimeiri had declared the restructuring of Sudan’s political 
institutions. Although many of the reforms to be implemented were not completed 
before the finalization of the Addis Ababa Agreement, he used the opportunity of the 
cessation of hostilities to introduce a permanent constitution promulgated on 8 May 
1973 to replace the largely modified temporary constitution of 1956 (Holt and Daly, 
2000: 173; Warburg, 2003: 149; Collins, 2008: 116). The new constitution became a 
manifestation of the regime’s secular approach,306 as Nimeiri favored the technocrats 
and southern politicians over sectors of Arab nationalists and conservatives and purged 
them from the government institutions (Niblock, 1987: 266). Incorporating the Addis 
Ababa Agreement, the constitution initially tackled national identity and religion by 
defining Sudan as “Arab” and “African”,307 attempting to resolve the contentious 
matters relating to the nature of the country. However, in the long run the specific 
political arrangements and the dynamics of the marginalizing state encouraged further 
the constructed “regional” identities, instrumentalizing categories of “Arab” vs. 
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 Although addressing insecurity was one of the main tasks of the regional political institutions, it was 
only partly possible due to the continued availability of arms to fuel local conflicts and a growing 
dissatisfaction among civilians and within the southern security apparatus (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 
120-4). See also Prunier (1986) for more details.   
306
 Warburg (2003: 150, 166) asserts that “The significance of this constitution was that it attempted, for 
the first time since independence, to accommodate all religions on the basis of equality and openly to 
promote secularism . . . Yet, if we take into account both the realities prevailing in Sudan and the 
radicalization of Islam in surrounding countries, including Egypt, the 1973 Constitution could be viewed 
as a step towards liberalization and coexistence in a multiethnic society”. While the regime established a 
secular constitution, northern Islamist hardliners demanded that Islam be the state religion, the head of 
state to be a Muslim, and all legislation conform to Islamic jurisprudence (Alier, 1990: 145). Still, purged 
by the regime, they had to settle for the provided framework. In the context of the regional Islamic 
resurgence and Nimeiri’s reconciliation with the Arabized elite political forces in exile from mid-1970s 
onwards, the constitution was heavily amended and undermined after the traditional, conservative, and 
radical northern political forces re-entered in the Sudanese political scene (Warburg, 2003: 150). 
307
 The multifaceted document, relying on approximately 225 articles, described Sudan as secular 
enjoying freedom of religion but with society guided by Islam. The state provided the possibility to 
express the values of Islam and Christianity, and on paper Sudan embraced both Arab and African 
identity. This was allegedly exemplified by the incorporation of Addis Ababa Agreements as Southern 
Sudan Self-Government Act in the permanent constitution (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173; Collins, 2008: 
117). 
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“African” and “Muslim” vs. “non-Muslim” that had become increasingly polarizing 
during the war.   
  
The constitution also concentrated extensive powers in the presidency. In particular, it 
allowed Nimeiry to declare a state of emergency, suspend the constitution, and having 
the judiciary responsible directly to the president. Converting Sudan into one-party state 
with the SSU under his chairmanship, Nimeiri’s personal influence extended widely 
through elaborate patronage politics (Holt and Daly, 2000: 173-4). Although the other 
main institution, the parliament or People’s Assembly, was portrayed as a largely 
independent institution checking presidential power, these were clearly superior and 
Nimeiri neutralized the Assembly by filling it mainly with regime supporters (Niblock, 
1987: 261-2; Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Collins, 2008: 117). As such, the permanent 
constitution concentrated political power in Nimeiri’s presidency and purged traditional 
Arabized elite parties by proclaiming them illegal. Despite these measures the main 
opposition parties had found sanctuaries in the neighboring Arab states and operated in 
exile. 
 
Throughout the early 1970s, Nimeiri continued to survive coup attempts organized by 
anti-regime elements, some with foreign support.308 This shows the narrow base of the 
regime, which relied locally extensively on sectors in the military loyal to Nimeiri and 
southern support.309 In 1975 yet another aborted coup convinced Nimeiri to pass 
constitutional amendments to concentrate power in the presidency, giving the State 
Security Organ (SSO) freedom to perform preventive arrests in weeding out dissent 
(Akol, 2007: 140-1; Collins, 2008: 127-8). This led to growing authoritarianism, but 
also conditioned Nimeiri to seek alliances with sectors of the exiled Arab Muslim elite 
in an attempt to strengthen the regime. 
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 A coup in January 1973 was aborted, as was an ensuing Libyan backed attempt to murder Nimeiri in 
April 1974. The riots which followed were put down, dissidents arrested, and by the end of the year 
Nimeiri had declared a state of emergency and replaced cabinet members with more loyal personnel 
(Collins, 2008: 128). 
309
 In September 1975, Nimeiri suffered yet another coup attempt that made him strengthen presidential 
powers towards absolute autocracy. Paratroopers of western origin under Lieutenant Colonel Hassan 
Hussein, motivated by Khartoum’s disregard of Darfur and Kordofan while negotiating peace with the 
southern rebels, arrested their commanding officers, took control of Radio Omdurman, and announced 
that Nimeiri was under house arrest. Officers loyal to Nimeiri put an end down to the attempt and Nimeiri 
was in any event never captured by the plotters (Rogier, 2005: 14; Akol, 2007: 140; Collins, 2008: 127). 
Southern soldiers in Khartoum played an indispensable role in undoing the coup and also participated in 
bringing down an attempt in 1976 by the northern political opposition in exile, which demonstrates the 
degree of success of Nimeiri’s policy to consolidate southern support (Rogier, 2005: 14). 
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     Political Arrangements for Southern Autonomy 
 
The swift agreement to the Addis Ababa treaty by the southern negotiators created 
confusion in the South. This led to an initiative among the SSLM to renegotiate the 
agreement by delaying its ratification (Howell, 1978a: 434-5; Akol, 2007: 132). 
However, the indecision came too late as Uganda and Zaire, both of which supported 
the Anya Nya and hosted large numbers of southern refugees, announced their support 
of the treaty and pressured the SSLM to comply (Akol, 2007: 133).310 This shows that 
the SSLM leadership consisted of a number of secondary power centers under Lagu’s 
leadership, and that settling into an agreement that was rejected by sectors in southern 
political and military leadership, such as hard line secessionists and sections that 
became the underground officers’ movement and parts of the Anya Nya II, brought 
about an enduring internal instability. This had serious consequences soon after, as the 
rebel military officers lost the political power and prominent economic role they had 
enjoyed during the insurgency to the politicians who assumed the political leadership 
after the agreement. Thus, even after the war, grievances among the southern military 
heightened and continued to promote a polarization of identities along the constructed 
“Arab”-“African” rift in sections of the southern army units.    
 
The ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement on 27 March 1972 by Nimeiri and Lagu 
marked the formalization of the accord and paved way for its implementation. However, 
against expectations, Nimeiri interfered in the process. He deprived Lagu of the 
appointment as the president of the Interim HEC, removed him from the political 
leadership of the SSLM by absorbing Lagu into SSU structures, and emphasized his 
military role,311 instead rewarding Alier with the Interim HEC presidency (Akol, 2007: 
136; Collins, 2008: 112). Whereas Alier (1990: 127) points out that his appointment as 
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 Meanwhile, Lagu headed a new delegation to Addis Ababa. Together with Oduho, he discussed 
privately with Alier the possible modifications to the agreement (Akol, 2007: 133). Although Alier 
reminded the southern leaders of the difficulty to revise the treaty and told them that many southerners 
already celebrated the end of hostilities, he announced that the regime had yielded to Lagu’s and Oduho’s 
demand for the ensuring that the 6,000 southerners in the Southern Command would be exclusively Anya 
Nya troops (Akol, 2007: 133; Collins, 2008: 111). Their other demands never materialized because Lagu 
was both unable and unwilling to demand further concessions that could have unraveled the negotiated 
pact (Howell, 1978a: 435).    
311
 After the ceremony Lagu and a number of southern leaders cautiously proceeded to Khartoum where 
Lagu held a press conference and on 1 April was appointed Major-General of the Sudanese army and 
commander of the army’s Southern Command. This adhered to the SSLM demand that he should be in 
condition to supervise the Anya Nya and he was awarded SSU membership (Alier, 1990: 127; Akol, 
2007: 134; Collins, 2008: 112). 
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the President of the Interim HEC was coherent with the SSLM view, Collins (2008: 
112) asserts that it was unexpected and finalized without consultation. In fact, according 
to Lagu, he had been previously falsely promised the post as the president of the HEC 
(Madut-Arop, 2006: 22). Regime collaborator Alier’s, appointment to head the southern 
region generated renewed suspicion within sectors of southern leadership.312 It also 
became the prelude to a political competition between Lagu and Alier, which polarized 
the southern elite, aligning secondary power centers behind the two confronting 
protagonists. 
 
3. External Factors Challenging Reliance on Southern Support  
 
This section highlights external, regional, and international factors that induced the 
marginalizing state in Sudan to return to its Arabized elite constituency. 
 
     External Factors in Political Reversion 
 
Nimeiri regime, relying on southern support, continued to face challenges. This was 
largely because the favorable external conditions for the alliance with the South that had 
supported the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreeement were now changing. While 
sectors of the Arabized elite opposition remained in exile, Ethiopia became a Soviet ally 
together with Libya which sought to destabilize Nimeiri. In 1976 the National Front 
(NF), a coalition of exiled Arabized elite political parties founded in 1974, attempted to 
seize power. Qadhafi, who had not forgiven Nimeiri for his refusal to implement the 
Tripoli Charter that would have allowed Libya extend its influence and access to Darfur, 
backed the attempt (Yohannes, 1997: 312; Collins, 2008: 128).313 Nevertheless, Nimeiri 
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 While some in Khartoum viewed the process as a defeat against the ‘outlaws’, many in the South 
considered that Lagu had been bought by the northern Arabs, and he was condemned by politicians such 
as Jaden and Gordon Muortat Mayen, aggrieved at him having taken power in the region (Alier, 1990: 
127). Despite Alier’s disappointment, Lagu remained committed to the peace process and married a 
daughter of a jallaba merchant killed during the Torit disturbances as a gesture of goodwill (Madut-Arop, 
2006: 22).   
313
 The coup was to take place in the morning of 2 July 1976 upon Nimeiri’s arrival from France and the 
U.S., but due to his earlier than expected landing Nimeiri was able to escape. Troops loyal to him, among 
which there were many southerners, arrived in the capital and suppressed the Ansar dominated uprising, 
killing more than 700 and leading to arrests of a number of religious leaders and dissidents (LOC, 1991; 
Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Collins, 2008: 128). The plan was masterminded from Britain by Sadig al-
Mahdi, leader of the Umma, but also involved Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, a former NUP minister of finance 
and other exiled leaders of the NUP, the DUP, and the ICF all part of the NF (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; 
Collins, 2008: 128-9). It had been executed by training 2,000 mostly Ansar dissidents with Soviet help in 
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had been saved by the American intelligence that knew about the coup and advised him 
to change his schedule (Yohannes, 1997: 312). Surviving another coup attempt 
encouraged Nimeiri’s belief in the divineness of his personalized rule (Collins, 2008: 
128-9). However, it also made him more inclined to seek alliances with the exiled 
sectors of the Arabized elite at the expense of the South. It could be argued that this 
reversed the trend for increased incorporation of the South through lesser 
marginalization and identity polarization. 
 
Nimeiri accused Libya, Ethiopia, and the Soviet Union of backing the coup attempt. 
Such accusations were carefully expressed by Nimeiri to cement American support and 
portray the affair as the designs of international communists for Sudan. This was not 
completely unfounded as Ethiopia, Libya, and the U.S.S.R. supported the dissidents, 
with Ethiopia seeking to install a pro-Ethiopian regime in Sudan to purge ELF supply 
networks (Yohannes, 1997: 313). Whereas the U.S.S.R. was interested to overturn 
Sudan’s new pro-Western foreign policy orientation towards Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
the U.S., a successful coup in Sudan would have extended Qadhafi’s influence in the 
Sahel towards Chad, where Libya was supporting a rebel faction led by Goukouni 
Oueddi against the regime of Felix Malloum, himself in power since leading a coup in 
1975. The most immediate repercussions of the aborted coup attempts were that Nimeiri 
sought to extravert more support from the U.S., and, concluding that southern support 
was insufficient to stabilize the regime, reverted back to embracing the Arabized elite as 
a domestic constituency.  
 
Nimeiri’s rhetoric portraying Sudan as surrounded by the communist threat was 
sufficient to elevate the level of American support. The U.S. converted Sudan into the 
focal point of its machinations in the Horn of Africa which along with Southern Africa 
became its main zone of interest on the continent throughout the 1980s (Yohannes, 
1997: 313). This approach aimed to neutralize growing Libyan influence,314 and 
                                                                                                                                               
two of the 20 training camps established for Qadhafi’s Islamic Legion in the southern Libyan desert and 
sent to the capital as seasonal workers, burying their guns in the sand in Omdurman and waiting for 
Nimeiri’s arrival (Rogier, 2005: 14; Collins, 2008: 129). Allegedly, according to John Garang, many of 
the forces of the aborted coup were foreign mercenaries, which motivated the Sudanese army to counter 
the “invasion” (Heritage, 1987b: 4).   
314
 The U.S. was particularly preoccupied by Qadhafi’s designs of converting Libya into a regional power, 
establishing an Islamic bloc by extending the boundaries of its influence to Sub-Saharan Africa, which 
culminated in a triple alliance with Ethiopia and South Yemen in 1981 (Yohannes, 1997: 314). One of 
Libya’s main strengths was its financial capability as it offered US$855.1 million to its two allies, while 
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included the rebuilding of the Sudanese army,315 the building of a regional alliance of 
states and sub-state groups centering on Sudan, and the minimizing of the potential for 
internal instability through investment on the Sudanese economy (Yohannes, 1997: 
314). As a result, the U.S. began arms transfers to Sudan.316 This owed much to 
Nimeiri’s initial ability to extravert foreign resources in support of his regime through 
Sudan’s Cold War relations. 
 
Alarmed by the threat of the formerly dominant exiled political organizations, Nimeiri 
sought to legitimize the regime by embarking on a policy of “national” reconciliation. 
However, this reconciliation was hardly national as it involved only factions of the 
Arabized elite from whose military ranks he also originated. As Nimeiri began to 
consider them as the main threat to the regime (Rogier, 2005: 15), he reversed the 
earlier policy of persecution of the sectarian parties and Islamists.317 He announced 
elections to be held in 1977, luring the exiled northern factions back to Sudan where he 
could exert control over them by facilitating them token representation in political 
institutions. The return of the NF would also diffuse pressure from Saudi Arabia, which 
pushed for reconciliation of Arabized elite political factions and whose financial 
                                                                                                                                               
the triple alliance agreement included propping up military strength by raising 60,000 troops to aid rebels 
in Somalia and the existing residual Anya Nya bands supported by Ethiopia in southern Sudan to 
undermine Nimeiri (Woodward, 1987: 182-3; Yohannes, 1997: 314). 
315
 The focus on armed forces was justified by the relatively small and poorly equipped army of 50,000 
depending on antiquated Soviet military hardware in 1977, relative to Ethiopia with 150,000-300,000 
soldiers with new Soviet equipment, and Libya using US$5 billion in 1974-8 and US$12 billion in 1981 
for arms from the U.S.S.R. to distribute them both to its relatively small 22,000 strong army and to 
subversive activity to extend its regional influence (Yohannes, 1997: 314). Allegedly, Libya had spent 
US$1.4 billion solely for such activity in 1975-80 (Woodward, 1987: 182). 
316
 In 1977, Sudan imported US$500 million worth of Western armament, with the U.S. pledging to 
supply Nimeiri with 12 F-5 jets and six C-130 transport planes as part of US$70 million military aid 
package with US$80 million promised for the following year. France pledged to supply 15 Mirage jets, 
10 helicopters, and armored vehicles worth US$85 million, paid for covertly by Abu Dhabi. Britain 
offered its military expertise and opened its arms market to Sudan (Legum and Lee, 1979: 18, 124).                 
317
 While initially Nimeiri forced the judicial authorities condemn Sadiq and al-Hindi to death in absence, 
he secretly met Sadiq, the leader of the NF, in Port Sudan, which led to an accord announced in July 1977 
on the return of the Umma and the Ansar in Sudan. This was agreed on condition that they recognized the 
SSU party state and the presidential system. Nimeiri declared amnesty, including for the Muslim 
Brothers, and promised political reforms (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Sidahmed and Sidahmed, 2005: 33; 
Collins, 2008: 129-30). Despite initially demanding further concessions, al-Hindi’s DUP, which could not 
afford to be left in exile when its rival had been reincorporated into the authoritarian politics in Sudan, 
disputed the elections of the National Assembly in 1978 (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Sidahmed and 
Sidahmed, 2005: 33). While Sadiq and Nimeiri had reportedly discussed Nimeiri’s fear of Soviet 
aspirations and the need for the political stability and unity of the northern political factions, they also 
talked about their apprehension of the South. Sadiq praised Nimeiri’s fermenting Islamist tendency and 
expressed his willingness to work within the one-party framework if it was opened further and made more 
effective and representative (Khalid, 1985: 171). The “national” reconciliation included a general 
amnesty of formerly banned opposition, which also applied to southern political prisoners (Akol, 2007: 
141).  
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investments Nimeiri partly depended upon (Warburg, 2003: 153). On the other hand, 
the NF had been severely debilitated by the failed coup and could not afford another 
attempt against the regime that was backed by the army, Egypt, and the U.S. (Yohannes, 
1997: 313; Holt and Daly, 2000: 174; Collins, 208: 130). As a result, the northern 
opposition factions accepted Nimeiri’s invitation and regained limited access to the 
political institutions.318 The return of the main northern political forces strengthened the 
regime, particularly because they were now more controlled in the domestic political 
scene and left without significant power. This was because Nimeiri was changing his 
power base from the earlier main support groups, the secular technocrats, communists, 
and southern politicians, towards al-Turabi’s Islamists but excluding the sectarian 
power centers, the neo-Mahdists and the Khatmiyyah, in the process. 
 
In 1977, Nimeiri’s term as the president dictated in the permanent constitution had 
come to an end. In the absence of an established legal opposition, the conditions of the 
plebiscite convoked for his reelection were similar to those in 1971; Nimeiri continued 
in power (Niblock, 1987: 262). In February 1978, however, the parties returning from 
exile were allowed to take part in the elections for the People’s Assembly. Yet, as was 
projected by the authorities, the result was a victory for the regime despite its internal 
weakness.319  
 
After the elections Nimeiri felt necessary to patch up the declining popularity of the 
regime and curb support for the returning parties. As a result, he appealed to Muslims to 
strengthen the regime in northern Sudan by emphasizing the role of Islam, and in the 
long term resorting to support of the Muslim Brothers and shari’a.320 This political 
move was in part due to his personal convictions, but it allowed the Muslim Brothers to 
grow from a small urban political movement to a mass movement counting Saudi 
Arabian support (Melvill, 2002: 7). Playing the Islamic card was convenient in the 
regional political context because, apart from helping to cement the economic 
relationship with Saudi Arabia, the leftist radical ideologies had subsided to Islamic 
resurgence in Egypt and militant Islam had emerged in Iran and Algeria (Warburg, 
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 This is how in the regional context of Islamic resurgence, al-Turabi’s Muslim Brothers, backed by a 
network of individuals and organizations from the Arabian Peninsula, seized the opportunity to infiltrate 
the state apparatus (Prunier and Gisselquist, 2003: 116-8; Rogier, 2005: 15).    
319
 The candidates of the Umma, the DUP, and the Muslim Brothers obtained 80, and independents 60 out 
of 304 available seats (Holt and Daly, 2000: 174). 
320
 According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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2003: 152-3). In Egypt, Sadat had endorsed the Muslim Brothers and Islamic student 
organizations in order to undermine the opposition of Nasserist-dominated professional 
and student organizations, and amended the constitution so that shari’a became the 
main source of all legislation (Zeidan, 1999; Zubaida, 2000: 70; Warburg, 2003: 153). 
This had far reaching consequences in Sudan in the following years due to Nimeiri 
remaining heavily influenced by Egypt. 
 
Whereas the sectarian parties hesitated, the Muslim Brothers ceased the opportunity to 
collaborate with the regime. Turabi, “ . . . openly committed himself to the regime in 
order to rebuild the Muslim Brothers under his patronage” (Collins, 2008: 130).321 This 
could be seen as unprecedented opportunism since Turabi was the first Islamist leader in 
the Arab world to cooperate with a seemingly socialist government (Sidahmed and 
Sidahmed, 2005: 33). Nimeiri cleared the way for the Muslim Brothers who decided to 
work within the state apparatus by purging the opposition parties and declining to 
introduce promised political reforms. He rewarded the Muslim Brothers for their 
collaboration with a number of positions in the government and state machinery, 
culminating in Turabi’s appointment as the Attorney-General in 1979, which allowed 
the movement to gain influence, while also granting generous Islamic banking 
concessions that allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to expand by using external financing 
and gain economic power over other groups (Melvill, 2002: 7; Warburg, 2003: 159). 
After 1979 Nimeiri’s actions became increasingly compromised by his health and upon 
his return to Khartoum after surviving a second cardio-vascular surgery in 1982, he 
became obsessed with completing his Islamic vision for Sudan (Collins, 2008: 146). By 
this time Turabi was exercising wide powers and to some had become “the real 
president”.322     
 
Initially the inclination towards the West was not incompatible with Islamization. This 
view was facilitated by the regime’s relationship above all with Western supported 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which, like Sudan, used strategies of extraversion to obtain 
                                                 
321
 Turabi used a network of contacts with individuals and organizations in the Arabian Peninsula to gain 
support fro the Muslim Brothers, also counting on diaspora financing. Later the movement was able to 
control financial flows and dominate the Islamic financial system implemented in Sudan, extending its 
influence by providing employment, creating Islamist middle and higher class, appealing to the poor 
through charitable and civil society organizations, and elaborating patronage system that allowed 
infiltration into the state machinery. See i.e. Musso (2009).   
322
 According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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external resources to remain in power. This allowed a more advantageous climate for 
domestic Islamic resurgence in the northern provinces, supported also by the U.S. in the 
Middle East as a counterforce to communism. Nimeiri became convinced that the 
survival of his regime depended on Western and Arab patrons. This owes largely to the 
fact that Sudan was on the brink of bankruptcy due to its deteriorating domestic 
economic conditions, which worsened in the international context of a petroleum crisis, 
leading to the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves to negative S£53 million by July 
1977, mass unemployment, inflation, and inadequate supplies of basic commodities 
such as bread, sugar and fuel (Legum and Lee, 1979: 127; Yohannes, 1997: 311).  As a 
result, Nimeiri adopted opportunist rhetoric to extravert political and economic support 
by exaggerating the Soviet, Libyan, and Ethiopian threat.      
 
The U.S. administration sought to keep Sudan in the Western camp. This position, 
which overlooked the murder of two American diplomats in 1977,323 was motivated in 
part by the threat Libya posed to Western interests in the region, the unreliability of 
Ethiopia in the long term, and Nimeiri’s negotiations for a release of captured 
Americans by the Eritreans (Yohannes, 1997: 305). Secondly, oil prospecting in Sudan 
had intensified in the early 1970s, with the U.S. company Chevron forwarding a 
payment of US$1 billion to secure a contract over a large area in 1974, and other 
American enterprises having invested heavily in the country. Finally, a policy envisaged 
to convert Sudan into a “breadbasket” of the Arab world also promised the U.S. 
companies an important commercial role (Yohannes, 1997: 305). All this resulted in 
Sudan becoming the focus of the U.S. policy in the Horn of Africa after the Ethiopian 
socialist revolution in 1974 (Yohannes, 1997: 305-6, 311). 
 
Sudan’s relations with Egypt were intimate. While Egypt’s military presence in Sudan 
helped to save Nimeiri from several coups, increasingly open economic arrangements 
                                                 
323
 However, in 1977 an incident again cooled the relationship momentarily. This was the abduction and 
assassination of a Belgian diplomat, the American Ambassador and his deputy in the Saudi Arabian 
Embassy by Black September branch of the Palestinian Liberation Organization during the first 
anniversary celebration of the Addis Ababa Agreement attended by Selassie, which was understood as an 
expression of unenthusiastic Arab opinion about the peace agreement and an attempt to undermine the 
Sudan-U.S. relations (Alier, 1990: 145, 154; Yohannes, 1997: 304; Akol, 2007: 139). Black September 
executed the hostages after the U.S. government refused to negotiate the release of Palestinians in 
captivity (Yohannes, 1997: 304). Nimeiri promised to deal with the situation but commuted the imposed 
life sentences of the captured aggressors to seven years in prison after which they were handed to PLO to 
be punished (Yohannes, 1997: 305). This severed U.S.-Sudan relations momentarily and the American 
aid to Sudan was suspended for a brief period (Yohannes, 1997: 305). 
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followed and were formalized through a program of political and economic cooperation 
signed in February 1974 and a defense treaty concluded in 1977 (Holt and Daly, 2000: 
175-6). In 1979-80, Sudan boycotted Egypt’s decision to offer Nile water to Israel for 
irrigating Negev desert, but had to renew its commitment in 1981 to continue the joint 
effort to curb Libyan encroachment in Chad and Darfur by consolidating its union with 
Egypt (Khalid, 1990: 326; Jendia, 2002: 122). This alliance reached as far as an October 
1982 Integration Charter, which dictated the founding of a number of joint institutions, 
such as the Higher Council and the Nile Valley Parliament (Holt and Daly, 2000: 176; 
Jendia, 2002: 122-3). However, the countries never integrated.   
 
Similarly, Sudan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia improved after it parted from the 
communist path. The Western oriented Saudis perceived Sudan as strategically 
important to counter Soviet influenced Ethiopia but feared the weakening of the regime 
and encouraged Nimeiri to reconcile with the exiled political parties that had the Saudi 
monarchy’s sympathy. This was in part due to cultural affinity and the relationship with 
the Arab-Muslim sectarian movements. Khatmiyyah originated in Saudi Arabia and the 
Mahdist movement was considered in some circles as a guardian of Arab culture and 
Islamic values in Sudan. In addition, Saudi pro-Islamist supporters funneled financing 
for the Muslim Brothers particularly after they assumed control of the Islamic banking 
sector in Sudan. In the end, by the mid-1970s, both Egypt’s military and Saudi Arabia’s 
economic support were indispensable to the weakening Sudanese government that was 
ruling in deteriorating economic conditions.  
 
However, Sudan’s relationship with a number of its other regional neighbors worsened 
after the signing of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement and the later change in foreign 
policy. Its relationships with both Libya and Ethiopia, the staunchest collaborators of 
the Soviet Union in the region during the 1970s, deteriorated. In the case of Libya, 
Qadhafi was personally disappointed with Nimeiri’s move to negotiate peace with 
Sudan’s southern rebels and distance Sudan from the Tripoli Charter. Together with 
Sudan’s inclination towards Egypt and the West, this provided an incentive for Libya to 
support Sudanese dissidents and undermine Nimeiri by accelerating activity in Darfur in 
relation its war against Chad (Jendia, 2002: 124-5). In addition, more and more 
threatened by deepening collaboration between Western supported Egypt and Sudan, 
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Qadhafi formed a Tripartite Alliance with Soviet-backed Ethiopia and South Yemen in 
August 1981. The Soviet influenced alliance formed part of a larger strategy through 
which the U.S.S.R. sought to challenge pro-Western Khartoum and consolidate its geo-
political control south of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea shipping passage extending to 
the Indian Ocean (Eprile, 1974: 115-7; Jendia, 2002: 117).        
 
Moreover, in the course of 1970s the war in Chad became more complex. It included 
Soviet-backed Libya, U.S.-supported Egypt and Sudan, and the old colonial master, 
France. In 1975 Tombalbaye was killed in a coup executed by General Felix Malloum 
and by the mid-1970s the principal warring parties had disintegrated into a number of 
factional armies. However, the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT) 
continued to be the main rebel force although even it had not been able escape 
factionalism, which resulted in Egypt and Sudan supporting Hissene Habre and Libya 
backing Goukouni Oueddi. In 1979, Oueddi deposed Malloum and established a 
Government of National Unity until the resurgence of war in 1981 brought Habre to 
power when he conquered N’Djamena in July 1982. The war dragged on and its 
repercussions were felt on Sudanese soil, particularly in Darfur, as a Libyan threat to 
Nimeiri. 
 
The Addis Ababa Agreement had been a high point of Sudan’s relationship with 
Ethiopia in the early 1970s which culminated in the demarcation of a frontier between 
the two states and Kenya. However, Khartoum’s continuing support to the Eritrean 
rebels in Sudan soured relations particularly after the Marxist regime of Mengistu Haile 
Mariam assumed power in Ethiopia (Turner, 1998: 204; Jendia, 2002: 115). While the 
increasingly Islamic agenda and facilitation of support of the Arab League states to 
Eritrea, which was considered as a bulwark of Arabism and Islamic faith, continued to 
play a role particularly from the latter 1970s, the ethnic and cultural ties of eastern 
Sudanese communities with Eritreans were also a factor (Turner, 1998: 204; Chan and 
Zuor, 2006: 59). In return, by 1976 Ethiopia had began supporting residual Anya Nya II 
groupings based in Ethiopia’s western border and which had not accepted the Addis 
Ababa treaty, demanding secession and causing instability in southern Sudan 
(Rolandsen, 2005: 26; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 59).324 This became an important element 
                                                 
324
 Some Anya Nya stayed out of the peace treaty and did not return to Sudan (Interview with mid-
ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala). 
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in the conflict formation process in the early 1980s because Ethiopia provided a 
potential support base and a sanctuary for southern insurgents. 
 
Sudan-Uganda relations during the decade of 1970s were relatively turbulent. In 1971, 
Amin had seized power from Obote with the support of approximately 500 Anya Nya 
and other soldiers, many summoned from ethnic groups overlapping into northern 
Uganda and Sudan’s Equatoria province. Amin’s shifting from an alliance with Israel 
towards Libya favored the Addis Ababa Agreement and the establishment of a 
relationship of mutual tolerance between Khartoum and Kampala throughout the 1970s 
as Nimeiri personally preferred Amin to Obote (Adefuye, 1985: 64; Jendia, 2002: 119).  
 
Although the massive task of the repatriation of Sudanese refugees, which totaled 
500,000, in the neighboring countries, was already well underway, Amin’s downfall in 
1979 generated unprecedented refugee flows from Uganda into southern Sudan. 
Refugee numbers totaled 39,000 in 1979 and 80,000 in August 1981, elevating to an 
estimated 200,000 by the second half of 1983 when war in the southern Sudan 
reinitiated and again reversed the flow of refugees (Crisp and Ayling, 1985: 3; Musa, 
1988: 457; Jendia, 2002: 119). This affected Equatoria most heavily, where it strained 
agricultural and social resources, together with its ecosystem (Musa, 1988: 466). 
Refugees were also used for extraversion as the regimes sought external resources 
through humanitarian aid. Thus, mutual refugee situation along with overlapping ethnic 
boundaries in southern Sudan has bound a number of southern ethnic groups to the 
territories of the neighboring states.325 This exchange of refugees has featured strongly 
in Sudan’s relations with its neighbors in the south.  
 
Sudan’s turn towards the West also affected its economic orientation. After receiving 
news about deteriorating Soviet relations, the Americans quickly announced that Sudan 
was eligible for buying American military equipment, which led the way for Sudan to 
resume diplomatic ties with Washington in July 1972 (Jendia, 2002: 129). This resulted 
in a significant flow of American aid and paved way for a reversal of the nationalization 
policy in 1974, which in turn encouraged U.S. investment in the development of 
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 This is said to have been important factor in rebel support not only in the Anya Nya war but also 
during the later SPLM/A insurgency during which the rebel movement received logistical and material 
support in different degrees from the territories of Ethiopia, Uganda, Zaire (DRC), Kenya, and the CAR 
(Rapoport, 1996: 267). 
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financial and commercial infrastructure, communications, and mining activities (Jendia, 
130-1). In 1977 further economic and military support followed, and in 1981 Nimeiri 
allowed Americans to use Sudanese military bases and negotiated an arms contract after 
hearing about the Libyan Tripartite Alliance with Ethiopia and South Yemen (Jendia, 
2002: 131-2). Holt and Daly (2000: 175) note that “The perceived threat of Soviet-
backed regimes in Ethiopia and Libya, increasing dependence on Western and 
especially American Aid, and Nimeiri’s apparent belief in the domestic value of close 
American support, produced strong bilateral relations that lasted until the end of the 
regime”. By the early 1980s Sudan had become the second highest recipient of U.S. 
economic and military assistance in Africa after Egypt (Malwal, 1985: 25) 
 
In this context the socialist model for economic development was abandoned. Sudan 
reversed the nationalization and reverted to endorsing private ownership and external 
investment through collaboration with commercial and financial agencies, foreign 
governments, private companies, and international organizations (Niblock, 1987: 279; 
Collins, 2008: 117).326 
 
In addition, Khartoum sought to promote agricultural production for which Sudan had 
high potential. This attracted those Arab states seeking to secure future foreign food 
supply by investing in agriculture in Sudan, which came to be visualized as the 
“breadbasket” of the Middle East (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 118).327 In 
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 To demonstrate its goodwill towards a capitalist mode of production and to satisfy International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) stabilization requirements, including reducing public sector, trade liberalization, 
elimination of subsidies, policy against inflation, and devaluation, which it agreed to in exchange for an 
initial loan of US$24 million in 1972. The government returned a number of companies to their owners 
and passed legislation to protect private ownership, initially promulgating the 1972 Development and 
Promotion of Industrial Investment Act and 1974 Development and Encouragement of Industrial 
Investment Act (Elhassan, 1985: 153-7; Niblock, 1987: 279; Collins, 2008: 118). The transition from a 
socialist economy towards capitalism was embodied by the transformation of the previous development 
plans. The Five Year Industrial Development Plan undertaken in 1970 was transformed into two interim 
programs (1973-4 and 1976-7), and the S£2.7 billion Six Year Plan (1977-83) along IMF policy 
guidelines (Legum and Lee, 1979: 127; Niblock, 1987: 282; Collins, 2008: 119). However, the ambitious 
plan, which was to draw S£1.8 billion from foreign sources, required seizing Arab financing and 
implementation of Western technology, necessitating continuity in its new foreign policy orientation 
(Legum and Lee, 1979: 127; Yohannes, 1997: 312).  
327
 This was to be achieved by applying Western technology and Arab financing. At an Arab summit held 
in 1976, commitments were made towards this objective with a pledged US$700 million in agricultural 
aid during a 10 year period. Kuwait agreed to invest US$ 61 million, Saudi Arabia US$28 million, and 
the World Bank US$42 million to bring new land under cultivation, Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia 
donated US$10 million, and Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) lending another 
US$50 million, while joint American and Saudi investment financed a US$40 million cement factory to 
support development of infrastructure (Yohannes, 1997: 318; Jendia, 2002: 140). According to the 
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1972 promises for significant Arab financial flows began to arrive. The United Arab 
Emirates donated US$1 million as rehabilitation funds for southern Sudan, and the 
following year the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) 
announced significant financing for irrigation projects and the Arab Fund for Economic 
and Social Development agreed on an investment of US$ 6 billion to cover the first ten 
years of Sudan’s projected 25-year program (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Jendia, 2002: 
139-40; Collins, 2008: 119). After “national” reconciliation and when Muslim Brothers 
were appointed in prominent positions, relations with a number of Arab states improved 
even further (Jendia, 2002: 139).  
 
The state encouraged the financial flows towards Sudan deliberately as a strategy of 
obtaining resources through extraversion. The encouragement of investment in Sudan 
was seen as beneficial for the Arab states providing the financing, for the West 
providing the technology, and for Sudan for rapid economic development (Niblock, 
1987: 280). By the mid-1970s the business of development had converted into the main 
economic undertaking in the country with massive investment and expenditure.328 Plans 
were made for agricultural, industrial, infrastructure, transportation, and 
communications development, counting largely on investment from Arab states, the 
creation of new markets, modernization of production, eradication of internal instability 
through growth in food production, and overall revitalization of economy (Yohannes, 
1997: 318). Efforts were concentrated in north-central Sudan (Jendia, 2002: 141, 142; 
Collins, 2008: 119-20), where the Sudanese state persistently controlled by sectors of 
the Arabized elite is strongest.  
 
Still, despite generous external financing injecting unprecedented funds to Sudan by the 
latter 1970s, Sudan was in economic crisis.329 The soaring oil prices from the mid-1970s 
                                                                                                                                               
strategy, Sudan was to supply the Arab world with 42% of its vegetable oil, 58% of its basic food 
commodities, and 20% of its sugar by 1985 (Yohannes, 1997: 318).   
328
 The 1976 Development of Agricultural Investment Act aimed to attract foreign investment with 
diplomatic visit to the U.S. to encourage private investment in long-term agriculture and other projects for 
up to US$1.1 billion (Legum and Lee, 1979: 128; Niblock, 1987: 280-2; Yohannes, 1997: 312; Collins, 
2008: 118-9). Consequently, there was an increase in expenditure from £S278 million in 1972-3 to more 
than £S1 billion in 1976-7 (Niblock, 1987: 282).  
329
 This was in part because only a few of the major projects had finished on time, those completed could 
often not meet the planned levels of production, and neglect of the already existing agricultural and 
industrial projects led to decline of their production levels resulting in decreasing output (Niblock, 1987: 
283). In addition, by 1978 relentless borrowing had resulted in massive and increasing external debt, 
which alimented inflation, hindered the ability to acquire foreign inputs, and led to severe decline in 
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due to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) maneuvering to punish 
Western powers that had supported Israel in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War resulted in a 
global economic slump, which also hindered investments to Sudan (Niblock, 1987: 279; 
Collins, 2008: 118). The domestic effect of the financial crisis was a recession, which in 
turn had a direct effect in aggravating social grievances and generating strengthening 
opposition to the regime that culminated in the mid-1980s. This was largely because the 
increasingly bankrupt regime was unable to maintain its extensive neo-patrimonial 
clientelist networks buttressing Nimeiri’s power.   
 
The rapid economic decline provided an incentive for the government to turn to the 
international financial agencies for economic adjustment. Although the WB had 
previously refused to help Sudan financially due to its economic problems, in 1978 it 
agreed to provide support, which was followed by a deal with the IMF in May 1979 in 
exchange for austerity measures (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 153). The 
imposed export-led remedies included repeated devaluations, cuts to subsidies of 
consumer goods, further privatization to establish free market environment, and 
rehabilitation of neglected Gezira area to recover cotton production. The projects 
approved by the WB included live stock marketing, improvement of port facilities, 
mechanized farming, and agricultural research (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 
2008: 153; World Bank, 2008). This shows the political orientation of the international 
financial institutions aligned with the Western interests in case of Sudan. Yet, the 
austerity measures could not remedy the deteriorating economy, but rather deteriorated 
the situation as it weakened the state’s political control by imposing strict downsizing of 
the bureaucracy, subsidies, and services. This way, as the state lost control of its neo-
patrimonial support structures, the intervention of the international financial 
organizations contributed to Nimeiri’s eventual overthrow in April 1985.330  
                                                                                                                                               
Sudan’s exports (Collins, 2008: 153). The problems were compounded by low world prices of Sudan’s 
mostly agricultural exports, mismanagement, a thriving black market, and record levels of corruption that 
implicated Nimeiri’s closest financial advisers, such as Saudi businessman Adnan Khashoggi (Holt and 
Daly, 2000: 177; Collins, 2008: 126, 153). 
330
 In 1980 the regime decreed the Encouragement of Investment Act, but failure of the overall strategy 
could be attributed to an extent of deficient planning of overall development program and external factors 
such as oil crisis and emigration of labor to the Gulf States (Niblock, 1987: 279, 283, 285-6). The series 
of devaluations that raised the prices of imported goods and the drastic lowering of subsidies of basic 
commodities proved costly for the regime because it gradually lost control of the masses, facing 
continuous riots and demonstrations as of 1979, and which were an important ingredient in the process 
that led to the demise of the regime (Holt and Daly, 2000: 177, 179; Collins, 2008: 153-4). By April 1985 
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4. Implementation of Southern Autonomy 
 
This section deals with the political arrangements of the Addis Ababa Agreement and 
its implementation. It shows how the southern administration with inadequate funding 
faced insurmountable burden of successfully developing the region.  
 
     Addis Ababa Agreement Implementation 
 
After Alier’s appointment the implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement began. 
On 4 April 1972 Nimeiri issued a presidential order for appointing the Chairman and 
the Interim HEC and on 22 April the cabinet took the oath of office in Khartoum. Two 
days later Alier flew to Juba with 11 regional ministers, formerly known as 
commissioners, of which seven were returnees from exile and four from within Sudan331 
(Beshir, 1975; 112, 113; Alier, 1990: 128, 131; Madut-Arop, 2006: 22). The attempt 
was to include southern politicians both from ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ with two ministers 
from Bahr al-Ghazal, six from Equatoria, and four from Upper Nile including the 
president (Beshir, 1975: 112; Alier, 1990: 128). However, plagued by ethnic and 
personal rivalries, the autonomous government did not integrate traditional authorities 
or returning educated refugees into its structures, which generated protests (Beshir, 
1975: 112, Holt and Daly, 2000: 171; Collins, 2008: 112). It was also alleged by smaller 
groups and those dissatisfied that the Dinka (Alier) and the Equatorians (Lagu) had 
disproportionally high representation in the southern political institutions for having 
larger sections of mission educated individuals, and that the former SF and SSLM 
politicians and rebels were favored over other groups (Beshir, 1975: 112; Alier, 1990: 
129; Collins, 2008: 112). In addition, three southerners were appointed to the central 
government, Wol becoming the Minister of Planning, Bona Malwal the Minister of 
State of Information and Culture, and Samuel Lupai the Minister of state of Local 
                                                                                                                                               
when Nimeiry was overthrown, Sudan’s foreign debt was approximately US$13 billion with debt arrears 
to the IMF alone amounting to US$130-50 million (Warburg, 2003: 159). 
331
 The returning exiles (and their ministries) in the Interim HEC included Elia Lupe (Public Service and 
Labour), Mading de Garang (Information, Culture and Tourism), Gama Hassan (Agriculture and Animal 
Production), Michael Towili (Natural Resources and Rural Development), Joseph Oduho (Housing and 
Public Utilities), Ezboni Mundiri (Transport, Roads and Communications), and Michael Wal (HEC 
Affairs). Those appointed from within Sudan included Abel Alier (President) and Hilari Logale (Finance 
and Economic Planning), who had been prominent politicians in the banned SF, Samuel Aru Bol 
(Regional Administration), a skeptic of the peace agreement who only yielded to serve after been 
pressured by his constituents, Dr. Toby Maduot (Public Health) who had formed part of the banned 
SANU-inside, and Luigi Adwok (Education) who was independent (Beshir, 1975: 112;  Alier, 1990:128).  
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Government, which raised arguments about insufficient southern representation and 
counterarguments for the southerners getting more than they deserved (Beshir, 1975: 
112). Yet, as had been the case previously, all regime positions granted to southerners 
had limited influence and were designated to politicians who had no capacity to 
challenge the status quo power relations of the marginalizing state.  
 
Successively, the southern leadership designed and appointed the lower echelons of the 
regional administration.332 The organization of the local government was adopted from 
the persisting structure dating from the colonial period. According to Johnson (1998: 
67),  
This administrative structure, despite many re-namings of units and offices, 
remained essentially the same after independence and during the brief period of 
the southern Regional government (1972-83), with chiefs being supervised at the 
district level by local government officials, who reported to a civil administrator 
within the province or a region, who was in turn subordinate to the provincial 
commissioner/regional governor, a political appointee. 
By June 1972 the administration of the region had become completely southern (Beshir, 
1975: 133; Alier, 1990: 129-30). It is important to note that the administrative 
continuity and the groups in power with similar interests rising from the administrative 
context and related political and economic dynamics permitted a degree of continuity of 
colonial ruling structures and methods in the South. 
 
Initially after the agreement most of the southern region continued in a state of 
uncertainty. Many southerners had to be disarmed and integrated in the state security 
apparatus or civilian sector, more than 500,000 refugees were to be repatriated and 
another half a million internally displaced persons resettled, and many feared for their 
personal security in the absence of police force (Alier, 1990: 124-6).333 On 21-23 
February 1972, an international conference was held in Khartoum to extravert aid for 
                                                 
332
 In 1972, a number of senior administrative positions were filled such as two secretaries-general, nine 
ministerial positions, three provincial governorships, and five posts in security services, including Lagu’s 
appointment as Major-General, and regional police and prison commissioners and their assistants. Moses 
Chuol Juak (Upper Nile), Henry Bagho (Equatoria), and Ezekiel Kodi (Bahr al-Ghazal) were appointed as 
Commissioners of the three southern provinces with added responsibilities related to relief, resettlement 
and rehabilitation of social services, maintenance of security, and confidence-building in their respective 
provinces (Alier, 1990: 129; Akol, 2007: 314). 
333
 Alier took steps to ensure the security of the jallaba, believing that they played a role in the South as 
merchants, receiving returnees, and confidence building, but some left for the North (Alier, 1990: 132). 
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the returning southern refugees and internally displaced. Attended by the OAU, the 
U.N., NGOs, and observers from African and Arab countries, the conference stated its 
support for the government efforts and pledged emergency relief and resettlement and 
rehabilitation projects (Beshir, 1975: 106-7).334 Attempting to secure Sudan in the 
Western camp, the U.S. made US$22.45 million available for resettling and 
rehabilitation of 680,000 registered refugees mostly in Ethiopia (Yohannes, 1997: 304).  
 
A Resettlement Commission335 was established to oversee repatriation and 
rehabilitation. A Repatriation and Relief Commission was also constituted to transport 
refugees back to Sudan, while assisting the approximately 500,000 internally displaced 
(Beshir, 1975: 115-6; Alier, 1990: 133). The commission was given powers to work 
internationally together with the UNHCR and assisted by a number of NGOs336 (Beshir, 
1975: 115; Alier, 1990: 134; Collins, 2008: 112-3). In 1974, the emphasis was put on 
rehabilitation and resettlement to revive social services, such as education, health, and 
water, together with providing agricultural inputs, tools, technical assistance, and 
marketing and cooperative services for the returnees (Alier, 1990: 133; Akol, 2007: 
137). However, this was limited by the lack of resources and expertise, leading to 
renewed grievances oriented towards the central government and the southern political 
leadership.  
 
Still, despite repatriation and rehabilitation the overall results were slim. Reportedly 
more than 300,000 refugees went without benefit from the process and many, 
remembering the terror of war, preferred to stay with their ethnic kin in the neighboring 
states (Alier, 1990: 133). The internally displaced were encouraged to return as well 
from peace villages and other parts of the country (Collins, 2008: 113), as the regime 
                                                 
334
 The UNHCR pledged US$17.7 million for Sudan out of which only S£3 million were received from 
the OAU, the central government, a number of northern provinces, private sources, exile communities, 
NGOs, and states such as Qatar, Dubai, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Gabon, Somalia, Cameroon, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, Cyprus, Italy, the U.S., Britain, Egypt and Yugoslavia (Beshir, 1975: 116). 
335
 Chaired by Mboro, it received donations and supervised the administration of financial and technical 
assistance, being supported by the regime’s Special Fund, chaired by Mahmoud Beheiry and assisted by 
Peter Gatkwoth (Beshir, 1975: 115; Alier, 1990: 128-9; Akol, 2007: 137). It was assisted principally by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), UNCHR, 
the World Bank, World Health Organization, and foreign governments (Alier, 1990: 134; Akol, 2007: 
137). This allowed for extraversion of material support to the South, which overall remained limited. 
336
 These included the African Committee for the Relief of the Southern Sudanese, both German and 
Norwegian Church Aid, Oxfam, Lutheran World Service, the Catholic Relief Organization, Caritas, the 
World Council of Churches, Save the Children, and the Red Cross (Beshir, 1975: 115; Alier, 1990: 134; 
Collins, 2008: 112-3). 
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preferred to alleviate the population pressure that the internally displaced generated in 
Khartoum. Soon the number of returnees overwhelmed the repatriation effort sustained 
principally by external cooperation.337 These proved to be the main efforts to 
rehabilitate and develop the southern region during the autonomous period during which 
the regime concentrated on economic development in benefit of the northern 
provinces.338 The dynamics of the marginalizing state were at work to the extent that 
they continued to produce conditions in the South that maintained grievances. 
 
Moreover, the Addis Ababa Agreement’s Cease-Fire Protocol ensured the cessation of 
hostilities. Use of violence and provocative troop movements were forbidden and a 
Joint Cease-Fire Commission composed of equal representation and foreign observers 
was to be instituted to supervise the cease-fire, oversee repatriation and registration of 
returnees, inspect cease-fire violations and recommend action to contain them (Beshir, 
1975: 117; Alier, 1990: 135). The main regime and the SSLM representatives, Brigadier 
Abdel Latif Dahab and Colonel Frederick Maggot, had been enrolled in the Sudan 
Military College together and worked securing the cease-fire so that both parties agreed 
to discard almost all foreign observers (Alier, 1990: 135). Despite this, a number of 
incidents occurred in 1972-1974 that were contained before initiating hostilities.339  
 
As part of the peace treaty, the Temporary Arrangements for the Composition of the 
Units of the People’s Armed Forces in the Southern Region protocol called for 
recruitment of male southerners to the Army’s Southern Command. A Joint Military 
Commission constituted in April 1972 by presidential decree was to supervise the 
process of absorption into the Southern Command. It was to be composed of 6,000 
southern males to match 6,000 northern troops for a total of 12,000, whereas 4,500 
Anya Nya were to be recruited as police, prison wardens, and game scouts, and the rest 
                                                 
337
 UN agencies and engineers from Britain, West Germany, and the Netherlands, revived health 
infrastructure and services, building 16 bridges, and rehabilitating schools in which 113,230 children 
were enrolled in 1972-4 (Alier, 1990: 134-5). This was facilitated by Sudan’s Western orientation. 
338
 According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
339
 For instance, in September 1972 in Wau a northern police officer opened fire on a crowd. The civilian 
authorities responded by detaining all northern political officers, including the police commissioner, 
suspected of plotting against the peace agreement (Alier, 1990: 136). Moreover, in the context of growing 
tension among the absorbed Anya Nya over the military integration process, on 24 January 1974 in Wau, 
Chinese made grenades were thrown into a cinema, a bachelor mess, and a non-commissioned officers’ 
club mostly occupied by northerners killing one and injuring others, with the incident allegedly linked to 
the Anya Nya underground movement scheming against the peace treaty at Bussere camp (Alier, 1990: 
136; Madut-Arop, 2006: 26, 29). 
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placed in non-military occupations ranging from road construction, veterinary, and 
agricultural work (Beshir, 1975: 117; Awur, 1988: 65; Madut-Arop, 2006: 23-4). The 
Joint Military Commission stipulated the selection criteria, which included being 
member of the Anya Nya, academically sufficiently qualified, medical health, and 
willingness to continue as a soldier (Beshir, 1975: 117).340 Women were not recruited. 
The absorption process included training for the Anya Nya forces to match their 
northern counterparts to guarantee the safety of the southerners, and while the protocol 
did not specify that the southern recruits were to be Anya Nya, Lagu had settled this 
with Alier. The Joint Military Commission recommended a two-stage process, the 
absorption of the former Anya Nya in the army structures as units and following 
integration, through which its organization would be gradually dismantled (Beshir, 
1975: 118-9). 
 
The Anya Nya absorption and integration were gradual intertwined processes faced with 
the difficulty of uniting former enemies. The warring parties continued to be suspicious 
of each other at an individual and collective level and the Anya Nya remained wary of 
situations that would expose them to the northern forces. According to the HEC the 
process, partitioned to several stages341, was to be completed by 3 March 1977, within 
five years time from the signing of the Addis Ababa Accord (Awur, 1988: 69, 79; Alier, 
1990: 148).342 The integration process was also problematic due to the negative views 
of some northerners about the incorporation, corresponding perceptions among the 
Anya Nya, the lack of Anya Nya cohesion and training, suspicion and rumors,343 lack of 
                                                 
340
 The recruitment process was intended to function in equal terms allocating 2,000 troop and more than 
200 officer positions together with 1,500 police and prison forces posts for each of the three southern 
provinces (Beshir, 1975: 117; Alier, 1990: 138). According to Beshir (1975: 118), 1 Major-General 
(Lagu), 4 Colonels, 7 Lt. Colonels, 18 Majors, 57 captains, 48 Lieutenants, and 66 Second Lieutenants of 
the former Anya Nya were absorbed. In the end, out of 15,832 aspirants, 6,079 entered the army, 1,860 in 
the police and prison services, and 5,489 to work in civil administration, 2,414 medically unfit were 
recommended for work in the public administration (Beshir, 1975: 117). 
341
 The plan included several phases of which the first (May 1973 - June 1974) consisted of increasing the 
administrative and technical capability of the absorbed Anya Nya through selection for specialized 
training to match their northern counterparts (Awur, 1988: 68; Alier, 1990: 151; Collins, 2008: 114). The 
next stages (June 1974 -November 1975) concentrated on internal integration of the absorbed Anya Nya 
and consecutively to form mixed troops with northern units (Awur, 1988: 68; Alier, 1990: 152). Finally, 
the fourth stage aimed to complete the Southern Command as a fully integrated and functioning force in 
the structure of the army, allowing a possibility for Nimeiri as the Supreme Commander of the People’s 
Armed Forces to transfer the absorbed Anya Nya anywhere in the country with a recommendation of the 
President of the HEC (Awur, 1988: 68; Alier, 1990: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 25-6). 
342
 The Regional Assembly had the right to recommend an extension to this for the president of the 
regime. 
343
 This is an important element resulting from suspicion and mistrust, which is a powerful tool for 
mobilization if adopted and extended through rumors and other strategies in an organized manner. While 
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logistical and housing capacity for large-scale troop movements, adjustment of rank, 
seniority, replacement of personal armament, and rules of promotions affecting the 
absorbed Anya Nya officers. Some had to settle for non-military occupations perceived 
as less prestigious (Alier, 1990: 148-50; Madut-Arop, 2006: 24; Collins, 2008: 113), 
which contributed to a generalized resentment and came to be considered as a deliberate 
government policy on the part of many Anya Nya members and civilians (Kulusika, 
1998: 103).   
 
The incorporation of the former rebels to the army was a contentious issue. Since the 
army’s rank and file was mostly composed of western Sudanese (Darfurians) under 
orders of Arabized riverine, principally Shaiqiyyah, officer corps, it was hardly an 
unbiased representation of the national ethnic plurality (Collins, 2008: 113). This made 
the process difficult to accept by the northern officers with some resigning in protest,344 
while others interpreted the arrangement only as temporary and considered that after 
five years the influence of the Anya Nya would fade due to troop transfers, dismissals, 
and retirement (Alier, 1990: 148; Collins, 2008: 113). In fact, the regime did design a 
covert policy to demote, retire, and lay off senior ex-rebel officers to remove the 
movement’s power centers, which caused resentment and contributed to their secret 
anti-regime mobilization in the course of the 1970s (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 35). This led 
to a reconstruction of grievances within the southern military. 
 
There were also varying interpretations of the integration process in the South. Some 
ex-rebels and southern civilians returning from exile considered the five-year period as 
time dedicated for training in separate units before the integration, while others 
perceived the arrangement as consisting of two separate parallel armed forces (Alier, 
1990: 149). Both views originated from a sentiment that full integration would be 
dangerous for southern regional integrity and should be resisted (Alier, 1990: 149). This 
was despite of Alier reiterating that the HEC policy stipulated full integration within 
five years (Awur, 1988: 69, 79). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
rumors were an integral part of this kind of mobilization for the southern disturbances in 1955, there are 
other situations in Sudan in which rumors have generated indiscipline but not led to organized armed 
opposition precisely because they have not been part of a systematic orchestrated mobilization effort.  
344
 There were a number of arguments against the Anya Nya integration, including lower efficiency and 
non-recognition of the special treatment of the South, which hindered the integration further.      
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Other security issues related to absorption also became problematic. These were the 
question of personal armament, the army’s rules over promotions, the material rewards 
of absorption, and, possibly above all, sentiments of suspicion and imposed inferiority 
among the absorbed ex-rebels.345 These led to explosive outbursts of emotions that were 
tantamount to the sentiments that contributed to instability among the military in the 
South.   
 
The absorption was organized by assembling the Anya Nya of each province into 
specific camps. Despite the general enthusiasm some officers slowed down the process 
deliberately.346 Such efforts to postpone the absorption of the troops under their 
commands should be viewed also in the context of stated opposition to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. These actions by the ex-Anya Nya officers may have been linked to the loss 
of regional political and economic power to the southern politicians after the peace 
treaty. Yet, by September 1972 the absorption had been completed and by May-July 
1973 the training of selected Anya Nya troops had been completed to promote a sense 
of security, strengthening Nimeiri’s position even before he had announced the formal 
integration plan (Alier, 1990: 148-151; Collins, 2008: 113-4). This points to Alier’s 
ambiguous role due to his close relationship with Nimeiri, but also presenting himself as 
an advocator of southern rights through unionist approach. Indeed, southern opinion 
about Nimeiri was divided.347 
 
                                                 
345
 First, during the process the personal weapons of the ex-Anya Nya had to be replaced, but many 
refused to exchange their arms for what were considered inferior Chinese produced weapons, while the 
ex-rebels expected compensation for their weapons they considered personal property (Alier, 1990: 151-
2). Many also insisted on keeping their personal arms, which were consequently licensed, while the ex-
rebels left outside state’s security apparatus were disarmed through a financial compensation scheme for 
which a special budget was provided (Alier, 1990: 152). Second, a dispute over the rules of promotions of 
non-commissioned officers became a contentious issue. They were not allowed to rise to higher ranks, 
which resulted in some ex-Anya Nya officers threatening head back to the bush in 1976, and 
simultaneously the southerners’ admission to the Military College was deliberately scaled down to 5% 
from the promised 1/3 in 1974-82 (Alier, 1990: 150; Collins, 2008: 139). Third, some were dissatisfied 
due to the lack of material rewards after being absorbed, while suspicion of being eliminated and an 
inferiority complex due to lower education, training, and experience relative to the army troops, translated 
into occasional defensive and violent outbursts (Alier, 1990: 242; Collins, 2008: 139). 
346
 For instance, at Malek camp near Bor in Upper Nile the Technical Committee of Absorption headed 
by Brigadier Mirghani Suleiman faced an adamant Captain John Garang who stated over his commanding 
officer that the troops in the province were not ready for absorption, only having to yield to the absorption 
in August 1972 (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 23). 
347
 According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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Still, some ex-Anya Nya officers continued to hinder the process.348 Their attitudes 
show the general feeling among the absorbed ex-Anya Nya and many civilians in the 
South who were suspicious, mistrustful, and feared a possible change of regime since it 
appeared to the southerners that Nimeiri had brought the war to an end contrary to what 
had been the general northern attitude towards the South since 1956 (Awur, 1988: 73). 
 
The following integration phase proved more explosive. It aimed to incorporate the ex-
Anya Nya first by uniting ex-rebel provincial commands by mixing individual or 
smaller detachments of former rebels, and then incorporating them into the army 
structures (Awur, 1988: 57). As part of the planned integration the regime established a 
covert program to send senior ex-rebel officers abroad or other branches of the armed 
forces for training, after which detached from their original units they were placed 
elsewhere (Awur, 1988: 69-70; Madut-Arop, 2006: 24).349 After this, their units would 
be transferred350 or dismantled, but by the end of 1973 this had raised unprecedented 
tension. This led Lagu and Alier to tour garrisons and clarify the integration plan and to 
write documents to diffuse tension (Madut-Arop, 2006: 25-6). They recognized that 
non-confidence was not limited to ex-rebels but was a generalized sentiment that 
resembled the overall political situation, and that northern officers in the South should 
be made feel more comfortable, banned from socializing exclusively with the jallaba, 
and isolated from corrupting rumors (Awur, 1988: 74-5). By identifying these and other 
                                                 
348
 For instance in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile, Major Magaya, a member of the commission, reported 
a number of difficulties in selecting forces for the Support Arms and Services department because of 
inability to convince the commanding officers of allowing integration. In Malek near Bor, the 
commission representatives faced Major William who would not allow the process without orders from 
the provincial command in Malakal despite the Technical Commission’s mandate from Juba (Awur, 
1988: 71). At Malou garrison near Rumbek the reception of the members of commission by some of the 
officers was hostile and aggressive, which thwarted the effort to initiate the process (Awur, 1988: 72). 
The next garrison where the initiation of integration was attempted was in Bussere south of Wau, but it 
was problematized again by the commanding officer, Joseph Kuol, who responded that no one person, 
even Lagu, had the right to decide the faith of the South alone, that he unilaterally rejected the plan 
because it was against the Addis Ababa Agreement, and that the proposed integration at battalion instead 
of brigade level was unacceptable because it would assimilate the Anya Nya into the army structures, that 
the troops should remain separate for the five year period, and that Lagu should come in person to explain 
the integration instead of sending lower rank officers to do the job (quoted in Awur, 1988: 72).   
349
 This separation targeted particularly the officers resisting integration from their original units, such as 
John Garang, the future leader of the SPLM/A, who was first transferred to Bor and Khartoum and then 
sent to study in the U.S. while others were sent to Great Britain, Egypt, Pakistan, Cyprus or India (Alier, 
1990: 151; Madut-Arop, 2006: 26-7; Collins, 2008: 114). 
350
 Any mention of transfer to the North raised tensions among the absorbed ex-rebels because many were 
told about the 1955 events when the mutineers had been persuaded to return, disarmed, and reportedly 
later killed (Awur, 1988: 70). Yet, very few individual Anya Nya soldiers dared to question the process, 
fearing a transfer to the North, while the ex-rebels in Bahr al-Ghazal tended to be afraid of moving 
individually and continued to sing Anya Nya war songs against “Arabs” (Madut-Arop, 2006: 25, 26). 
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factors Lagu demonstrated his ability to observe the situation beyond the scope of a 
southern viewpoint and indicate the need for cultural sensitivity by the northern officers 
and officials whose behavior in the South was often influenced by the jallaba.351 Still, 
despite widespread suspicion the first phase of the integration was completed by 
persuasion and threats disciplinary measures if orders were not obeyed (Awur, 1988: 
76-7).  
 
However, by 1973 this had caused growing fear. Consumed by suspicion and mistrust, 
the absorbed battalion in western Juba refused to move to a new location between the 
Juba General Army Headquarters and the Nile River, which in the case of resumption of 
hostilities would prevent them from taking refuge in the bush (Madut-Arop, 2006: 28). 
At around this time, Garang appeared in Bussere, the cradle of the early disobedience 
led by aggrieved ex-Anya Nya, and took the leadership of an underground movement of 
officers in opposition to the Addis Ababa Agreement.352 They portrayed themselves as 
the protectors of southern interests, seeking to remain alert to resume war in case of a 
coup against Nimeiri that would undermine the agreement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 25, 27, 
28).   
 
This sense of insecurity was exacerbated by the circulating rumors and matched by 
discontent over the integration process. As a result, in the Bussere camp, which had 
converted itself into one of the centers of discontent, Lagu was ill-received and mocked 
as a traitor, which made him respond that the troops were nothing but a Dinka tribal 
army (Madut-Arop, 2006: 26). Two weeks later, a delegation was sent from Khartoum 
to arrest John Garang, alleged leader of an underground resistance movement, but it had 
to return empty-handed when the officers threatened to revolt if Garang was detained 
                                                 
351
 As Awur (1988: 76) notes, 
These jallaba have contributed considerably to the problem of the southern Sudan. They do not 
behave as the citizens in a part of their country, but as “settlers”, and therefore think that the 
Northern government – represented in the army – is there to “protect” them. They are the first to 
invite newly transferred Northern Officers (or any other government officials) to their homes and 
tell them imaginary things and advise them how they should behave towards the local people. I 
have observed a good number of Northern Officers and officials who for the first two weeks in a 
town of the South and before coming into contact with these jallaba have behaved and 
considered themselves as Sudanese and just as the locals, but after meeting with jallaba, changed 
their behavior completely and adopted colonial attitudes. 
352
 This included Lt. Col. Alfred Deng, Lt. Col. Joseph Kuol Amuom, Maj. Stephen Madut Baak, Maj. 
Albino Akol Akol, Maj. Thomas Dhol, Maj. Santino Ajing Dau, and various junior level officers (Madut-
Arop, 2006: 25). According to John Garang, “ . . . we were in frequent contact . . . [and] . . . active. We 
were even engaged in sabotage activities in places like Wau, Malakal and other places. We were active 
during the ten years between 1972-1982 planning to launch the Peoples Revolution” (Heritage, 1987a). 
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(Madut-Arop, 2006: 26). This event, together with the abovementioned 1974 grenade 
incident in Wau, led to the reorganization of the ex-rebels at platoon, company, and 
battalion levels.353 
 
The policy allocating civil service positions was also designed to respect the regional 
composition of the southern region. However, the allocation of positions was plagued 
by favoritism, personalized politics for self-gain, and corruption. From the start it 
generated inter-ethnic and inter-regional competition and tension, which characterized 
the southern regional government and was favored by the national regime. It should be 
noted that the militarization of society in the South during the conflict emphasized 
soldier and military status, exceeding civil administration and other employment as 
secondary.354    
 
In addition, the Interim HEC had to engage the ex-rebels who did not qualify to be 
integrated into the security apparatus. Yet, the regional government had limited 
resources to employ the majority of the remaining ex-Anya Nya due to financial 
dependency on the regime.355 The regime special fund for southern rehabilitation ran 
out already in 1974 after which Khartoum preferred to employ southerners as low-cost 
manual labor in agro-industrial sugar schemes in the northern provinces, which the 
Interim HEC declined (Alier, 1990: 143). Instead, the HEC suggested implementation 
of two sugar schemes in the Kenaf in the South, which the regime rejected as it 
concentrated economic and technical resources on agricultural projects in the central 
Sudan (Alier, 1990: 143). When potential for local employment was not realized, many 
ex-rebels became unemployed and approximately 3,500 were equipped and directed for 
                                                 
353
 This led to the formation of battalions Aweil 110, Rumbek 111, Wau 103, Malakal 104, Bor 105, Juba 
116, and Torit and Kapoeta 117, and the abolition of the defiant Bussere camp by integrating its forces 
into battalions 103, 110, 111, and 113, the latter in Wau. Garang was transferred to Bor then to Khartoum, 
and sent to pursue training and doctoral studies in the U.S. Other officers, such as Lt. Col. Stephen Madut 
Baak, were either sent to the North or spread among other battalions (Madut-Arop, 2006: 26-7, 29). In the 
process, lack of confidence and suspicion continued to generate resistance towards internal integration. 
Individual battalions were transferred between regions, which was resisted because it was considered by 
some soldiers as a part of a plan to move southern units to the North but this was only occasionally 
achieved, as between Kapoeta and Rumbek, where troops were interchanged (Awur, 1988: 77-8). 
354
 See Alier (1990: 143, 152) evidence for this. 
355
 Short-term labor intensive projects and occupation in the forestry department, construction, 
rehabilitation, wildlife department as game scouts, local administration, agriculture, fisheries, roads, 
resettlement, and traditional farming was offered (Alier, 1990: 139, 143; Akol, 2007: 138; Collins, 2008: 
114). Bilateral projects funded by the Overseas Development Agency, the World Bank, governments of 
West Germany and the Netherlands, the European Economic Community, and USAID also employed ex-
Anya Nya personnel (Alier, 1990: 143).  
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farming, which many of them resented because government posts, particularly in the 
army, were generally preferred over farming and trade (Alier, 1990: 143-4; Collins, 
2008: 114). This left a pool of aggrieved southerners for potential political mobilization. 
 
5. Southern Regional Politics 
 
This section emphasizes the politics during the first and second southern regional 
assemblies. It shows how the political situation grew increasingly divisive due to the 
context in which ethnic and personalized agendas became dominant.  
 
     First Southern Regional Assembly, December 1973-December 1977 
 
The Interim HEC had laid a base for the first ordinary regional assembly. Its last 
mission was to prepare and conduct elections of the People’s Regional Assembly no 
later than 18 months after it was formed. It did this first by instituting an Election 
Commission in September 1973, and then undertaking democratic election in October-
November 1973 (Beshir, 1975: 113-4; Akol, 2007: 138-9; Collins, 2008: 114). Out of 
the allotted 60 seats 30 were for the elected southern representatives of the SSU and 30 
regional: 11 for Bahr al-Ghazal, 10 for Equatoria, and 9 for Upper Nile (Beshir, 1975: 
114). Alier’s constituency of the former SF and Lagu’s SSLM politicians gained a 
majority (Beshir, 1975: 115). 
 
However, tensions emerged in the first seating of the Regional Assembly. In December 
1973 Nimeiri appointed Alier as the sole SSU candidate for the HEC presidency, thus 
violating the Addis Ababa Agreement, now part of the 1973 permanent constitution, 
which stated that the People’s Regional Assembly was to recommend a candidate for 
the HEC presidency to the president of the central government who would then appoint 
him (Akol, 2007: 139, 148; Collins, 2008: 115). While this move renewed Alier’s term 
in office,356 it contradicted the constitution and set a precedent for Nimeiri’s numerous 
interventions in the southern affairs, undermining the regional administration. This 
                                                 
356
 Alier was confirmed as the president of the HEC through a vote, but in fact this was just a formality 
since the relevant members of the assembly had already met previously as the SSU representatives, giving 
full support to Alier who was the only candidate (Akol, 2007: 140). 
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shows that the regional political arrangement was insufficient to transform the dynamics 
and the logic of the marginalizing state. 
 
The first Regional Assembly was the only one to serve a full four-year term. It checked 
the HEC, which was often accused of corruption and using the security apparatus to 
curb opposition (Akol, 2007: 140; Collins, 2008: 115).357 Among the principal issues 
faced by the first regional assembly was the military integration process. While the 
grouping of absorbed ex-rebel units at provincial level was less problematic, inter-
provincial unification proved more difficult.  
 
By 1974, the government accelerated and widened the process of integration with a 
view to completing the program within the agreed five-year period. In fact, the southern 
political leadership in Juba accepted the policy of speedy integration pushed by the 
regime, and was aware of it involving troop transfers (Akol, 2007: 148). Such deadlines 
were contrary to the belief of many southerners (Awur, 1988: 78), and the accelerated 
process faced growing resistance that led to violent confrontations, such as in Juba in 
December 1974358 and February 1977, Akobo in March 1975, Kapoeta-Rumbek in 
January 1976, and Wau in February 1976, triggered often by soldiers’ fears of being 
transferred to North or rumors of being attacked by northern troops (Alier, 1990: 152; 
Chan and Zuor, 2006: 35; Akol, 2007: 142; Collins, 2008: 114). However, these 
uprisings were generally related to frustrations and not well-organized.359  
 
                                                 
357
 According to Collins (2008: 114-5),  
During its four-year term the Assembly was characterized by lively debates, feeble 
understanding of parliamentary procedure, and motions of censure frequently proposed for no 
other reason than personal vindictiveness. Nevertheless, the Assembly passed mundane 
legislation without which the Regional Government could not function, and resolved serious and 
potentially explosive issues over the safety of southerners sent north for training, and charges of 
corruption over a large purchase of educational materials which precipitated heated charges and 
counter-charges that nearly dissolved the Regional Assembly before the matter was peacefully 
defused. The contentious question of the language of instruction in schools was satisfactorily 
settled by instruction in the vernacular languages, English, and Arabic in an ascending level of 
the educational ladder. 
358
 The first politically threatening incident took place in Juba in December 1974 when an absorbed ex-
Anya Nya Battalion 116 was ordered to move according to the integration policy. The soldiers disobeyed 
fearing that the transfer would lead them into a trap and expose them to possible northern aggression. 
They detained and beat their commanding also ex-rebel officer Peter Cirillo, because he had accepted the 
integration (Awur, 1988: 78; Alier, 1990: 153; Kulusika, 1998. 103; Madut-Arop, 2006: 28). Defying 
their threat to execute the officer if someone came to his rescue, Alier, the president of the HEC, entered 
the barracks and liberated him personally (Awur, 1988: 78; Madut-Arop, 2006: 28).  
359
 According an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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From 1975 on, a number of more severe incidents took place. For instance, on 2 March 
1975 prior to Unity Day celebrations in Akobo, a number of former Anya Nya soldiers 
and officers of the garrison staged a mutiny.360 According to Madut-Arop (2006: 29),  
The Akobo troops were reportedly acting on the rumour that a contingent of 
Northern Sudanese troops was on its way to disarm them before they would 
subsequently be transferred to Northern Sudan . . . [and] . . . the mutineers were 
hoping that their move would have sparked a mutiny all over the south to mark 
the return of the war for total independence of the South Sudan . . . 
Many of them eventually surrendered after being subjected to intense diplomatic 
persuasion by both regional and national authorities, and were subsequently arrested 
and executed (Alier, 1990: 154-5; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). However, some escaped to 
Ethiopia and became part of the armed groups of Anya Nya II operating in eastern 
southern Sudan.361 Whereas the main Anya Nya II military organization consisted 
principally of the Nuer, other armed groups calling themselves Anya Nya II also 
emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Bentiu, Fangak, Akoka, and northern Bahr 
                                                 
360
 They killed Colonel Abel Chol, who had been given orders to implement integration by joining the 
absorbed Anya Nya with army forces, along with seven recently integrated northern soldiers, and injured 
permanently Captain Philip Dok and others, when they went to reason with the mutineers who sealed off 
the town and held the barracks for five days (Nile Mirror, 1975; Alier, 1990: 154; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). 
361
 For instance, Lieutenants Vincent Kuany Latjor and Benson Kur, and Corporal James Bol Kur 
Alangjok managed to escape to Ethiopia with a reduced number of men and were sentenced to death in 
absentia (Alier, 1990: 155; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29; Akol, 2007: 142). These mutineers joined forces with 
other discontented former Anya Nya elements, some in Ethiopia, who had either never accepted the peace 
treaty or were disenchanted with it, forming Any Nya II and conducting scattered guerrilla activity in 
southern Sudan with Ethiopian (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 22; Akol, 2007: 169) and Libyan support. They 
also counted principally on Nuer refugees, other previously disarmed Anya Nya in Ethiopia, and students, 
politicians, such as Yong Kier, who had spread propaganda among the discontented ex-rebels with intent 
for them to desert and start another war for the complete liberation of the South (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 
21-2). These insurgents were heavily dependent on Ethiopia, which was eager to establish a rebel 
movement in southern Sudan. It sought to destabilize Nimeiri and convince him to end support for the 
Eritrean rebels by aiding insurgents in southern Sudan. This is why the deserters were immediately 
consulted in 1975 about their willingness to establish a guerrilla movement and with their approval five 
politicians in exile, among who were Muortat and Elia Aduang, were invited to Addis Ababa to form the 
rebel organization (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 22-3). Yet, Ethiopia was not interested to support a full-scale 
war that would lead to the disintegration of Sudan because of its own regional secessionist problems, but 
wanted to provide means for the southerners to wage limited “residual guerrilla warfare” with a limited 
scope that hardly destabilized the South until 1983 when a succession of larger scale mutinies took place 
(Johnson, 2003: 59-61). In order to hide their support and assert control over the rebel organization, the 
Ethiopians ordered the formation of the movement to be announced elsewhere, monopolized its support 
so that it could be withdrawn at any moment if there were a shift in policy, and insisted on operating the 
military camp in Bilpam where the rebels were based (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23). Consequently, the birth 
of the movement, whose short-lived political wing became known as the Anya Nya Patriotic Front, was 
announced in Nairobi where a BBC journalist labeled it as the Anya Nya II. Muortat became its president, 
assisted by Moses Malek Chol, while Aduang became the general secretary aided by Bol Kiir Diew (Chan 
and Zuor, 2006: 23; Akol, 2007: 169). 
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al-Ghazal.362 In essence, this was the beginning of organized insecurity that culminated 
in the second insurgency in southern Sudan.  
 
It is noteworthy that a pattern developed that in the cases of ex-Anya Nya disobedience, 
either the northern elements in the army in the South or regime officials often used force 
to crush the dissidents. This endangered the implementation of the agreement by 
provoking discontent leading to further mutinies, although initially personal 
interventions by Alier and Lagu helped to avoid escalating situations (Awur 1988: 79; 
Alier, 1990: 153-4, 155-7). Yet, incidents involving suspicion and fear of northern 
aspirations, provoked by some defiant ex-Anya Nya officers among their troops 
continued to occur in 1976 and 1977.363 In some of these, southern hard line politicians 
were implicated along with the military.364  These incidents are referred to as the most 
                                                 
362
 Most of these had no connection to the main Anya Nya II, some of them being essentially Dinka 
militias fighting against Baggara raiders (Madut-Arop, 2006: 64-5; Akol, 2007: 169). 
363
 In January 1976, the two companies of Kapoeta and Rumbek Anya Nya garrison were given orders to 
exchange forces. However, both were reluctant to obey commands, which again required Alier and Lagu 
to address the troops (Alier, 1990: 157-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). Due to rumors of conspiracy to send 
the Kapoeta troops to Khartoum to be disbanded or neutralized, the soldiers and their officers were in a 
mutinous mood roaming the streets, but the southern political and military leadership convinced them to 
accept the orders (Alier, 1990: 147, 158). Similar diplomacy was required when troop transfers took place 
from Aweil to Rumbek (Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). A month later, an incident occurred that required further 
action from the regional authorities. By that time many absorbed troops had become frustrated about the 
integration and were often aggressively instigating minor problems (Awur, 1988: 80). In connection to 
the earlier mutinous mood in Kapoeta and Rumbek, the desertion of troops that took place in February 
1976 among the Battalion 103 in and around Wau was part of a larger conspiracy to retake arms and also 
due to the personal preoccupation and disappointment of an absorbed officer Alfred Agwet Awan 
regarding his integration from Battalion 111 in Bor and not obtaining promotion like many colleagues of 
the same rank (Awur, 1988: 80; Alier, 1990: 159, 160; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). Having been transferred 
to Wau from Rumbek to be integrated into the northern army units, the troops camped in the center of the 
city and had to be convinced by the Commissioner of Province, Isaiah Kulang Mabor to move to the 
barracks, which they reluctantly did (Alier, 1990: 159). Agwet had proceeded with the plan prematurely. 
On 16 February he deserted with his troops, escaping to the bush outside Wau, believing that the former 
Anya Nya in the army, police, prisons and wildlife departments in the South would defect and join him, 
allegedly repelling a reconnaissance force sent after him (Awur, 1988: 80; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29-30). 
Again the army suggested pursuing and destroying the deserters, but the southern authorities, Kulang and 
Provincial Security Committee, agreed only to send a few volunteering officers to convince them to 
return (Alier, 1990: 160; Akol, 2007: 142). Yet, on 19 February Agwet had the negotiators, the police 
inspector Captain Bullen Kuca, the first cousin of Agwet, Brigadier Emmanuel Abbur, and Gabriel 
Abdalla Mabok shot. Agwet also killed Abbur himself after having explained his bitterness about having 
been excluded from higher officer cadre (Alier, 1990: 161; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30; Akol, 2007: 142). 
While Captain Lawrence Aleu along with some non-commissioned officers returned to Wau and deserters 
revealed the whereabouts of the majority of Agwet’s hidden arms, some men followed him to the CAR 
where Agwet was arrested months later, returned to Sudan, convicted, and executed along with five of his 
non-commissioned officers, and most of his troops were reintegrated (Awur, 1988: 80; Alier, 1990: 161-
2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30). Agwet’s execution generated tension among the absorbed forces in Aweil and 
Rumbek, which the regional authorities sought to diffuse (Madut-Arop, 2006: 30). 
364
 In 1976, a letter from the deputy speaker of the Regional Assembly, Benjamin Bol, in Wau to the 
minister of HEC, Joseph Oduho, in Juba and Malath Joseph Luet came to light, detailing a plan for a 
general desertion of the ex-Anya Nya, consisting of hiding their arms in the bush and proceeding to take 
refuge and engage in training in the neighboring countries, while preparing another full-scale rebellion 
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serious plan to retake the rebellion, involving southern hardliner separatist politicians, 
such as Bol and Oduho, along with absorbed junior officers. The events in January and 
February in Wau, Rumbek, and Kapoeta point to a plan in which the implicated 
southern politicians seem to have alimented the ex-Anya Nya junior army officials’ 
resentment and suspicion over integration and slow promotions, and fear among the ex-
rebels over the integration. This mobilization was directly linked to the reconstructed 
grievances manifested in the context of the re-polarizing “Arab”-“African” identities. 
 
The seriousness of the situation prompted Alier to attempt to diffuse tension by 
recommending measures to the regime. He suggested that that the integration process 
should focus on internal ex-Anya Nya integration first, only to be followed by their 
integration and transfer within the South before any attempt of moving them North 
(Madut-Arop, 2006: 30-1). However the regime, conditioned by the dynamics of the 
marginalizing state and the re-focused Arabized elite orientation, continued with its 
policy of neutralizing the Anya Nya. It transferred units to the North and retired former 
Anya Nya officers, applying similar measures to police, prisons, and wildlife 
departments, but had to leave the most resistant absorbed Battalions 103, 104, 105, 111, 
116, 117 intact (Madut-Arop, 2006: 31). This owed to their resistance and the regime’s 
effort to avoid further tensions.  
The integration coincided with other political developments that did not involve the 
military but affected the ex-Anya Nya and the civilians. Issues that added to generalized 
discontent included a 1977 military and integration agreement with Egypt that many 
                                                                                                                                               
(Alier, 1990: 160; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30). It became clear that Bol had specifically asked Oduho to 
prevent the intermixing of Anya Nya troops from Kapoeta to Rumbek, while he went to seek further 
support for the plan from retired Major Kawac Makwei, a member of he Regional Assembly, on leave in 
Aweil, whose help would have been essential because he enjoyed wide influence over ex-Anya Nya 
(Alier, 1990: 159, 160; Madut-Arop, 2006: 30). Consequently, both Bol and Oduho were detained briefly 
(Alier, 1990: 174). In yet another development on a February 1977 sections of the absorbed forces 
attacked unsuccessfully the Juba airport. The attack was repelled but, if successful, the plan would have 
included further maneuvers (Awur, 1988: 80). During the confrontation four northern soldiers were 
killed. The incident is considered an attempt to take power in the South and led to an arrest of Oduho and 
Peter A. Sule until December 1977 when they were pardoned as part of Nimeiri’s “national 
reconciliation” policy (Alier, 1990: 162, 174; Akol, 2007: 142). This incident was not only a 
manifestation of dissatisfaction regarding the integration but also allegedly linked through Philip Abbas 
Gaboush, a Nuba politician regarded in the South as northerner, to the northern NF factions that had 
attempted to depose Nimeiri the year before (Awur, 1988: 81; Akol, 2007: 149). Reportedly, Habbakuk 
Soro, and the members of Battalion 116 under his command, had responded to a letter circulated by two 
students from the University of Khartoum, Walter Kunijwok Ayoker and Lual Acuek, intended for all ex-
Anya Nya officers, and prisons, police, and wildlife personnel that a coup was to take place against 
Nimeiri and ex-rebels should be ready to act, but he and his men were persuaded back to barracks after 
reassurances that such conspiracy did not exist (Madut-Arop, 2006: 28-9). 
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southerners felt reaffirmed “Arab” ties and was thus oriented against them, and the 
growing competition among the southern politicians that undermined regional political 
unity (Awur, 1988: 81-2). The question of lack of southern development365 was also 
important, particularly the controversy over the externally influenced Jonglei Canal 
project and oil prospecting,366as it was felt by many that the regime aimed to keep the 
South poor and take its resources for its own and Egypt’s benefit.367 Indeed, the unity of 
Sudan had been justified by the economic dependency of the southern provinces of 
northern Sudan already during the colonial period, but some in the Arabized elite feared 
that in the case oil was found, part of the southern intelligentsia would be empowered to 
claim that such a condition for unity had ceased to exist and would advocate secession. 
This thinking led to the attitude among some northern politicians in Khartoum to be 
against oil exploration in the southern region, refusing public recognition that southern 
                                                 
365
 After the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Agreement it would have taken an unprecedented effort to lift the 
southern economy. Yet, such effort was not undertaken and the regime starved the regional government 
of financing for reconstruction, rehabilitation, and development (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 33). Although 
plans were made to rehabilitate the southern economy and concentrate on rebuilding basic social and 
economic infrastructure in the context of a national five-year development plan, these were not respected 
as the expenditure matched 20.1% of the projected budget allocation in 1972-7, falling short of the 
original budget by 60% in 1972-3, 90% in 1973-4, 83.8% in 1974-5, 77.3% in 1975-6, and 76.4% in 
1976-7 (RMFEP, 1977: 226; Yongo-Bure, 1988a: 382, 1993: 56). Because the large scale economic 
development in the region was dependent on the regime financing, it could not take place in these 
circumstances (Jendia, 2002: 144-5). For instance, health and education deteriorated in the South 
(Interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala). 
366
 The Jonglei Canal project and oil prospecting became politically explosive and destabilizing issues in 
this context of widening socio-economic drift between the northerners and the southerners, economic 
discrimination, and inadequate development financing for the South (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 33). They are 
particularly representative of the regime’s approach towards the southern region and significant in 
southern alienation and resurging grievances. First, in February 1974 Nimeiri signed an agreement for 
political and economic integration with Egypt, which contributed to the revival of a Jonglei Canal project 
to build a 175 mile channel to cut the rate of evaporation in the Sudd by 50%, adding irrigated cultivable 
area in northern provinces by 3.7 million acres (Collins, 1990: 310, 312, 313; Yohannes, 1997: 323). It 
was presented to the local authorities as a project in benefit of the South (Alier, 1990: 1997-8), and 
portrayed as a measure of the regional government’s commitment to southern development. Yet, it was 
largely linked to financial blackmailing by the regime and after minimum guarantees for its benefits for 
the South the regional government accepted the project. This led to student riots in many major towns in 
the South in October 1974, which were forcefully put down and two pupils were killed as the police fired 
upon demonstrators (Awur, 1988: 82; Alier, 1990: 200-1; Jendia, 2002: 149; Collins, 2008: 120-1). 
Second, in 1974, after foreign petroleum companies suggested conducting oil exploration in the southern 
region, many members of the northern elite, largely politicians, became alarmed. It was feared that 
finding petroleum in the South would strengthen secessionist sentiment in the region that already had 
limited autonomy and enjoyed security arrangements which hindered the government’s options in using 
military force to enforce unity (Alier, 1990: 215). Yet, the will to attract foreign investment prevailed and 
prospecting was supported by adopting a new legislation that companies such as British Ball and Collins, 
American Pacific International, Oceanic Exploration (U.S.), and Chevron (U.S.) used to secure contracts 
(Widatalla, 1988: 420-1, 425, 427), with Nimeiri allegedly pocketing the proceeds of a Chevron contract 
for the South that by Addis Ababa Agreement was the rightful authority to receive the money (Chan and 
Zuor (2006: 33).  
367
 This was manifested in the regime’s initiative for establishing new Unity State encompassing the 
Bentiu oil region, which would fall under regime administration. Interview with a local religious leader in 
Juba, 29 September 2008.  
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secessionism was to a large degree a result of the marginalizing state’s policies that had 
not redistributed resources or promoted development in the southern provinces.  
 
Nevertheless, the state sought petroleum in order to establish a new source of financing. 
This was attractive to the governing sections of the Arabized elite because it would 
provide economic power and resources to maintain state’s neo-patrimonial and 
clientelist structures, and strengthen it for instance through financial co-option of 
opposition forces. It would also diminish the reliance on external resources that were 
obtained through the relatively unreliable process of extraversion.  
 
The first Regional Assembly came to an end on 19 December 1977 in an atmosphere in 
which politicians from various parts of the southern region were increasingly divided. 
There was an element of envy and bitterness attached to the views of some politicians, 
the HEC being perceived by some as a privileged club with higher salaries, housing, 
cars, telephones, and a resignation payment (Alier, 1990: 172-3; Holt and Daly, 2000: 
173; Collins, 2008: 115). This led politicians to use ethnic hostility, accusations, and 
malicious propaganda aimed to bring down ministers while others attempted to enter the 
ministerial cadre (Alier, 1990: 173; Collins, 2008: 115). Although such conduct had not 
prevented the democratic regional political institutions from functioning, it had 
reinforced further the use of ethnic “tribalist” and regionalist strategies as major tools in 
southern politics.368 
 
While many divisions among sections of southern politicians were of their own making, 
Nimeiri’s machinations deliberately exacerbated ethnic politics. He sought to play 
southern leaders, mainly Alier, who he knew personally, and Lagu, and their 
                                                 
368
 According to Chan And Zuor (2006: 28),  
This tribal sentiment was responsible for reshuffling of the ministerial posts according to how 
people knew each other as opposed to how good they can do the job. Nepotism became the 
policy of survival as people tried to pact ministerial positions with their kin-men . . . as tribal 
sentiments and personal rivalries overwhelmed many of them to the point of giving up the 
Southern national interests. The situation was like a dream come true to those who were 
enjoying its fruits i.e., access to the national resources through ministerial portfolios and 
assignments. 
Madut-Arop (2006: 36) adds that  
. . . it was common for some officials to favour some of their tribesmen when filling some 
positions that would have genuinely been offered for public competition through merit in 
accordance to the existing public service regulations. Some of these examples were reported, 
especially in the recruitment of police, local government, and wildlife departments; the 
recruitment process was controlled by Dinka and Nuer officers.  
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constituents, deliberately against each other by favoring one after the other in an attempt 
to weaken regional unity and eventually prepare the South for decentralization by 
abrogating the Addis Ababa Agreement (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 28, 29). This became 
more apparent after the regime’s rapprochement with other sections of the Arabized 
elite through the “national” reconciliation. This became another major factor in the 
weakening of the southern political autonomy because the resurgence of the Arabized 
elite factions undermined the southern region as they engaged in a campaign for the 
abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement, portraying the treaty as separatist and 
impeding Islamist constitution (Rogier, 2005: 15). Behind this political agenda was also 
retaining access to southern resources (Rogier, 2005: 15), and extending Arabized 
elite’s influence in the region, which further undermined southern autonomy and 
contributed to political instability. This began to be the case increasingly when Turabi’s 
Muslim Brotherhood gained power from its association with the regime and replaced 
the South as a major regime constituency. This regime approach dictated by the political 
culture and dynamics of the marginalizing state generated grievances in the South and 
reinforced a re-polarization of identities. 
 
     Second Southern Regional Assembly, February 1978 - February 1980 
 
By mid-1970s divisions among southern politicians had reappeared and hindered 
political processes. They originated in the leaving out of influential politicians from the 
first HEC, failure of being elected to the Regional Assembly, or transfers from desired 
to unwanted offices, and widened through dismissal of four ministers and the arrests of 
a number of southern politicians (Alier, 1990: 174; Collins, 2008: 133).369 The leaders 
left out threw their weight behind Lagu who resented Nimeiri’s favoring of Alier and 
was seen as the best guarantee against renewed northern aggression (Alier, 1990: 174; 
Akol, 2007: 144; Collins, 2008: 133). These divisions became the seeds of personalized 
power struggles that undermined the common southern stand as the political scene in 
the South polarized between two main positions.370 This weakened the South in the face 
of the central government. 
                                                 
369
 For instance, Mboro’s brief detention ordered by the SSO in Khartoum because of being suspected 
having been involved in the 1975 coup attempt, and Bol’s and Oduho’s short arrest in 1976 due to 
inciting rebellion were particularly controversial (Alier, 1990: 174: Collins, 2008: 133). 
370
 There were those supporting the continuity of Alier leadership facing those grouped behind Lagu 
looking for change. The latter came from the group of politicians in search of high positions that they 
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The first regional assembly ended its term in December 1977 after which elections were 
conducted. They resulted in a victory of the loosely tied section of leaders demanding 
change (Akol, 2007: 144), which owed in part to Nimeiri’s influence as he faced 
growing pressure from army officers and civilian officials aspiring to remove Lagu from 
the army to the political sphere (Alier, 1990: 175). This was because sections in the 
Arabized elite, traditional and conservative factions returning from exile, felt threatened 
by the possibility of Lagu becoming one of the highest army officials and resented some 
of the Anya Nya officers’ influential positions in the Southern Command (Alier, 1990: 
175). Also, during the negotiations that had led to “national” reconciliation they had 
received promises from Nimeiri to revise the Southern Self-Government Act regarding 
security, language, culture, religion, and border trade (Alier, 1990: 175). This pressure 
and the growing power of the islamist section of the Arabized elite became instrumental 
in the undermining of the Addis Ababa Agreement.  
 
As one of the initial steps to demonstrate the regime’s authority over an autonomous 
South and undermine its autonomy, Nimeiri adhered to the Arabized elite demands by 
removing Lagu from the army and appointing him as the president of the HEC. The NF 
endorsed the plan, Sadiq supporting Lagu’s candidature both morally and financially 
(Collins, 2008: 133). Moreover, southern politicians were led to believe that Lagu’s 
importance lay in propelling economic progress of the southern region with deliberate 
omission of any statement about his future position in the army (Alier, 1990: 175). In 
1978, Alier received notice from Abu al-Gasim Muhammad Ibrahim, a member of the 
SSU political bureau and cabinet that it was Nimeiri’s personal view that he should give 
up the race for the HEC Presidency, which Alier accepted although it was clear that 
Nimeiri had began favoring Lagu (Alier, 1990: 177; Wakoson, 1993: 41). This was 
done to promote regime authority by creating further division among the southern 
politicians (Collins, 2008: 133). In the process, the personal ties between Alier and 
Nimeiri reflected the projection of the regime authority and manipulation of the 
southern autonomy.  
 
Consequently, in the first meeting of the Regional Assembly on 27 February 1978 Lagu 
was elected unanimously as the president of the HEC, Aru appointed as his assistant, 
                                                                                                                                               
could not obtain under Alier, together with those detained in mid-1970s, those losing positions in the 
1973-7 legislature for any reason, and those pointing to a failure of economic policies (Alier, 1990:  176). 
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and Mboro as the Speaker of the Regional Assembly. All three represented change in 
the southern leadership, Lagu benefiting from the support of a wide range of southern 
ethnic constituencies371 (Alier, 1990: 177; Akol, 2007: 144). When Lagu was sworn into 
his new post in Khartoum Nimeiri told him not to appear in a military uniform again 
(Alier, 1990: 177). This way Lagu had been removed from the army and the security 
arrangement that had empowered the southern region to check the regime’s goodwill 
regarding the autonomous South was severely undermined. This shows how the 
political wrangling within the marginalizing state benefits the narrow most influential 
elites in control or affecting political arrangements and policies. 
      
However, the situation turned more turbulent by the end of the decade. Soon, the 
southern political dynamics resumed ethnic squabbling as differences emerged between 
the HEC presidency, the cabinet, and the Speaker of the Regional Assembly, which led 
to a profound reshuffling of ministers, and dismissal of the speaker and his the deputy in 
1979 (Alier, 1990: 178; Akol, 2007: 144-5). Lagu alienated the constituency that had 
brought him to power through personal wrangling and had no significant connections to 
Nimeiri or to other influential northern factions, which weakened the regional 
government and soon obliged him to increase his personal hold on the HEC and the 
regional assembly to strengthen his position (Alier, 1990: 179; Collins, 2008: 133-4). 
For instance, by 1979 Lagu had pressured to create a number of new administrative 
posts, mostly under directorates in the ministries of finance, public service, and 
agriculture, and upgrading other already existing positions, while curbing what he stated 
as Dinka domination by appointing Equatorians to higher echelons (Alier, 1990: 179; 
Collins, 2008: 134). While the claim was not completely unfounded in that the Dinka 
and Nuer administrators tended to favor their ethnic kin in the allocation of positions 
and provision of services, the Equatorians were also well represented (Chan and Zuor, 
2006: 37). In any event, this rhetoric propelled growingly divisive ethnic politics 
                                                 
371
 He stated in his regional policy statement before the regional assembly that 
My dear countrymen, before the advent of the May revolution, the very fabric of the Sudan as a 
nation was almost torn apart by the divisive forces of religious sectarianism, racialism, and party 
factionalism. But now, national unity has been achieved and the divisive forces curbed. The 
policy of the Regional Government, therefore, is to consolidate national unity and combat forces 
hostile to our peace, security, and prosperity. I wish to call upon every member of this House, 
and upon every Southerner to maintain Regional unity. We will not allow tribalism to divide us. 
My election as President of the High Executive Council proves that the South is politically 
mature and nationalistic enough to rise above ethnic and geographical differences when 
choosing leaders. At last, the basis to build and develop a Southern personality within the united, 
diverse Sudan now exists (RPS, 1978: 6-7). 
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between Lagu and the Equatorians and Alier and the Dinka, fragmenting inter-ethnic 
political consensus in the South.       
 
In 1979, a secret report of the army headquarters to the northern officers in the South 
came to light. It was discovered by Colonel Andrew Makur Thaou, transferred from 
Wau to Juba, who was replacing Colonel Umar on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Umar had 
forgotten a copy of the report describing how to handle the absorbed forces, the police, 
prison warders, and wildlife officers in case of a rebellion and took it to Lagu, the 
president of the HEC (Madut-Arop, 2006: 31). However, Lagu pointed out that he was 
no longer a military officer with authority over the ex-Anya Nya, but a civilian official, 
and recommended Makur to draft an immediate counter-plan (Madut-Arop, 2006: 31-2). 
This incident contributed to the strengthening of the former Anya Nya officers’ 
underground movement since its leaders, including Garang, became alarmed by 
possible regime aspirations. Efforts to remove absorbed senior commanders faced more 
resistance, and by 1980 it had become clear that the former Anya Nya maintained an 
organization with an internal network, which prompted the government to plan ways in 
which to remove the absorbed forces from the South without provoking the resumption 
of war (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32; Akol, 2007: 150). As a result, the security tension in the 
South escalated as sentiments of mistrust and fear heightened. 
 
Meanwhile, Alier and others in opposition to Lagu struck back politically. They accused 
him of embezzling US$2.5 million reportedly donated by Abu Dhabi in 1978 and 
demanded his resignation (Alier, 1990: 178; Akol, 2007: 145). The accusations came at 
the time when “ . . . there was little doubt in Juba that corruption had become 
conspicuous in direct proportion of his dispensation of patronage, particularly to the 
Dinka Samuel Aru Bol, vice-president of the HEC and speaker of the Assembly, a post 
Lagu had created” (Collins, 2008: 134). The opposition, headed by Mboro, Malwal, 
Alier, and a Dinka pressure group, accused Bol of mishandling of £S30,000 for the 
resettlement of refugees, which fueled further demands for Lagu’s resignation (Collins, 
2008: 134).  
 
Intensified by the mishandling of the issue, the dispute over ousting the speaker had 
significant repercussions. Subsequently, 24 members of the regional assembly claimed 
that the dismissal of Mboro was unconstitutional and that the president was acting 
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beyond his powers, forwarding the matter to Nimeiri in 1979 and asking for Lagu’s 
destitution (Alier, 1990: 178; Akol, 2007: 145; Collins, 2008: 134). This gave an excuse 
to Nimeiri, pressured by conservative elements of the Arabized elite, to dissolve the 
regional assembly in February 1980 in an unconstitutional. Aru was then arrested and 
charged with corruption, while Nimeiri dissolved the National Assembly where he 
faced growing opposition (Alier, 1990: 178-9; Holt and Daly, 2000: 171; Akol, 2007: 
145, 150; Collins, 2008: 134).372 This was in part justified by inter-ethnic disputes and 
not completely unfounded due to the militarization of many Dinka and Nuer societies in 
the course of 1970s (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999: 125-45). Prior to dissolving the regional 
assembly and dismissing Lagu, Nimeiri had promulgated the 1980 High Executive 
Council and Regional Assembly Act without opposition in the National Assembly, 
which gave him power to dissolve the Regional Assembly (Akol, 2007: 145). The law 
stood in direct confrontation with the 1973 national constitution, but was celebrated 
within Alier’s faction in the South as a move to undermine Lagu (Akol, 2007: 145). 
Nimeiri had removed the final safeguards of the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has analyzed the implementation of the southern autonomy and highlighted 
its political dynamics in the aftermath of the first insurgency analyzed in Chapter V. It 
has demonstrated the fragility of the Addis Ababa peace agreement with the southern 
region remaining dependent on the regime, perpetuating its role as a peripheral element 
to the marginalizing state. Although initially Nimeiri sought to incorporate the South to 
the state structures through a project of reduced marginalization and convergence of the 
constructed “Arab”-“African” identity rift, southern political autonomy remained 
dependent on Nimeiri’s personal goodwill as part of a strategic alliance that used the 
South as a major regime constituency against opposing sections of the Arabized elite.  
 
As a result, when the external and local context turned inopportune for the South 
continuing as the regime’s constituency, the agreement became more contested. As will 
be seen in Chapter VII, upon the return of the opposition sections Arabized elite to the 
                                                 
372
 Nimeiri intervened in the process of selecting the President of the HEC in 1973, 1978, 1980, and 1982, 
dissolved the southern political institutions in 1980, and used the fear of many Equatorians of a possible 
Dinka domination by encouraging Lagu to pursue the demands for the division of the southern region 
(Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37).  
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Sudanese political scene in the context of regional Islamic resurgence the regime 
became inclined to undermine the agreement as it realized that the support of South 
appeared insufficient in remedying chronic political instability and successive coup 
attempts. Its volatile relationship with sectors of the southern leadership was 
exemplified by the disputes over southern natural resources which it sought to exploit, 
partly because of the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state that maintain 
Sudan’s unity by constructing the South as a threat to the state. This involves deliberate 
perpetuation of poverty in the South to maintain it under regime control. Thus Nimeiri’s 
initial project to remedy identity polarization after the war failed as the dynamics and 
logic of the marginalizing state encouraged the reconstruction of grievances in the 
South.   
 
The resumption of portraying the South as a threat to state, as shown in the next chapter, 
also explains largely why the second insurgency emerged in southern Sudan as opposed 
to other parts of the Sudanese periphery. The foundation for the resumption of war was 
laid during the autonomous period as the breach between sectors of southern soldiers 
and politicians that surfaced during the first rebellion remained. Sections of the southern 
military leadership resented the loss of their prominent role to politicians after the peace 
agreement, and in the fear of becoming redundant as part of the absorption and 
integration process they sought to conspire against attempts aimed at their 
neutralization.  
 
At the same time, many southern soldiers continued to be affected by the sentiments of 
sections of the local population that grew mistrustful and fearful during the ailing period 
of limited autonomy which was unable to produce security and development in most 
parts of the South. Growing militarization and insecurity was facilitated by perceptions 
of many southern politicians becoming increasingly corrupt, motivated by a struggle for 
positions, and manipulated by Khartoum to the extent that they were seldom able stand 
as a common front for southern interest. The reconstruction and instrumentalization of 
ethnic, religious, sectional, and regional distinctions became paramount not only in the 
regime’s dealing with the southerners, but in the southern political scene. This led to 
politicization of factionalism and tribalism, creating local dynamics of ethnic exclusion 
(Berman and Lonsdale, 1992; Lonsdale, 1994). 
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When the lack of progress in the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreement and 
intentions to undermine it became apparent, disappointment spread in the South. This 
elevated the level of grievances among the general population and particularly among 
many southern soldiers. As a result, secret opposition formations emerged. Next chapter 
will show how the situation escalated as sections of the Arabized elite initially in 
opposition were reincorporated in the government, which along with external factors 
resulted in the undermining and demise of the southern administration to benefit the 
state and its allies. 
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Chapter VII. The Path to War 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, deteriorating political and economic conditions in the 
South gave rise to conditions conducive to the resumption of large scale violence. This 
chapter will demonstrate how these dynamics led to the culmination of the regime’s 
undermining of southern autonomy in order to reinstate the region’s direct subordinate 
status in the early 1980s. The regime sought to neutralize the ex-Anya Nya rebels, 
deprive the region of economic development, and manipulate the political order to 
facilitate its dismantling and decentralization. This process was influenced by the 
regional dynamics of the Islamic resurgence in the neighboring Arab states, and the 
support for Islamism as a counterforce to communism and the potential power of the 
autonomous South which pressured Nimeiri to resort to the Muslim Brothers for regime 
survival. This favored the Islamization of the Sudanese domestic political and economic 
scene and, coupled with an unstable and insecure regional political situation, gave 
further impetus to the heightening of southern grievances that became an integral part of 
the re-polarization of identities along the “Arab”-“African” rift. 
 
This chapter focuses on the process of insurgency formation. It shows how the local and 
external political and economic contexts of the final years of the Nimeiri regime were 
instrumental in the deterioration of situation in the South, leading to the emergence of 
armed opposition. The efforts to neutralize the former Anya Nya in an environment of 
amounting insecurity were counterproductive, as were the abrogation of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement and resorting to radical Islamism without respect for the 
heterogeneous nature of the highly diverse state. This shows how the dynamics and 
logic of the marginalizing state controlled by a section of the Arabized elite re-polarized 
the political scene, as shown in Chapter VI, empowering and imposing those military 
sectors in the South willing to resort to violence against the regime over the secondary 
political leadership.   
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2. National Context of Islamization 
 
This section highlights the rise of Islamist political and economic context that 
penetrated Sudan through the regime leadership and its changing constituency. It shows 
how the national political and economic scene became conducive to renewed 
insurgency in southern Sudan.   
 
     Nimeiri’s Islamic Path 
 
By the mid-1970s Nimeiri was demonstrating a growingly religious inclination.373 This 
was partly prompted by the decline of Nasserist Arab nationalism in the region, while 
political and militant Islam gained momentum in Algeria, Iran, and neighboring Egypt 
(Warburg, 2003: 152-3; Collins, 2008: 146). In Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat, who followed 
Nasser as President, encouraged Islamic student groups and the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and the resurgence of Islamic groupings with economic connections to Saudi Arabia 
presented an opportunity for Nimeiri to save the deteriorating economy in Sudan 
(Warburg, 2003: 153).374 Thus, the Islamic political approach served to extravert 
funding from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf States, and Western allies who perceived 
Islamism as a desired counterforce to communism. Although Nimeiri knew that an 
Islamic approach advocated by the main sections of the Arabized elite since 
independence would alienate the South, he sought to supplant southern support for the 
regime with sectors of the Arabized elite and the Muslim population in the northern 
provinces to strengthen the regime against other Arabized elite factions now considered 
a main threat. This meant a re-Arabization and re-Islamization of the state’s identity 
discourse, which led to a re-polarization of identities between the center and the South.   
                                                 
373
 This was in part due to his poor health and the belief that divine forces had saved his regime (Collins, 
2008: 146). Nimeiri began consistently attending Friday players with a distinct location announced every 
Thursday by the President’s Office, and associated himself increasingly with Sufi orders, inviting their 
leaders for an annual Ramadan reception, providing them with palace grants, organizing an annual 
Qur’an contest, and instituting the Ministry of Endowments and Ministry of Religious Affairs to gain the 
support of smaller Sufi orders (Warburg, 2003: 153; Collins, 2008: 145). In 1980, the first of Nimeiri’s 
two books explaining his Islamic inclinations was published in which he explained how a return to 
conviction and commitment to Islam was necessary for Sudan which had been condemned to 
backwardness by the Western colonialism which continued to affect Sudanese society (Warburg, 2003: 
152; Collins, 2008: 145). 
374
 In 1974 Nimeiri began to invite members of Sufi tariqa for pilgrimage to Mecca financed by the 
government, while the President’s report to the SSU party National Congress expressed Nimeiri’s view 
that faith was not only a private issue, but also a major building block for the social and political 
institutions of a society (Warburg, 2003: 153; Collins, 2008: 145). 
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The aborted coup in 1976 demonstrated that endorsing the South and relying on small 
Sufi orders375 in the North was not enough to stabilize Nimeiri’s leadership. As a result, 
pressured by Arab states in 1977, Nimeiri had reconciled with the exiled Arabized elite 
NF political factions.376 Consequently, the Muslim Brothers sought actively to 
collaborate with the regime,377 and in April 1977, Nimeiri founded a Committee for the 
Revision of Sudanese Laws on Islamic Principles to study a return of the laws in 
coherence with the Islamic law, shari’a, appointing Turabi, the leader of the ICF, as its 
chairman, and Muslim Brothers such as Jaafar Shayk Idris as its members, alienating 
other NF factions378 (Legum and Lee, 1979: 113-4; Daly, 1993: 20; Warburg, 2003: 
155; Collins, 2008: 145). Allegedly, this path towards Islamization was a secretive step 
to prepare the legal framework for the declaration of September Laws in 1983 (Awur, 
                                                 
375
 Nimeiri had appointed leaders of smaller Sufi orders into the SSU apparatus, government posts, and 
minor ministries, and allowed them new opportunities in secondary schools and universities (Warburg, 
2003: 154; Collins, 2008: 145). Consequently, through political influence the small Sufi orders drew 
financing from Arab states, which increased their power relative to the traditional Arabized elite factions 
in exile until 1977, but some of their members escaped dependence on Nimeiri, who was not perceived as 
an ideal religious leader, by joining and strengthening more radical non-Sufi organizations, mainly the 
Muslim Brothers (Karsani, 1993: 144-7; Warburg, 2003: 154).  
376
 These included the Umma party of the neo-Mahdist Ansar, the DUP of the Khatmiyyah, and the ICF of 
the Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri promised to democratize the SSU, re-evaluate part of the 1973 constitution, 
particularly Article 16 that gave Christianity and traditional religions equal standing with Islam, and 
review the Addis Ababa Agreement that the conservative parties viewed as a surrender to the South 
(Alier, 1990: 235-6). The “reconciliation” and the general amnesty with the release of 1,000 political 
prisoners facilitated the process and ensured pressure on Nimeiri particularly from the Muslim Brothers, 
who gradually became a powerhouse within the state (Yohannes, 1997: 320-1). The NF factions sought to 
propel Sudan’s Arab identity and the state’s adherence to Islam. They resented the 1973 constitution and 
the Southern Self-Government Act. Particularly Muslim Brothers, but also other NF factions gave 
Nimeiri the impression that he would gain full support of the conservative northern political forces by 
revising the Southern Self-Government Act and would be remembered as a great Sudanese leader by 
implementing Islamic constitution (Alier, 1990: 237).  
377
 During his 1971 visit to Saudi Arabia after the aborted SCP coup, Nimeiri had first met leaders of 
Muslim Brothers who had escaped from Sudan in 1969. They were led by Sorbonne and London School 
of Economics-educated Turabi. Nimeiri also discussed with King Faysal his future plans for Sudan’s 
Islamic path, hoping for the Saudi financing which was soon withdrawn when Sudan passed the 1973 
secular constitution (Yohannes, 1997: 321; Warburg, 2003: 159-60). However, despite planning a 
partnership with the Muslim Brothers already in 1971, it was not until 1977, after Turabi had calculated 
that they would benefit most by infiltrating state institutions such as the SSU, that the movement opted 
out of the NF and began active cooperation with the regime. This was only months before the “national” 
reconciliation (Warburg, 2003: 160, 184; Collins, 2008:149). 
378
 For instance, since the “national” reconciliation, the leader of the Umma, Sadiq al-Mahdi, who since 
the Aba Island incident had also become the Imam of the Ansar, sought to fix the movement’s 
relationship with the army and strengthened its organization in Sudan. He was also highly critical of the 
Muslim Brothers, perceived as elitist opportunists willing to work within Nimeiri’s framework and to 
support rigid policy based on a traditional pattern, such as a literal interpretation of the Qur’an and 
shari’a not suitable for a contemporary Muslim society (Warburg, 2003: 173-5; Collins, 2008: 150). In 
addition, Sadiq and the Ansar, along with their rivals the Khatmiyya and smaller Sufi orders, became 
preoccupied with the infiltration of the Muslim Brothers into the SSU, secondary schools, universities, 
and the Islamic banks (Collins, 2008: 150). Moreover, Sadiq criticized Nimeiri’s Islamist policy as a 
desperate calculated attempt to falsify Islam and use it to purge his opponents in the North and the South 
to save his collapsing regime, which led to Sadiq’s periodic detentions along with other Ansar leaders and 
the exclusion of the Umma from Nimeiri’s Islamic project (Warburg, 2003: 176). 
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1988: 98), and was detrimental to the South due to the Islamist discourse that was 
constructed explicitly to target the largely non-Muslim South.  
 
However, these maneuvers initially elevated support for the regime in northern Sudan. 
It added domestic and international legitimacy, and initiated a process in which Nimeiri 
sought to outplay the Muslim Brothers by appealing to the northern Sudanese Muslim 
population through Islamic reforms towards improved quality of life (Daly, 1993: 20-1; 
Yohannes, 1997: 321). However, since Nimeiri lacked any strong constituency aside 
from the Muslim Brothers, he was again increasingly conditioned by the political 
dynamics and culture of the marginalizing state. 
 
The Muslim Brothers became the main constituency of the regime. Turabi’s growing 
influence and knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence, law, and economics helped him to 
manipulate the politico-religious context and enhanced the movement’s political and 
economic influence, particularly through the establishment of a network of banks in 
Saudi Arabia similar to financial institutions in Sudan to manage the finances of many 
of the 350,000 Sudanese migrant workers in the Persian Gulf states (Yohannes, 1997: 
321; Musso, 2009), which enabled the Muslim Brothers to operate from an expanding 
financial platform.379 The Islamists provided services for the poor through their civil 
society organizations and employment for their constituents, generating an Islamist 
“middle” and “top” class and a broad social base through practices of patronage 
                                                 
379
 In the early stages the financial needs for the expansion of the movement were met by donations from 
Arab states and wealthy Sudanese businessmen who hoped to serve Allah (Collins, 2008: 149). However, 
as the movement’s influence grew Turabi was able to propel the Islamization of the economy and from 
1978 to at least partially control Islamic banking and other financial institutions, which allowed for a 
profitable manipulation of economic processes and secured financing to extend political influence 
(Warburg, 2003: 190, 191). The Muslim Brothers benefited from the banks’ dominance of the 
import/export sector and foreign currency market, which permitted them to hijack the state’s control of 
the economy (Yohannes, 1997: 321). Allegedly, in 1978-1987, approximately US$11 billion of Sudan’s 
external aid was transferred abroad through the Islamic banking system (Duffield, 1993: 333, 346). 
Turabi, himself, was closely linked to the board of directors of both the Faisal and Tadamon Islamic 
banks, which facilitated the funneling of donations to build a large mosque near the University of 
Khartoum and an Islamic university in Omdurman (Collins, 2008: 149). Moreover, in the 1970s and 
1980s the Muslim Brothers were heavily engaged with the northern Sudanese emigrants in the oil 
producing Arab states, who sent not only official remittances back to Sudan in benefit of the national 
economy but also through informal channels of the Muslim Brothers. According to a study in 1984-5, an 
estimated US$3 billion was smuggled back to Sudan annually, part of which trickled to the Muslim 
Brothers (Warburg, 2003: 191). After all, the movement encouraged the emigration of Sudanese male 
workers, particularly those with Islamist tendencies, cared for the social needs of emigrants in the 
receiving states, and encouraged women’s education and the role of the wives of the emigrants in public 
life (Warburg, 2003: 190-1).  
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(Yohannes, 1997: 321; Musso, 2009).380 The strategy to attack the regime from within 
culminated in the infiltration of the Muslim Brothers in state institutions, such as the 
military,381 public administration, and the public education system, with the long term 
objective of taking over state power (Yohannes, 1997: 321).382 In addition, Turabi’s 
appointement as Sudan’s Attorney-General in August 1977 and subsequent directorship 
as the chairman of the committee for the revision of Sudanese laws on Islamic 
principles put him in a powerful position to influence policy (Yohannes, 1997: 321; 
Warburg, 2003: 184-5).383 In the process the state became Islamized.       
 
The response by international actors to these regionally inspired domestic developments 
followed the lead of the U.S., which was the main external political and economic actor 
in Sudan. While Egypt’s official policy resembled relative religious moderateness, 
particularly after its crackdown on the Islamist movement in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, Al-Azhar spoke publicly in support of Nimeiri’s policy of re-Islamization in 
1983-5 (Martín Muñoz, 1999: 274). At the time, growing Islamism was viewed as a 
desired counterforce to the Soviet geo-political aspirations and covertly supported by 
the U.S. in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This bound Sudan inextricably to the Middle 
East in the U.S. approach, which led to active support by the U.S. through the CIA to 
train, arm, and transport Sudanese Islamists to Afghanistan, with the CIA often 
supporting their military careers (de Waal, 1994: 48-61). Consequently, Islamists 
                                                 
380
 Originally an organization of urban educated individuals, the Muslim Brothers broadened its social 
constituency by creating a patron-client network in which they distributed a portion of their wealth to 
merchants, artisans, students, taxi-drivers, and others, converting them into a social constituency, which 
Turabi preferred over religious agitation (Yohannes, 1997: 321). 
381
 After 1977 the Muslim Brothers gained more influence in the military. According to Warburg (2003: 
189), “Their better-educated membership, experience, superior organization and relative financial 
affluence, gained as a result of the new Islamic banking system introduced by Numayri with their active 
assistance, enabled the Brothers to achieve greater success in the army too”. Not only were they 
appointed to organize courses of Islamic ideology for senior officer corps, which facilitated their 
influence, but graduated Muslim Brothers were encouraged to become officers upon completing their 
studies and soldiers were persuaded to join the movement (Warburg, 2003: 189-90; Collins, 2008: 149). 
Two major strategies of the Muslim Brothers included the use of the army as a vehicle to impose an 
Islamic state and the formation of an Islamic army to replace the elements that guarded the secular status 
quo as in the case of a number of states in the Muslim world (Warburg, 2003: 190). 
382
 Turabi sought increasing political and economic power by enlisting students of secondary schools and 
universities who would later be professionals, such as school teachers, professors, lawyers, doctors, 
engineers, civil servants, and cadets, and by infiltrating the army and manipulating the Islamic economy, 
launching a bill converting zakat into a compulsory tax, followed by the Islamization of financial 
institutions and the monetary system (Jendia, 2002: 144, 155; Warburg, 2003: 155, 185; Collins, 2008: 
149).  
383
 Turabi’s political and pragmatic majority overtook Abdallah Abd al-Majid and Jaafar Shaykh Idris’s 
ideological minority closely connected with Egyptian Muslim Brothers (Warburg, 2003: 185-6; Collins, 
2008: 149). 
298        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
became a major force in the Sudanese military, which in turn backed their political 
power.    
 
In this political context, following the foreign policy inclinations of Egypt, Sudan 
continued to count on U.S. support in the early 1980s. The U.S., on the other hand, 
continued to view Sudan as the cornerstone its regional policy, contributing to its 
militarization.384 Nimeiri took an active part in the U.S. regional strategy particularly in 
support of Ethiopian armed opposition.385 This complemented the U.S. policy view of 
the importance of Eritrea to undermine Soviet-backed Ethiopia and minimize its 
intervention in Sudan (Yohannes, 1997: 316).  
 
Libyan encroachment in Chad was also viewed as an important security threat to Sudan. 
In these circumstances, Nimeiri, who instrumentalized the relationship with the U.S. for 
extraversion,386 produced 10,000 undocumented refugees and alleged Libyan spies as 
evidence of Libyan aspirations to attack Sudan, while claiming that Libya had 
established military facilities on the Chad-Sudan border (Yohannes, 1997: 316). If such 
allegations were true, the Libyan attack in Darfur may have been motivated by Sudan-
U.S. support for anti-Libyan forces in Chad from the Sudanese territory bordering Chad 
and for Chadian pro-Sudanese faction under Hissein Habre using villages in Darfur as a 
sanctuary. In any event, such claims adhered to the CIA’s agenda to curb Libya and it 
provided evidence that Libyan air force had attacked Sudanese villages near the 
Chadian border in September 1981 (Yohannes, 1997: 316). This legitimized U.S. 
                                                 
384
 Nimeiri drew US$101.5 million in security assistance in 1982, followed by similar amounts until 
1985, for modernization of the Sudanese army (Yohannes, 1997: 315). From the US$520.6 million 
budget requested for the Indian Ocean and African countries for 1984, US$498.9 million was divided 
between Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya in a regional containment strategy with US$500,000 in covert 
support allocated annually to the Eritrean and Tigrayan rebels through Sudan, despite their leftist 
discourses, and for hardware provided by Saudi Arabia (Woodward, 1987: 373, 384; Yohannes, 1997: 
315). 
385
 It allowed Ethiopian rebels to beam anti-Mengistu propaganda and challenged the Eritrean question’s 
status as a domestic crisis at the OAU by stating that it was in fact an internationalized conflict due to the 
refugee problem affecting Sudan which automatically justified the implication of the latter, and also 
claiming that Ethiopia had unilaterally abolished the U.N.-dictated federal system that provoked an 
internal war (Legum and Lee, 1979: 124). 
386
 Nimeiri’s rhetoric about regional threats deviated international attention from Sudan’s internal 
problems. Militarization in the name of external threats ensured the persistence of authoritarianism as 
Nigeria defied democratization (Yohannes, 1997: 317). The arms shipments to Sudan were normally 
treated as commercial transactions financed by Saudi Arabia, which in 1977-9 used US$320 million to 
buy arms for Sudan. The financing schemes for foreign military sales included grant aid paid by 
American tax payers and cash or credit with any shortfall financed by a third party, usually Saudi Arabia 
(Lefevbre, 1991: 210; Yohannes, 1997: 317-8). 
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financial, military, and diplomatic support to secure Nimeiri,387 which largely ensured 
the prolongation of the regime until 1985 despite deep political and economic problems.   
 
As part of the strengthening of Nimeiri, the U.S. recommended measures to change the 
course of what was considered a structurally statist economy. As mentioned in Chapter 
VI, while funneling funds for development, an attempt was made to reschedule debt, 
encourage investment, promote rural development through international agencies and 
NGOs, devaluation, and a market oriented approach, particularly in agricultural pricing 
(Yohannes, 1997: 319; Rolandsen, 2005: 25-6). These efforts included a number of 
experimental NGO projects in southern Sudan, which in some cases replaced the local 
government provision of services, externalized power, and justified the regime’s lack of 
transfers to fund local administration in the South (Rolandsen, 2005: 26). This 
contradicts the thesis by Chandler (2006) that externally dictated state capacity building 
and reinforcing is a strategy developed by Western powers and international 
organizations in the context of their unprecedented power after the Cold War. Rather, it 
appears that this phenomenon was already part of the U.S. approach to Sudan in the 
1970s and 1980s and used by the Nimeiri regime.   
 
Although realizing that there was little desired impact from the increased financing, the 
U.S. continued channeling funds to Sudan.388 Yet the U.S. economic aid was 
conditional as it sought a laissez faire capitalist system, weakening the regime by 
undermining its total control of the economy.389 Other actors, principally the Islamists 
who extracted a growing amount of external funding, took advantage of the opening 
economic space which led to a re-polarization of identities as more resources were used 
to ‘Islamize’ the state, contrary to the desire of many southerners.  
                                                 
387
 In 1981-2 the U.S. helped finance the failed OAU intervention force in Chad, funneling US$30 and 
US$100 million as security assistance and sending radar aircrafts to Sudan, while supporting Habre’s 
rebels in Chad with US$25 million (Yohannes, 1997: 317). 
388
 In 1976-85 the American transfers amounted to US$1.358 billion or 9.5% of the total allocated for 
Africa. After putting down US$100 million, the Americans convinced other Western countries and 
institutions to contribute another US$800 million (Yohannes, 1997: 319). In 1983, the WB and the IMF 
also became involved, the former sponsoring a Paris Club meeting raising US$780 million for Sudan and 
the latter supervising structural adjustment and debt rescheduling measures promoted by the U.S. 
(Yohannes, 1997: 319).  
389
 The requirements attached to U.S. support, which included advancing free market reforms, prices, 
privatization, removal of subsidies on consumer articles, devaluation, and adherence to the WB and IMF 
programs, reduced Nimeiri’s hold on the Sudanese economy and weakened the regime that used 
repression and refused to democratize, creating political instability during economic deterioration 
(Yohannes, 1997: 319-20). 
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Moreover, the exigencies of many in the Arabized elite and the political power 
dynamics continued to concentrate development projects even in unviable areas of 
central Sudan.390 This contributed to the economic crisis that featured a number of 
elements including incapacity and rampant corruption.391 Thus, the marginalizing state 
encouraged the reverting to the colonial pattern of uneven development deliberately 
excluding the periphery to maintain its dependence on the center by concentrating 
economic benefits of development in central riverine areas, while expanding the area of 
exploitation towards the southern periphery.392 This continued to be part of a larger 
strategy of the dominant sections of the Arabized elite to maintain exclusive power over 
unitary Sudan, creating inequality, poverty, and dependence in the periphery and 
imposing internal colonialism manifested in the political subjugation of the South.393 
 
By 1978 Sudan could not service its external debt.394 The dominant agricultural sector 
had reached a standstill by the mid-1970s395 and economic deterioration had become 
                                                 
390
 For instance, plants making tomato paste and dehydrated milk were located in date producing and 
cow-free areas (Whitaker, 1988: 74). 
391
 First, harsh climactic conditions in the Sudanese desert areas impeded more delicate projects, such as 
sugar refining (Whitaker, 1988: 74). Second, technical incompetence and corruption played an important 
role in obstructing modernization of productive infrastructure. For instance, the Kenana sugarcane 
complex that was to become one of the major projects was halted by financial incoherence since although 
the scheme was originally evaluated at a cost of US$150 million, between October 1973 and September 
1976 the calculations had been revised several times to US$475 million. The government announced it 
was still lacking US$260 million while the companies building the projects charged high management 
and execution fees (Legum and Lee, 1979: 130). Corruption in the administration, as referred to above, 
was also rampant with the use of public property for personal benefit, transfers of government assets to 
the officials, such as valuable farmland sold for cheap prices, and on one occasion a national bank lending 
US$200 million to a businessman with a fictitious company (LOC, 1991). Finally, experimenting with 
Islamic reforms in the economy encouraged the spread of Islamic banks, exempt from taxation in Sudan, 
and provided a channel for the transfer of illegitimately obtained funds abroad without controls, spreading 
state corruption and eroding the legitimacy of the regime (Yohannes, 1997: 320).      
392
 Part of this was the expansion of the mechanized farming controlled by sectors of the Arabized elite 
allowed by the replacement of the colonial system based on tribal leaders with northern Sudanese 
administrators and new legislation strengthening the powers of the state over the rural populations 
(Johnson, 2002: 2; Pantuliano, 2007: 3). Expropriation under the 1970 Unregistered Land Act had 
become commonplace, allowing the elites associated with the government to obtain land from rural 
peoples, and the 1974 Law of Criminal Trespass which further obstructed the access of pastoral people 
and small farmers to the expropriated land (Johnson, 2002: 2; Pantuliano, 2007: 3). Expropriation of land 
was particularly apparent in the North-South border region, such as Southern Kordofan’s Habila area 
“where illiterate farmers and pastoralists saw their land assimilated into mechanised farming schemes or 
simply registered in someone else’s name” (Simpson, 1981: 201; Pantuliano, 2007: 3).  
393
 This could be seen in the Arabized elite’s concern of the development of the South, where economic 
development and prosperity in their view would feed a secessionist sentiment. The continuity of such an 
attitude was clearly expressed when the Abboud regime removed resource rich areas, such as Hufrat al-
Nahas, from the southern provinces in the 1960s, during the Addis Ababa negotiations, and in early 1980s 
when the Nimeiri regime attempted to remove resource rich areas from the South. 
394
 It had amounted to US$2.25 billion and Sudan began to default debt service payments, which 
increasing the public debt by US$130.9 million (Elhassan, 1985: 202; Collins, 2008: 153). 
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more apparent to an extent that it began to threaten the political stability of the regime. 
The International Labor Organization (ILO) recommended economic reforms which the 
regime failed to implement in its effort to expand large-scale agricultural and industrial 
schemes through a strategy that neglected small-scale industries and commercial 
ventures in an effort to satisfy Arab investors and large landowners (Jendia, 2002: 152). 
The declining production levels in the agricultural sector translated into lower export 
earnings, while import expenditure continued to grow.396  
 
As mentioned in Chapter VI, the financial crisis of the state led to the introduction of 
the IMF’s three-year economic recovery program.397 The overall strategy was to 
increase production of agricultural exports and donor investment was guided 
accordingly through primarily macroeconomic adjustments that ignored the impact on 
regional economic disparities, lowering salaries, and growing poverty (Jendia, 2002: 
152-3). This became a politically explosive issue which the IMF recognized but 
nonetheless proceeded with the policy.398 Thus, the IMF’s approach weakened the 
regime further, although some relief was provided by U.S. aid399, prompted by 
geopolitical designs for the Horn of Africa. 
                                                                                                                                               
395
 The plunge in agriculture was largely due to the large landowners’ propensity to prefer quick profit 
and unwillingness to work in less profitable conditions. This led to unsustainable use of land by ignoring 
regulations of land management, lack of use of fertilizers, soil conservation methods, shifting cultivation 
to virgin areas without rehabilitating the exhausted soil, and abandoning business due to higher input 
prices or lower terms of trade on the international market (Simpson, 1981: 203-7; Collins, 2008: 151). 
Still, by 1977 over 8 million acres had been intensively cultivated by large landowners, which enriched a 
number of them enormously despite dwindling production (Collins, 2008: 150). 
396
 As gross domestic output fell 4.3% in 1978-9 and 1% in 1979-80, while import expenditure grew 
steadily, generating trade deficit of £S564, 2 million in 1980, external borrowing led to foreign debt 
soaring from US$3 billion in 1978 to US$5,2 billion in 1982 (Elhassan, 1985: 199; Niblock, 1987: 23, 
356). 
397
 The objective was 4% annual growth and reduction of inflation to 10% through fiscal measures such 
as reduction of external debt, domestic borrowing, money supply, announcing pre-seasonal faming prices, 
and investment in essential productive ventures including agricultural projects such as the Gezira scheme, 
the completion of unfinished ventures, and undertaking new necessary projects that addressed the 
problem of deteriorating infrastructure, including rejuvenating the Sudan Railways (Jendia, 2002: 152-3; 
Collins, 2008: 153). The measures generated urban riots in 1979, and the IMF and the WB estimated that 
Sudan’s recovery program required 10 years of sacrifices in order to be completed (Brown, 1986: 498; 
Holt and Daly, 2000: 177). 
398
 The regime was increasingly incapable of managing its economy and “Weak world prices of Sudan’s 
dwindling exports, shortages that led to inflation, black-marketeering, the crippling of production, and 
mismanagement and corruption on unprecedented levels all required drastic action” (Holt and Daly, 2000: 
177). 
399
 In 1981 and 1982, 41% and 62% of the total U.S. budget for Africa was divided between Sudan, 
Liberia, Kenya, Somalia, Zaire, and Zambia, with Sudan being the largest recipient throughout the early 
1980s (Yohannes, 1997: 313). To justify this Sudan was portrayed as a capitalist democracy with a 
moderating influence in the Horn of Africa, supporting the Camp David Accord, and mediating in 
Eritrean issue (Yohannes, 1997: 313).      
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Moreover, public agencies had become more redundant and politicized in the process of 
extension of Nimeiri’s personal influence over the decision-making processes.400 This 
tendency, which reflects the expanding of the neo-patrimonial and clientelistic networks 
as the Nimeiri regime’s main form of governance, impeded economic recovery and was 
emphasized by the increasingly authoritarian nature of the regime to counter the 
growing popular discontent caused by economic deterioration. The system was rife with 
favoritism with positions generated according to patronage, family links, and 
connections, and fostered corruption from the highest palace officials to the local 
government representatives (Collins, 2008: 152-3).401 Lacking resources, the hollow 
patronage structures became gradually replaced by the Islamist financial networks 
involving foreign private investors, organizations, Islamic banks, and the Sudanese 
expatriates abroad in the Gulf States.   
 
In this context, the soaring prices of consumer goods became a politically explosive 
issue.402 The structural adjustments eradicated price controls and affected not only the 
poorest but also wealthier sectors of urban population, being felt in those sections of the 
Arabized elite not intimately linked to the regime at a high level. Regional wealth 
disparities provided a growing incentive for the rural poor to migrate to the cities, which 
overwhelmed the central urban centers, particularly Khartoum, creating a vast number 
of unemployed and homeless mostly from the South and Darfur (Collins, 2008: 151). 
While Khartoum alone grew by a rate of 6.6% annually, reaching 1,343,000 inhabitants 
by 1983, the government initiated a program in 1980 to transport migrants forcefully 
back to the countryside (Collins, 2008: 151), setting a precedent carried out until today. 
                                                 
400
 The public administrations became reluctant to make decisions, passing them to ministerial offices, 
while macroeconomic efficiency was also hindered by bloated bureaucracies summing 250,000 civil 
servants in 1976 to service 15 million Sudanese, together with another 100,000 working for public 
enterprises (Collins, 2008: 152). When it became apparent that Sudan lacked the will and capacity to 
implement fully the recovery program, in part because of inefficiency of the civil service and Nimeiri’s 
obsession with controlling decision-making personally, the IMF introduced more stringent austerity 
measures in 1981 (Jendia, 2002: 153; Collins, 2008: 152). 
401
 Over 800 cases of fraud exceeding £S1,000 reported in 1975-1982 provide some indication of the level 
of corruption in public bureaucracies and corporations (Yohannes, 1997: 320; Holt and Daly, 2000: 177; 
Collins, 2008: 153).      
402
 Prompted by the cutting of subsidies on basic commodities due to the IMF recovery measures, 
stagnating wages, and increasing prices of sugar, cooking oil, and gasoline, the gap between the rich and 
the poor expanded and the growing poverty generated discontent and urban unrest (Jendia, 2002: 154; 
Collins, 2008: 151). This was affected by devaluations, which made imports more expensive for 
consumers and affected particularly the urban bourgeoisie that had developed a taste for imported luxury 
goods. 
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This was resented in the South and elsewhere in the periphery where it was viewed that 
the national capital was for all Sudanese.  
 
In 1979, Khartoum had initiated a process of decentralization of political authority 
through the devolution of powers to provincial councils. This culminated in the 1980 
Regional Government Act that divided northern provinces into five regional 
governments, Darfur, Eastern, Khartoum, Kordofan, and Northern, each with their own 
governor and minister (Khalid, 1985: 205-10) under the Central region authority, which 
supposedly brought local governments closer to the regime but was largely 
implemented to respond to emerging political instability, particularly in Darfur, due to 
demands of more regional power (Arou, 1988: 168; Warburg, 2003: 166). The policy 
was used as a cost-cutting measure to reduce the financial responsibilities of the central 
government with a pretext of growth of local autonomy and satisfying grievances of 
regional elites by providing political positions (Niblock, 1987: 287; Holt and Daly, 
2000: 173). This policy enabled the regime to diffuse regionalist pressures, but also 
elevated anxiety in the South since any decentralization of the South would be 
unconstitutional and against the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
 
In fact, many southern politicians considered the law as an assault to regional integrity. 
Some perceived it as an attempt to resume the historical exploitation of southern natural 
resources after the discovery of oil, by generating a boundary dispute in contested oil-
rich areas (Alier, 1990: 215-24; Warburg, 2003: 166-7; Rogier, 2005: 16). This was a 
direct response to the eagerness of powerful sections of the Arabized elite to restore the 
central government’s domination of the region (Malwal, 1985: 30-7), under the pretext 
of curbing federalist and secessionist tendencies. Turabi orchestrated these regime 
designs as he and other Muslim Brothers advocated the abolition of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement they had opposed from the beginning as a step prior to the extension of 
shari’a (Warburg, 2003: 167; Rogier, 2005: 16).403 This economic and political context 
became conducive to the reemergence of insurgency in the South where the impact of 
future decentralization differed from other peripheral areas of the Sudanese state.  
                                                 
403
 Officially the Muslim Brothers blamed the colonial powers, Egypt and principally Britain, for the 
“Southern Problem” and the Mahdists for neglecting it. According to them, this allowed the South to be 
penetrated by the imperialists from Zaire. They recognized no Arabized elite responsibility of the origin 
of the “Southern Problem” (Warburg, 2003: 167-8). The sectarian parties were also reluctant to accept 
such responsibility.      
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By 1983 the Sudanese economy had deteriorated to its worst level during the Nimeiri 
period.404 This worsening situation since the late 1970s had severe effects on most 
sectors of the population, which led to strikes and demonstrations405 and encouraging 
Nimeiri to decree martial law on 30 February 1984 (Collins, 2008: 152). Prior to this 
Nimeiri proceeded with Islamization to curb discontent and by 1983 radical Islamic 
views had gained momentum in north-central Sudan.406 While this was endorsed by a 
number of the allies of the Muslim Brothers regionally, it distanced the less Islamic 
regime in Egypt from Sudan, which deprived Nimeiri of one of his main external 
supporters. 
 
In addition, Nimeiri’s international patrons resented the increasingly Islamic domestic 
policy. Particularly the U.S. found it problematic because by the early 1980s it had 
concluded that the Islamists were opposed to Western liberalism and against American 
values, which might undermine U.S.-Sudan relations, Sudan’s role as a market, and the 
U.S. geopolitical strategy in the Horn (Yohannes, 1997: 322). In addition, Americans 
                                                 
404
 In 1983-4, the cotton harvest was 550,000 bales, less than 1/3 from ten years before, and foreign debt 
amounted to over US$7 billion (Collins, 2008: 153). Debt arrears to the WB reached US$786 million in 
1981 and to the IMF US$1.1 billion a few years later. Nimeiri’s strategy of drawing US$6 billion 
investment from the Arab states had backfired because the already injected US$2.3 billion had been 
misallocated in part due to rampant corruption (LOC, 1991; Yohannes, 1997: 323-4).  
405
 In June 1981, 8,000 Sudan Railway Workers’ Union members went on a strike but were forced back to 
work by the army; 45,000 were dropped from the public salary list, and labor law was amended to make 
strikes acts of treason (Collins, 2008: 151). Sensing the mounting discontent, Nimeiri attempted to 
appease the population, but in December 1981 nationwide demonstrations organized by students took 
place that turned into violent riots (Alier, 1990: Jendia, 2002: 154; Collins, 2008: 151). Despite being 
forcibly suppressed by the security apparatus, similar events occurred in January 1982 in which the police 
killed five students in Wad Medani (Jendia, 2002: 154; Collins, 2008: 151). Nimeiri felt threatened by 
these events and called a meeting of national leadership including members of his political bureau, 
representatives of the SSU, generals, under-secretaries of ministries, and youth and workers’ unions 
representatives (Brown, 1986: 502; Alier, 1990: 187). The meeting was designed to be inclusive abd 
sought to minimize direct criticism of regime policies, but many participants pointed to corruption and 
demanded political and economic reforms along with the return of more executive power to ministries 
and public administrations (Alier, 1990: 187). Nimeiri responded to corruption accusations in public 
administrations by suggesting that many of the conferees were implicated in corruption themselves and 
announced that if the Sudanese were not satisfied with his work he would quit (Alier, 1990: 187-8). 
However, his threat to resign was a strategy he had used previously in 1969 to eliminate civilian 
leadership from the regime’s highest echelons, again in 1975 to introduce sugar tax and in 1980 to assess 
the support of the regime (Alier, 1990: 188). Yet, he continued in power and purged 23 critical senior 
army officers in an attempt to reassert his position (Alier, 1990: 188, 189). 
406
 This was apparent in allowing Muhammad Najib al-Muti, a recently exiled Egyptian Muslim preacher 
involved in agitation against the Copts, to freely express his fundamentalist Islamic perceptions on 
Sudanese television, which resulted in arresting Republican Brothers who had been offended by his direct 
accusations of heresy (Warburg, 2003: 162-3). This led to a conflict between the regime and the 
Republican Brothers, which intensified in the context of growing Islamism and culminated in the public 
hanging of influential Republican Brother leader Mahmud Muhammad Taha on 18 January 1985 which 
rejoiced the Islamic World League in Mecca that considered him heretic. However, the hanging was 
condemned by President Mubarak of Egypt who may have withdrawn his support to Nimeiri as a result 
(Warburg, 2003: 160-5; Collins, 2008: 147-9). 
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feared that Islamization might provoke a rebellion in the relatively unstable southern 
Sudan, allowing Ethiopia and Libya to undermine the Nimeiri regime, and result in 
Soviet domination of the region (Yohannes, 1997: 322). After all, Nimeiri was already 
facing a lack of legitimacy and serious economic problems.        
 
3. Political and Economic Context in Southern Sudan 
 
This section focuses on the political and economic dynamics in southern Sudan in the 
context of the crisis of the marginalizing state described previously. It shows the 
intensifying political confrontation at the national level and within the South, and the 
competition over resources which favored a return to war. 
 
     Third Southern Regional Assembly, June 1980 - October 1981 
 
The deterioration of southern political autonomy became apparent during the third 
regional assembly legislature. Prior to this, Nimeiri had dissolved the southern regional 
assembly and dismissed Lagu. Whereas some claim the reason for the dismissal as 
being his lack of response to southern demonstrations triggered by the news of oil 
development (Alier, 1990: 179; Collins, 2008: 134), Lagu’s argument was that it had 
been motivated by pressure by Alier and his Dinka constituency as the largest group in 
the South to dominate the regional administration (Awur, 1988: 89). However, Nimeiri 
did encourage his preferred elements in the South to regain power and exploited Lagu’s 
and other Equatorians’ Dinka animosity to fragment the southern region. This was 
aimed to reduce its political power and capability to supervise the exploitation of its 
natural resources. 
 
The 1980 elections demonstrated the deep division in the southern leadership. On the 
one hand, Lagu had become the figurehead of the Equatorian Central Committee of 
Individuals (ECCI) seeking a division of the South so that Equatoria could have its own 
region and escape the perceived “Dinka domination” of regional affairs. This faction 
was mostly composed of Equatorian politicians, intellectuals, and returnees, such as 
soldiers, elites, and businessmen, many of whom had held high positions in Idi Amin’s 
regime in Uganda and now blamed the Dinka for their economic malaise (Madut-Arop, 
2006: 36; Collins, 2008: 136). Many in this leadership were interested in the lucrative 
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job opportunities and hoped that re-division would generate socioeconomic 
development (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37).  
 
On the other hand, the other group led by Alier stood for unity of the southern region. It 
endorsed the status quo that had prevailed in southern politics in 1973-7 and was mostly 
composed of Nilotics, principally the Dinka, but also some Equatorians, and enjoyed an 
overwhelming support in the South with strongholds in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile. 
This faction also had limited support in Equatoria, which undermined Lagu’s 
divisionists.    
 
Despite the confrontation between Alier’s and Lagu’s factions, the 1980 election 
campaign was carried out. While Lagu’s divisionists were encouraged by the regime to 
undermine the southern autonomy through demands that focused on intra-regional 
tensions, Alier’s unity-minded followers considered their adversaries as unpatriotic and 
punishable, leading to violent incidents (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37). During the election 
campaign both Alier’s and Lagu’s constituencies sought Nimeiri’s support (Madut-
Arop, 2006: 37), who eventually sided with Alier after realizing the destabilizing effect 
of the growingly contentious political scene in the South. After all, the “Southern 
Problem” had facilitated the collapse of a number of previous governments.  
 
Consequently, in 1980 Nimeiri announced that he would not decentralize the region as 
had been the case in the northern provinces. He referred to the legality of the 1973 Self-
Government Act as part of the national constitution and recognized the majority of 
southerners as opposing such a policy. This outraged Lagu, who insisted that people did 
want a division, and intensified his faction’s “Equatoria region now” campaign or 
“equal division” (kokora in Bari language), printed and showcased in t-shirts (Madut-
Arop, 2006: 37-8) and hats.407 By this time Lagu had become heavily influenced by 
Nimeiri’s plan for decentralization, which the regime wanted to execute at a later 
stage.408 This decision was affected also by the rising insecurity in the South and the 
persisting problems of integration of a number of the former Anya Nya units.  
 
                                                 
407
 Based partly on an interview with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba. This led Nimeiri 
to stimulate kokora by encouraging Lagu and his faction. According an interview with mid-ranking 
SPLM/A official, 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
408
 Based on an interview with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba. 
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Alier became the new HEC president, 409 and selected his cabinet in order to maximize 
support in the regional assembly through a Dinka-Equatorian balance. He relied on a 
number of the politicians that had formed part of his earlier government (Alier, 1990: 
180; Collins, 2008: 134). 410 Alier was also aware of the realities that had led to Lagu’s 
rule in 1978, the shortcomings of economic development, the oil and water issues, and 
the need to maintain the fragile peace in the southern region in which he occupied a 
vital personal role diffusing tension (Madut-Arop, 2006: 38). However considering the 
wider deteriorating political and economic context of the marginalizing state, his efforts 
came in vain.     
 
The HEC continued the push for more concessions for the South.411 However, soon 
Nimeiri had become alarmed by Alier’s and the HEC’s influence and decided that the 
South should be decentralized to facilitate the regime’s control over the region (Madut-
Arop, 2006: 39). In the mid-1980, against the backdrop of the 1980 Regional 
Government Act and also seeking to control land and oil discovered in the North-South 
border area, the parliamentary representatives of the Arabized elite initiated a discussion 
over the boundary (Akol, 2007: 147).412 Southern representatives in the parliament 
                                                 
409
 Since Nimeiri was interested principally to maintain control of the South at a personal level and 
weaken the region  by playing the southern political factions against each other, he ensured that Alier 
renewed his HEC Presidency, winning against the recently released Aru, another unity-minded candidate, 
by 68 to 37 in a regional assembly vote, with Angelo Beda from Alier’s constituency elected as the 
speaker (Alier, 1990: 180; Jendia, 2002: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 38; Akol, 2007: 146; Collins, 2008: 
134). This demonstrates the initial weakness of Lagu’s ECCI and its lack of support in the South overall.  
410
 According to Alier (1990: 180), the composition of the ministerial positions was the following: 
Gatkwoth (Vice-President and Finance), Logali (Regional Administration), Malwal (Industry and 
Mining), Oduho (Public Service and Labour), Gama Hassan (Agriculture and Natural Resources), Justin 
Yac (Rural Development), Joseph Ukel (Information), Andrew Wieu (Education), Samuel Abu John 
(Wildlife Conservation and Tourism), Toby Maduot (Health). 
411
 For instance, Gatkwoth and Malwal were sent to Khartoum a number of times to persuade Nimeiri not 
to meddle in southern regional politics and resources (Madut-Arop, 2006: 39). Particular focus was aimed 
at encouraging projects in agro-industrial and transportation sectors since the main agricultural ventures 
in the South, such as the sugar schemes, had stagnated (Alier, 1990: 181). On the other hand, prospecting 
for oil and minerals had continued uninterruptedly and in 1980 the French Total Oil had been granted a 
concession in Bor, Pibor, and Kapoeta region within Bahral-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile with the 
possibility to explore the Ilemi Triangle, which had been under Kenyan administration since the colonial 
period (Widatalla, 1988: 427; Alier, 1990: 182, 216). In August 1981 Nimeiri sent a delegation under the 
Minister of Finance, Bedr al-Din Suleiman, including senior officials of the Bank of Sudan, and 
agricultural, industrial, and commercial banks to visit the South and inquire as to its lack of development 
(Alier, 1990: 182; Collins, 2008: 134). As a result, bank branches were established in Juba and US$9 
million from the KFAED was promised for rehabilitation of the Nzara agro-industrial venture (Alier, 
1990: 182; Collins, 2008: 134-5). 
412
 Whereas before independence the British annexed Abyei to Kordofan and in 1961 Abboud transferred 
copper-rich Hufrat al-Nahas and uranium-rich Kafia Kingi to Darfur from the southern territory, they 
were to be returned through a favorable locally-conducted referendum stipulated by the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, but in the absence of such referendum the people of Abyei had become increasingly 
discontent (Awur, 1988: 83-4; Alier, 1990: 101). The referendum dictated by the Addis Ababa Agreement 
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noticed a map attached to the proposed law violating the boundaries of the southern 
region stipulated in the 1972 Regional Self-Government Act, and annexing newly found 
oil deposits in Bentiu413 and agricultural lands of northern Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper 
Nile to the northern provinces (Awur, 1988: 84; Alier, 1990: 182, 218; Akol, 2007: 
147).414 The move had been made with belief that the southerners would not be capable 
of disputing the claims and would permit more grazing land for the local Baggara, allow 
more land for northern large-scale agriculture around Kosti, and provide access to 
mineral wealth (Awur, 1988: 84). 
 
The discovery of the altered boundary map provoked ill feeling among many southern 
leaders, politicians, and intellectuals. An extraordinary meeting of the HEC condemned 
the regime’s deliberate effort to annex the Bentiu oil zone, Renk agricultural land, and 
the Hufrat al-Nahas copper rich area to the northern provinces, and demonstrations were 
staged in major towns (Awur, 1988: 84; Dallalah, 1988: 441). Alier denounced the 
move and affirmed that the boundaries were to remain in place (quoted in Awur, 1988: 
84), and a joint petition by the HEC and the regional assembly was passed to Nimeiri 
who appointed an investigation committee headed by Chief Justice Khalafallah 
Rasheed, which resolved the dispute in favor of the South (Dallalah, 1988: 441-2; Alier, 
1990: 218).415 Nimeiri accepted the conclusions of the committee and issued a 
presidential decree accordingly (Dallalah, 1988: 442; Alier, 1990: 218). Still, the 
incident had further damaged the regime’s image in the South and, together with other 
developments violating its integrity, convinced many southerners that Nimeiri sought to 
                                                                                                                                               
for areas with ethnic ties to the South, such as Abyei and Chali al-Fil in the Blue Nile, was never 
conducted (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 34). 
413
 These oil wells were located north of the Unity Field but within the boundaries of the Bentiu Area 
Council, despite the central government’s claim that they were part of Southern Kordofan (Alier, 1990: 
219). Symbolically, the central government also named the first oil well in the area as heglig, an Arabic 
term of a tree known in the Bentiu area as thou in Dinka language (Alier, 1990: 219; Warburg, 1993: 
350). Similar name changes were commonplace in the disputed Renk agricultural region to give an 
impression that areas named in Arabic belonged to the northern provinces (Alier, 1990: 219). All were 
designed to prepare the areas to be annexed to the northern provinces. 
414
 This attempt had been preceded by Nimeiri’s failed effort to annex Hufrat al-Nahas permanently to 
Darfur in 1978, which the southerners had collectively rejected (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 34). 
415
 The investigation on the issue revealed secret contracts between the government and Chevron. The 
southern politicians found out that the contracts had been made favoring Chevron and that Kafi Kengi, 
presumably located in the petroleum rich area in western Bahr al-Ghazal, had been secretly leased to 
Chevron in 1979 (Alier, 1990: 218). While Kafi Kengi had been part of the southern region since the 
Addis Ababa Agreement, it had been a previously controversial region in 1961 when Abboud had 
temporarily annexed it to Darfur because uranium deposits had been detected in the area (Alier, 1990: 
219). When the issue resurfaced in 1980-1 as part of the boundary dispute during which the central 
government transferred the area to the North, it reinforced a perception of the regime’s deceitfulness 
(Alier, 1990: 219). 
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divide the region (Madut-Arop, 2006: 38-39). This rivalry over resources had a re-
polarizing impact on identities along the “Arab”-“African” rift by heightening southern 
grievances again towards the Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state. 
 
Moreover, in the context of the state’s financial crisis other incidents took place that 
indicated the regime’s desperation to exploit southern resources,416 while Nimeiri also 
began to apply political pressure on the HEC. For instance, planned oil exploitation 
became highly disputed,417 and a proposed oil refinery project was abandoned due to 
disagreement of its location.418 
                                                 
416
 In November 1980 Nimeiri addressed the National Assembly on government policy claiming that an 
oil refinery would be built in Kosti (Dallalah, 1988: 443; Alier, 1990: 219; Akol, 2007: 147). This raised 
an uproar among the southern politicians because it overrode previous assumptions that a refinery would 
be placed in Bentiu, as it was considered habitual to build refineries near the oil fields. Alier wrote a letter 
to Nimeiri explaining that despite Chevron’s reluctance, Khartoum should insist on building the refinery 
in Bentiu to advance development in the area and permit the southern government to collect taxes from its 
undertakings, diminishing the regime’s responsibility to fund the South (Awur, 1988: 85; Alier, 1990: 
219-20; Akol, 2007: 147). Nimeiri disagreed and invited Alier and Malwal, who was the HEC minister of 
industry, to debate the issue in Khartoum (Dallalah, 1988: 443-4; Alier, 1990: 220). Whereas Chevron 
officials and al-Tuhami explained that building refinery in Bentiu would not be economically viable since 
it would be operative in only three to five years while a refinery in Kosti could be finished in two. 
Moreover, Kosti was closer to industries needing oil and better connected through essential transportation 
links (Dallalah, 1988: 444). This did not convince southern delegates who pointed out that the local 
population could benefit from jobs, economic development, byproducts such as tar to build roads, fair 
sharing of oil revenues, and services such as dispensaries, hospitals, and schools (Awur, 1988: 85-6; 
Alier, 1990: 220; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 33-4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 39). Nimeiri claimed that the decision 
was based on economic and technical arguments and not political reasons. He raised the issue of 
increasing southern separatism and argued that Equatorian divisionists preferred that refinery revenues be 
placed in the central government treasury so that all regions in Sudan would benefit equally (Awur, 1988: 
85-6; Alier, 1990: 220; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 33-4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 39).  
417
 The U.S. oil company Chevron suggested a technical committee made up of both southerners and 
northerners to study the feasibility of locating the refinery in Bentiu, but the regime representatives used 
this deliberately to produce fabricated evidence that the southern leadership was secession-minded (Alier, 
1990: 220; Jendia, 2002: 150). Nimeiri used this to justify the decision to favor Kosti, while Chevron 
offered a nominal incentive package including Kosti-Renk-Malakal road improvement, enhancement of 
sanitation, health, and education and establishment of a development council with S£1 million base 
money in the Bentiu area, reviving a plan for a topping plant, and transportation of refined products to the 
South (Alier, 1990: 220-1). However, Chevron violated its commitments. The central government, which 
pocketed the proceeds of Chevron and Total concessions in the South, advised both companies not to 
collaborate with the HEC (Alier, 1990: 221). As a result, Chevron declined to take up the development 
work it had promised and favored northerners by recruiting only a handful of southerners. In contrast, 
Total did cooperate with the southern regional administration (Alier, 1990: 221; Jendia, 2002: 150). 
418
 This was because Chevron preferred more immediate profit from unrefined Sudanese oil in 
international markets, and the palace clique sought access to export commissions despite Sudan’s need of 
oil for domestic consumption, leading to renewed plans to build the 1,455km pipeline from Bentiu to Port 
Sudan for US$437 million (Dallalah, 1988: 446; Alier, 1990: 221-2; Khalid, 1990: 332). At the same 
time, the regime deemed a southern initiative of building a pipeline to Mombasa politically and 
economically unfeasible, despite the fact that it had promised to lease land to American, Greek, and Saudi 
businesses to pipe oil from the Gulf through Africa to Gabon where it could be shipped onwards avoiding 
areas with Soviet strongholds (Alier, 1990: 222). While Western geo-political security policy aimed to 
avoid Red Sea, Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean for oil exports, the regime insisted 
on piping oil out through Port Sudan (Alier, 1990: 222). This proves that not only was the regime 
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However, these incidents heightened grievances and animosity in the South towards the 
regime. While the HEC was inclined to accept the plans for oil exploitation, the 
pressure by the Regional Assembly419 and the southern public largely prevented it. 
Many southerners grew disenchanted with the weakness and corruption of the HEC, 
resulting in declining credibility of the regional government together with the 
increasingly despised regime and some of its foreign collaborators420 (Dallalah, 1988: 
445; Alier, 1990: 221; Akol, 2007: 147). It also encouraged more radical elements 
particularly among the ex-Any Nya.421 This reflects the growing sentiment of 
disappointment and anger towards the marginalizing state that became conducive to a 
renewed rebellion. 
 
Faced with economic crisis, pressured by the collaborating factions of the Arabized 
elite, and discontented with the southern autonomy, Nimeiri proceeded with a plan to 
decentralize the southern region into three equal regions.422 In March 1981, the issue 
was brought to the southern Regional Assembly, where it was rejected as a violation of 
the 1973 Self-Government Act (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37). Nimeiri continued with the 
plan by pinpointing to “Dinka domination” and excessive “centralization” (Malwal, 
1985: 30; Dak, 1988: 191), and sought to fragment regional unity against the regime by 
encouraging anti-Dinka sentiment and propaganda through support of Lagu’s pro-
divisionists.423 Nimeiri sought to persuade sections of Equatorian politicians behind 
                                                                                                                                               
disingenuous towards the South as it sought to administer oil exclusively, but its internal policy for 
petroleum overrode larger geo-political considerations of the Cold War situation. 
419
 In 31 March 1981, the regional assembly had adopted a resolution to “Disapprove of the attitude of the 
Chevron Oil Company in blatantly and deliberately taking part or side in a politically motivated decision 
which clearly adversely effects the interest of the people of the Southern Region” (RPRA, 1981). 
420
 The southern attitude towards Chevron had a later repercussion when hostilities against the regime 
began because the rebels targeted personnel and installations of the company (Dallalah, 1988: 447).    
421
 They claimed that they had fought the government previously without knowing about the oil, blamed 
the HEC for not fighting for the refinery physically if necessary, and asserted that they would take up 
arms if Nimeiri deceived them (Alier, 1990: 221; Jendia, 2002: 151). 
422
 Bringing up the issue in the SSU Central Committee meeting in February 1981, he claimed, “Now that 
devolution of powers has become reality in the North . . . we consider the possibility of devolving 
administration in the South itself” (see Arou 1988: 168 and Akol, 2007: 151), arguing that division would 
bring administration closer to people, facilitate people’s participation in the political process, and limit 
domination of one single ethnic group over others (Arou, 1988: 168-9). Nimeiri’s proposal was based on 
an earlier ECCI to divide the South (Collins, 2008: 135). At this point, the regime’s central committee 
took no action because the motion had only minority support from Lagu’s constituency (Akol, 2007: 
151). 
423
 In March 1981, 12 southern politicians submitted a written petition for Nimeiri to dissolve the 
southern government and divide the region (See Arou, 1988: 174) partly due to Nimeiri’s encouragement 
(Alier, 1990: 234), which was followed by the publication of Lagu’s booklet, Decentralization: A 
Necessity for the Southern Provinces of the Sudan in April 1981, echoing his thesis of Dinka domination, 
arguing that the Dinka had disproportionate representation in the higher echelons of the southern 
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decentralization with promises of high-level administrative posts and development 
money.424 This contributed to the polarization of sentiments along ethnic lines, 
promoting “tribalist” logic of ethnic identities. 
 
But, Nimeiri’s initiative faced overwhelming resistance in the southern political 
institutions in part because they were at the time dominated by Alier’s unity-minded 
forces. This led him to find more ways to weaken the unity sentiment, particularly after 
pro-unity propaganda literature commissioned by Alier’s Solidarity Group for the Unity 
of Southern Sudan appeared.425  
 
In fact, the projects of the two main southern factions differed radically in their 
approach to the regime. While both the divisionists and unionists emphasized the 
integrity of the southern territory, Lagu believed that smaller regions would ensure the 
rights and interests of smaller ethnic groups, emphasizing their self-determination. To 
achieve this, a strategic partnership with the central government was necessary to 
                                                                                                                                               
administration. For instance, Lagu (1981: 1) argued against the Dinka that “Political leadership, with a 
strong tribal orientation having satisfied themselves that the only way to remain in power is to fan up 
tribal loyalties from their tribe, which they believe must dominate because of sheer numbers are now 
turning around to point a finger at those who want to correct the situation as ‘power hungry’ politicians”.  
The regime financed Lagu’s booklet published by the Samar Printing Press in Khartoum (Awur, 1988: 
89; Akol, 2007: 151; Collins, 2008: 135), which was widely circulated free of charge by Lagu’s 
associates (Akol, 2007: 151; Collins, 2008: 135). 
424
 Nimeiri allegedly told prominent Equatorians who had been defeated in the regional elections in 1980 
that decentralization would create 2/3 more high level administrative positions in the southern provinces 
and all three regions in the South, Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, would be granted initially 
S£15 million for economic development (Alier, 1990: 234). Still, while Equatorians became increasingly 
drawn in only when the propaganda was given a more development-oriented tone, some senior politicians 
such as Mundiri changed their initial posture after realizing that the regime was a significant force behind 
it (Awur, 1988: 90; Dak, 1988: 191, 192). 
425
 The book, The Redivision of the Southern Region: Why it Must Be Rejected, also known as The 
Solidarity Book, describes Nimeiri’s cowardice and southern officers’ heroism to save him from coup 
attempts, warns him not to tamper with southern resources and development, and treats “Arabs” scruffily 
in relation to Arab-Israeli relations (Alier, 1990: 183; Madut-Arop, 2006: 40; Collins, 2008: 135). On the 
situation of the South, its authors state that 
Tribalism is still a very strong force in African politics . . . [;] . . . it is in our determination that 
tribalism, however little, is condemned and uprooted . . . [and] . . . tribal loyalties and activities 
are simple agitations and moves not based on relevant justifications . . . But obviously, redivision 
is not the accurate prescription for this disease (quoted in Awur, 1988: 91, 92).  
The book was rejected in Khartoum, declared illegal and banned (Awur, 1988: 92), and Alier was 
summoned to explain its appearance. Although he argued that the book had been written by members of 
the national parliament and some students of the University of Khartoum as an answer to Lagu’s 
propaganda, it having been printed by the Nile Printing Press in Juba infuriated Nimeiri and other 
Arabized elite individuals and facilitated a consensus among northern political forces that the South had 
become detrimental to the national interest (Awur, 1988: 90; Alier, 1990: 184-5; Madut-Arop, 2006: 39-
40; Akol, 2007: 152; Collins, 2008: 135). 
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bypass regional political institutions in which his constituency was minority.426 In 
contrast, the unionists focused on consolidating the South as one region which would be 
able to stand against the central government to bargain for better political and economic 
arrangements. A united South was seen to an extent as a guarantee of southern rights 
within the Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state.427 When the political situation 
polarized the South, the two main political factions threatened with radical action if 
their respective demands were not met. The divisionists warned about a revolt and the 
unity-minded about the resumption of war in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006: 40). Both 
parties included ex-Anya Nya elements and had links to the southern military, which 
made their threats real. 
 
Prompted by his growing discontent towards the HEC and pressure for him to revoke 
the Regional Self-Government Act, Nimeiri proceeded to undermine the southern 
regional government. In September 1981, he raised the issue in the SSU Political 
Bureau and on 5 October 1981 unilaterally dissolved the southern political institutions 
relying on the 1980 High Executive Council and Regional Assembly Act used earlier to 
dissolve Lagu’s HEC (allegedly having been drafted with Alier’s collaboration), 
                                                 
426
 On the other hand, the divisionists pointed to the conduct of affairs in regional politics since 1972 and 
argued that instead of endorsing unity the southern governments had propelled division through 
discrimination (Madut-Arop, 2006: 37; Akol, 2007: 156). This generated space for a wide array of 
grievances that were channeled for a call to equal division, kokora, of the southern region to free 
Equatorians and others of “Dinka domination” even if it undermined the Addis Ababa Agreement (Akol, 
2007: 156-7). For many, “Dinka domination” had become a legitimate fear, at least in the manner it was 
portrayed as referring to nepotism, and there was also a genuine attempt to achieve economic 
development (Madut-Arop, 2006: 36, interview with an elderly merchant 29 September in Juba). In 
general, the message of the divisionists, which was transmitted through a campaign of political 
mobilization, was able to capture vast support in Equatoria (Akol, 2007: 156-7). Indeed, Lagu’s assertion 
at a political rally in Khartoum in March 1981 that the South did not have to be strong and unified 
anymore was applauded, while some southern politicians felt embarrassed by the member of regional 
assembly and the chairman of the SSU assembly body, Ambrose Ring Thiik’s, response to Lagu in which 
he claimed that South’s struggle against the northern Arabs was not over yet (Akol, 2007: 158). Thiik was 
later arrested for his support of unity of the southern region (Akol, 2007: 158). 
427
 The unity faction argued that decentralization was simply Nimeiri’s strategy to undermine southern 
autonomy and resume direct control over the region by Khartoum, history lending support to their 
argument because various northern governments had been keen to divide and rule the region since the 
1965 Round Table Conference (Akol, 2007: 155-6). They further argued that the southern region’s unity 
was the only guarantee of its strength and that intra-regional differences should not weaken a common 
stance against any northern plot to undermine autonomy, the only valid manner altering the provisions of 
the Addis Ababa Agreement being the referendum (Akol, 2007: 156). During the campaign the unity 
faction defended its prior term in the office that had been tainted by a number of letdowns such as the 
failure to hear public opinion during the 1981 refinery dispute, and continued using legalistic arguments, 
largely by Alier, a lawyer by training, in defense of unity perceived by some as an attempt to defend their 
jobs and other personal interests (Akol, 2007: 157). Moreover, by defending unity they continued to 
function within the SSU political bureau and declined to take responsibility for the CUSS activities (Akol, 
2007: 157). Some of this was perceived negatively in the South, which was turning increasingly hostile to 
Nimeiri, the regime, and disenchanted by its own politicians.      
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eliminating pro-unity elements and appointing a Transitional Regional Government 
(TRG) under the authority of General Gismallah Abdullah Rasas, a Fertit southerner 
and Lagu’s friend (Arou, 1982: 185, 1988: 174; Rogier, 2005: 16; Akol, 2007: 153). 
The national parliament was also dissolved in preparation for a projected referendum to 
obtain the 75% majority vote to secure the re-division proposal,428 after which it would 
require a 2/3 majority support in the regional assembly to become effective (Awur, 
1988: 94-5). 
 
Consequently, the new Nimeiri-appointed southern administration took office. Although 
it was to be in office only six months, mainly to oversee preparation for a referendum 
on the division in southern Sudan, Rasas refused to convoke a referendum before the 
elections for a new regional assembly, as this was resisted by members of his cabinet 
(Arou, 1988: 174; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37; Madut-Arop, 2006: 32; Akol, 2007: 153). 
The Rasas cabinet was composed of a number of ex-Anya Nya commanding officers,429 
belonging to the underground organization that Nimeiri had sought to neutralize by 
removing them from the army and appointing them to the TRG. On the other hand, the 
former Anya Nya officers believed they had joined the TRG with a view to be reinstated 
in the army after its dissolution (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32). By this point, many ex-Anya 
Nya officers were aggrieved by their waning political and economic influence after the 
war and sought to retake the role as the protagonists within the southern elite, either 
through the political process or armed struggle. 
 
                                                 
428
 Nimeiri’s move was meant to undermine the unity-minded southern leadership and lower the southern 
representation at national level below the stipulated 25% to facilitate the South’s division, adhering to the 
1981 People’s Local Government Act that had been applied to decentralize the North previously (Dak, 
1988: 176; Alier, 1990: 186; Madut-Arop, 2006: 32).  
429
 Apart from Vice President and Minister of Commerce and Industry Makur, who had found the army 
orders to act against a rebellion in 1979 (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32, 33, 40), some of the former Anya Nya 
officers in the TRG were: Brigadier Joseph Kuol Amuom, the Minister of Administration and Local 
Government, Colonel Habbakuk Soro, Minister of Wildlife Conservation, Colonel Alison Manana 
Magaya, Commissioner of Western Equatoria, Colonel Saturnino Arika, Commissioner of Eastern 
Equatoria, Colonel john Kaong Nyuon, Commissioner of Jonglei Province, Colonel Peter Mabil, 
Commissioner of Upper Nile, Colonel Alfred Deng Aluk, Commissioner of Bahr al-Ghazal, and Major 
General Samuel Mabur Malek, Commissioner of Lakes Province (Madut-Arop, 2006: 33). Particularly 
Makur had become suspected of forming part of Anya Nya conspiracy and was kept out of the South on 
political duties (Madut-Arop, 2006: 32, 33). If this were not the case, they would desert and reinitiate 
hostilities against the Nimeiri regime (Madut-Arop, 2006: 33). 
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The news of the disruption in regional politics destabilized the situation in the South. 430 
Demonstrations ensued against the dissolution of the southern political institutions 
which were also aimed against Rasas who was portrayed as a figurehead of renewed 
northern domination (Alier, 1990: 186; Collins, 2008: 135-6). However, Alier 
proceeded with a transition he had promised Nimeiri by intervening on the radio on 6 
October 1981 to diffuse tensions in Juba and providing Rasas with the necessary 
government information (Alier, 1990: 186). Yet, suspecting manipulation of the TRG 
by unity-minded southern politicians,431 Nimeiri ordered Rasas to distance himself from 
the latter, but Rasas proved less enthusiastic about dividing the South than expected and 
made public remarks about the importance of unity of the region (Alier, 1990: 187; 
Akol, 2007: 154). These events give further credence to Alier’s ambiguous role between 
the regime and the South. The marginalizing state continued to use such support by 
some southern leaders. 
 
In the midst of growing tension in December 1981 Nimeiri visited the major towns of 
the South. However, he faced demonstrations as his popularity had plummeted.432 In 
response Nimeiri, who claimed to be personally insulted, ordered the arrests of pro-
unity politicians and demanded recommendations from the HEC concerning a suitable 
manner to decentralize433 the southern region (Alier, 1990: 190-1; Madut-Arop, 2006: 
41-2; Akol, 2007: 163-4; Collins, 2008: 136). Yet, the HEC declined to submit 
                                                 
430
 While the unity-minded in Alier’s faction, including leaders of Bahr al-Ghazal, Upper Nile, and some 
Equatorians, were disappointed and rejected Nimeiri’s order because it was aimed to dismantle the Addis 
Ababa Agreement and weaken the South, Lagu’s divisionists celebrated the move because it opened the 
window for re-division, escape from the alleged Dinka domination, and was believed to bring material 
benefits for Equatoria in the form of administrative jobs and development financing  (Arou, 1988: 175; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 32, 33). 
431
 Many southern politicians opposed to decentralization worked to undermine the attempts to divide the 
region. In October 1981, a broad coalition overcoming ethnic and regional affiliations among those 
southern politicians against Lagu’s policy emerged and founded a political organization called the 
Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan (CUSS) chaired by Mboro, assisted by Aru, with Oduho as 
the Secretary-General, along with 24 prominent southern politicians in its executive committee (Akol, 
2007: 160-1).  
432
 For instance in Wau, he was welcomed by the demonstrating Bussere Secondary School students and 
other school children, ill-received and ridiculed by stone-throwing students of the Secondary School in 
Rumbek, after which Nimeiri became increasingly uncompromising (Khalid, 1985: 237; Alier, 1990: 190; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 41; Collins, 2008: 136). It is likely that this incident is linked to agitation by the main 
cell of the ex-Anya Nya officers underground movement in Bussere, with membership mainly in Bahr al-
Ghazal but also in Upper Nile and Equatoria, including Col. Emmanuel Abuur Nhial, Cpt. Garang, Lt. 
Col. Stephen Madut Baak, Lt. Col. Joseph Kuol Amoum, Lt. Col. Deng Aluk, and Maj. Albino Akol 
Akol. 
433
 Nimeiri preferred the term decentralization, instead of division to diminish protests (Alier, 1990: 234). 
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recommendations claiming that it had no legal power to amend the Southern Self-
Government Act (Alier, 1990: 234; Collins, 2008: 136).  
 
Consequently, measures were taken against the anti-divisionist leadership. On 22 
December, the Council for the Unity of the Southern Sudan (CUSS), the main unity 
faction founded in October 1981, sent a communiqué to Nimeiri to demand recognition 
of the majority anti-divisionist opinion in the South in the regional assembly and among 
southern members in the parliament and the SSU, requesting neutral and equal 
treatment of the two main southern political factions, and legalization of the CUSS as a 
political formation (Khalid, 1985: 236-7). The CUSS also called for aid outside of 
Sudan.434 This prompted the regime to arrest the CUSS executive committee, along with 
unity-minded southern members of the parliament and students (Arou, 1988: 175; 
ESPAC, 2002: 33; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42; Akol, 2007: 161). The CUSS politicians 
were accused of connections with Libya and plotting to undermine the state 
unconstitutionally since the 1973 constitution stipulated that the SSU was the only legal 
political organization in the country (Arou, 1988: 175, 176).435 The arrest of the 
southern politicians triggered riots and violence in the South targeting northerners, and 
the regime felt obliged to calm the situation by releasing the detained politicians in 
January-February 1982 to dispute elections in the southern region. 436  
 
This growing political tension became conducive to the resumption of war as Nimeiri 
proceeded to undermine southern autonomy. Driven by self-initiative, rising pressure by 
his allies,437 and external factors, the concentration on decentralization and the southern 
issue helped Nimeiri divert attention from the general economic crisis. The support 
                                                 
434
 It attempted to capture the attention of the neighboring countries, such as Ethiopia that was supporting 
residual armed factions in the South, which might be most inclined to help the cause of the anti-
divisionists through the OAU. A letter was written in which the measures taken by the regime to 
undermine the southern autonomy were detailed (Arou, 1982: 341-2). 
435
 There was reason to believe in the Libyan connection because the letter stating the formation of the 
CUSS gave some indication to that direction, and Alier, who was aware of Qadhafi’s designs to 
undermine Nimeiri, had met him personally in 1975 in Wau (Arou, 1982: 346-9; Alier, 1990: 170-2). 
436
 These resulted in numerous deaths including three school children killed in Wau (see Arou, 1988: 
186). The southern riots took place in the context of overall economic deterioration and accompanying 
political tension resulting in large-scale demonstrations in various parts of the country in December 1981, 
and the southern politicians were released after some of them were charged with constituting a political 
organization against the national one-party constitution (see Arou, 1988: 177; Akol, 2007: 161). 
437
 According to Alier (1990: 230), “For a President who wanted to manage things alone, the autonomy of 
the South was an undesirable limitation to his powers. And for those who wanted to revive the call for a 
theocratic system of government based on Islamic fundamentalism, the autonomy was a constitutional 
barrier to their cherished goals”. 
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against southern autonomy enabled him to adopt a hardening position, as Nimeiri 
became increasingly fearful of resumed rebellion in the South.438 This fear drew in part 
on the experience of several regime changes during the first southern insurgency that 
had emerged in the context of the marginalizing state. 
 
4. End of Southern Autonomy  
 
This section focuses on the fourth Regional Assembly in the South which culminated in 
the end of southern autonomy. It shows how Nimeiri’s actions to undermine southern 
unity and local polarization in the South crystallized in the abrogation of Southern Self-
Government Act that laid a platform for intensification of violence.  
 
     Fourth Southern Regional Assembly, May 1982 - June 1983 
 
Although poised to divide the southern region, Nimeiri was wary of its impact on the 
marginalizing state in crisis. This is why he briefly shifted his position on the South439 
as a strategic move to diffuse the pressure at the national level that threatened the 
regime,440 while he also sought to prevent a reactionary vote in the upcoming elections 
in the South. However, in his call for the restoration of democracy in the South, Nimeiri 
did not forget to mention that proper application of the 1981 People’s Local 
Government Act together with other decentralizing administrative measures was 
necessary, and that southern factions should reach a compromise on decentralization 
(Arou, 1988: 186; Akol, 2007: 154-5; Collins, 2008: 188). This legalistic approach was 
used to legitimize the future division.   
                                                 
438
 In October 1981, Nimeiri warned Alier and Beda of the use of force against any armed uprising in the 
South and delayed Alier’s return to Juba to sent Rasas with him to minimize a risk of a rebellion (Alier, 
1990: 185, 186). 
439
 In the opening of the Fifth People’s National Assembly in February 1982 he told the southern 
leadership that he perceived decentralization as excessively divisive and against national interest, and 
announced that elections were to be held in the southern region in April with a view to maintain its unity 
(Awur, 1988: 95; Alier, 1990: 189; Akol, 2007: 154). 
440
 The December riots all over the country following the dissolution of the national and regional 
assemblies in October 1981 had shaken his government. This had not only led to Nimeiri organizing a 
meeting with the national leadership, but convinced him to reassert his position in the army, the SSU, the 
National Assembly, and the cabinet in the face of declining legitimacy (Alier, 1990: 189). For this task 
that became the main priority, Nimeiri needed time and the issue of the South became temporarily a lesser 
concern. Second, after assessing that it was practically impossible that the southerners would vote for 
decentralization in a free and fair referendum because only a minority, mostly Equatorians, supported 
Lagu’s divisionists, he decided to postpone the plan to divide the southern region (Alier, 1990: 189; Akol, 
2007: 153). Nimeiri wanted temporarily to minimize any destabilizing effect from the South, which 
would debilitate his position further.  
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Meanwhile, personalized ethnic and regional factionalism continued in the South. As a 
result, under pressure from both Lagu’s constituency and the central government, the 
CUSS disintegrated due to personal rivalries over the presidency of the HEC, which 
prevented a concerted campaign by the unity-minded to match that of the divisionists 
(Akol, 2007: 161, 162).441 In March 1982, as the southern factions prepared for 
elections of the next month, the division issue monopolized the campaign and pitted 
Lagu’s ECCI divisionists against Alier’s unity-minded CUSS, with Lagu’s 
decentralization agenda particularly popular in Equatoria (Arou, 1988: 178; Alier, 1990: 
189; Collins, 2008: 136).442 At this stage, the ECCI’s propaganda was adopted in the 
major towns in Equatoria but also in the rural areas where many Equatorian farmers had 
been experiencing occasional armed confrontations with the influx of Dinka migrants 
and their cattle since Nile floods of the 1960s around Bor and Yirol (Alier, 1990: 189; 
Collins, 2008: 136). The insurgency and the period of southern regional government 
had also contributed to migration. The ECCI’s propaganda and the violent events had a 
polarizing effect on the reconstruction of inter-ethnic grievances in the South, which in 
turn had far reaching consequences on the reconstruction of Equatorian identities with 
the Dinka categorized as “the other”.443  
 
The electoral process polarized the division debate further. Some violent incidents were 
reported, while both the unity-minded and the divisionists sought to convince 
southerners. In April 1982 the vote was conducted and Lagu’s divisionists won most 
seats in Eastern and Western Equatoria, while Alier’s unity faction dominated the vote 
in the remaining four provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, Jonglei, Lakes, and Upper Nile (Arou, 
1988: 178; ESPAC, 2002: 33). In the aftermath, the regional assembly elected Joseph 
                                                 
441
 Whereas Alier and his associates sought the presidency undermining Mboro’s candidature only to 
endorse him later after having damaged his credibility, Toby Maduot and Othwonh Dak reached an 
agreement with Equatorians on forming a government and Brigadier Andrew Makur Thou announced his 
candidature for the HEC Presidency under the Government for Regional Reconciliation, widely believed 
to have been sponsored by Nimeiri to undermine the unity faction (Akol, 2007: 162-3). 
442
 According to Alier (1990: 189), 
There were many reasons for this which had to do with interaction between groups and their 
neighbours, a tradition of resistance to foreigners of all types, the unequal distribution of 
education in the region, the uneven impact of the civil war—which affected Equatoria most of 
all—and the recent upheavals in Uganda. A large number of soldiers, workers, elites and 
businessmen, all Southern Sudanese, who worked in Uganda during the administration of Idi 
Amin had rushed to Equatoria between October 1979 and January 1980 after his overthrow.  
Most of them were without jobs and all were from Equatoria. The unemployment and 
comparative poverty they found at home contrasted sharply with the prosperous lives they had 
lived in Uganda. Their frustrations led them to actions that were sometimes beyond the norm and 
the ‘liberation’ of Equatoria from the Dinka was one of them. 
443
 This was relevant regarding the alliances during the second southern insurgency and beyond. 
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James Tembura, an Equatorian divisionist covertly intensely backed by the regime,444 as 
the president of the HEC with 62 votes over Clement Mboro with 49 votes, and 
Matthew Obur became the speaker (Arou, 1988: 180-1; Alier, 1990: 192).  
 
After Tembura’s victory Nimeiri could harden his posture on division. Immediately 
after the elections he replaced Alier with Lagu as the second national Vice President 
(Awur, 1988: 95, 96), to shift from the less radical position he had chosen before 
elections. By the time the TRG handed power to the new HEC in June 1982, the former 
Anya Nya officers had been dropped from the new HEC and automatically retired. This 
was part of a deliberate strategy by Nimeiri to minimize the risk of rebellion, but it led 
to restlessness in the South because it was seen as part of an overall attempt to eliminate 
the former rebels.445 Another element to this strategy was the transferring and 
integration of the remaining most resistant absorbed elements446 of battalions 103, 104, 
105, 110, 111, 116, and 117, coinciding with escalating violations of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 34, 35). These deliberate measures by the 
marginalizing state dissolved the security guarantees of the Addis Ababa Agreement 
and raised tension further. 
 
                                                 
444
 Tembura’s election was rife with accusations of regime manipulation, indicated by him being returned 
as the sole candidate for the divisionists, having security personnel at his residence when still a member 
of parliament, and his election victory being the cover story of the March 1982 edition of the Sudanow 
Magazine (Awur, 1988: 96; Madut-Arop, 2006: 34, 41). Tembura, who was able to secure votes from an 
ethnically larger variety of regional assembly representatives, including 20% of his vote coming from the 
Dinka, received assistance from Siddiq al-Banna, Nimeiri’s close relative and a northern Sudanese 
commanding officer of the army’s southern command, together with a delegation from Khartoum headed 
by Ezzil al-Din al-Sayed, the speaker of the national parliament. Most importantly, he obtained financial 
resources from members of Islamic Brotherhood, Abdel Hamid Saleh and Yassin Omer al-Imam, which 
became decisive for Tembura’s victory as the unity faction was meanwhile deliberately undermined by 
bribes, promises for cabinet positions, and propaganda (Arou, 1988: 178, 180-1; Alier, 1990: 190; Nyaba, 
2000: 29; Madut-Arop, 2006: 34; Collins, 2008: 136). Allegedly, unity faction politicians were told that 
Nimeiri would not proceed with the division, which resulted in almost 30 members breaking away to the 
divisionist camp and enabled the election of Tembura (Arou, 1988: 178, 181; Alier, 1990: 190; Madut-
Arop, 2006: 34). 
445
 For instance, 103 of the 203 original ex-Anya Nya officers had been relieved from the army by 1982, 
the number of the former Anya Nya soldiers had declined to 1/3 from the original 6,000, and the ex-Anya 
Nya in police, prison, and wildlife forces had diminished, all due to non-promotion, retirement, disability, 
and death, with neither officers nor soldiers being replaced by other trained southerners (Kulusika, 1998: 
103; Madut-Arop, 2006: 34). 
446
 Since 1980 the policy of transferring former Anya Nya had been intensified, according to the demands 
of the army headquarters in Khartoum and despite the HEC leadership’s warnings, with an attempt to 
minimize the ex-Anya Nya potential to undermine the political order in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006: 
36). Those officers who had avoided transfer by threatening to revolt, particularly in Ayod, Bor, Kapoeta, 
Rumbek, and Torit were secretly placed under regime vigilance (Madut-Arop, 2006: 369). 
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The accumulated effect of particularly the two latter factors was a growing feeling of 
local insecurity in the South. This was particularly because many viewed the former 
Anya Nya in the military, police, prisons, and wildlife department as the protectors of 
the South and the guardians of the Addis Ababa Agreement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 34). In 
these deteriorating circumstances the process of removal of the former rebel officers 
encouraged conspiracies and mutinies among ex-Anya Nya troops loyal to them.447  
 
In June 1982, the new Regional Assembly initiated its work in the midst of growing 
tension. Nimeiri applied pressure to the HEC to implement the division of the South, 
but the project continued to face resistance in the southern political institutions, which 
led him to tamper with the SSU regional congress voting results on the issue.448 
However, while Tembura neither adhered to nor rejected Nimeiri’s pressure,449 
Nimeiri’s machinations propelled by sectors of the Arabized elite pressure groups were 
gaining momentum. 
 
In spring 1983, plans of finalizing the division were moved forward. In March, the 
regime neutralized political resistance to decentralization in Abyei,450 and arrested two 
                                                 
447
 According to Madut-Arop (2006: 34, 36), “ . . . [This] undoubtedly opened doors for the former Anya 
Nya underground movement to agitate and ring bells of the resumption of insurrection in the South. 
Indeed, the government’s policies and reactionary propensities of the Southerners naturally synchronized 
the rhythm towards war that was gaining momentum day by day”. 
448
 In the first meeting, the HEC insisted on the implementation of the reforms dictated by the Nimeiri 
regime (Akol, 2007: 155). However, after the regional congress of the SSU, which Nimeiri convoked to 
raise the issue of division in January 1983, voted overwhelmingly to preserve unity and the Self-
Government Act, he applied pressure on Tembura and Zein al-Abdin M. A. Abdel Gader, who were in 
charge of publishing the regional assembly voting results, to change the resolution from rejection to 
acceptance (Alier, 1990: 191, 234; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42; Collins, 2008: 136-7). Soon after the vote 
Tembura met Nimeiri and suggested a reshuffle of the HEC, but Nimeiri pressured that by February 1983 
three separate governments should be formed in the South and the Regional Assembly dissolved (Alier, 
1990: 191-2; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37). The plan for the division consisted of three stages including 
appointment of one minister for Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile responsible to the HEC for 1-
2 year interim period, followed by the appointment of vice-presidents administering each region and 
reporting to the HEC, and finally the formation of governments for each region after the end of 
Tembura’s four-year term after which the HEC and the regional assembly would gradually cease to 
function (Alier, 1990: 192). 
449
 According to Alier (1990: 192) and Akol (2007: 164), both non-Equatorian, Tembura proceeded 
privately by writing a letter to Nimeiri calling for the division of the southern region, and submitted his 
plan to initiate the formation of three separate governments in the South in February 1983. However, 
Chan and Zuor (2006: 37) assert that “Tambura, the descendant of a prominent Azande family, 
recognized that most people in Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal opposed re-division, and did not act on 
that request”. 
450
 The regime arrested members of the Abyei central committee who had just returned from Juba to call 
for the Abyei referendum as stipulated in the Self-Government Act because they were allegedly 
encouraging Anya Nya II activities in northern Bahr al-Ghazal where 12 northern merchants had been 
killed in Ariath, north of Aweil, in January 1983 (Niblock, 1987: 288; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42-3, 65). 
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senior southern politicians agitating against the division in Khartoum.451 This prepared 
Nimeiri to announce the division of the South,452 which he did on 5 June 1983, 
453effectively splitting the region into its three prior provinces, Bahr al-Ghazal, 
Equatoria, and Upper Nile. This stripped the southern region of its limited autonomous 
status with self-elected leadership, turning it into three financially unviable provinces 
without right to question national legislation and with appointed leadership answerable 
to the president and the regime (Rogier, 2005: 16; Akol, 2007: 166, 167, 168; Collins, 
2008: 138). Above all, it resumed the Arabized elite dominated marginalizing state’s 
direct subjugation of southern Sudan, by abolishing the southern political organs and 
limited political and economic claims including control over its own resources. Arabic 
was reinstated as the official language in the South, with the use of other languages 
requiring a special permission, the regional public service including internal southern 
security bodies was ended, and the formal right for a collective southern request to 
withdraw any law affecting it adversely was abolished (Alier, 1990: 227-9, 232; Akol, 
2007: 166-8; Collins, 2008: 138). This measure by the marginalizing state was designed 
to resume direct domination of southern Sudan. As such it was a success in neutralizing 
any emerging southern influence at the national level and reaffirming Nimeiri’s and his 
Arabized elite constituency’s position in northern Sudan, but cleared a path for growing 
southern military agitation in the face of the waning power of local politicians.       
                                                 
451
 This was when the regime’s SSO arrested Obur, the Speaker of the Regional Assembly, and Dhol 
Acuil Aleu, the Vice President of the HEC, who had previously supported Tembura over ethnic lines, 
after having held a rally in the University of Khartoum. They had told students about the forgery of the 
regional assembly voting results on the division issue, accusing Tembura and the ministers of the central 
government of changing the outcome, asserting that Nimeiri would not divide the South due to his 
religious conviction as a Muslim, and that they would oppose any such possible violation of the Southern 
Self-Government Act (Alier, 1990: 192, 234; Madut-Arop, 2006: 42). Both were imprisoned in Kobar 
until mid-1984 when they were released and went to Addis Ababa to join the newly emerged rebels 
(Akol, 2007: 164). 
452
 In May 1983, Nimeiri had received a delegation of northerners and southerners demanding the division 
of the southern region. Headed by Lagu, it included Philip Obang, Luigi Adwok Bong, Othwon Dak, 
Oliver Albino, Dr. Ahmed-Hameed Saleh, and the Speaker of the National Assembly, Izz al-din al-Saeed. 
They were discontented with Tembura, claiming that being a Zande conditioned him against the division 
and that he would not undertake it during his term (Madut-Arop, 2006: 54).  
453
 Tembura was called to Khartoum, and upon his meeting with Nimeiri on 5 June 1983 he was told that 
the president would announce the division the same evening and that Tembura would become the 
governor of Equatoria region, Daniel Kuot Matthews the governor of Upper Nile region, and Wol the 
governor of Bahr al-Ghazal region (Madut-Arop, 2006: 54-5). Consequently, Nimeiri called a press 
conference and announced in a televised session, with Lagu at his side, the Republican Order No. 1, 
which divided the southern region initially for a period of 18 months after which the people would decide 
according to the constitution, denying interference with the Southern Self-Government Act (Alier, 1990: 
235; Akol, 2007: 164; Collins, 2008: 137-8; interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official, 1 October 
2008 in Kampala). Decreeing the transfer of the personnel from the regional institutions, he claimed that 
the plan was executed because it was recommended by Tembura’s regional government (Malwal, 1985: 
34; Madut-Arop, 2006: 55). 
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The re-division of the South represented also the crystallization of the “national” 
reconciliation and the power of the Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri defended his position by 
asserting that the Addis Ababa Agreement had been a contract between Lagu and 
himself and that both wanted it changed, and that while by law a referendum was 
necessary to change the Southern Self-Government Act, while he saw a plebiscite 
unnecessary since he was mandated by the people of Sudan to do what he saw as 
essential (Khalid, 1985: 239). Nimeiri’s final decision to go through with the division 
was largely pressured by the Muslim Brothers whose support to the president was 
conditioned by their stand against the southern autonomy and promotion of Islamic 
constitution (Alier, 1990: 164; Collins, 2008: 138). However, through the abolition of 
the southern autonomy, the Muslim Brothers who had been among the principal actors 
pressing Nimeiri to divide the South achieved another objective of dismantling the 
southern region and removing the main potential support base that Nimeiri could have 
used to counter their rising power (Alier, 1990: 234-5). This opened them an 
unrestricted avenue to become the sole major political constituency of the regime and to 
be the main covert power governing the marginalizing state. 
 
Following the division, new systems of government were set up. Ministers of the HEC 
returned to their home areas to participate in separate executive organs,454 members of 
regional assembly returned to their constituencies, and large quantities of people were 
forced to return to their areas of ethnic origin evicted from their residences without any 
financial aid from the regime dedicated for the process (Alier, 1990: 235; Madut-Arop, 
2006: 55-6; Akol, 2007: 165). This was particularly the case of the many Nilotics 
(Dinka and Nuer) who had resided in Equatoria, while “Northerners residing in the 
South were unaffected by this mass dislocation of people and went about their business 
as usual” (Akol, 2007: 165). Especially many of the Dinka, as the largest ethnic super-
group in the South, were affected. This caused mass exodus as many uprooted people 
headed towards the Ethiopian border and joined with rebel elements (Awur, 1988: 87; 
                                                 
454
 For instance, Tembura returned to Juba where he was received with joy by Lagu’s constituency, but 
after being appointed as the Governor of Equatoria region leaving out some of the staunchest supporters 
of division of the South, including Albino, Eliaba James Surur, Luka Monoja, Samson Kwaje, and Jino 
Gama, further political strife took place in Equatoria along ethnic and sectional lines (Madut-Arop, 2006: 
56-7). Demands were encouraged for further decentralization, manifested in the fractionalization of 
Equatorian politics before political life was disrupted by the conflict in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006: 
57). The pledged improved conditions after the division did not materialize and as grievances spread and 
Nimeiri’s machinations became more apparent, some members of the Equatorian intelligentsia later 
joined southern rebels despite them being principally Dinka (Madut-Arop, 2006: 57). 
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Madut-Arop, 2006: 56). Subsequently, Nimeiri appointed new governors, cancelled 
elections, abolished the local authority to extract revenue from regional trade and 
resources, and made the security apparatus in the South formally responsible to 
Khartoum instead of Juba (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 37). This elevated the insecurity of the 
population in the South considerably as the number of armed groups grew.455 
 
5. Increasing Insecurity and Militarization 
 
This section explores growing insecurity in southern Sudan caused by renewed 
momentum for militarization. It shows how armed factions became more organized, 
which culminated in the second insurgency.  
 
     Local Ethnic Struggles and Militias  
 
Although the Addis Ababa Agreement provided a framework for the pacification of 
society after war, the process was gradual and could not be completed before insecurity 
again gained momentum. Particularly many rural areas in the South experienced 
persistent insecurity throughout the period of southern regional autonomy, and it is not a 
coincidence that many of the absorbed Anya Nya units placed in the remote rural army 
outposts were affected. While the lack of security in rural areas was related to local 
ethnic feuds aggravated by the war and competition over basic resources it was also 
linked to the activities of the disparate Anya Nya II bands that persisted throughout the 
autonomous period in the South.456 Meanwhile, several absorbed Anya Nya units loyal 
to their ex-Anya Nya leaders were affected by news and rumors related to regime 
policies and political developments, while their own condition as the absorbed forces 
defied integration and loyalty to the national army because they were only expected to 
serve as part of the army’s Southern Command. 
 
                                                 
455
 The situation encouraged the underground political opposition in the South as well. These had been 
active since the 1970s and included the National Action Movement (NAM), the Juwama African People’s 
Organization, the SSLM, and the Movement of Total Liberation of Southern Sudan. None of these 
survived the havoc of the early 1980s but some of their members such as Samuel Gai Tut and Akwot 
Atem (NAM), and Pagan Amum and Nyachugak Nyachiluk (SSLM) became active in armed groups after 
the war broke out. See i.e. Akol (2001: 2-3).    
456
 For instance, continuously in the 1970s, the Murle, a people with a deep-rooted warrior culture, carried 
out cattle raids on their neighboring Bor, Twic, Nyareweng, and Ghol Dinka and Lou Nuer groups (de 
Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 120). 
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The Anya Nya II groups and armed bands organized along ethnic lines. They tended to 
use guns obtained from the government during the 1960s as part of its strategy to 
encourage the “tribalization” of local ethnic conflicts by raising, arming, supplying, and 
sometimes paying, militias among southern groups to fight each other (Johnson and 
Prunier, 1993: 119, 120). More guns were readily available in the Ethiopian border 
areas were an arms trade had existed already long time before the emergence of the 
“Southern Problem”, and the proliferation of arms had caused internal Nuer conflicts in 
Ethiopia to intensify and spread to the Nuer communities on the Sudanese side of the 
border, impeding their resolution (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 120).  
 
Similarly, historical inter-ethnic feuds in the North-South border zone, manifested in the 
context of traditional relationship between conflict and cooperation, intensified in 
conjunction with the first southern insurgency. Although these conflicts457 were already 
manifested in the colonial period particularly in the controversial Darfur-Bahr al-Ghazal 
boundary demarcated 14 kilometers south of the Bahr al-Arab (or Kiir in Dinka) river in 
1924, in the 1960s they culminated in the 1965 al-Muglad massacre of over 200 Ngok 
by the Humr Misiria (de Waal, 1993: 144). These feuds continued throughout the Anya 
Nya insurgency and ended intermittently when some Baggara negotiated agreements 
with local Anya Nya leaders to continue their grazing activity by paying taxes in money 
and bulls (Alier, 1990: 255-6). However, the relationship remained volatile and subject 
to reinforcement by “external” actors such as the marginalizing state seeking to divide 
and rule through strategies of inclusion and exclusion.  
 
By the 1970s a combination of more destructive military technology and deterioration 
of the traditional inter-ethnic conflict settlement councils during the war had resulted in 
more difficulties to manage these conflicts. The introduction of advanced armament, 
such as semi-automatic weapons, compounded the debilitating effect of Nimeiri’s 
abolition of Native Administration in 1971, leading to deterioration of security situation 
in areas where local ethnic conflict was prevalent.458 This is significant because the 
                                                 
457
 These conflicts took place between sectors of the nomadic Rizaigat and Misiria, both perceived 
culturally as Arab Baggara, and sections of Malwal, Twic, Ngok, Ruweng Dinka, sectors of the Nuer, and 
parts of the Nuba. 
458
 The replacement of Native Administration through which the colonial state had encouraged local 
mechanisms for conflict settlement, with the system of local People’s Councils, resulted in resistance of 
the new structures by some chiefs opposing the regime and some locals ignored all local administrators 
(de Waal, 1993: 145). 
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Addis Ababa Agreement restored Native Administration in the South, in terms of 
chief’s courts, but similar structures ceased to exist north of the Bahr al-Ghazal 
boundary, hindering inter-ethnic conflict resolution.459  
 
During the late 1970s the relationship between sections of the Baggara and the Dinka in 
the North-South boundary began to deteriorate further. This took place in the context of 
droughts continuing into the early 1980s and the subsequent contest over pastureland 
and water (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121), which reinforced polarization of identities 
along ethnic lines. When growing conflicts emerged between parts of the Rizaigat 
(Baggara) and the Malwal (Dinka) by the end of 1970s, instability emerged also 
between sectors of the Humr Misiria (Baggara) and Ngok (Dinka) in 1983-4, leading to 
organized militia activity by the Humr in 1985 (de Waal, 1993: 146). The murahalin 
militia, consisting of sectors of the Baggara, had originally been used to patrol the 
North-South border during the Condominium, but at this point it began to target 
primarily Dinka civilians (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121). Yet, the Nimeiri regime 
made no effort towards inter-ethnic conflict resolution in the South since 1983, despite 
helping to settle inter-ethnic conflicts in Darfur, and the Transitional Military Council 
government after the collapse of the Nimeiri regime pushed formalization of some 
Baggara militias as part of a policy of systematic use of militias against southern armed 
groups and civilians (de Waal, 1993: 146, 147). 
 
The deteriorating rural security situation was compounded by regional factors. One 
contributing factor was the fall of the Selassie regime in Ethiopia in 1974 which led to 
the decline of Sudan-Ethiopia relations and resulted in growth of Sudan’s support for 
Ethiopian and Eritrean dissidents, while Ethiopia in contrast increased its support for 
southern Sudanese guerrilla bands (collectively known as the Anya Nya II), making 
                                                 
459
 For instance, in the 1971-6 period there were no regular traditional meetings to resolve Rizaigat-
Malwal Dinka feuds and it was only in 1979 after army intervention by southern troops from Aweil that a 
system of three consecutive annual meetings was imposed, the Malwal complaining that they were not 
treated fairly by the Rizaigat court and the Rizaigat expressing discontent over intervention of the 
southern forces (de Waal, 1993: 145). It should also be mentioned that in the southern Kordofan/Abyei 
area, which the regime defined strictly as an “Arab” dominated region belonging to the North, similar 
instability existed throughout the 1970s. In this case, both Ngok Dinka and Humr Misiria were under the 
same Area Council, which potentially facilitated local conflict settlement, but also subjected the Ngok to 
domination of the local Baggara groups (de Waal, 1993: 145), an important constituency of a section of 
the Arabized elite. These received limited backing from the regime authorities, attempting to assert its 
control and buttress Baggara superiority locally.  
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small arms more widely available for other groups in the South (Johnson and Prunier, 
120, 122). Similarly, the overthrow of Idi Amin in 1979 in Uganda contributed to the 
growing insecurity in the South through a flow of weapons from northern Uganda 
reaching Bahr al-Ghazal and Jonglei by late 1980, and through the now unemployed 
southern military personnel and mercenaries who had served under Amin and returned 
to Sudan (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121). It was principally the proliferation of arms 
in the South to add fuel to the local disputes that caused deterioration of the rural 
security situation. By 1980, there were various armed groups and militias in the South, 
referred to as the Anya Nya II, of which some were ideologically motivated and others 
were aggrieved about the Addis Ababa Agreement or subsequent developments 
(Kulusika, 1998: 103).        
 
     Consolidation of Armed Factions and Underground Movements 
                  
The origins of the military conspiracy leading to the 1983 mutiny in Bor, which 
culminated in the formation of the SPLM/A, go back to the years immediately after the 
Addis Ababa Agreement. While in the context of growing dissatisfaction among some 
southerners due to the political situation a number of secret organizations460 emerged 
apart from the CUSS, it was the military underground movement of many of the 
absorbed ex-Anya Nya officers along with the diverse Anya Nya II groups that became 
the most powerful armed actors, paving the way for the resumption of the armed 
struggle in the South (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121-5; Johnson, 1998: 57-60, 2003: 
59-61; Madut-Arop, 2006: 59, Akol, 2007: 149-50).461 Most of these groups called 
themselves Anya Nya II, ranging from organized bandits and cattle rustlers to militias 
and rebel groups with varying degrees of armed activities and political motivations.   
 
                                                 
460
 These included the National Action Movement, led by Oduho, Akwot Atem de Mayen, Benjamin Bol 
Akok, and Samuel Gai Tut, the Movement for the Total Liberation of Southern Sudan, an Equatorian led 
student movement with connection to the southern Sudan student association in Egypt, and Juwama 
African People’s Organization. 
461
 However, the secret opposition organizations were scattered throughout the 1970s, and it was only 
after the organized mutinies in 1983 when an effort was made to unite the armed struggle between the 
underground movement and the Anya Nya II (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125-6; Johnson, 1998: 60-1, 
2003: 65-66; Nyaba, 2002: 28-41; Madut-Arop, 2006: 59). 
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However, an important cluster of Anya Nya II significant in the emerging second 
insurgency in the South was based in the Ethiopian border area.462 These elements 
became collectively known among the southerners as the main secessionist Anya Nya 
II, or Anya Nya Patriotic Front (APF),463 operating from Bilpam464 in western Ethiopia 
to liberate southern Sudan,465 receiving support from both Ethiopia and Libya (Heritage, 
1987b: 4; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121; Johnson, 1998: 57-8; 2003: 59; Madut-Arop, 
2006: 60).466 The material support to the Anya Nya II was restricted so that it could 
inflict only limited damage to make its presence known but unable to stage a full-scale 
war.467 Although at this stage groups unrelated to Ethiopian support provoked most of 
                                                 
462
 In 1975-6, remnants of absorbed ex-Anya Nya who had mutinied or deserted in Akobo and Wau had 
headed towards Ethiopia for safety. This was in part because other scattered guerrilla bands with camps in 
Ethiopia, which had not accepted the Addis Ababa Agreement in the first place, already existed, along 
with less politically or ideologically motivated groups (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121; Johnson, 1998: 
57, 2003: 59). Many of these were Nuer who drew support also from local Nuer communities in western 
Ethiopia. In the late 1970s, particularly discontented, and mostly poorly educated, Nuer youth were 
encouraged to join armed groups, but often an embryonic political leadership succumbed into ideological 
abyss and the groups engaged in banditry, a number of them lacking political objectives while others cited 
specific political grievances related to the 1972 peace treaty (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121; Johnson, 
1998: 57-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 62). Non-Nuer groups included the Revolutionary Committee of James 
Bol Kur (Shilluk), Bernard Bakam (Anuak), Thaan Nyibil (Shilluk), and Joseph Mubarak (Nuba) founded 
in response to Nuer animosity towards non-Nuer recruits (Madut-Arop, 2006: 62). 
463
 In 1975, a group of Anya Nya II had constituted the APF, led by Muortat and other prominent 
members being Elia Duaang Arop, Francis Mayar Akoon, and Agolong Chol, consisting of some of those 
condemning the Addis Ababa Agreement and former members of the NPG with a secessionist agenda to 
liberate southern Sudan (SSFI, 2002; Madut-Arop, 2006: 60-1). However, the separatist agenda and non-
communist orientation was not appealing to Soviet-aligned Ethiopia, and failing to maintain unity the 
political leadership of the APF gradually waned out (Madut-Arop, 2006: 61).  
464
 Bilpam became to be referred to as the place of hope where a transformation to the situation in the 
South could originate and many southerners warned the authorities about going there if they felt pressed 
by the regime’s policies (Madut-Arop, 2006: 60). 
465
 Upon the arrival of the Akobo mutineers some dissatisfied former members of the Anya Nya who had 
already found refuge in Ethiopia joined them, the majority of them Nuer, and Ethiopia permitted their 
operations from Bilpam, which forms part of an ethnically Nuer and Anuak region extending to Upper 
Nile in the eastern part of southern Sudan (SSFI, 2002; Johnson, 2003: 59; Madut-Arop, 2006: 60). 
According to John Garang, “When I was at the General Headquarters in Khartoum, we used to be briefed 
about Bil Pam. The reports we had is that Gordon Koang had 7,000 strong, that Yagoub Ismail was with 
several thousand men and Abdalla Zakaria had many thousands…” (Heritage, 1987b: 4). This points to 
the factional nature of the main Anya Nya II in Bilpam.  
466
 For instance, the mutineers from Akobo led by Kuany and Bol reached an agreement with Ethiopia for 
limited political and material backing after Sudan did not cease its support for the ELF despite Ethiopia’s 
official warning in 1976. Ethiopia became interested in destabilizing Nimeiri and curb Sudan’s support of 
the ELF, Tigray People’s Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Front, and Gambella People Liberation 
Force (Nyaba, 2000: 35-6; Johnson, 1998: 57; 2003: 59; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 24; Madut-Arop, 2006: 
60). 
467
 This was in part, because the Anya Nya II was incapable to confront the army (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 
23), because Ethiopia did not want to involve its own military, and also because Ethiopia could not 
support secessionist insurgency in Sudan while fighting secessionist insurgents domestically. For 
instance, whereas a section called the Sudan People’s Revolutionary Party became the main Anya Nya II 
group initially enjoying Ethiopian and particularly Libyan support in terms of military material, namely 
150 rifles forwarded to them through Sadiq, training in Gambella region, and some financing, it had no 
capacity to draft a political program to maintain such support and was able to conduct limited recruitment 
in the Nuba Mountains and Khartoum (Johnson, 1998: 58, 2003: 60; Turner, 1998: 205; Chan and Zuor, 
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the armed incidents in the South (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 122), Bilpam provided a 
rhetorical channel for expression of grievances against the regime as the mere existence 
of dissidents also encouraged the absorbed ex-Anya Nya troops to threaten with revolt if 
subjected to transfer to the North (Madut-Arop, 2006: 61). 
 
By 1978, yet another group that called itself Anya Nya II had appeared. Unlike other 
bands that where mostly active in Upper Nile and Jonglei, this group was created as an 
inter-clan militia by the Ngok Dinka of Abyei together with the Malwal Dinka of Aweil, 
after selling cattle for arms in response to an escalation of traditional conflicts over 
water and grazing land against members of Baggara groups, the Misiria of Kordofan 
and the Rizeigat of southern Darfur (Madut-Arop, 2006: 63, 64).468 These conflicts had 
intensified from 1965 onwards, acquiring ethnic and racial dimension in the context of 
the first insurgency, and involved the reinforcement of the category of “slave” among 
sections of Baggara, enabling enslavement of many Dinka, cattle raiding, and violations 
of many Dinka women, which encouraged sections of Dinka youth to join the Anya Nya 
(de Waal, 1993: 144-6; Madut-Arop, 2006: 63, 64).469 Violence heightened this 
polarization of identity between “Arab” and “African”, which the marginalizing state 
and the southern elite reinforced in the context of resumed war. 
 
However, it was not until the early 1980s when the Anya Nya II groups began to inflict 
more noticeable damage.470 This led to regime retaliation with military action, 
harassment and shooting of civilians, and stepping up the detaching of the absorbed 
                                                                                                                                               
2006: 23; Madut-Arop, 2006: 62).  The scope of the activities of the groups supported included 
occasional attacks on civilians and government posts, but mostly cattle rustling near the Ethiopian border, 
and permitting Sadiq al-Mahdi to beam radio propaganda to Sudan after the 1976 aborted coup (Johnson 
and Prunier, 1993: 122; Johnson, 2003: 59; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 24).  
468
 This militia was formed, when a particularly violent episode of local conflict took place in 1977, under 
Michael Miokol Deng Majok, which included also Twic and Rek Dinka along with other neighboring 
groups. From 1982 on the recruits were trained by Dinka soldiers retired of the army early (Madut-Arop, 
2006: 64, 65), as part of the regime policy to neutralize the ex-Anya Nya.  
469
 This is why the Addis Ababa Agreement contained a clause for referendum for the Ngok Dinka 
inhabited Abyei to be joined to the South, particularly because the Misiria continued to exercise their 
grazing tradition in Dinka land with the protection of an allegedly regime backed militia force “Quaat al-
Marheel”, encouraged by self-enrichment through cattle-raiding in the deteriorating economic conditions 
later compounded by drought and famine (de Waal, 1993: 144; Madut-Arop, 2006: 64). 
470
 By 1980 operations including attacks on police posts and market lorries requiring more organizational 
coherence began to take place in a number of locations around the South with groups appearing in 
Jonglei, Upper Nile, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Lakes (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 122-3; Johnson, 1998: 57, 
58; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23). Until then, many had engaged in banditry and attacks on civilians had been 
or more frequent than confrontations with the security forces (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123). 
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Anya Nya from their leadership.471 This led to initial decline of the Anya Nya II 
activities by the end of 1981, but in 1982 they were on the rise again with an Ethiopian 
backed faction that had received only rudimentary support earlier asserting its 
dominance over Anya Nya II activities in Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Lakes provinces, 
forwarding new recruits to Ethiopia for training (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121-3; 
Johnson, 1998: 58, 2003: 60; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 23; Madut-Arop, 2006: 43; Collins, 
2008: 140).472 In this context, Adwot Atem, a Twic Dinka from Kongor and a leader of 
one of the Anya Nya II groupings based in Ethiopia active in Jonglei area, became the 
link between the underground movement commanders, Garang and Major William 
Chuol Deng, and a major Anya Nya II leader Lieutenant General Samuel Gai Tut who 
was heavily engaged in sending Nuer youth secretly to Bilpam (Johnson and Prunier, 
1993: 123; Madut-Arop, 2006: 43).473 
 
In this situation, the political environment in the South had become more opportune for 
a large-scale rebellion.474 Garang seized the initiative in attracting covert support among 
southerners in the armed forces, and among civilians such as politicians, professionals, 
and students, extending the underground network in the South (Madut-Arop, 2006: 
                                                 
471
 This regime attempt was aimed to minimize the threat of renewed insurgency since the underground 
movement was viewed to be associated with Anya Nya II activity, but it created a new grievance among 
the southern troops directly linked to the mutinies of 1983 (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121). According 
to the policy, the suspected leaders of the former Anya Nya opposition were removed from Bussere: 
Abuur had been promoted to Brigadier and moved to Wau; Madut Baak was transferred to Jebeit in Port 
Sudan; others, such as Andrew Makur Thou, Joseph Kuol Amoum, Albino Akol Akol, Alison Manani 
Magaya, and Habakuk Soro were kept under surveillance and given posts in the government to appease 
them; and Garang, had been sent to the U.S. for training where among other studies he completed a 
doctorate degree in agricultural economics. However, after Garang returned in 1981, in part because of 
the deteriorating situation, he retook underground activities in Khartoum where he was appointed as an 
assistant researcher for the army and a visiting lecturer, while junior officers such as Francis Ngor 
Makiech, Salva Kiir Mayardit, Abdalla Chuol, and Chagai Atem became increasingly active in the 
movement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 43).   
472
 By the early 1980s Addis Ababa became inclined to support wider rebellion in Sudan because its 
limited aid to the Sudanese dissidents was insufficient to pressure Khartoum (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 24), 
which coincided with growing support for the main Anya Nya II groups by soldiers and civilians in the 
South, amidst of rumors of Khartoum’s plan to divide the region after the rebels, particularly those in the 
Nasir area, began to reduce attacks on civilians, assault “northern Arab” targets, and persuade absorbed 
police and military to their side (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121, 123; Johnson, 2003: 60). 
473
 While Gai Tut was a former Israeli trained Anya Nya and Nuer from Akobo expelled from the army in 
1974 having threatened Lagu with a pistol but who had also been a regional minister under Lagu and 
Rasas, Chuol who had resigned from the army upon dismissal of Gai Tut was originally a Dinka but 
became a Lak Nuer through naturalization and residence (Alier, 1990: 251, 252; Collins, 2008: 140). 
474
 In these circumstances, the underground movement of the absorbed Anya Nya officers strengthened its 
network and gained impetus through unpopular regime measures and mass arrests of southern unity-
minded leaders (Madut-Arop, 2006: 43). 
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43).475 He appealed to individual commanders of the absorbed forces, and connected 
with the Anya Nya II476 as contacts deepened between him and Chuol, Gai  Tut, and 
Atem who smuggled arms to the Anya Nya II (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123; 
Johnson, 2003: 61).477 The contacts with the Anya Nya II, which allegedly began in 
1982,478 were used in 1983 to organize the mutiny and the defection of the absorbed 
Anya Nya to the bush in the midst of desertions among southern police and soldiers 
(Johnson, 1998: 58; 2003: 61). 
 
Yet, differing political views between absorbed Anya Nya leaders and many of their 
former, now Anya Nya II, comrades hindered collaboration. It was only by the early 
1980s when Nimeiri’s reputation in the South was in an unprecedented slump when 
local grievances that had motivated many Anya Nya II were superseded in sectors of 
southern leaders by regional and national issues, to the extent that one contingent linked 
to the underground movement moved to Bentiu to protect southern oil fields in response 
to the 1980 border dispute (Johnson, 2003: 60-1). During the two following years Anya 
Nya II in Bentiu, Fangak, and Nasir, areas initiated contacts with the absorbed Anya 
Nya in police and military, explaining that their grievances were with the regime 
(Johnson, 2003: 61). In the midst of rumors and the growing tension particularly after 
more northern army troops arrived to the South, incidents including harassment and 
killing of civilians became more commonplace in Aweil, Bentiu, Nasir, and Malakal. 
Southern soldiers in Upper Nile and Jonglei began to complain about the conduct of the 
                                                 
475
 He resided briefly at Hajj Yousif in the eastern fringes of Khartoum, a location he chose to conduct his 
underground activities due to its relative remoteness (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44). Garang also moved 
discreetly and associated himself publicly with northern top army officers, such as generals Yousif 
Ahmed Yousif and Sowar al-Dhahab, General Abu Kodok, the chief of Staff of the Sudanese army, and 
professional cadres in Khartoum (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44, 47). According to Garang, “My calculation was 
that if there were intelligence reports about my activities . . . These generals would dismiss the reports . . . 
” (quoted in Madut-Arop, 2006: 47). Moreover, to contain secret services, Garang worked with Major 
Arok Thon Arok who was a popular security officer and a tutor at Wad Saidna Military College in 
Omdurman until April 1982 when he had become member of southern regional assembly (Madut-Arop, 
2006: 44). 
476
 For instance, Garang was in constant contact with commanders such as Kiir in Malakal, and Chuol 
was assigned to attempt to coordinate with the Anya Nya II in Bilpam, while Chagai Atem passed 
messages between Bor, Juba, Malakal, and Khartoum (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44). 
477
 In early 1982 Gai Tut was discovered, dismissed from the HEC of which he formed part, and detained 
when caught on Juba Bridge in an attempt to smuggle weapons to Anya Nya II based in Ethiopia 
(Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123; Johnson, 2003: 61). 
478
 For instance, Major Kerubino Kwanyin Bol, a Dinka from Paywayi, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Major 
William Nyuon Bany, originally Dinka but Nuer by naturalization, who formed part of the underground 
movement, were ordered by the army to fight the Anya Nya II in Jonglei province, but eventually 
developed contacts with the latter in 1982 and reportedly visited Anya Nya II camps prior to the Bor 
mutiny the following year (Alier, 1990: 251; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123; Nyaba, 2000: 29; Johnson, 
2003: 61). 
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army and people talk better about the guerrillas who by early 1980s were attempting to 
recruit civilians and ex-Anya Nya (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 121, 123; Johnson, 2003: 
61). Despite this, most absorbed troops remained in the army until 1983 although 
Nimeiri’s machinations against the Addis Ababa Agreement, the CUSS, and the 
absorbed ex-Anya Nya, together with the presence of northern units in the South raised 
suspicion and generated desertions and disobedience (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 123-
4). 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown how the dynamics of Sudan’s external alliances and domestic 
developments came together by the early 1980s, reinforcing the dynamics and the logic 
of the marginalizing state. The prevailing forces in the national political and economic 
context resulted in the exclusion of the South and its elites from national processes and 
the power vacuum was filled by the Islamist section of the Arabized elite that became 
Nimeiri’s major constituency. This, in turn, reinforced the securitization of the issue of 
the South as its regional power came to be viewed increasingly as a threat to the power 
of the Islamist cadres in Khartoum. Because the South was viewed as a menace among 
the most influential cadres of the Arabized elite, the resource competition between the 
regime and the autonomous South heightened as both administrations lacked funding. 
This rivalry strengthened Khartoum’s strategy to propel underdevelopment and poverty 
to undermine the power of the autonomous South. 
 
Since the marginalizing state continued to be controlled exclusively by elements of the 
Arabized political elite, its institutions, ruling methods, and the projected political 
culture continued to be shaped according to their discourses with an aim to maintain the 
political and economic status quo. Any successful implementation of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement would have required a radical transformation of power structures in Sudan, 
which any faction of the Arabized elite throughout Sudanese post-colonial history, 
including that of Nimeiri, has been reluctant to undertake. This is because it would 
entail political and economic power-sharing with regional elites of the peripheries, and 
endanger the Arabized elite factions’ ability to control the politics and economy of the 
marginalizing state exclusively. This could end its privilege as the most prominent 
social constituency. 
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Another dynamic that threatened regional autonomy of the South was the political 
competition within its local elite factions. As has been shown in this chapter, the 
heightened competition between the Alier and Lagu constituencies generated growing 
identity divide as they envisioned distinct future arrangements for southern Sudan. At 
the same time, the factionalism weakened collective demands for economic 
development and power over local resources. Consequently, the existence of the South 
as an autonomous region became undermined both due to political and economic 
dynamics. 
 
As pointed out in this chapter, this situation was opportune for growing political 
instability in the international and regional context leading to Cold War dynamics and 
alliances, and the Islamic resurgence. The marginalizing state’s collaboration with the 
U.S. and its economic interests elevated the contested nature of the southern autonomy, 
and it was undermined further by Nimeiri’s alliance with the Islamist section of the 
Arabized elite. The regime’s shifting alliances that led to the tampering with the Addis 
Ababa Agreement resulted in increasing discontent in the South. Nimeiri’s strategies 
encouraged political “tribalization” within southern Sudan and re-intensified identity 
polarization along the rift between the “Arab” ruling sections of the “North” (the state) 
and part of the southern political and military leadership of the “South”. In this context 
insecurity heightened.  
 
These circumstances led to deterioration of conditions in the South as the political and 
economic context encouraged sections of former Anya Nya military leaders to challenge 
the leadership of the waning local politicians. As the hour of the latter was passing after 
the division, militarization and growing insecurity became the order of the day, 
particularly after Nimeiri announced the end of the autonomous South. When factions 
of military officers conspired against the regime and armed groups resurged, the 
situation culminated in the renewed rebellion discussed in the next chapter.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
332        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter VIII. Emergence and Trajectory of the Second Insurgency         333 
 
Chapter VIII. Emergence and Trajectory of the Second Insurgency 
 
1. Introduction 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, by the early 1980s the political order of the Nimeiri 
regime had become increasingly contested in the northern provinces and in the divided 
South. The rising Islamists had already invaded important parts of the state apparatus, 
their influence being projected onto the society and Muslim population of north-central 
Sudan. In these circumstances the resumption of insurgency in southern Sudan had 
become more likely as fear of reinforced “Arab” domination and repressive Islamism 
grew. However, any viable rebellion in southern Sudan required capable organization 
and external support, as had been previously the case.     
 
This chapter picks up the analysis from that situation and highlights the organization 
behind the mutinies that culminated in the formation of the SPLM/A. The deteriorating 
political circumstances in which sentiments of fear and insecurity gained ground were 
instrumental in the early popularity of armed opposition. The chapter also shows how 
the absorbed Anya Nya officers’ underground movement became part of a network of 
armed groups patronized by Ethiopia, and how the with SPLM/A asserted prominence 
over other armed groups in the South and launched a military campaign that, coupled 
with initial external support principally from Libya and Ethiopia, led to its 
consolidation. It is demonstrated how the dynamics of governance of the marginalizing 
state by the sections of the Arabized elite dictating the narrow distribution of political 
and economic power, including exclusionary politics marginalizing the southern 
military and political elites, continued to be the main cause heightening the will to rebel. 
As the deteriorating political and economic circumstances in Sudan and particularly in 
the South led to insecurity, armed groups strengthened and the insurgency launched by 
a section of southern officers gained momentum. 
 
This chapter shows the continuity of those processes detailed in the previous chapter 
with an attempt to highlight the impact of the marginalizing state policies on southern 
groups and the responses among their leadership within the regional context.           
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2. Conspiring Elements in Southern Sudan 
 
This section highlights the conflict formation from the initial conspiracy to the mutinies. 
It unveils the planning and external contacts behind the dissidence and challenges in the 
process of insurgency organization. 
 
     The Conspiracy  
 
Prompted by the deteriorating political situation, the underground officer movement had 
decided to initiate rebellion in the South and take control of the major towns of the 
region.479 To this end, contacts were sought with the Anya Nya II groups and an excuse 
was made to enable John Garang, who was working as army intelligence officer in 
Khartoum, to visit the South.480 Due to the intensifying contacts with sections of the 
Anya Nya II the underground movement became linked to their main group and to 
Ethiopia, the latter of which elevated its support to the rebels after 1983 when a growing 
number of former Anya Nya commanders joined the Anya Nya II (Chan and Zuor, 
2006: 24). 
 
Upon his return to Khartoum Garang found out that transfers of remaining former Anya 
Nya units to northern provinces had been accelerated. Nimeiri had issued orders to 
transfer battalions 105, 110, and 111 to the north and west to remove the remaining 
influence of the former Anya Nya officers in the South (Collins, 2008: 139).481 This 
                                                 
479
 In a secret meeting in February 1983 in Khartoum, August 1983 was set as the time to engineer a 
number of mutinies with prior full alert of all absorbed battalions in the South, particularly 104 in Ayod-
Waat-Akobo, 105 in Bor-Pibor-Pochalla, 110 in Aweil, 111 in Rumbek, 116 in Juba, and 117 in Torit-
Kapoeta, and to take Juba, Malakal, and Wau by surprise (Madut-Arop, 2006: 44). 
480
 A telegram was sent to Garang to plan the groundwork for the rebellion with the excuse that his non-
existent brother was ill in Malakal. In Malakal, Garang received updated information about the security 
situation. He was briefed on Anya Nya II activities and Chagai Atem and Chuol were assigned to meet 
Gordon Kong, a commander of the most powerful Anya Nya II group based in Bilpam, to convince him 
to support the rebels upon the outbreak of mutinies (Madut-Arop, 2006: 45). After having been rejected 
from army employment in the aftermath of the Anya Nya rebellion due to deficient eyesight and after his 
job as laborer for the Department of Education had been suspended due to the end of resettlement funds, 
Kong had moved to Ethiopia to his extended family and joined the Anya Nya II (Alier, 1990: 254). 
481
 The move was possibly a regime response to the killing of 12 Arab merchants in Ariath in December 
1982, and in the case of battalion 110 it almost triggered a mutiny by a single-handed attempt by an 
officer, Bol Madut, who defected and began recruiting for an Anya Nya II faction in Tonj area (Madut-
Arop, 2006: 65-6). In December 1982, the general army headquarters had already achieved the transfer of 
battalion 110 in Aweil to El-Fasher in Darfur despite complaints and resistance, but allegedly facilitated 
by collusion of one of its former commanders, Albino Akol Akol, who had been a leader of a cell in the 
underground movement (Madut-Arop, 2006: 45, 65; Collins, 2008: 139). Akol had convoked the forces 
outside of their post and a northern contingent had occupied their positions, which had forced the 
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made the underground movement leadership consider an earlier date to initiate the 
rebellion. 
 
Meanwhile in November-December 1982, an issue had emerged over the pay of some 
absorbed Anya Nya units,482 which culminated in March 1983.483 An investigation was 
taken on the matter in part because army officers had become suspicious,484 and resulted 
in further breach when the commander of Battalion 105, Cpt. Bullen Alier, refused to 
revise the distorted salary lists that Maj. Kerubino had used to demand overpay for his 
troops.485 Through the salary scandal, Kerubino drew army’s attention to his violent 
activities to confiscate goods for self-enrichment in the context of fighting the Anya 
Nya II, and also provided the regime a justification to accelerate transfers of southern 
troops to the north (Johnson, 2003: 62; Madut-Arop, 2006: 46, 47).486 This pressured 
                                                                                                                                               
unarmed troops to comply with the orders to be moved. However, although confirming his presence in 
Aweil during the event, Akol denied having collaborated with regime authorities to transfer the service 
company he claimed had remained in Aweil (Madut-Arop, 2006: 45, 65). 
482
 Allegedly, this dispute over Battalion 105 soldiers’ pay arose in the context of Kerubino’s and 
Nyuon’s relationship with the commanding officer of the first infantry division in the southern region, 
General Siddig al-Banna, who used the two officers to amass personal wealth for himself through their 
activities against the Anya Nya II during which their troops looted money, gold, cattle, and wildlife goods 
(Nyaba, 2000: 29; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 40). It has been argued that the situation emerged because 
Kerubino and Nyuon had been granted liberties among other things to use funds of their units as they 
preferred, including Kerubino’s misappropriation of financing, requests of increased funds (Alier, 1990: 
243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 45), and manipulation of other administrative issues (Nyaba, 2000: 29, 31). 
Nyaba (2000: 31) has pointed out that in the process of insurgency formation “The uprisings were 
triggered off by a volatile political situation, emanating from the general crisis of the regime. 
Furthermore, those who ignited the fire in Bor were those very close to the army leadership in Southern 
Region – Major General Saddiq el Bana, a very close relative of General Nimeiri”. 
483
 This is when an investigation due to irregularities in payroll sheets was launched (Alier, 1990: 243; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 45), and Kerubino, the commander of Pochalla garrison had become suspected of 
misallocation and embezzlement of funds, which made him alarmed of a possibility that the regime would 
discover the underground plan (Kulusika, 1998: 104; Johnson, 2003: 61-2). 
484
 Kerubino was member of underground movement and had turned down orders in January 1983 for the 
Battalion 105 to be disarmed and transferred to North amidst of prevailing discontent, suspicion, and 
indiscipline among the troops (Awur, 1988: 87; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 124; Nyaba, 2000: 29; 
Johnson, 2003: 61). These sentiments were generated largely by the deteriorating political climate in the 
South. The troops refused the orders for a number of reasons: Because according to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement they were to serve in the South only; because throughout their stay in Bor for a number of 
years they had accumulated cattle and cultivation plots; because they suspected they would be disarmed; 
and because they feared being sent to Iraq to join an existing Sudanese contingent fighting Iran (Johnson 
and Prunier, 1993: 124; Johnson, 2003: 61). In fact, it was customary for the absorbed Anya Nya to 
supplement their low army salary, between US$10 and US$45, through farming and cattle raising and had 
developed local family and community ties, all of which increased the difficulty of relocating them 
elsewhere (Turner, 1998: 205). Refusal to be transferred increased the tensions further. 
485
 He claimed that salaries and allowances were correct, while the soldiers were growing restless due to 
the scandal and circulating rumors about imminence of war (Alier, 1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 45-6). 
486
 This policy resulted in a garrison mutiny in Wangkay 160km west of Bentiu where the commanding 
officer was killed and a defection to the local Anya Nya II group. The army unit sent after the soldiers 
was ambushed, while around the same time Anya Nya II assaulted police posts in Warop near Tonj and 
Ganylid near Rumbek. In addition, another southern garrison in Raja, Bahr al-Ghazal, declined to move to 
el-Fasher, rebelled and fled to the bush (Turner, 1998: 205). 
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him to stage a mutiny in mid-May instead of August 1983 agreed among the leaders of 
the underground movement.487 The deteriorating security situation was provoked to a 
large great extent by the policy of the marginalizing state to neutralize ex-Anya Nya 
resistance and eliminate Anya Nya II in the South.        
 
In April 1983, al-Banna convoked an emergency meeting to diffuse the tension in Bor 
by inviting political representatives of Jonglei Province and military authorities to a 
meeting in Juba.488 In addition, a military committee of investigation including a 
number of underground officers489 was set up to determine if the salary disagreement 
was politically devised or a mere accounting problem.490 While the crisis worsened, Al-
Banna followed orders from Khartoum to not to give in to the Battalion 105 leadership 
and continued to refuse to issue the salaries, including those of April, without newly 
corrected payrolls from Bor (Alier, 1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 48). This 
demonstrates that the military intelligence was aware of military-civilian connection, 
suspecting that local politicians were deliberately creating instability through the 
absorbed forces. It also planned secretly a military assault on Bor (Nyaba, 2000: 29), 
which was suspected by the underground leadership. 
 
Meanwhile, the leadership of the underground movement reconsidered. Garang, a Twic 
Dinka originally from Wangulei north of Bor, took his annual leave and went to Juba on 
                                                 
487
 Assertion based on interview with a mid-ranking SPLM/A official on 1 October in Kampala. As part 
of the preparations, Kerubino had visited Anya Nya II camps in 1982 prior to moving to Bor (Collins, 
1982: 140), and used his personal relationship with al-Banna to shuttle between Juba and Bor for weeks 
without interference to secure food, logistics, and other supplies for his troops for the rainy season when 
communications would be cut (Madut-Arop, 2006: 46, 47). 
488
 He expressed concerns about security in Bor and threatened Jonglei politicians that they would be held 
responsible if the soldiers continued to disobey orders, but the southern politicians responded that 
responsibility for the armed forces corresponded to the national president (Madut-Arop, 2006: 48-9). 
489
 It consisted of the Vice President of the HEC, Dhol Acuil Aleu, as the Chair, and the Minister of 
Education, Philip Obang, General James Loro, Brigadier Musaad Nueri, Major Arok Thon Arok, and 
members of parliament, Abdel Latif Chaul Lom, Elijah Malok, Michael Wal Duany, Samuel Gai Tut, and 
Akwot Atem (Madut-Arop, 2006: 49). 
490
 The committee met the disgruntled soldiers in Bor and sought to appease them by announcing that 
their transfer to the north was revoked, that their salaries of April would be paid immediately, and that 
their dismissed fellow soldiers would be rehired (Madut-Arop, 2006: 49). However, al-Banna in Juba 
refused to pay the salaries despite the committee’s suggestion that the army headquarters should pay the 
demanded sum, which inspired the sending of a delegation, including two former commissioners of 
Jonglei Province, Jonathan Malwal Leek and Nathaniel Anaai Kur, the SSU Province Secretary Bul Bior, 
representative of the Bor Chamber of Commerce, Abdullahi Elias who was a northerner, and others, from 
Bor to Juba to convince the authorities to pay the salaries (Alier, 1990: 243, 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 46, 
48, 49; Collins, 2008: 139). Despite Elias warning that the required S£107,000 should be raised even as a 
loan if necessary to prevent a rebellion in southern Sudan, the army leadership in Juba declined and 
detained the delegation there with an allegation that it sided with the Bor garrison (Alier, 1990: 245). 
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9 May 1983 to meet those officers part of the conspiracy, and some supportive CUSS 
politicians and civil servants.491 Realizing the severity of the situation Garang pushed 
the conspiracy earlier, fearing that it could be discovered by the regime in the midst of 
rising tensions due to the Bor incident (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 47).492 
 
Meanwhile, Kerubino had prepared the mutiny.493 Garang left for Bor on 13 May 
1983494 and upon his arrival assumed the leadership of the troops from Kerubino, only 
to find out from Kiir from Malakal, on 14 May, about an airlift of army units to Akobo 
with orders to attack Pibor and Pochalla, while an attack on Bor would be staged from 
Juba (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 51). Consequently, he organized the 
defense of the town (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 51-2).495 
In the dawn of 16 May 1983 the army attacked.496 It forced the mutineers to withdraw 
towards Ethiopia by the following morning (Alier, 1990: 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 53; 
                                                 
491
 These included members of the regional assembly. Elijah Malok, told Garang about Kerubino having 
inflated the payroll for his own benefit possibly in preparation for war, Martin Majer Gai represented Bor, 
police, prison warders, wildlife officers, student union leaders, and discussed with Thon Arok, who 
formed part of the committee of investigation on the salary dispute (Madut-Arop, 2006: 46-7). 
492
 He visited al-Banna to assess the army’s view of the situation. Garang, who had ostensibly been sent 
by Nimeiri to resolve the situation, was planning to travel to Bor to take over the leadership of the 
mutineers from Kerubino, but wanted to make sure that al-Banna did not suspect his intentions. After 
hearing about Garang’s intention to go to Bor where he had an agricultural project as part of an alleged 
leave, al-Banna warned him about the mutinous Battalion 105 in Bor, Pibor, and Pochalla, but agreed on 
Garang’s petition to go for a brief visit to fetch his family which the latter had deliberately sent to 
Wangkulei (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Johnson, 2003: 61; Madut-Arop, 2006: 49-50; Collins, 2008: 141-2). 
493
 During the first week of May Kerubino had arrived from Pochalla to Bor and assumed the leadership 
of the discontent troops from Bullen Alier, confiscating 250 bags of sorghum (dura) from the market for 
the soldiers and taking over and fortifying the town. He had also forbidden a northern army company 
traveling by a steamer to dock at Bor on 8 May, and lynched an alleged government soldier sent from 
Juba to spy on Garang’s activities and to gather information prior to a planned army assault to retake the 
town. Kerubino had rightly suspected that the company had been sent to disarm the Bor garrison (Alier, 
1990: 243; Madut-Arop, 2006: 46-51; Collins, 2008: 139). 
494
 He was accompanied by Thon Arok, Malok, and Chagai Atem, Malok being initially unaware of the 
conspiracy and critical of Kerubino (Madut-Arop, 2006: 50-1). 
495
 The threats were the main attacking force from Juba and a Company led by a loyal army officer in 
Langbar. The Battalion 105 commanded by Kerubino and Bullen Alier received the attack from Juba, and 
Garang went personally immobilize the troops in Langbar as a senior officer. He convinced the 
commander of Langbar, whose confidence he had gained, not to attack Bor, which he was inclined to do, 
due to the necessity of protecting Alier and expatriates (Heritage, 1987a: 4; Madut-Arop, 2006: 52-3). 
Langbar was the base of the French CCI that was building the Jonglei Canal, and Dutch engineers of the 
DeGroot Company building a Malakal-Juba road had been brought there for safety. Alier had moved to 
Bor after his tenure of the HEC and was either brought to Langbar for protection with orders from 
Khartoum or stayed in the area despite demands of his relatives and friends to take him to safety in his 
village 16 miles away (Alier, 1990: 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 52). According to Alier (1990: 245), he 
insisted on staying in the Jonglei Executive Organ rest house with northern merchants and their families, 
some weak people of the town, and U.N. personnel who had sought refuge in the compound. 
496
 The forces led by Lt. Colonel Dominic Kassiano launched an offensive on Bor and Pibor, during 
which the deputy commander of the army force was killed, Kerubino wounded, and Bullen Alier assumed 
the leadership of the mutineers (Alier, 1990: 245; Madut-Arop, 2006: 52; Akol, 2007: 169). 
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Collins, 2008: 139).497 The rebels in Pibor and Pochalla followed the example of Bor 
mutineers after emptying storages in their respective towns (Alier, 1990: 245; Johnson 
and Prunier, 1993: 124; Madut-Arop, 2006: 53; Collins, 2008: 139). Other garrisons 
followed also and were supported by sections of the Anya Nya II.498 Overall, in the 
course of May to July 1983, driven by the combination of the Bor mutiny and the re-
division of the South, soldiers and police revolted or deserted in Malakal, Nasir, Bentiu, 
Aweil, Wau, Rumbek, and Nzara in western Equatoria, although most Equatorians were 
initially less enthusiastic to join the rebellion because they saw it as a Dinka initiative 
(Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 124-5; Johnson, 2003: 62; Collins, 2008: 142, 143). 
Approximately 1,000 troops deserted in the initial stages (Niblock, 1987: 288), but 
further defections and mutinies meant that by July there was a large concentration of 
rebels in the Ethiopian border, with approximately 2,500 absorbed soldiers making their 
way to Bilpam and another 500 remaining scattered in Bahr al-Ghazal (Johnson and 
Prunier, 1993: 125; Madut-Arop, 2006: 54; Collins, 2008: 139-40).  
 
Garang also left for Ethiopia. As a central figure in the conspiracy and mutinies, he was 
received by the Ethiopian area commander who escorted him to Adura that was 
designated as his command post (Madut-Arop, 2006: 54). The conspirators’ prior 
contacts with the Anya Nya II sections also facilitated the move. While there is mixed 
information about Garang’s prior contacts with Ethiopia, the evidence here confirms 
that plans for mutinies had been made with awareness of the Ethiopian military. 
 
Nimeiri remained poised to implement his designs for the South after learning about the 
mutinies. In fact, the growing insecurity facilitated re-securitization of the southern 
issue and legitimized more regime repression, served to justify its division, and opened 
                                                 
497
 Depending on the source consulted, the exact date of withdrawal was either 17 May (Alier, 1990: 245; 
Collins, 2008: 139) or 18 May (Madut-Arop, 2006: 53). Reportedly, both sides suffered five casualties 
apart from the killed army officer (Alier, 1990: 245). 
498
 For instance in Ayod, the local garrison under Major William Nyuon Bany belonging to Battalion 104 
intercepted an army convoy from Malakal (Alier, 1990: 245; Prunier and Johnson, 1993: 125; Kulusika, 
1998: 104). Nyuon invited the officers of the convoy to spend night at his residence and ordered troops to 
spend the night outside the command post (Madut-Arop, 2006: 53). While doubtful, the officers, all 
northerners, accepted the invitation and were killed at night with their bodies dumped into an abandoned 
well. In the morning, the soldiers were categorized between northerners and southerners, and all northern 
soldiers were killed and unloaded into the same well. In succession, Nyuon and his force took the 
ammunition and supplies of the Ayod garrison, and headed towards the Ethiopian border where a 
concentration point for the rebels had been fixed (see Madut-Arop, 2006: 53-4). When the army attacked 
Ayod on 6 June 1983, battalions 105 and 104 had already slipped to Ethiopia facilitated by their 
collaboration with the local Anya Nya II (Johnson, 1998: 58; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 40). Moreover, in 
Waat, a company revolted, attacked the town garrison with local Anya Nya II, and took to the bush. 
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ground for the imposition of shari’a (Alier, 1990: 245-7; Nyaba, 2000: 29, 31). In this 
process Nimeiri was influenced by Turabi and pressured by his sole political 
constituency, the Muslim Brothers, with the fighting being portrayed as a result of failed 
southern regional politics and “tribal” feuds of primitive and deteriorated southern 
society requiring stronger intervention by the marginalizing state to control the region 
through repression, including decentralization and Islamic law. This of course would 
maintain its exclusion as part of marginalized state periphery. 
 
In the cases of disobedience among the absorbed Anya Nya in the 1970s the northern 
authorities had sought to use force,499 but by the early 1980s during rising political 
instability in the South such capacity declined. This, along with the political weakness 
of the southern elite500 led to a political situation that permitted mass support for violent 
approach under southern military leadership, providing a context conducive to war. To 
this extent the insurgency was a response to the policies of the marginalizing state that 
had reinforced identity polarization along the “North-South”, or “Arab-African”, rift. 
 
     Constituting the SPLM/A 
 
The succession of mutinies and desertions in the South had undermined the regime 
efforts to reaffirm its control over the region. In a number of provinces, such as Jonglei, 
the fighting initiated displacement and migration from towns to remote rural areas, 
which was compounded by the division of the South that obliged a large amount of 
people to relocate to their areas of origin. This happened in the context of fear of 
renewed regime domination and a deteriorating security situation. The politics by the 
regime and some southern politicians that heightened ethnic animosity had not only 
encouraged attitudes adverse to regional unity, but divided many southerners along 
ethnic lines to the extent that it became difficult to regain a common stand against the 
government despite an earlier tendency of many southern groups to collaborate over 
ethnic allegiances to face and resist a common threat to their cultural identity 
originating outside their local socio-cultural context (Madut-Arop, 2006: 66). 
                                                 
499
 For instance, in 1975 and 1976 the personal interventions or negotiation capability of the southern 
leadership had prevented bombardment of mutinous troops (Alier, 1990: 243-4). 
500
 According to Nyaba (2000: 31-4), this included greed for power, aspirations for material wealth, and 
personalized authority imposed through the military (i.e. to prevent Abyei and Kurmuk referendums), and 
ambiguity and obscurity of political stand weighing towards Islamization and promotion of Arab culture. 
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Politicized Islam and Arabization had posed such a threat previously and again became 
issues in the context of abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement that had been viewed 
as a political guarantee for southern cultural survival. 
 
In the aftermath of the Bor mutiny the leadership of the underground organization 
headed for Ethiopia. In Khartoum, the members of the movement informed Ethiopian 
authorities that the leading conspirators were reaching the border, who then raised the 
level of preparedness in Gambella garrison to locate the rebel leaders and receive them 
(Madut-Arop, 2006: 67). Meanwhile, secessionists Chuol and Gai Tut had defected and 
joined Akwot Atem in Ethiopia,501 Gai Tut leading a rival camp in Bukteng inside 
Sudan to separate from Garang and Kong’s Ethiopian influenced Anya Nya II in Bilpam 
(Alier, 1990: 251; Madut-Arop, 2006: 67).502 Addis Ababa’s enthusiasm to receive the 
mutineers points to its eagerness to bring the Sudanese dissidents under its influence. 
 
In the end of May, Garang, his family, and the closest supporters set up a base in Adura 
and were joined by other members of the underground movement and dignitaries from 
Abyei and dissidents from Boma.503 This support for Garang hindered Gai Tut’s attempt 
to assert his dominance along over Adura (Madut-Arop, 2006: 68). In the meantime, a 
                                                 
501
 Gai Tut, a Lou Nuer, and Akwot, a Twic Dinka, were both associated with the NAM, prominent in the 
Anya Nya II group led by Akwot, friends, and former ministers under Lagu in 1978-80 (Madut-Arop, 
2006: 67; Collins, 2008: 143). Similarly to Chuol, a Lake Nuer, and forming the leadership of the residual 
Anya Nya II groups, they were separatists along the Anya Nya tradition and kept their own units 
separated from Garang’s group (Alier, 1990: 251; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125; Collins, 2008: 143). 
502
 Gai Tut proceeded to contact other Anya Nya II groups. Short in external material and financial 
support, he turned to Kong’s group in Bilpam. Gai Tut was hoping to assert his role as the leader of the 
Anya Nya II before the leadership of the underground officers’ movement would arrive by suggesting to 
Kong that he, Akwot, and Chuol would form the political leadership of united Anya Nya II groups, while 
Kong would remain in charge of the military operations under the political wing. Although ethnically also 
a Nuer, Kong had been the sole leader of the Anya Nya II at Bilpam for years, had amassed wealth 
through his activities in Sudan in terms of money, cattle, and wives, and refused the offer, knowing that 
the leadership of the underground movement was about to arrive and that Ethiopians would not permit the 
change of leadership of the Anya Nya II in Bilpam lightly (Madut-Arop, 2006: 67-8). The rejection points 
to his personal interests and possible contacts with the underground movement.  
503
 Lt. Colonel Francis Ngor and Kiir had sought to invade Malakal before withdrawing to Ethiopia to 
join Garang. Soon after, a group of Abyei Liberation Front members, led by their deputy and general 
secretary, Chol Deng Alak and Deng Alor Kuol respectively, who had been jailed in January-May 1983, 
also arrived in Adura (Madut-Arop, 2006: 68). Yet another group that added to the support for Garang 
was the Southern Sudan Liberation Front of Pagan Amum Okiech, Nyachigag Nyachiluk, Lado 
Lokurnyang, and Oyai Deng Ajak, a movement of leftist southern university students aimed to conduct 
guerrilla warfare, which had first established itself in the Boma Plateau, kidnapping foreign personnel for 
ransom and receiving Ethiopian training and Libyan financing, but which dissolved itself to join Garang 
after rumors about envisaged socialist orientation of the SPLM/A in the making (Turner, 1998: 205; 
Nyaba, 2000: 27-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 68-9). 
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growing number of initially Nuer recruits continued to arrive,504 but after Garang’s 
arrival most of the thousands of people reaching Ethiopia were forced to choose if to 
join Adura (Garang), Bilpam (Kong), or Bukteng (Gai Tut and Atem), including a 
number of politicians such as Oduho and Majier Gai who joined Garang (Madut-Arop, 
2006: 69). Adura attracting many southern dignitaries reinforced Garang’s position.  
 
The Ethiopian government recognized Garang’s prominence.505 News of his preferential 
treatment and private meeting with Ethiopian General Mesfin generated resentment in 
the other dissident camps, and Akwot and Gai Tut demanded that Ethiopian authorities 
would choose a leader among the Sudanese rebels (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69). To appease 
others, Mesfin received a joint Akwot Atem-led delegation of the Sudanese factions that 
included Gai Tut, Garang, Oduho, and Kiir, and headed by (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69).  
 
Ethiopia aimed to unify the armed groups proposing it as a condition for its assistance. 
Mesfin pointed to a need to produce a written statement of policy objectives, which was 
hastily drafted by Akwot (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69).506 However, it was rejected by 
Mesfin as inadequate most importantly because Ethiopia would not support 
secessionism (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69-70). This is because it officially adhered to the 
OAU Charter condemning intervention in sovereign states and because it was also 
embroiled in separatist conflicts in its periphery.  
 
Subsequently, the rebel leadership drafted another document. Upon the return from 
Gambella where they had presented the first memorandum, Oduho persuaded Garang 
and it was agreed that Garang would write the new version to secure Ethiopian support 
                                                 
504
 Initially, they oriented to Bukteng and Bilpam to join the prior Nuer elements from Bentiu and Nasir, 
the Dinka of Jonglei and Lakes, and the students from Rumbek Senior Secondary School who had made 
the bulk of the rebel organizations in Ethiopia prior to the Bor mutiny (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 131; 
Chan and Zuor, 2006: 53). 
505
 The chairman of general joint-chiefs of staff, General Tesfy Mesfin, left for Gambella and arranged 
Garang to be transported there also for a meeting to discuss the rebel movement in the making (Madut-
Arop, 2006: 69). It is likely that this meeting was crucial in sealing strong Ethiopian support for Garang 
as he appears to have convinced Mesfin and consequently Mengistu. Based on an interview with a mid-
ranking SPLM/A official 1 October 2008 in Kampala. Garang’s communist ideological inclinations may 
have played a role in this (interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September in Juba). 
506
 In competition with Garang, Akwot wrote a statement that the Sudanese dissidents as a whole would 
adhere to a socialist ideology  and to liberate the South and make it an independent political entity, a task 
for which external financial and logistical support would be required. The draft document sought to 
prevent a rift between secessionists and those favoring unity of Sudan. (Madut-Arop, 2006: 69-70). 
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(Madut-Arop, 2006: 70).507 The document became the SPLM/A Manifesto officially 
made public on 31 July 1983.508 This gave Garang an upper hand as Ethiopians became 
inclined to support him as the desired leadership for the Sudanese rebel movement.509  
 
One of the key SPLM/A objectives was the construction of socialist, secular, and 
unified New Sudan by eradicating social injustice and inequality.510 With this agenda, 
the SPLM/A sought to differ from the exclusively “southern” view of the Anya Nya to 
describe the problem on center-periphery grounds with the state being dominated by a 
single minority group over marginalized majority in the peripheral Sudan. It was made 
explicit that the southern issue was a problem of the entire country and that a socialist 
                                                 
507
 Garang put forward three conditions: the rebellion was to be for new united Sudan that would bring 
equality and justice to the marginalized regions; the rebels were to advance a socialist ruling system; and 
that the different armed groups in the South, including the Anya Nya II, would be regrouped and trained 
prior to launching a war (Madut-Arop, 2006: 70). He is said to have used earlier manifesto of the 
underground movement to define the three main rebel objectives. Whereas overthrowing Nimeiri required 
Ethiopian patronage conditioned by maintaining united Sudan, it was necessary for the language and the 
objectives to have Ethiopia’s approval (Johnson, 2003: 63; Madut-Arop, 2006: 70; Collins, 2008: 142). 
As such, this not only provides evidence of existence of a conspiracy, but also confirms earlier contacts of 
the underground movement with Ethiopia, which exerted influence over it. 
508
 Garang had selected a group to draft the Ethiopian influenced document, which was subsequently 
adopted with minor modifications (Madut-Arop, 2006: 70; Collins, 2008: 142). Consisting of 11 chapters, 
the Manifesto defined the problem of southern Sudan as more general problem of the backward and 
underdeveloped peripheral regions of the country neglected in economic development by the colonial and 
post-colonial ruling clique. It pointed out that the latter comes from the most developed central region of 
the country and seeks to establish its identity, defined through its Arab culture, language, and Islam, as 
the national identity (SPLM/A Manifesto, 1983: 1-2). The stated aims of the movement, with Marxist 
overtones adopted from the Ethiopians, included a radical restructuring of political power by ending the 
exclusive rule of Arabized elite groups, an end to uneven development between the center and the 
periphery, the fight against racism embodied in regime policies such as the kasha, elimination of 
tribalism, sectionalism, and provincialism, and socioeconomic transformation of the Sudan as an 
industrial and agro-industrial society (SPLM/A Manifesto, 1983). In Chapter 3 the Manifesto described 
the causes of Anya Nya insurgency, highlighting educational differences and job distribution as the main 
reasons and stating that the SPLM/A would not fight for jobs but it had other objectives. The specific 
grievances stated in Chapters 4-6 of the Manifesto were: 1) Khartoum’s interference in the selection of 
southern leaders; 2) Jonglei Canal; 3) the act of dissolving southern political institutions 
unconstitutionally; 4) intention to tamper with southern boundaries; 5) the issue of oil refinery and 
consequent plans of exporting the petroleum unrefined; 6) deliberate exclusion of the South from 
socioeconomic development; 7) the integration treaty and defense agreement with Egypt; 8) the re-
division; 9) lack of adequate livelihood provided for the former Anya Nya; 10) the incomplete integration 
of the Anya Nya; and 11) the policy of transferring southern troops to the North. The last three chapters 
defined the movement’s enemies, such as northern political parties, fundamentalists, southern Sudanese 
elites, and Anya Nya members, together with any external force interested in Sudanese resources, its 
friends being the workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, and progressive elements in the army (Chan 
and Zuor, 2006: 57-8). 
509
 In fact, the Ethiopian desire to locate Garang, meet with him prior to any other rebel leader, 
subsequent inclination to accept his statement of objectives drafted according to its policy, and later 
support for Garang in the fight over the leadership of the rebel movement confirm this assumption. 
510
 This was to be modeled according to the U.S. system of which Garang was familiar, with a federal 
form of autonomous governments with a central government committed to fight against racism and ethnic 
divisions (Garang, 1987: 19-21, 26-7; Collins, 2008: 141, 143). Sudan was to become socialist and 
secular free of family rule, ethnic, religious, and regional discrimination, with a democratic redistribution 
of political power national resources (Heritage, 1987b: 4; Kok, 1992: 104; Rogier, 2005: 18). 
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revolution to form the New Sudan instead of secession was the only viable option.511 
Subsequent acceptance of the Manifesto by Ethiopian authorities512 made the SPLM/A 
the sole Sudanese anti-government organization recognized officially by a neighboring 
state, and a rebel delegation was permitted to meet Mengistu Haile Mariam in Nazareth 
near Addis Ababa (Madut-Arop, 2006: 71, 72). Thus the calculations to ensure 
Ethiopian support by adopting a socialist agenda had been successful (Yohannes, 1997: 
323). Thus socialism was embraced, although the stated objective was the liberation of 
the marginalized areas by removing power from the narrow Arabized elite by ensuring 
effective democratic political participation capable of producing regionally and socially 
equitable distribution of resources and economic development (Heritage, 1987c: 4).513 
 
However, there was disagreement of the true objective of the struggle within the 
SPLM/A. While the leadership was largely committed to the cause for unity, many 
followers perceived unity as a tactical recourse and others required tangible concessions 
from the central government prior to believing in unity solution (Rogier, 2005: 19). As a 
result secession remained an option, at least to the extent that it boosted the SPLM/A’s 
negotiation leverage against the marginalizing state controlled by the Arabized elite. 
 
3. Formation of the SPLM/A and Factional Conflict 
 
This section deals with the formal establishment of the SPLM/A and related 
factionalism and leadership competition. It shows the initial difficulties in forging the 
leadership, structure, and securing support.  
 
 
   
                                                 
511
 This created a rift between the SPLM/A leadership and some followers who fought for the cause 
thinking that the movement was secessionist. There was hope that some northern political factions might 
embrace the Manifesto, but it failed to convince northerners, including the SCP, to join any southern led 
political formation as had been the case since independence (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 58-9, 60). 
512
 It should be noted that despite the overwhelming influence of Ethiopia in the making of the SPLM/A, 
or claims about an absence of ideology, the movement had socialist aims. The concept of New Sudan 
focusing on eradicating uneven development, inequality, and injustice between the center and the 
marginalized periphery could be considered a justice seeking ideology in itself, despite its resemblance to 
Marxism. As a result, justice seeking in the sense spelled out in the SPLM Manifesto or the posterior 
refinement of the concept of New Sudan focus on the restructuring of political and economic power 
adapted to the case of Sudan and could be considered as an ideological foundation for a rebel movement. 
513
 Garang admitted already in 1987 that he would encourage a mixed economy (Heritage, 1987c: 4). 
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     Formational Challenges 
 
The constitution of the SPLM/A had taken place before some elements of the rebel 
leadership had arrived to Ethiopia.514 This led to the SPLM/A leadership being initially 
not clearly defined, with secessionist leaders suspicious of Garang’s dealing with the 
Ethiopians. Thus, Akwot demanded a SPLM government to be formed prior to meeting 
with Mengistu, hoping that he could claim leadership without further competition in a 
similar manner he had made his way up the political ladder of the Anya Nya in the 
1960s (Madut-Arop, 2006: 71). By convoking his supporters, Akwot was able to secure 
a position initially as the Chairman of the SPLM/A, with Gai Tut made the Minister of 
Defense, Oduho the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Majier the Minister of Legal Affairs, 
and Garang the Commander in Chief (Johnson, 1993: 125; Madut-Arop, 2006: 71).  
 
In this situation tension heightened between the main factions. Oduho, a senior 
politician, stepped in to avert disintegration by advising the leadership dispute be 
resolved only after some concrete support from Ethiopia would be secured (Madut-
Arop, 2006: 72). Consequently, the fledging SPLM/A delegation met Mengistu who 
ensured Ethiopian material and moral support to the movement with objectives of 
bringing social justice and political and economic equity, but that Addis Ababa, which 
was the seat of the OAU, would no longer allow separatist elements operating from its 
territory (Madut-Arop, 2006: 72). This was threatening to Gai Tut and Akwot who 
based the legitimacy among their supporters on secessionism, particularly when Mesfin 
pointed out openly that Garang515 would be his sole contact with the SPLM/A especially 
regarding military support and logistics (Madut-Arop, 2006: 72). Successively, Ethiopia 
transferred the rebel operations to Itang where Kerubino and Nyuon arrived and joined 
Garang,516 which unified and strengthened Garang’s faction in terms of leadership and 
                                                 
514
 For instance, Kerubino was still hospitalized and Nyuon was ostensibly confiscating resources, 
principally cattle and money, in the midst of deteriorating conditions in the South. He appears to have 
been motivated by self-enrichment without interest in forming part of the constituting the SPLM/A 
(Madut-Arop, 2006: 71). 
515
 Ethiopians had decided to support the younger and well-educated Garang because out of the senior 
officers he was ideologically the most committed to the unity of Sudan despite endorsing southern 
independence as a secret option, commanded the larger and more effective force, held diverse experience, 
and drew support from some prominent exiled southern politicians opposed to separatist agenda of 
Akwot, Gai Tut, and Chuol (Alier, 1990: 252; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 125, 126; Johnson, 2003: 65).   
516
 Kerubino and Nyuon had rejected Akwot’s proclamation of leadership of the movement in part 
because they had previously fought his Anya Nya II group, which elevated tension between the 
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manpower (Madut-Arop, 2006: 72-3). This ensured Garang control of material 
resources, but also resulted in his faction having been influenced by Ethiopia.517 
 
Ethiopians added fuel to the factional rift. They insisted that both the political and the 
armed wing of the movement should be united under a single leader because it would 
allow better control, but this worsened the situation as Addis Ababa supported Garang 
and simultaneously allowed legitimacy to Akwot’s and Gai Tut’s claims for leadership 
because they had been senior to Garang in the Anya Nya military hierarchy (Johnson 
and Prunier, 1993: 125, 126; Johnson, 2003: 65).        
 
In the growing contention, an effort was made to negotiate the leadership issue but the 
situation deteriorated further. 518 The factionalism turned into violence as the Ethiopian 
army intervened in support of Garang and forced the Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group back 
to Sudan despite the existence of rumors that Akwot had initially accepted Garang’s 
leadership (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Nyaba, 2000: 38; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 
43). The struggle between the groups ended in bloodshed with countless deaths and 
while Nyuon’s SPLA contingent ousted Gordon Kong’s Anya Nya II group, the prior 
recipient of Ethiopian arms, from its base in Bilpam, Ethiopians supported Garang by 
attacking Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group’s bases in the Sudanese border (Nyaba, 2000: 
37-8; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Johnson, 2003: 65-6; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 43; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 74). This resulted in the remnants of Kong’s faction coalescing with 
Akwot and Gai Tut at Bukteng, but there were also those Anya Nya II forces and 
refugees in Ethiopia that disagreed with Akwot and joined Garang (Johnson and 
Prunier, 1993: 126; Madut-Arop, 2006: 74). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
increasingly polarized two main factions, one led by Garang and other by Akwot and Gai Tut (Johnson 
and Prunier, 1993: 126; Johnson, 2003: 65; Madut-Arop, 2006: 73). 
517
 See i.e. Akol (2001: 25). 
518
 A committee of leaders including Oduho, Majer Gai, Chol Deng Alak, Kiir, Francis Ngor Makiec, 
Garjiek, Ganyjuj, Chuol, Kerubino, Nyuon, and Elijah Jon had been formed, but during its proceedings 
Kerubino shot Marial Alek, a young refugee and recruit, whom he alleged of insubordination of a senior 
officer. Partly because of this, Akwot and Gai Tut accused Garang’s faction of conspiracy, Gai Tut 
stating, to draw support, that Garang had been manipulated by Ethiopian Marxist ideology, and Akwot 
alleging that he had been sent by Khartoum and supported by Ethiopia to take over their struggle (Alier, 
1990: 252; Madut-Arop, 2006: 73). While the Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol faction remained adamant about 
Akwot’s claim to rebel leadership, Garang’s group had initially preferred Gai Tut over Akwot due to 
Kerubino’s and Nyuon’s animosity towards the latter (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 42, 43). 
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Despite Akwot-Gai Tut-Chuol group being primarily Nuer and Garang’s group mainly 
Dinka, it has been asserted that the factional violence related to the leadership struggle 
was shaped by ideological rather than ethnic motivations.519 The evidence for this has 
been that there were members of both larger ethnic affiliations in either side’s 
leadership (Alier, 1990: 251; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 42-3).520 Still, the Anya Nya II’s 
rank and file was predominantly Nuer, while the Garang’s faction was composed 
principally of the Dinka since its early days. Thus, although this categorization might be 
relatively irrelevant at the level of leadership, after the early days the struggle evolved 
to have a Dinka-Nuer ethnic element at the grassroots level (Nyaba, 2000: 49, 67) that 
persisted and culminated into a wider Dinka-Nuer confrontation in the context of the 
insurgency in the 1990s (Jok and Hutchinson, 1999: 125-45; Johnson, 2003: 111-26). 
Many Nuer and Dinka recruits were inclined to join a group to which they held ethnic 
allegiance despite the ideological objectives of their leadership, which culminated into 
an attempt to weed out Nuer Anya Nya II sympathizers from the SPLM/A and had 
repercussions on the civilian population (Nyaba, 2000: 49, 50-1). This points to the 
relative fluidity of ethnic identity categories at the level of rebel leadership, and their 
reconstruction and application to the constituencies in more rigid forms.  
 
In July 1983, the SPLM/A leadership structure was formally fixed.521 Garang became 
the figurehead of the movement, the Chairman of the SPLM and Commander-in-Chief 
of the SPLA, surrounded by his most loyal supporters from the earlier underground 
movement.522 Some rudimentary political structures headed by Oduho and Majier Gai 
                                                 
519
 It has been alleged that the fighting that ensued was principally motivated by the leadership struggle 
and ideological orientation of the movement. This is true at least at the highest level to the extent that 
despite the multiple candidates for the leadership, the two groups differed ideologically, the Akwot-Gai 
Tut-Chuol group representing the unfulfilled dream of secession of the separatist tradition in the South, 
while Garang’s group emphasized a socialist political agenda to the southern armed struggle appealing for 
unity and maintaining secession only as a covert option (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Johnson, 2003: 
65; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 43-4). It should be remembered that this agenda, attributed to Garang’s ability 
to maneuver for securing Ethiopian support, was influenced, if not altogether imposed, by Ethiopia that 
aspired to destabilize Nimeiri. 
520
 For instance, Garang and Akwot were both Twic Dinka from the Bor district in Kongor, Gai Tut a 
Nuer, Kerubino a Dinka, and Chuol and Nyuon originally Dinka but had become ethnically Nuer through 
naturalization. 
521
 Chan and Zuor (2006: 67, 72-4) claim that it became an authoritarian and highly hierarchical military 
organization with no plurality in the decision-making, resulting allegedly in unilateral views of policy, 
mistakes, and human rights violations by individual leaders with extensive power over their soldiers, 
operations, and jurisdictions. If this is true, it was in part due to military and subjective individual 
character of leaders and not necessarily the case for the movement as a whole. 
522
 Kerubino became Garang’s deputy in both functions, Nyuon was appointed as Chief of Staff of 
security operations, Kiir became his deputy, and Nyachigag Nyachiluk became an alternative member of 
the SPLM/A political-military High Command (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 73; Madut-Arop, 2006: 74). 
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were put in place, with political headquarters in London (Turner, 1998: 2006), but were 
soon suppressed and withered away against the military organization, leading to the 
arrest of the two prominent politicians (Nyaba, 2000: 45; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 72). 
 
After the removal of the most immediate threat to Garang’s leadership the principal task 
became the organization of the rebel forces. While by July 1983 the ranks of recruits for 
the guerrilla forces in Itang had been swollen by thousands, along with 2,500 defected 
soldiers of the absorbed forces, and 500 remaining in Bahr al-Ghazal making it difficult 
to wield together an effective force,523 it was the remaining soldiers of the battalions 
104 and 105 with some Anya Nya II fighters who formed the base of the movement 
(Nyaba, 2000: 38; Johnson, 2003: 62; Collins, 2008: 139-40). 
 
From the outset, members of various sectors of the southern population had mixed and 
varied motivations to join the rebels or opt for other strategies in the prevailing insecure 
political context. The deterioration of local conditions and resumption of violence 
owing largely to the strategies and governance of the marginalizing state, forced most 
southerners to decide if to participate in the rebellion, armed activities, or opt for non-
violent survival strategies, including becoming internally displaced or refugees.  
 
Many of those who decided to join the rebellion initially did so due to the widespread 
grievances. They came among pastoralists, students, laborers, youth, women, peasants, 
and intelligentsia, while school pupils, teachers, students, office workers, and members 
of army largely followed after the imposition of shari’a  by Nimeiri in September 1983 
(Nyaba, 2000: 27; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 53). Ostensibly, many rallied behind the 
                                                                                                                                               
Whereas some members joined the SPLM/A ranks from exile, such as Stephen Madut Baak, many 
prominent military members of the underground movement, among them Andrew Makur Thaou, Albino 
Akol Akol, Alison Manani Magaya, Peter Cirillo, Robert Mayuk Deng, Scopas Juma, remained in Sudan 
during this period (Madut-Arop, 2006: 75). According to Garang, other early members of the high 
command included Arok Thon, Daniel Awet, Bona Baang, Riek Machar, Lam Akol, James Wani Igga, 
Kuol Manyang, and John Kulang (Heritage, 1987b: 4). Major Arok Thon also became part of the High 
Command, but was disenchanted upon his late arrival in July in Itang because his former junior officer, 
Cpt. Kiir, had been promoted over him despite Arok having been the only one in the SPLA trained in the 
officer training school in Sudan (Nyaba, 2000: 30, 44-5; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 73). There was also 
friction between Arok and Garang because Arok challenged Garang’s social prominence in their native 
Bor county and had extensive combat experience relative to Garang’s almost none, the latter relying on 
more experienced field commanders Kerubino, Nyuon, and Kiir for military operations (Johnson, 2003: 
66; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 73). It is likely that this is why Garang favored them. 
523
 According to Chan and Zuor (2006: 41), “With the arrival of large number of South Sudanese in Itang, 
and the two battalions brought by Major William Nyuon from Ayod and Major Kiruno from Bor, the 
question became what to do next with all these different armies and groups of people?” 
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SPLM/A not because of its socialist ideology per se, which was little known in most of 
the South, but because of animosity against the “Arab” government and as a reaction to 
the policies (Nyaba, 2000: 26-7) of the marginalizing state. Strong motivational factors 
for some recruits were also the perceived regionalist “southern” ideas and views, the 
access to guns similarly to the 1960s for defense against the regime supported militias, 
to claim respect, higher social standing, economic advancement, and at times to 
facilitate criminal activity (de Waal, 1993: 154; Nyaba, 2000: 26, 42, 43, 72; Chan and 
Zuor, 2006: 45, 46). While some youth saw themselves as defenders of ancestral land or 
joined in defense of their families, others used recruitment to maneuver within the space 
between the dominant actors, the state and the SPLA, in order to gain resources to 
invest in their own future, in essence to continue to reproduce the local culture by 
relying on family as the most durable institution during the conflict (Leonardi, 2007: 
391-412). The “Arab” vs. “African” group categorization used by the SPLM/A, 
conviction for liberation of the South, and forced conscription also played a role in the 
recruitment,524 but in some areas the SPLM/A call to arms had much less effect.525 
 
The SPLA recruitment was encouraged through propaganda. The main tool for this was 
the Radio SPLA: The Voice of the Revolutionary Armed Struggle, established in Naru, 
next to Addis Ababa, in 1983, which countered the regime’s propaganda over the armed 
struggle and promoted recruitment and political sympathy by addressing people of the 
marginalized peripheral regions and encouraging the poor, dispossessed, and oppressed 
to join the movement (Nyaba, 2000: 27; Madut-Arop, 2006: 92, 103).526 In addition, the 
SPLA radio served to advance the ideological dimension of the movement.527 While this 
                                                 
524
 Based on an interview with a local religious leader on 29 September in Juba. The interview also 
confirmed the role of conviction to “fight for your rights”, imposition of shari’a, and acquisition of arms 
for criminal for criminal activity as motivating forces.  
525
 For instance, in Aweil, a pro-divisionist Dinka area, in Nuer areas of Upper Nile, and in most of 
Equatoria the response was less enthusiastic (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127). Many among Equatorian 
youth were hesitant to join the SPLA because the SPLA was viewed mainly as a Dinka movement rather 
than expression of legitimate fight against “Arab” domination, and due to later SPLA atrocities against 
some Equatorians (Kulusika, 1998: 110; Madut-Arop, 2006: 37; Collins, 2008: 143). 
526
 The programming included grandiose news about battles fought against the army, portraying even the 
ones lost as victories, but also political commentary, war songs, and poems, beamed in Arabic, English, 
and local languages (Nyaba, 2000: 53; Madut-Arop, 2006: 103). 
527
 While the regime portrayed the movement as Marxist, which was enough to convince the U.S. initially 
and ensure the delivery of military support, Garang articulated the movement’s socialist agenda in the 
Radio SPLA and concentrated on grievances experienced by people at the grassroots level, such as the 
collapsing economy, shortage of basic food items, rising unemployment, deterioration of social services, 
denouncing the repression by the SSO, inflation, and devaluation of currency (Johnson, 2003: 64; Collins, 
2008: 143). This increasing use of radio as an anti-regime propaganda tool by armed southern opposition 
followed Sadiq al-Mahdi’s anti-Nimeiri radio campaign in the 1970s from Ethiopia. 
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elevated the scale of recruitment much higher than in the case of the Anya Nya, it also 
facilitated to an extent the defection of some members of the northern elite from the 
government side, such as Khalil Osman, a textile entrepreneur, and Mansour Khalid, the 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had participated in negotiations for the Addis 
Ababa Agreement (Nyaba, 2000: 27; Madut-Arop, 2006: 92).  
 
The recruits were trained according to stipulated SPLM/A principles. Ethiopians 
organized training for the movement as able-bodied men were sorted out and sent to the 
Bonga Training Center originally set up near Gambella to train Anya Nya II, while 
women, children, and the elderly were sent to refugee camps in Itang, Panyudo, Dima, 
or Gambella (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 44-5; Madut-Arop, 2006: 77). The SPLM/A 
training camps, in Bonga, Bilpam, Buma, Dima, Itang, and some mobile ones, were set 
up with an intent to build an effective military machinery characterized by harsh 
training conditions and strict discipline, deliberately militarizing the movement 
according to socialist principles following the example of Ethiopia (Nyaba, 2000: 38, 
52; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 44; Collins, 2008: 143).528 The recruits were forced through a 
process of indoctrination529 aimed to overcome their ethnic, sectional, geographic, or 
professional differences and canalize their anger towards the “Arab” enemy, encouraged 
to believe in their superiority on the battlefield (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 46).530 The 
process of indoctrination resulted in higher awareness among the troops about the 
political objectives of the movement than had been the case previously during the Anya 
Nya insurgency,531 and was used to reinforce the “Arab” vs. “African” identity 
cleavage.  
 
                                                 
528
 It has been further alleged that SPLA Combat Intelligence, a security unit modeled according to 
Nimeiri’s SSO, was established to suppress any free political opinion, and the imposition of immediate 
obedience in concentration camp-like conditions during the 3-4 months of training during which the 
recruits were indoctrinated to worship the rebel leaders as parent-like figures and forced to vow personal 
allegiance to Garang. In the process many were brutalized and dehumanized, generating an environment 
of distrust, fear, indifference, demoralization, and apathy that translated into SPLA atrocities against 
civilians in the field (Nyaba, 2000: 52-3; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 45-7). 
529
 Nyaba (2000) has criticized the imposition of the SPLM/A vision for its harshness.  
530
 Allegedly, this treatment of recruits was motivated by a claim that they had to be prepared for any 
situation and a belief that the movement would never run out of human resources, while Garang, 
Kerubino, Nyoun, Kiir and Arok, were made the mystified leaders of whom the soldiers invented moral 
songs and poems and who became the figureheads of the “cause” to the extent that many rebels felt they 
were fighting personally for Garang (Nyaba, 2000: 38, 44-5; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 47-8, 73). 
531
 According to an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A official on 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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Yet, the early SPLM/A leadership feared being overthrown. It suffered from personal 
animosities, and was surrounded by prominent individuals that appeared to have 
different responses to that of the SPLM/A leadership.532 Worry about possible 
conspiracies allegedly led to an initial weeding out of some Nuer and persecution of 
politicians and intellectuals.533 The potential threat of plots was countered by outright 
militarism and rudimentary Marxist teachings to implant ideological foundations in the 
soldiers according to the Ethiopian curriculum, which elevated the SPLA’s coherence 
but tied it further to Ethiopia (Nyaba, 2000: 50, 51, 53, 54-5).  
 
The SPLA military was organized in divisions under area commands as a mass guerrilla 
movement.534 Critics claim that this marked a premature conventionalization of the war 
because of having to fight in several fronts (against the Anya Nya II remnants, militias, 
and the army), lower quality of training of the SPLM/A relative to the army, desertions, 
low administrative capacity of the liberated areas, indiscipline, attacks on civilians, 
looting of property, and forceful conscription, which encouraged migration away from 
SPLM/A areas and local collaboration with the regime (Nyaba, 2000: 58-60; Madut-
Arop, 2006: 114-5). 
 
 
 
                                                 
532
 For instance, inspired by competition for positions under Garang’s leadership, Kerubino developed a 
dislike of Colonel Francis Ngor Makiec who he was able to keep out of the High Command Council 
despite the latter’s long involvement in the underground movement and seniority in military rank to 
Kerubino (Madut-Arop, 2006: 84). Moreover, while some secretly sympathized with the movement, 
many others, such as General Akol Akol, declined to join (Madut-Arop, 2006: 84-6). 
533
 Allegedly, such persecution initially alienated politicians from the militarized movement particularly 
after the death of Benjamin Bol Akok, a respected individual, in obscure circumstances by the Ethiopian 
security in August 1984, possibly also involving SPLM/A leaders (Madut-Arop, 2006: 81-3). 
534
 Unlike the Anya Nya that was a loose union of localized forces, the SPLM/A ostracized its soldiers by 
seeking to deploy them to areas different from their origin. While some Nuer recruits refused to leave 
their home areas for training in Ethiopia, most Dinka recruits were deployed away from their home areas 
(Johnson, 2003: 69-70).The Jamus (Buffalo) Battalion led by Kerubino became the first larger unit to 
finish training in 1983, followed by the Jarad or Kaoryom (Locust) Division in 1984 and Timsah and 
Tiger battalions led by Thon Arok and Kiir (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 45; Madut-Arop, 2006: 77, 111). 
While Nyaba (2000: 38) claims that the latter Division was mainly composed of recruited and trained 
university students and office workers, Madut-Arop (2006: 77) asserts that it was an amalgamation of 
defected soldiers from allover southern Sudan. The Kaoryom Division consisted of five branches: the 
Central Command under Garang included four battalions (Bilpam, Elephant, Hippo, and Lion); the 
Southern Axis under Thon Arok in southern Upper Nile consisted of three battalions (Zindia, Cobra, and 
Lightning); the Northern Axis under Ngor-Makiech operated in the Southern Blue Nile; the Eastern Axis 
under Nyachiluk operating in Boma Plateau and east of Bor consisted of the Scorpion Battalion; and the 
Western Axis under Makur Aleiou and Amum operated in Bahr al-Ghazal consisted of the Rhino 
Battalion overrunning Aluakluak and Tonj, taking Yirol, and surrounding Wau and Rumbek (Nyaba, 
2000: 54; Madut-Arop, 2006: 111-2). 
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4. Escalation of the Conflict 
 
This section deals with the responses to the emergence of the SPLM/A and shows how 
despite the efforts to obstruct its strengthening the movement was able consolidate itself 
largely due to external assistance.  
 
     Regime and Rival Groups Responses  
 
In September 1983 Nimeiri had announced that the Islamic law, shari’a, would guide 
all legislation and judicial practices.535 Having been pressured by the Muslim 
Brothers536 threatening to stage a pro-shari’a demonstration, Nimeiri had felt obliged to 
decree shari’a as soon as possible.537 Although openly supported and heavily influenced 
by Turabi,538 who was pushing for immediate implementation of the Islamic law, 
Nimeiri replaced him with Awad al-Jid Muhammad Ahmad as the attorney general 
prior to announcing the order (Warburg, 2003: 155, 187). This move was prompted to 
                                                 
535
 In November 1983 the national assembly ratified the bills proposed by the three-man committee 
during two brief sessions without any debate. Along with the Sources of Judicial Decisions Act, which 
allowed the implementation of the Islamic law, a completely new Penal Code, a Code of Criminal 
Procedure, the Civil Procedures Act, and the Civil Transactions Act were promulgated, enabling the 
Islamization of penalties of criminal conduct (Warburg, 2003: 156). Among other measures alcoholic 
beverages were destroyed and became prohibited, and men were condemned to public punishments such 
as lashings, executions, and amputations, which could also be followed through radio or television. When 
forced to follow his first public amputation along with other government officials, Turabi, the mastermind 
of the Islamic laws, fainted. The day Nimeiri announced the Islamic laws, he also released 13,000 
detainees from the Kobar prison and claiming that he forgave them as Muhammad had done to the people 
of Mecca after they persecuted him (Collins, 2006: 146).  
536
 In November 1982, the Islamic militants had held a conference to outline their policy. They had 
convened in Khartoum in the session organized by the Society of Islamic Thought and Civilization during 
which Turabi asserted that the main issue for the Muslim Brothers was the Islamization of Sudan and 
adhering Sudanese law to comply with shari’a, which was reflected in the conference resolutions calling 
for social reforms preceding gradual implementation of the Islamic law (Warburg, 2003: 186-7).    This 
led to the SSU national congress, now widely influenced by the Muslim Brothers, to favor the “Islamic 
path” in June 1983, opening a path for legislation according to Islamic principles that began in the two 
following months when Nimeiri appointed a three-lawyer committee to Islamize Sudan’s legal system 
(Warburg, 2003: 155). It proceeded to draft bills mostly according to suggestions of Turabi’s committee 
included in Provisional Republican Orders (Warburg, 2003: 155-6). 
537
 This was despite Sadig al-Mahdi telling Nimeiri that proclaiming shari’a would not remedy societal 
ills rising from poverty (based on an interview with an elderly merchant, 29 September in Juba). Nimeiri 
also declared himself Imam to assert power over the Muslim Brothers by politicizing religion, 
simultaneously establishing a symbolic relationship with his senior officials similar to al-Mahdi and the 
Khalifa during the Mahdiyya (Johnson, 2003: 56; Collins, 2008: 146). 
538
 In fact, Turabi had advised Nimeiri in the effort to divide the South to undo southern opposition to the 
implementation of shari’a (Johnson, 2003: 57; Warburg, 2003: 167).    
352        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
curb Turabi’s increasing power, but did not prevent his prominence that rivaled 
Nimeiri.539 
 
Reaction to the declaration of Islamic laws was mixed.540 To regain political legitimacy 
by attempting to elevating status as a religious leader in the context of rising Islamism, 
Nimeiri began to deliver speeches, and claimed to castigate anyone who would stage a 
strike despite the economic malaise because it would obstruct the cause of Allah for 
Sudan (Collins, 2008: 147).541 While these efforts aimed to maintain Nimeiri in power, 
he was gradually losing the grip of absolute power over the marginalizing state.  
 
As could be expected, the declaration of the Islamic laws raised uproar in southern 
Sudan. While they affected directly southerners residing in the North who also suffered 
from kasha,542 in southern Sudan they were interpreted as an all out attack on southern 
cultures, traditions, and lifestyle due to expected resumption of forced Islamization and 
Arabization (Awur, 1988: 100).543 Despite the armed groups and rebels already causing 
insecurity in southern Sudan, the Islamic laws deteriorated the situation further as they 
generated another grievance due to which the number of recruits to the rebel training 
camps in Ethiopia grew considerably (Madut-Arop, 2006: 56). The reaction among 
southern leadership was general rejection in part because many in the southern elite felt 
antagonism towards Turabi who was viewed as the main instigator of the troubles of 
during the early 1980s, which propelled support for a rebellion that had started only 
months earlier even among some Equatorian leaders who overcame their anti-Dinka 
                                                 
539
 Some have even suggested that Turabi became the “real” president behind Nimeiri (interview with an 
elderly merchant, 29 September in Juba. 
540
 It was characterized by disappointment in urban areas where people enjoyed activities prohibited by 
the shari’a, apprehension about following inquisition, utter disappointment and fear in the South where 
Nimeiri lost the last thread of his support, and was rejoiced in some rural areas where it was seen to purify 
religion and wash the urban areas from their heresy (Collins, 2008: 147). 
541
 For instance, in a speech on 22 September 1984 in International Islamic Conference in Khartoum he 
defended the policy by stating that Islamic state guided by shari’a was necessary for creating a crimeless 
and just society prescribed by Islam, which was echoed by Turabi who claimed it being part of 
educational process, while Sadiq, Republican Brothers, and a number of other groups denounced it in 
various parts of the country (Alier, 1990: 230; Warburg, 2003: 156, 163). According to Nimeiri, since the 
adoption of the Islamic law crime had declined 40%, although this was hardly the case since due to 
economic and social deterioration and the previous liberation of criminals as a gesture of goodwill armed 
robbery had reached unprecedented levels (Sidahmed, 1997: 139; Warburg, 2003: 158). 
542
 Based on an interview with a prominent member of Juba University on 22 September 2008. Homes of 
many southerners in Khartoum were bulldozed to motivate them to leave the capital. 
543
 Based on interviews with an elderly merchant on 29 September 2008 in Juba, and mid-ranking 
SPLM/A representative on 1 October 2008 in Kampala. 
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sentiment (Malwal, 1985: 35; Alier, 1990: 230; Warburg, 2003: 167).544 Christian 
organizations found the prevailing circumstances in southern Sudan opportune for 
conversion to Christianity and incited believers against the Islamic laws.545  
 
These developments led to a general sentiment that the threat from the North had 
returned, producing a number of incidents and actions particularly in Juba.546 Such 
provocations culminated in the formation of organized Equatorian opposition to the 
regime and more Equatorian rebel recruits,547 giving many southerners genuine reasons 
to join the armed struggle against the perceived “Arab” domination (Nyaba, 2000: 72; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 57). In fact, the Islamic law and forced migration denied many 
southerners the right to full citizenship, excluding them on cultural grounds (Nyaba, 
2000: 26-7). These were manifestations of the policies of the marginalizing state. 
 
Consequently, the regime proceeded with the implementation of the Islamic laws. While 
in June 1984 Alier and Lagu also put aside their differences to draft a petition 
                                                 
544
 In fact, according to Awur (1988: 98), 
Within short time there was a spirit of reconciliation, confession and repentence [sic] among 
Southerners. Opposition to Sharia became united, and rallies, public prayers, demonstrations, 
and such like, were conducted in the big towns like Juba. Many pamphlets were circulated 
denouncing Sharia and calling all Southerners to put aside their differences and unite. 
545Their statements encouraged people consumed with fear to resort to Christianity to confront the threat 
of Islamic law. Thus, strengthening of Christian beliefs in the southern was reactionary and directly 
linked to politicization of Islam by the regime and its manipulation of religion as a political tool. Such 
response as part of reactionary pattern of southern politics overall is partly related to the Christian legacy 
and colonial isolation of southern Sudan (Nyaba, 2000: 32). For instance, Catholic Bishops of the Sudan 
reminded that “Conflicts begin where there are injustices, discrimination and oppression; when people are 
asking for their rights and they are denied to them”, while adding that “ . . . where the Sharia Law 
conflicts with Christian tradition and customs, and violates the freedom of conscience, you must stand for 
Christ” (CBS, 1984: 4, 7). They also stated that “ . . . you are Africans and Christians, and therefore have 
the right to live in this country according to your culture, customs and religion. These are your rights, not 
only as citizens but human beings” (CBS, 1984: 13).    
546
 A week after the declaration, a demonstration was staged in Juba in response to the Islamic laws and 
students, particularly in Equatoria, agitated people to join armed liberation struggle (Madut-Arop, 2006: 
57). This feeling was expressed and propelled by a number of local publications. One of them, 
Memorandum, written by Equatorian students and spread widely in Juba in July 1984 explained that  
Inspired by the struggle of our great fore-fathers and by the aspirations of the Southern Sudanese 
people for total freedom from enslavement, exploitation and subjugation of all kinds, we the 
students of Equatoria in the Universities and higher institutions shall proceed to pronounce in 
words and deeds our view-point and judgement [sic] on the prevailing strained political situation 
. . . (quoted in Awur, 1988: 100). 
547
 A pamphlet dated on 8 July 1984 was circulated in Juba, which described the goals of the South Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement (SSPLM), indicating that armed struggle was necessary for the total 
liberation of the people of southern Sudan (Awur, 1988: 101). Although SSPLM lost its momentum, in 
part because it was secessionist and in part because it was an Equatorian initiative imitating the Anya 
Nya, it encouraged some Equatorians to take up arms against the regime. An added factor to this was the 
disappointment of Tembura’s leadership favoring the Zande along ethnic lines that led to a gradual stream 
of Lotuko recruits to the SPLM/A, while some Acholi, Lokoya, and Moru also joined in eastern Equatoria 
(Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 133).      
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personally addressed to Nimeiri in which they asserted that “The South wanted a 
recognition and acceptance to simple objective and vital facts, namely the existence of 
diversity of cultures, historical differences and economic social backwardness of the 
South” (Awur, 1988: 103), the regime pointed out that the three newly formed southern 
regional assemblies in southern Sudan had no authority to question its decisions (Alier, 
1990: 230-1). The regime announced repeatedly that shari’a would not affect Christians 
or southern Sudan and in fact it had almost no effect on the local life in the South where 
including in Juba bars continued to offer alcoholic drinks (Awur, 1988: 104-5). This 
shows Nimeiri’s attempt to moderate the effects of the agenda of the Muslim Brothers 
to make an effort to manage southern Sudan more carefully to neutralize grievances 
based on religion. However, such management was incompatible with the orientation of 
the marginalizing state that sought to extend Arab culture and Islam and did not 
convince the majority of southerners affected by the end of the regional autonomy. 
 
The Islamization also transformed the national economy. Avoiding responsibility for the 
economic malaise, Nimeiri described an implementation of zakat as a tax system and 
the successful core of the Sudanese economy because it helped the poor and attracted 
investment, but the reality was different, as the Islamic economic reforms had ended 
hope of recovery (Warburg, 2003: 156; Collins, 2008: 149).548 Consequently the 
banking system was fully Islamized in December 1984, contrary to recommendations of 
Nimeiri’s financial advisors and in detriment to the economy, in benefit of the Muslim 
Brothers who gained control over it (Warburg, 2003: 159). Thus, their strategy of 
politicization and at least partial instrumentalization of religion facilitated their ascent to 
economic and political power. 
 
The deteriorating conditions549 led to economic bailout attempts and adjustment 
measures.550 Financial aid was channeled and remedies such as the devaluation of 
                                                 
548
 This had decreed income tax at 2.5% with a similar tax also applicable to non-Muslims, and corporate 
tax at 10% (Warburg, 2003: 156). Both The Civil Transactions Act and Zakat and Taxation Act 
undermined the economy because the former ended limited liability and interest charges in intra-Sudanese 
transactions and the latter undermined the previous tax base (Warburg, 2003: 158-9). 
549
 These coincided with a drought in 1984-5 in the Sahelian Sudan, affecting principally the populations 
of Darfur, Kordofan, and eastern Sudan (Niblock, 1987: 288-9). However, it also had an impact in the 
conflict in the South as it pushed Baggara southwards towards Dinka territories. 
550
 For instance, the U.S. lent economic support to Sudan. It diverted US$18 million from the USAID to 
pay Sudan’s debt arrears and pressured the IMF to accept the standby loan for Sudan in May 1984, but 
after a scandal of misappropriation of the funds the U.S. Congress ordered the donor countries not to pay 
off Sudan’s debt (Jendia, 2002: 156). As a result, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia cancelled an initiative to pay 
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currency, which heightened discontent among urban dwellers accustomed to purchase 
imported goods, and export led strategies were applied. However, these measures were 
unsuccessful in part because corruption551 was rampant with heavy implication of the 
high level officials, and while the mushrooming of government departments coincided 
with the lack of resources to maintain the political patronage, the public administrations 
stopped functioning (Holt and Daly, 2000: 178). Sudan was on the brink of bankruptcy, 
the rising cost of living, devaluations, and overall inflation infuriating common people 
who demonstrated and rioted, blaming the regime and the IFIs, the WB having been 
converted into the controversial figure of austerity measures and the IMF canceling its 
standby credit to Sudan (Holt and Daly, 2000: 178, Warburg, 2003: 159; Collins, 2008: 
153-4).552 The external support that had sustained the Nimeiri regime was waning.    
 
Nimeiri countered the deteriorating political and economic conditions by maintaining 
power through repression. The regime used measures such as the state of emergency 
from April to September 1984, and Islamic justice, while Nimeiri turned against his 
allies, the Muslim Brothers, by imprisoning their leadership and accusing them of 
planning to overthrow the regime among other charges (Holt and Daly, 2000: 179). In 
1985, the Nimeiri regime finally collapsed in the face of “ . . . an unprecedented 
combination of foreign pressure, economic disaster, famine, civil war, popular disgust, 
and the overweening self-confidence of a ruler who had come to despise his own people 
(Holt and Daly, 2000: 178). His political maneuvering had reached its limit.      
 
While the SPLM/A military organization was being formed in Ethiopia the situation in 
southern Sudan deteriorated as some of the excluded factions began to work against the 
                                                                                                                                               
US$25 million worth of Sudan’s IMF fees (Jendia, 2002: 156). In June, the U.S. finally bowed to pay 
Sudan’s arrears to the IMF, which led to the IMF release the first US$20 million of the standby loan 
(Brown, 1986: 506). Despite this, Sudan’s overall dissatisfactory financial performance and willingness to 
pay its debt arrears made the IMF consider expelling Sudan in January 1985 (Brown, 1986: 487-11). 
551
 Apart from the state apparatus, the corruption had also adverse effect on the education system, medical 
care, and trade unions and professional associations (Holt and Daly, 2000: 178). 
552
 While the Sudanese oriented their discontent towards the IMF and the WB, the government continued 
its collaboration with the IFIs until its Islamic economic system hindered foreign investments. In 1984, 
when the Islamic economy gained impetus, the regime announced that it would not need a regular budget, 
but that it would be issued on the basis of three-month periods until September after which the fiscal year 
would respect the Islamic calendar, the first Islamic budget being presented in August (Brown, 1986: 498-
501, 504; Jendia, 2002: 155). As a result, and because Islamic banking hindered the ability to control the 
money flow due to the abolition of interests and transaction costs, the IMF, which was about to approve 
standby financing for the government, experienced difficulties to supervise the recovery program (Khalid, 
1990: 327-8).  
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movement by targeting its recruits.553 In response, Nyaba (2000: 49) alleges that the 
SPLA began attacking their constituencies, killing also many Nuer civilians including 
women and children indiscriminately, razing towns, destroying grain, and looting 
livestock. This soon evolved into a campaign to eliminate the remaining Anya Nya II 
groups in the South with Ethiopian support through absorption and confrontation.554 
 
During the emergence of the SPLM/A the regime sought to exploit any ethnic 
animosities as cheap counterinsurgency measures.555 Politicization of religion556 was 
left for Nimeiri as the only major tool to rally for counterinsurgency in the deteriorating 
conditions, while the proclamation of jihad in its racial context was linked to the hidden 
                                                 
553
 After returning to Bukteng in Sudan, Gai Tut and Akwot engaged in recruitment and concentrated 
from facing the army to blocking principally Dinka recruits crossing through Upper Nile to Ethiopia to 
join Garang, who they now perceived as the main threat to their existence, by roadblocks, harassment, 
and ambushes (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126; Madut-Arop, 2006: 77-8). Many recruits from Bahr al-
Ghazal destined to Ethiopia fell victim to Akwot’s and Gai Tut’s forces, being detained, tortured, or 
murdered such as 1,000 Ngok Dinka conscripted by Bakat Agwek out of whom 2/3 were killed and 
several captured in an ambush in Upper Nile. However, many of those captured also escaped and arrived 
later to Ethiopia. One large concentration of such recruits trapped by Gai Tut and Akwot were over 
10,000 from Aweil under the leadership of Lual Diing Wol, a former unity-minded member of the 
abolished regional assembly, who thought Akwot and Gai Tut were the main SPLM/A, but after 
discovering his mistake, he collaborated with the movement to secretly send his recruits to join Garang 
and after defecting himself Diing received officer training and was appointed as alternate commander in 
the SPLM/A High Command. In this context, Akwot resumed his rhetoric to persuade the recruits by 
claiming that he commanded the real SPLM/A that was secessionist. During 1983-4 when Akwot and Gai 
Tut engaged in their activities, principally those recruits coming from Tonj, Aweil, Gogrial, and Abyei, 
and civilians on their way to Ethiopia or moving with their cattle looking for pastures were harassed or 
killed, while those going through Rumbek, Yirol, and Bor, avoiding main areas of Upper Nile, often made 
it to Ethiopia more safely (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127; Madut-Arop, 2006: 78-80). 
554
 Garang pressured the Bukteng group and Gai Tut felt obliged to negotiate, which led him into a trap in 
Itang surrounded by Garang and the Ethiopians hoping to disarm him (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126). 
However, Gai Tut and some of his troops were able to escape, capture weapons in Adura, and return to 
Sudan (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126). In January 1984, the main SPLM/A with Ethiopian army 
support launched military operations against Gai Tut-Atem-Chuol-Kong forces and captured Bukteng, but 
suffered heavy losses attributed to some Nuer elements in the main SPLM/A allegedly sympathizing with 
the Anya Nya II Nuer (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 126). Meanwhile, a number of smaller Anya Nya II 
groups were absorbed into the rebel movement or became influenced by it, but unlike during the Anya 
Nya insurgency they were not allowed to operate independently afterwards (Johnson, 1998: 58). 
555
 For instance, the Gaajak, Jikany, and Lou Nuer suffered from the SPLM/A reprisals and began to kill 
individual SPLM/A soldiers and take their guns. In 1984, Nimeiri began to seek ways to encourage the 
Nuer against the Dinka by providing arms and financing, justifying the support by claiming that the 
SPLM/A was Dinka dominated and a communist organization (Alier, 1990: 252; Johnson, 2003: 69). 
Encouraging ethnic war in the South by supplying militias enabled Nimeiri to portray the war as a local 
tribal conflict which provided justification for strengthening the SSO, enforcing Islamism, and declaring a 
state of emergency in the South on 29 April 1984, while accusing the SPLM/A of being a Marxist and 
Leninist tool of Ethiopia and the Soviet Union (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128; Turner, 1998: 206; Holt 
and Daly, 2000: 179; Madut-Arop, 2006: 97, 100).      
556
 Nimeiri exploited ethnic animosity in his propaganda through radio Juba and Omdurman for 
increasing support from the Western countries and Arab states, embarking on a hate campaign that was 
also part of the Friday prayers in Three Towns. He characterized the Dinka and the SPLM/A as poised to 
spread atheism and communism in the Horn of Africa and as the self-proclaimed Imam declared jihad 
against the SPLM/A proclaiming the military as army of God and promising paradise for soldiers killed in 
action (see i.e. Alier, 1990: 252 and Madut-Arop, 2006: 97, 98-9, 101). 
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agenda of the Islamists and sent members of the “friendly forces” and northern soldiers 
against the rebels to defend the status quo (Khalid, 1990: 12; Kulusika, 1998: 116; Chan 
and Zuor, 2006: 68). Thus, religion provided the last resort to cling onto the 
marginalizing state power by Nimeiri’s faction of the Arabized elite.  
 
The regime’s counterinsurgency campaign was designed around the creation of 
government militias in the South and the transitional zone, which led to sections of 
groups neighboring the Dinka to take arms against them.557 Part of this strategy was to 
kill and displace civilians particularly in the transitional area and in this way hinder 
SPLM/A support and recruitment (Rolandsen, 2005: 45), but it was also applied in areas 
such as Equatoria.558 For instance, after the Bor mutiny the Governor of Equatoria, 
Peter Cirillo, admitted openly that he facilitated arms deliveries from the regime to the 
Mundari militias for self-defense and to protect Juba from the SPLA,559 which turned 
Equatoria into a terrain for the proliferation of armed groups and escalation of violence. 
                                                 
557
 During this period encouraging Baggara raids became part of regime’s strategy (de Waal, 1993: 147). 
Among southern groups, apart from the Nuer out of whom sections were engaged in ethnicized conflict 
with the Dinka, militias of the Murle, the Mundari, Equatorians, and later Fertit were summoned to 
conduct raids against them. For instance, the Murle have a long history in cattle raiding the Bor Dinka 
and also the Nuer communities in Ayod, having been armed during the first war by the government and 
subsequently not disarmed, their activities in Akobo, Bor, and Waat continued throughout the 1970s 
almost every rainy season (de Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson, 2003: 68). After the Bor mutiny they became 
among the first regime supported militias with arms provided to Ismail Konye, a Murle chief around 
Pibor and a former army officer, who organized eight raids in 1983 (de Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson, 2003: 
68). Whereas the raids were aimed against civilian population for settling old feuds and private gain, they 
devastated rural dwellers likely to support the SPLM/A, tying down SPLA units in the area, but caused 
collateral damage to the Anya Nya II constituencies (de Waal, 1993: 154; Johnson, 2003: 68). Allegedly, 
in 1983 Nimeiri had convoked the governors of Equatoria, Bahr al-Ghazal, and Upper Nile, Lawrence 
Wol Wol, James Tembura, and Daniel Kuot Matthews to summon counterinsurgency forces in their 
respective regions with generous government funding (Madut-Arop, 2006: 105).   
558
 The regime sought to manipulate sectors of Equatorian groups against the Dinka. On the one hand, 
some Equatorian politicians, including Lagu and Tembura, were consumed by the propaganda adhering to 
anti-Dinka sentiments to the extent that they supported an army assault on Bor, allowed the harassment of 
the remaining Dinka and Nuer in Juba, and permitted the backing by the Equatorian regional government 
of the Toposa-organized long range raids to loot the Bor Dinka (Johnson, 2003: 67-8; Madut-Arop, 2006: 
106). While many prominent Equatorians denounced the regime’s propaganda after experiencing its 
effects, some politicians, such as Francis Wajo, the Deputy Governor, exploited the rhetoric and 
convinced Gajuk Wurnyang Lupai, the commissioner of eastern Equatoria and Mundari leader, to agitate 
against the Dinka (Madut-Arop, 2006: 102).  
559
 The Kabora Mundari around Terakeka harbored animosity towards the Bor Dinka due to a long history 
of local conflict over grazing land that had escalated during floods in the 1960s and 1970s (de Waal, 
1993: 153-4; Johnson, 2003: 68). Mundari militia gained strength particularly after December 1984 when 
a small Bor Dinka SPLA contingent raped, looted, and murdered Mundari after been received lavishly by 
the latter, causing many to flee to Juba and young men to enlist to anti-SPLA militia for self-protection 
(Kulusika, 1998: 110; Nyaba, 2000: 39-40; Madut-Arop, 2006: 106). However, while the Mundari militia 
oriented its activities largely against Dinka civilians, allegedly killing thousands and looting cattle, only 
sections of Mundari communities were involved in these activities, as those married with Dinka remained 
less enthusiastic about taking arms against the latter (Johnson, 2003: 68; Madut-Arop, 2006: 106). 
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This strategy was aimed to keep the war from spreading from the periphery to the north-
central heartland of the weakening regime. 
 
The militia activity and propaganda campaign provoked violent responses among the 
Dinka. Along with the Anya Nya II activity, they boosted SPLM/A recruitment560 and 
operations against communities of the groups aligned with the regime.561 In addition, 
the destructiveness of the traditional conflicts was heightened by the introduction of 
automatic weapons and external manipulation. The fall of Amin in Uganda, the 
SPLM/A rebellion, and the regime intervention all contributed to the proliferation of 
small arms and the rapid deterioration of conditions.   
 
In this context, Gai Tut’s faction became essentially a regime militia.562 Yet, the Akwot-
Gai Tut-Chuol group continued torn between fighting and seeking rapprochement with 
Garang. In early 1984, Gai Tut had made contacts with Garang ostensibly to reconcile, 
but was killed between March and May near Ethiopian border by Kerubino’s Jamus 
battalion when on his way to negotiate (Nyaba, 2000: 38; Madut-Arop, 2006: 80; 
Collins, 2008: 143). This frustrated the reconciliation attempt because Chuol, who 
claimed the leadership of Gai Tut’s forces, became involved with the regime (Alier, 
1990: 252-3; Nyaba, 2000: 38, 49),563 and engaged in anti-SPLA operations.564 
                                                 
560
 Many Dinka sought arms to protect their communities principally against the raiding parties, and more 
educated cadres of the Dinka strengthened the SPLA officer corps by submitting themselves to training in 
Bonga, Gambella, where an SPLM/A politico-military college was founded (Nyaba, 2000: 26; 92, Madut-
Arop, 2006: 102-3). 
561
 For instance, the SPLM/A retaliated by burning Pibor of the Murle in 1984 and turned its attention to 
the Mundari at Terakeka and Gemmeiza the following year (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 130). 
562
 The instigator of the relationship was Matthews, a Gaajak Nuer and governor of Upper Nile (Heritage, 
1987b: 4). The regime sustained propaganda campaign against the Dinka through Matthews, 
instrumentalizing the legacy of 19th century Dinka-Nuer hostility and portraying the Dinka as belligerent 
relative to the Nuer, and declaring that the SPLM/A was exclusively Dinka despite the movement also 
having Nuer elements (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127, Madut-Arop, 2006: 107, 109). Matthews was a 
central figure in the creation of the regime’s militia strategy of “friendly forces” in Upper Nile and led the 
main components of the government backed armed southern opposition against the SPLM/A, arming and 
providing uniforms for the Nuer fighters short of supplies that collaborated closely with the army (Alier, 
1990: 254; Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128; Nyaba, 2000: 23). After finding out about the breach between 
Gai Tut and Garang, Matthews wrote a letter to Nimeiri appealing for support to prevent the SPLA 
advance to Upper Nile, influencing the Anya Nya II leadership to the extent that by the beginning of 1984 
it had abandoned its separatist agenda in exchange for arms and financial resources, becoming an 
increasing military threat to the SPLM/A (Alier, 1990: 252; Johnson, 203: 66; Madut-Arop, 2006: 107).    
563
 Apart from the attempt to destabilize the SPLM/A, by 1984 Nimeiri’s interest in Chuol’s forces was 
principally to protect the beginning of oil extraction from Bentiu demanded by Chevron and Sudan’s 
creditors, but despite a number of military operations the area was insecure (de Waal, 1993: 151). Nimeiri 
initiated negotiations with Chuol, who, to differentiate himself from the SPLM/A and to adhere to the 
regime’s demand to become a government militia in exchange for assistance, changed the name of the 
movement back to Anya Nya II. He claimed spiritual powers and dressed in traditional manner to 
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Subsequently, Chuol held a series of negotiations in Khartoum and was portrayed by the 
government as the main voice speaking for the rebels in the South.565 This was used to 
convince Chevron and other interested parties, as Nimeiri announced an agreement with 
Chuol whose forces he called “a faction of the SPLA” and ordered Koat Chatim, 
commissioner of the oil-rich Unity Province, to negotiate with the local Anya Nya II to 
reach an agreement to secure oil extraction (de Waal, 1993: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 
117). This demonstrates how the ailing regime sought to rejuvenate its finances to 
maintain its hold of the marginalizing state by using militias in the South to secure 
economic extraction from the periphery to the center without possessing the ability to 
establish control over the territory. 
 
However, the regime continued the policy of earlier governments to focus on southern 
divisions. This was aimed to obscure northern political domination and inequality by 
appointing collaborating southern individuals along ethnic divisions to redundant posts 
in the regime (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128-9; Kulusika, 1998: 115). It intended to 
reconstruct and reinforce a perception of Dinka-Nuer ethnic conflict through exclusively 
Nuer recruitment to the Anya Nya II, although Nuer formed integral part of both major 
rebel groups.566  Thus, the struggle was never inherently ethnic but took place in the 
                                                                                                                                               
convince followers, and began operations in Waat-Nasir area and around Zeraf River with Khartoum’s 
military and financial support channeled through Matthews (Alier, 1990: 252-3; de Waal, 1993: 151-2; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 107; Collins, 2008. 143). Gai Tut’s death and possibly Kerubino’s denial of a proper 
burial alienated the Anya Nya II aligned Nuer further (Nyaba, 2000: 49). Although Akwot in his authority 
appointed Chuol as Gai Tut’s successor, the two disagreed. Frustrated by Atem’s leadership, his 
unwillingness to collaborate with Nimeiri to obtain badly needed supplies, and despite having been 
appointed the Minister of Defense and Commander in Chief, Chuol murdered Akwot in August 1984 and 
assumed the leadership (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 127; Madut-Arop, 2006: 81; Collins, 2008: 143). 
According to Madut-Arop (2006: 81), ethnic sentiment was strong in the murder of Atem as he “ . . . was 
just executed as a Dinka, believed to have been sent by Garang in order to wreck the Nuer’s movement 
from within”. This could also have been an excuse for Chuol to justify his plan. 
564
 Regrouping the 300 Anya Nya II troops, Chuol set up his headquarters in Zeraf valley and cooperated 
with Bul Nuer under Paulino Matiep in cutting the SPLA supply lines and harassing the stream of recruits 
from Bahr al-Ghazal, frustrating the SPLA movement of men and supplies and causing considerable 
damage (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 129, 131; Madut-Arop, 2006: 108; Collins, 2008: 143).     
565
 In November, he got together with representatives of the regime with a view to reach a political 
settlement, allegedly also meeting Nimeiri, while offering a federal solution to the southern problem 
through a confederation with two separate armies according to the SSLM proposition in 1972, and the 
replacement of Matthews who was against a federal solution with Peter Gatkwoth (Alier, 1990: 253; de 
Waal, 1993: 152; Madut-Arop, 2006: 108-9). However, fearing the possible resurrection of an Addis 
Ababa type arrangement, such proposals were met with an outright rejection by the regime 
representatives who characterized the federal plan as worse than separation, but since cooperation with 
Chuol was desirable the assistance was continued (Alier, 1990: 253; Madut-Arop, 2006: 108, 117). 
566
 It focused on the Gaajak of Maiwut, Mor Lou of Akobo, Lak and Thiang of Zeraf Valley, and Bul 
from the west, with the Bul, Mor, and Jikany Nuer sectors of who were inclined to join Anya Nya II due 
to family ties and grievances against the SPLA, while sections of the Gun Nuer oriented towards the latter 
(Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 128-9; Johnson, 1998: 61). 
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context of political situation in which the regime sought to portray the SPLM/A as an 
ethnic and separatist Dinka movement despite its inter-ethnic participation.567 
 
The regime’s policy of enlisting militias to counter the SPLM/A was less successful in 
parts of Equatoria and the majority of Bahr al-Ghazal. While Tembura was able to 
summon some Toposa and Mundari for government militias in Equatoria, Wol 
experienced more difficulty in Bahr al-Ghazal where the majority of the Dinka 
expressed anti-government sentiments. As a result, he mobilized narrow sectors of Fertit 
as a militia to raid Dinka populations in 1986-7 in Wau, overcoming Fertit opposition 
intellectuals such as Clement Mboro (de Waal, 1993: 153; Madut-Arop, 2006: 110). 
 
     Consolidation of the SPLM/A and Conditions in Southern Sudan 
 
After eliminating the most immediate Anya Nya II threat, the SPLA prepared its anti-
regime military campaign in the first half of 1984.568 By this time Ethiopian and Libyan 
support569 had provided for the logistical and material requirements to launch more 
extensive guerilla military operations, coinciding with the recruits starting to graduate 
from the training camps (Yohannes, 1997: 323; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 50; Madut-Arop, 
2006: 95, 97). While the Libyan assistance, which ended abruptly after the fall of the 
Nimeiri regime in April 1985, culminated symbolically in an unsuccessful meeting for 
the unification of northern and southern dissident groups on 31 December 1984 in 
Tripoli (Yohannes, 1997: 323; Madut-Arop, 2006: 120), it had allowed the SPLA to 
stockpile a large amount of military hardware for its campaigns (Heritage, 1987b: 4).  
  
Despite Libya’s initial siding with the SPLM/A, pan-Arabists generally perceived it as a 
threat. This was because the SPLM/A taking power in Khartoum would have 
undermined their machinations to consolidate Arab culture and Islam in Sub-Saharan 
                                                 
567
 Based on an interview with mid-ranking SPLM/A representative 1 October 2008 in Kampala. While in 
the early days Garang faction’s leadership was largely Dinka, it was only later when the majority of low 
ranking soldiers became Dinka due to an influx of Dinka recruits (interviews with religious leader and 
elderly merchant 29 September 2008 in Juba). 
568
 Initially, the rebel operations had consisted of small skirmishes conducted against the army near the 
Ethiopian border as a guerrilla war with an attempt to capture military hardware, cause damage, and 
disappear in the bush (Johnson, 2003: 69). 
569
 In 1984 SPLA armament came principally from Libya where Garang spent 11 days in April (Heritage, 
1987b: 4). But the SPLM/A also sought contacts with other Arab countries such as South Yemen, Egypt, 
and Jordan (Heritage, 1987c: 4). 
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Africa through strengthening the Arabized elite controlled marginalizing state in Sudan 
financially, politically, and militarily regardless of the nature of the Arabized elite 
faction in power (Nyaba, 2000: 64).570 Egypt poses as the main example of this with an 
intimate connection to sections of the Arabized elite, supporting its domination to 
ensure Sudan’s unity which has secured Egypt’s priority, safeguarding the Nile water, 
and has translated into relative inequality and underdevelopment in the South.571          
 
The conflict escalated when the SPLA initiated guerrilla operations. First it attacked 
police and army posts, as had been the case with the Anya Nya until 1963 (Johnson and 
Prunier, 1993: 127-8, 131),572 but initiated major operations in November 1984 after 
Garang had decided to stage incidents to demonstrate the SPLA’s strength and shock 
and embarrass the regime by attacking Chevron573 and CCI574 operations, and river 
                                                 
570
 In fact, no Arab country supported the rebels apart from Libya, which in the early 1980s was briefly 
more at odds with Nimeiri and the U.S. than the SPLM/A (Nyaba, 2000: 64). 
571
 After Nimeiri’s downfall the persisting Arab support to the government became increasingly perceived 
in the South as oriented against “Africans” (Kulusika, 1998: 113). 
572
 Simultaneously military/recruitment expeditions, largely by the Rhino Battalion, were conducted to 
more far reaching areas in Aweil, Bor, Gogrial, Tonj, and the Lakes districts, to Bahr al-Ghazal, and to 
Kajo-Kaji in Equatoria in June 1984. The objective was to obtain recruits from areas devastated by militia 
raids and reroute them to avoid Nuer areas in Upper Nile on their way to Ethiopia. Skirmishes against the 
army also took place, interrupting the Aweil railway (Johnson and Prunier, 1993: 133; Johnson, 2003: 69; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 87).  
573
 On 3 February 1984, an Anya Nya II remnant group assaulted a new Chevron base camp at Roba Kona 
next to Bentiu, allegedly in collaboration with the SPLM/A, which had already made contacts with 
guerrilla groups in Aweil, Bentiu, and Southern Kordofan in early 1984 as part of its military/recruitment 
operations (Johnson, 2003: 69; Collins, 2008: 144). Three foreign employees were killed and several 
wounded in the night attack during which the rebels shot into their barges used for housing, despite 
repeated assertions by the Minister of Energy, al-Tuhami, that the army was able to protect the oil wells 
and Chevron personnel (Verney, 1999: 14; Collins, 2008: 144). This triggered a confrontation between 
Chevron and al-Tuhami, Chevron leaving Sudan having lost its US$1 billion investment, and leading to a 
suspension of oil extraction and the construction of the pipeline to Port Sudan (Yohannes, 1997: 323; 
Verney, 1999: 14; ESPAC, 2002: 34; Collins, 2008: 144).  
574
 Having focused his doctoral research in the U.S. on a critique of the Jonglei Canal, Garang staged 
military operations to suspend its excavation. However, his decision was predominantly affected by the 
Bor conference of the Jonglei Executive Organ including members from the Permanent Joint Technical 
Committee, representatives of international aid organizations, the Mefit-Baptie research team, and local 
Dinka leaders together with some SPLM/A officers. In the conference, which had taken place 10 
November 1983, local grievances had been expressed along with SPLM/A warnings that the CCI should 
immediately stop the digging of the canal. Despite the warnings, the CCI had continued its operations and 
the SPLA kidnapped seven French and two Pakistani workers, which halted its activities until Garang 
released the hostages as a sign of goodwill. The CCI resumed its operations in January 1984, which 
prompted Kerubino’s Jamus Battalion to assault its camp in Sobat on 10 February 1984. The attack 
dispersed the army guards and Kerubino took six hostages, telling the French director of the camp that 
they would return after dark. Yet, the CCI steamer came to rescue the remaining workers and their 
dependents and bring them to Malakal before nightfall, leaving the Sobat camp abandoned and the 
excavation of the Jonglei Canal suspended at mile 166 (see Collins, 2008: 144-5). 
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transport used for army supply575 in the South, while Nimeiri tried to negotiate with 
Sudan’s creditors for financial resources to save his bankrupt government (Johnson and 
Prunier, 1993: 131; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 50; Collins, 2008: 144). These targets were 
carefully selected due to their propaganda value, as the SPLM/A leadership was aware 
of Nimeiri’s close collaboration with the U.S., which led to Chevron being singled out 
as a promoter of southern economic exploitation without offering compensation.576 By 
the end of 1984 the SPLA military operations had resulted in the occupation of Buma 
and Yirol, disrupting commercial activity in Bahr al-Ghazal and Upper Nile,577 which 
was followed by the occupation of most of the South in the following year (Alier, 1990: 
262-3; Nyaba, 2000: 54). In response to the escalating violence, the regime and the U.S. 
emitted propaganda condemning the SPLM/A as a communist organization due to its 
socialist agenda and links to Ethiopia (Rogier, 2005: 18). This approach was part of the 
Reagan administration’s strategic confrontation with the Soviet Union in the 
geopolitical Cold War competition in the Horn of Africa and Middle East, and used by 
Nimeiri to extravert resources to the regime until his overthrow. 
 
In more remote areas the insecurity led to a collapse of the already weak centralized 
authority and generated a war economy. During the autonomies period, spoliation of the 
southern natural environment had already taken place due to the lack of capacity of the 
regional government to enforce regulations on hunting and resource extraction.578 This 
depleted wild animal populations and caused environmental damage, heightening also 
the number of displaced of which many suffered from coinciding drought and famine. 
                                                 
575
 In February 1984 the SPLM/A admitted having attacked a Nile steamer, reportedly killing 150 
passengers and successively blocking the river route from Malakal by sinking two barges (Alier, 1990: 
261; ESPAC, 2002: 34). 
576
 For instance, there were no training schemes to work in the oil sector to which northerners were 
drafted, no jobs were created or financial contributions or development schemes granted, and government 
officials excluded southern political leadership from petroleum management (Alier, 1990: 222; Kok, 
1992: 107; Yohannes, 1997: 322-3). 
577
 Soon after most of the economic ventures in the South closed down, barter trade between the Baggara 
and the Dinka in Bahr al-Ghazal was disrupted due to growing mutual animosity involving regime 
supported Baggara militia activity and SPLA counter attacks to protect the local Dinka, and commercial 
freight between southern Sudan and Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya came to a halt (Majak, 1997: 144; Jendia, 
2002: 162-3, 165). 
578
 As a result, lucrative hunting of wild animals had involved government officials, soldiers, and others 
which intensified in the 1980s when some northerners went to the South driven by the economic 
opportunity of a breakdown of centralized authority and rebel leaders engaged in the same activity 
(Majak, 1997: 140; Nyaba, 2000: 29; Chan and Zuor, 2006: 40; Madut-Arop, 2006: 29). For instance, 
private individuals who enriched themselves through such activities smuggled ivory to East Africa from 
where it found its way to Asian markets despite the attempt of the southern authorities to prevent it 
(Majak, 1997: 136). In addition, they amassed wealth from other resources in the insecure environment, 
such as money, wood, gold, and cattle (Jendia, 2002; 161-2; Madut-Arop, 2006: 71). 
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Gradually, displacement emerged as a deliberate strategy to control areas, deviate 
humanitarian aid, and relocate the focal points of unrest (Keen, 1998, 2001; Duffield, 
2001) and incidents of slave capturing and trade emerged in the context of the 
conflict.579 The attitude of inequality towards the southerners persisted, rendering the 
use of labor of the displaced for physically demanding or other non-desirable jobs in the 
northern provinces. In fact, many southerners in northern Sudan have continued to be 
subjected to work for mere subsistence in full dependence of their patrons. This is 
another manifestation of marginalization, which intensified during the conflict in part 
due to the influx of displaced southerners escaping violence to northern provinces.    
 
The escalating violence reshaped southern social structures. The persisting insecurity 
and proliferation of small arms in the South resulted in the militarization of society, 
affecting social values and institutions such as the extended family, belief systems, and 
cultural practices, and resulting also in the loss of languages (Buckley, 1997: A22). 
Sentiments that undermined self-esteem and self-confidence heightened (Jendia, 2002: 
164). The violence also undermined the functioning of the traditional social networks, 
which forced people to search for social relationships outside of their traditional group 
boundaries. In many cases uncertainty and fear encouraged identities to revolve tighter 
around ethnicity and religion, increasing vulnerability to “tribalist” tendencies and 
Christian and Islamic propagation by ethnic and religious elites. 
 
Initially, the SPLA sought to govern newly conquered territory through military 
administration, while it tended to treat local civilian populations in such areas as 
conquered people.580 Although the SPLA sought to present itself as the liberator and the 
                                                 
579
 In circumstances of insecurity and violence, and persisting perception by sectors of Arabized peoples 
of southerners as slaves, manifested itself in incidents of slave capturing and trade. The Baggara militias 
engaged in slave extraction during their raids in the Dinka villages in Bahr al-Ghazal, looting and 
pillaging rampantly. There were incidents of southerners being sold in El Obeid and elsewhere in the 
northern markets, with some people allegedly sold to Libya and Middle East (Jendia, 2002: 165). Still, if 
such incidents took place they were isolated and hardly resembled the scale of 19th century slave 
enterprise. 
580
 According to Chan and Zuor (2006: 48, 53-4), empowered by their guns, the SPLA soldiers tended to 
subjugate local people, at times rape women at gunpoint, subject people to physical labor, force elders to 
obey them, conduct harsh punishments and torture at times leading to death, without respect of local 
cultures. While some of this behavior was due to indiscipline the punishments of the SPLA soldiers were 
scarce, although for instance according to the SPLM/A penal code, enacted in 1983, rape and looting 
were punishable by death (Johnson, 1998: 68). In fact, most cases against soldiers were resolved 
according to customary law, resulting in fines and other forms of compensation (Kuol, 1997: 12). This 
treatment provoked local opposition to the SPLA among some Nuer, Didinga, and Murle, although 
364        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
protector of southern civilians, there was first little emphasis on political administration 
and provision of social services in its militarized organization that remained largely 
dependent on external resources (Chan and Zuor, 2006: 48). In 1984, the SPLM/A built 
the first administrative structures in the conquered areas in Bahr al-Ghazal. It also 
convinced local defeated militias to join its ranks and adopted a role in settling local 
conflicts and disputes (Heritage, 1987c: 4; Kuol, 1997: 33-42). The new military/civil 
structures of provisional administration were imposed581 and enforced by battalions that 
formed part of their internal structures, while the Penal Code was amended into a 
disciplinary law for the army and community legal system made of the general penal 
and procedural codes with the customary law (Kuol, 1997; Johnson, 1998: 58, 68).582  
 
On 2 March 1984, due to growing opposition in the northern provinces and rebellion in 
the South, Nimeiri made an attempt for reconciliation583 to which Garang responded by 
defining the SPLM/A objectives. In his 12th anniversary speech of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement Nimeiri pledged that all Sudanese would benefit from development projects 
without discrimination and pleaded “general amnesty” to “all those who carry weapons 
in southern Sudan to return to their units and villages” (ESPAC, 2002: 34). The 
following day Garang addressed the nation by outlining the SPLM/A’s grievances and 
goals.584 He pointed out the instrumentalization of Islam for political objectives that had 
                                                                                                                                               
whenever the penal code was applied it was also used against the SPLM/A (Johnson, 1998: 69; Chan and 
Zuor, 2006: 54). 
581
 In this system area commanders were in charge of district political-military high commands that held 
wide policy and executive powers. The district high commands included the district administrator, 
political officer, intelligence officer, and the members of district councils. The district councils that 
provided education, judiciary, agriculture, medical, and veterinary services were under the district high 
commands. Below these were provincial, district, town, and village committees (Heritage, 1987c: 4).   
582
 Chief’s courts were maintained as the main institutions of local administration of justice, but the 
SPLM/A used its influence to interfere in the appointment of chiefs (Kuol, 1997: 10; Johnson, 1998: 66-
7). SPLM/A zonal commanders carried the responsibility of overall administration, aided by military/civil 
administrators supervising tax collection, but the chiefs maintained similar duties as during the British 
native administration system, their tasks including recruitment of labor and militias, collection of taxes, 
relief distribution, and dispute resolution according to customary law (Kuol, 1997; Johnson, 1998: 67). 
583
 This was after Vice President General Omer Muhammad al-Tayeb’s public statement in 9 December 
1983 that Ethiopia and Libya supported the SPLM/A, which had resulted in Egypt sending air and ground 
support units to Sudan (Turner, 1998: 206). 
584
 He pointed out how the northern riverine ruling elite, awlad al-balad, had divided and ruled other 
peoples of Sudan along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines using “tribalism” and racist ideology (Garang, 
1987: 19). Garang defined the objective of the SPLM/A to wage revolutionary armed struggle with 
political mass support to liberate584 Sudan from the exclusive ruling elite “in which a few people had 
amassed great wealth at the expense of the majority” to establish “a united Sudan under a socialist system 
that affords democratic and human rights to all nationalities and guarantees freedom to all religions, 
beliefs and outlooks”, and continued by arguing that “This injustice has resulted in profound crises and 
distortions in our economy, politics, ethics and even religion which Nimeiri has perverted into an article 
of trade” (Garang, 1987: 19, 23). Garang also listed what he perceived as Sudan’s major problems, 
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consumed the regime and featured in its counterinsurgency campaign. In contrast, 
religious differences have never been a source of dispute within the SPLM/A,585 the use 
of religion as a method of control being principally a strategy of the marginalizing state.   
 
By 1984 the SPLA had become the main armed group and threat to the regime in the 
South. Heavy armed clashes in Jekau and Malwal Gahoth in eastern Upper Nile, 
including many SPLA casualties, had initiated the SPLA offensive that had led to the 
siege of Nasir, demonstrating that even Chuol’s Anya Nya II could no longer counter 
the movement (Turner, 1998: 207; Nyaba, 2000: 58). Its early objectives of forming a 
cohesive organization, capturing territory, and consolidating control over the conquered 
areas (Turner, 1998: 206) had been reached. 
 
However, threatened, Nimeiri intensified the effort to persuade the SPLA/M leadership 
to end the rebellion. This was in part due to U.S. pressure because it was wary of the 
radicalization of Islam and had realized the conflict’s detrimental effect on its 
geopolitical interests and aspirations to extract Sudanese oil. Attempting to establish 
confidence and to diffuse Western pressure, Nimeiri lifted the state of emergency on 29 
September 1984, repealed the order that had divided the South, and halted the Islamic 
ad hoc courts set up after the implementation of shari’a (Madut-Arop, 2006: 118). On 
19 November 1984 in Malakal he addressed “all brothers” in the South offering to 
engage in dialogue, reiterating it later repeatedly, but the SPLM/A rejected such pleas 
every time (ESPAC, 2002: 35). In the following month, Nimeiri visited Nairobi and 
convinced Clement Mboro to help in his peace initiative, which failed due to Lagu’s 
positioning against it, giving way to Nimeiri’s attempt to persuade Garang with 
financial and political rewards if he abandoned armed violence (Akol, 2007: 170).586  
 
                                                                                                                                               
including the fall in production, hyperinflation, deterioration of social services, institutionalization of 
corruption and bribery, constant fear of the SSO, and kasha, and gave six main reasons for war, including 
dissolution of southern political institutions, integration treaty with Egypt, attempt to change boundaries, 
the oil and refinery issue, division of southern Sudan, and the intent to neutralize the absorbed forces 
(Garang, 1987: 19-22). Garang ended his speech by describing the first two SPLA military offensives of 
which the first one culminated in seven-day occupation of eastern Nasir in mid-December 1983, the 
second consisting of an attack and destruction of Ayod, the CCI Camp, and a Nile steamer in Wathkei, 
and ending in a bombardment of Malakal on 22 February 1984 (Garang, 1987: 23-4; Turner, 1998: 206).  
585
 In fact, the SPLM/A has many Muslim constituents. 
586
 He sent businessmen Adnan Khashoggi and Tiny Rowland shuttling between Khartoum, Ethiopia, and 
Kenya unsuccessfully offering Garang another Addis Ababa type arrangement, financial wealth, and the 
vice presidency (Madut-Arop, 2006: 118-9). Later, Rowland lent financial and logistical support to the 
SPLM/A (Nyaba, 2000: 65). 
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While Garang consistently rejected regime initiatives, Nimeiri grew desperate to save 
his collapsing regime. From the latter 1984,  he called for negotiations several times, but 
the SPLM/A responded in January 1985 that it would stop the war only “when 
Numayri’ s system [had] all been dismantled and thrown into history’s dustbin”, and 
initiated another military campaign (ESPAC, 2002: 35).  Whereas by mid-1984 the 
SPLA had controlled the area east of the White Nile, the launching of military 
operations in December 1984 paved way for the conquest of most of rural southern 
Sudan and an increasing number of towns in 1985, its successes owing in part to combat 
experience, support of sections of southern civilians, difficult terrain, and a demoralized 
and poorly equipped army (ESPAC, 2002: 35; Niblock, 1987: 288; Turner, 1998: 207; 
Madut-Arop, 2006: 119). In the process, the regime supported militias that were unable 
to stop the SPLA expansion but were terrorizing forces, engaging in mass killings, 
looting, destroying, kidnapping, and in the case of Baggara militias even enslaving, also 
contributing to a famine in 1986-7 (Kulusika, 1998: 105-6). The regime and its 
petroleum-interested allies587 encouraged militias to cause displacement, particularly 
away from the potential oil producing areas. This demonstrates the interest of Nimeiri’s 
Arabized elite constituency to maintain the marginalizing state through external 
economic alliances with devastating domestic consequences for the communities 
targeted by the militia activity in the South.   
 
In April 1985, the Nimeiri regime collapsed. Its downfall was due to a combination of 
factors including overall economic deterioration, external debt having risen from 
US$300 million to US$9 billion during his tenure as head of the marginalizing state, 
Islamism that had undermined both the economic and political stability of the regime, 
and the intensifying southern insurgency which required resources that could not be 
extracted from oil or increasing irrigation for agriculture (Jonglei Canal) due to the 
SPLA obstruction (Heritage, 1987c: 4; Henze, 1991: 158; Yohannes, 1997: 323). In 
order to reinvigorate the regime Nimeiri had turned against the Muslim Brothers in 
March 1985, imprisoning their leadership, in an effort to extract more aid from the 
regime’s Western allies. He visited Washington in early April to renounce Islamism and 
submit to a U.S. and IMF designed economic austerity program that removed subsidies 
                                                 
587
 At this time Chevron financed a Missiriya militia in southern Kordofan (Abbink, 2004: 7). 
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for bread, gasoline, and sugar and would have facilitated access to the IMF standby loan 
(Yohannes, 1997: 324; Jendia, 2002: 155).  
 
Meanwhile, popular demonstrations continued. They led to army officers with links to 
the northern opposition parties, particularly the Umma, to stage a coup on 6 April 1985 
(Yohannes, 1997: 324). Upon the overthrow of the regime and establishment of 
Transitional Military Council (TMC), Libya shifted its support from the SPLM/A to the 
traditional northern political forces, principally the Umma and the new regime 
(Johnson, 1998: 60; Kulusika, 1998: 112; Turner, 1998: 207). This, along with external 
resources from Arab states to other sectors of the Arabized elite, ensured the 
continuation of the narrowly based marginalizing state perpetuating systemic inequality 
and exclusion of the southern periphery and its population.            
 
5. Path towards Peace and Agreement for “Comprehensive” Peace  
 
This section provides a general trajectory of the war since the fall of the Nimeiri regime. 
It shows how the Islamist constituency consolidated its hold of the marginalizing state 
and highlights the peace efforts. 
 
     From the TMC to the Islamist Regime   
 
The TMC, headed by the former Minister of Defense and army Commander-in-Chief 
Abd al-Rahman Suwar al-Dahab, sympathized with the Islamist state constituency. It 
revoked Nimeiri’s 1973 secular constitution but left the 1983 September laws in place, 
while seeking to end the rebellion in the South by offering to reinstate the Addis Ababa 
Agreement (Johnson, 2003: 70-1). However, at the same time the SPLM/A was 
criticized by the northern political forces for its secular and socialist approach, which 
also led to a decline of the Libyan aid to the movement after the fall of Nimeiri. The 
SPLM/A was critical of the TMC, which it perceived as a continuation of the 
marginalizing state exclusively in the hands of a section of the Arabized elite, and 
pointed out that it would be ready to negotiate only when all political parties of the 
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country would be present (Johnson, 2003: 71). This led to negotiations at the Koka Dam 
resort in Ethiopia in March 1986.588  
 
The negotiations produced the Koka Dam Declaration, which outlined a political 
settlement to the conflict.589 However, elections took place before the next step of the 
agenda for peace could be reached. This ended the Koka Dam process because although 
the Umma emerged as victorious with 99 parliamentary seats, it was forced to establish 
a coalition government with the DUP which had gained 56 seats, in front of the Muslim 
Brotherhood with 51 seats, and rejected the Declaration as a compromise against a 
future Islamic state in the making (O’Ballance, 2000: 152; Johnson, 2003: 72, 79).590 
This provides further evidence to claim that those sections of the Arabized elite 
exercising power over the marginalizing state in Sudan have been conditioned by their 
constituencies and the positions of other sectors of the same elite, which in turn 
perpetuates the dynamics of marginalizing state in governance and policies. 
 
In May 1987, Sadiq sought to remove the DUP from the coalition government to gain 
more room for political maneuvering. However, the new government was equally 
incapable of deciding upon major issues and the coalition, called the National Unity 
government, that followed only a year later proved as ineffective as its predecessors 
(O`Ballance, 2000: 160-1, 163-4). Meanwhile, the DUP sought a partisan advantage by 
making overtures towards the SPLA without any significant result (Johnson, 2003: 84). 
This shows the factionalism within the northern parties and their persisting incapacity to 
govern democratically, which was already the case during the 1956-8 and 1964-8 
periods. This political culture of particularly extreme competition within sectors of the 
                                                 
588
 It was first peace initiative since the beginning of the insurgency and only one month before general 
elections convoked by the TMC, including a wide spectrum of Sudanese political parties under National 
Alliance,588 but it was boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood and the DUP (Akol, 2001: 41-2; Johnson, 
2003: 71). 
589
 This would consist of a National Constitutional Conference in June 1986 which would lead to the 
founding of New Sudan. The conference should discuss the “national problem” as opposed to the 
“Southern Problem”, lift the state of emergency, repeal the 1983 September and similar laws, adopt the 
1956 constitution as amended in 1964, end the military treaties between Sudan and other countries that 
undermine Sudan’s sovereignty, and make an effort to reach a ceasefire (Akol, 2001: 43-4).      
590
 Sadiq al-Mahdi who again became the Prime Minister showed a lack of commitment to peace, which 
can be seen in his view on the inevitable Arabization and Islamization of the South and acceptance of the 
1983 September laws (Johnson, 2003: 72, 79). This points to the growing power of the Islamist 
constituency and the Muslim Brothers buttressed by a regional Islamic resurgence and external support 
through Islamist networks. 
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Arabized political elite remains part of the continuing exclusive political dynamics of 
the marginalizing state in contemporary Sudan. 
 
Meanwhile the insurgency spread in the South. In 1985-6 the SPLA increased its 
military effort which led to its control of the majority of southern rural areas, and after 
reconciliation with the fractured Anya Nya II in 1987-8, it gained control of Bor, Torit, 
and Nasir by June 1989 (O’Ballance, 2000: 84; Johnson, 2003: 83-4). The escalation of 
war became an important factor for the government to reinforce its relationship with the 
U.S. after this had been undermined by the TMC overtures towards Libya, Gulf States, 
and the Soviet Union, as relations with Libya, Egypt, and Ethiopia now deteriorated 
(O’Ballance, 2000: 145, 158, 161; Johnson, 2003: 81). The government also reinforced 
the militia strategy to encourage fighting within the South and the North-South 
transitional zone because Sadiq had only a token support in the army and was therefore 
vulnerable to a military takeover (Johnson, 2003: 81). This led to an increase of 
violence against civilians, as the SPLA sought to target the suspected militia 
constituencies in retaliation to the militia raids (Johnson, 2003: 82). 
 
F. The Extent of the SPLM/A Control in 1989 
 
Source: Alier (1990)  
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By early 1989 the pressure for a settlement on the war in the South had amounted to 
such level that it threatened Sadiq’s power. The army sent him an ultimatum, which 
prompted him to form yet a new coalition with the DUP that had finally agreed to a 
National Constitutional Conference with the SPLA (Johnson, 2003: 84). However, 
when hopes for a settlement were rising and Sadiq was about to visit Ethiopia for direct 
talks with the SPLA, the Muslim Brothers staged a military coup, bringing the 
democratic interlude to an end on 30 June 1989. This coup, which was the 
crystallization of the growing power of the Muslim Brothers within the state apparatus 
and the army, was orchestrated by the army officers under Brigadier Omar al-Bashir, 
and Turabi who claimed the leadership of the National Islamic Front (NIF).       
 
     From War to Peace 
 
The NIF taking power in 1989 in Khartoum paralyzed the peace initiatives. After initial 
contacts between the NIF and the SPLM/A it became clear that there would be no 
settlement in the near future largely because the NIF pursued an Islamist project for 
Sudan (O`Ballance, 2000: 166), which contradicted SPLM/A agendas. In this situation 
the war intensified, and although an SPLM/A offensive led to the rebels taking Western 
Equatoria and towns of Kajo-Keji and Kaya in 1990, the collapse of the Mengistu 
regime in Addis Ababa in May 1991, to which Khartoum’s support of Eritreans and 
other armed opposition had contributed, had a severely undermining effect on the 
SPLM/A (Johnson, 2003: 85-8). This gave the momentum to Khartoum, which sought 
to exploit divisions within the SPLM/A. It was given an opportunity when senior 
commanders Riek Machar and Lam Akol in Upper Nile complained of having been 
excluded from diplomatic missions of the SPLA/M and masterminded an attempt to 
replace the SPLM/A leadership, counting on their Nuer constituencies in Nasir and 
Gambella (Nyaba, 2000: 78-85, Johnson, 2003: 93-4). They were in contact with 
Khartoum and also directly dealing with international relief agencies in Upper Nile 
independently from the SPLM/A leadership (Johnson, 2003: 95-6), which allowed them 
to secure sufficient supplies to fight the rest of the movement.  
 
Consequently, on 28 August 1991 the “coup” was announced. Kong joined Akol and 
Machar in denouncing Garang’s leadership and the allegedly dictatorial character of the 
movement, with the new stated objective being independence of the South (O´Ballance, 
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2000: 172; Johnson, 2003: 97). The NIF regime supplied Akol’s and Machar’s offshoot 
SPLA-Nasir as hostilities between it and the SPLA-Mainstream (SPLA-Torit) headed 
by Garang initiated in November 1991. This led to unprecedented inter-ethnic violence 
in the South along Dinka-Nuer lines and the weakening of the SPLA-Mainstream’s 
position as it lost many of its previously controlled territories to the SPLA-Nasir and the 
regime (O´Ballance, 2000: 172-3, 174, 175-6; Johnson, 2003: 98-100). 
 
In these unfolding circumstances in southern Sudan, there was little incentive for peace 
for the protagonists. The NIF encouraged the SPLA infighting while embarking on its 
campaign not only to Islamize southern Sudan forcefully, but also to become the beacon 
of Islamism in Africa, the Middle East, and the world. Now freed from an imminent 
threat from southern Sudan, al-Turabi’s NIF sought to transform the country with a 
bottom-up approach endorsing in principle households and local communities as a base 
for Islamizing the country and establishing dar al-Islam beyond Sudan as a perfect 
Muslim Community (Woodward, 2006: 46). Despite the ideological approach, it was in 
practice the state that was the NIF’s main vehicle for promoting Islamization. The 
structures of the marginalizing state became dominated by the NIF members from the 
local council level through the states’ leadership to the National Assembly and the 
Presidential Cabinet (Woodward, 2006: 39). The regime also transformed its security 
apparatus, including the army and the secret service, and established the Popular 
Defense Force as a mass militia movement in defense of the Islamist project it called the 
National Salvation Revolution. 
 
In 1993 the Revolutionary Command Council that had been established after the army 
takeover was dissolved. It was replaced by an officially civilian rule but power 
continued to reside mainly with individuals connected to the security apparatus, the 
main exception being al-Turabi as the NIF ideologue. The real power within the regime 
concentrated on the informal structure of the Committee of Forty, a small group of 
powerful individuals such as president Omar al-Bashir and the later vice president Ali 
Osman Taha who, along with al-Turabi, formed the main power centers in the NIF 
organization (Woodward, 2006: 39). This shows the continued narrowness and 
exclusivity of power within the marginalizing state in Sudan. 
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In 1992 an externally initiated effort was made to craft peace in Sudan. This was an 
attempt by the OAU appointed Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida to host the 
protagonists in Abuja. Although by the time of the negotiations the SPLA were able to 
present a joint delegation, the warring factions submitted different proposals based on 
their political inclinations, one for unity and New Sudan (SPLA-Mainstream) and the 
other for independence of the South (SPLA-Nasir). Although the negotiations broke 
down between the NIF and the SPLA umbrella delegations due to disagreement on the 
issues of religion and decentralization, while in the background remained the NIF’s 
belief that a military victory was still possible, the process had shown some 
convergence between the SPLA factions (Johnson, 2003: 101-2; Woodward, 2006: 45). 
The rapprochement between the SPLA factions and the alliance of the SPLA-Nasir with 
Khartoum both show how strife was principally instigated by the leading figures able to 
maneuver between alliances. This strengthens the view that there are no inherent and 
primordial incompatibilities among the leadership in terms of political stand or identity. 
 
At this point, the NIF was about to reach the high point of its Islamist project. It 
controlled the Islamized economy, and established the Ministry of Social Planning to 
Islamize the country, controlling the media tightly, and pursued Islamization through 
education and the promotion Islamic NGOs (Woodward, 2006: 40). Part of the project 
was to contain the influence of “modern” opposition forces, such as the once powerful 
trade unions, communists, and professional organizations, with “puppet” opposition 
organizations that were heavily influenced by the NIF (Woodward, 2006: 40-1).  
 
The Islamization project in Sudan encountered initially little international opposition as 
the end of the Cold War had left the major regional and international powers redefining 
their approach. This, in part, permitted the culmination of the most radical period of the 
NIF as it attacked the South with an Islamizing project, which had a polarizing effect on 
perceived “northern” and “southern” identities as it took place in the midst of 
intensifying war. As part of this campaign the NIF allegedly targeted the Nuba with an 
orchestrated campaign of genocidal violence and eradication of their culture through 
forced conversion to Islam.591 Internationally, the NIF sought to convert Sudan into a 
global leader of Islamic resurgence by establishing the Popular Arab and Islamic 
                                                 
591
 The alleged deliberately organized genocide of the Nuba in 1991-3 has been well documented. See i.e.. 
African Rights, 1995.  
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Conference in Khartoum as a pan-Islamic initiative against the West, encouraging an 
international Islamist network of armed groups and lending support to the armed 
radicals returning from Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden, training Islamist 
fighters, and endorsing Islamist groups in neighboring countries (Woodward, 2006: 46-
8). This made the NIF government the flag-bearer of radical Islamism as it sought to 
establish a worldwide movement, and creating opportune conditions for the 
consolidation of the international Islamist terrorist network (Woodward, 2006: 48-9).     
 
The NIF sought to extend its Islamist project also regionally. It supported proxy groups 
in the neighboring countries, encouraged terrorist operations, and promoted the 
activities of Islamic charitable organizations (Woodward, 2006: 49). It focused 
particularly on the staunchest supporters of the Sudanese armed opposition, namely 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, while also embracing relations with Iraq in the 1990-1 
conflict, Yemeni Islamists, and becoming a longstanding ally of Iran which facilitated 
arms deals for Khartoum. This undermined the relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, 
whose Islamists Khartoum supported actively, while Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia were 
also affected by Sudan’s support of armed Islamist elements (Woodward, 2006: 49-52). 
The regional reaction was condemnation that culminated after the assassination attempt 
of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak during his visit to an OAU meeting in Addis 
Ababa on 26 June 1995 which involved elements of the Sudanese secret service.     
 
Meanwhile, the Abuja talks to resolve the war in southern Sudan had laid a foundation 
for a peace process. By 1993 mainly the U.S. and Sudan’s neighbors viewed the war as 
troublesome and potentially regionally destabilizing, and initiated a peace process under 
the regional organization in the Horn of Africa, the Inter-Governmental Authority for 
Development (IGAD)592. The immediate success of the IGAD-led  process was the 
Declaration of Principles in 1994 that outlined the SPLA factions’ negotiation 
                                                 
592
 IGAD is a regional organization founded in 1986 as Inter-Governmental Authority for Drought and 
Development (IGADD) including Djibouti, Eritrea (until recently), Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and 
Uganda. The idea of IGADD initiative was first discussed in Addis Ababa meeting from 6-8 September 
1993 when the presidents of the IGADD member states stated their desire to end the conflict in southern 
Sudan (El Amin Khalifa 2003: 168). 
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positions,593 but which was not accepted even partially by Khartoum until three years 
later as it continued to believe in a military victory (Johnson, 2003: 102).  
 
After Mubarak’s assassination attempt the peace process stalled as Sudan became the 
subject of international condemnation. It was viewed as a hub for radical Islam, 
promoting armed opposition groups and terrorist action in the neighboring states and 
further afield, playing host to bin Laden and others, involving itself in the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing in New York, and the attempt on Mubarak’s life in 1995 
(Woodward, 2006: 48-53, 96). As a result, Sudan was placed on the U.S. list of states 
supporting terrorism and in 1996 subjected to UN sanctions that Egypt, fearing 
principally their potentially fragmenting impact on Sudan, deliberately watered down as 
the main plaintiff, leading the U.S. to impose unilateral sanctions on Khartoum the 
following year (Woodward, 2006: 93-5). There were also unsubstantiated rumors and 
reports of the U.S. and Israel’s support of the SPLM/A, although it was clear that the 
U.S. endorsed the Sudanese armed opposition indirectly through Ethiopia, Eritrea, and 
Uganda to contain Islamism and weaken the NIF (Woodward, 2006: 53-4, 97-9).594 This 
was possible because these neighboring states were inclined to support the Sudanese 
opposition to destabilize the NIF regime, permitting the SPLM/A to advance. The U.S. 
also initiated talks to establish a multilateral Africa Crisis Response Force, a rapid 
response force to answer state crises in Africa, and pressured the NIF through rhetoric, 
which generated fear in Khartoum of a possible external military intervention 
(Woodward, 2006: 98-9), particularly after the Gulf War experience. By 1996-7, the 
regional and international condemnation and isolation accumulated pressure on the NIF.   
 
This situation led the NIF to take measures to improve its international image. It 
reshuffled some of the leading members of the regime, reached towards Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia by accusing Israel and Zionism (as Khartoum’s governing elites have 
done historically when under distress), showed renewed commitment to the IGAD 
peace process,595 and offered to hand over bin Laden to the U.S. and give up the support 
                                                 
593
 The IGADD drafted the first Declaration of Principles proposing democracy and wealth-sharing as the 
main stipulations for the solution to the war, allowing a self-determination referendum if the process 
failed, according to model applied in 1993 in Eritrea.  
594
 For instance, in November 1996 the U.S. government announced openly to provide US$20 million 
military aid to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda (Woodward, 2006: 97). 
595
 The IGAD peace process was reinitiated in 1997. A meeting in Addis Ababa established direct 
negotiation links between the NIF and the SPLM/A, and both parties committed to a bilateral dialogue for 
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for terrorism (Woodward, 2006: 100-3). However, the momentum for peace was 
interrupted by the outbreak of Eritrea-Ethiopia war in May 1998 because it eased 
regional pressure on Khartoum that began to exploit its relationships with the warring 
states, while it appeared that Sudan continued to endorse the international network of 
armed Islamist cells at least until 1998 (Woodward, 2006: 101-4). On 20 August 1998, 
believing that the NIF was developing nerve gas the U.S. staged a missile attack on a 
pharmaceutical plant in North Khartoum, which generated international condemnation. 
Still, the U.S. continued its support of the SPLM/A rule in the South596 and pressured 
Khartoum in form of an internal debate about Sudan policy, with some encouraging 
direct intervention and others a diplomatic approach, which made Sudan fear possible 
further attacks (Woodward, 2006: 104-9). 
 
It was not until 2001, after the end of the Eritrea-Ethiopia war, and more importantly the 
change of administration in Washington DC, when the Sudanese peace process regained 
momentum. This was largely because the incoming administration of George W. Bush 
could build on the base laid by the outgoing Clinton administration and changing views 
in Washington DC, while it was pressured by its influential Christian religious and anti-
Islam constituencies to end the war in Sudan (Woodward, 2006: 114-6, 121). However, 
this was initially seen as difficult due to the pessimism in Washington DC regarding the 
interest of the main parties for peace. 
 
The 11 September 2001 attacks were instrumental in inspiring more imminent action on 
Sudan as they initiated the U.S. policy of “Global War on Terror”. By this time it was 
known that the military deadlock had made the parties more receptive to the peace 
process, as the NCP (the NIF until 1998) leadership had began to realize that more 
could be gained from oil exploitation in a more peaceful environment and the SPLM/A 
                                                                                                                                               
peace (El Amin Khalifa 2003: 38). However, tangible results of these talks were mainly reduced to 
technicalities over distribution of humanitarian aid and the continuation of cease-fire agreed to prior to the 
meeting. The talks which followed in Nairobi and Abuja were equally inconclusive. The Nairobi talks, 
mediated by the former U.S. president Carter between 30 November and 5 December 1989, did not result 
in significant advances, but the NIF government, which was at the time uninterested to make political and 
economic concessions for peace with the SPLM/A, characterized them as successful. However, the result 
that grew out of the following Abuja talks was that both parties committed to search for proposals for an 
interim period in the future that was “ . . . to create a suitable atmosphere for confidence building by 
devolution of certain powers to the component parts of the Sudan” (El Amin Khalifa 2003: 73, 123). 
596
 In 1997 the U.S. initiated the Sudan Transitional Assistance and Relief Program to support SPLM/A 
non-military activities and USAID was particularly prominent in southern Sudan along with a number of 
NGOs (Woodward, 2006: 107-8, 117).   
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was increasingly pressured for peace by the southern population (Woodward, 2006: 
118-9). There were also internal divisions between al-Bashir and al-Turabi at the 
highest level of the NCP leadership, which led to the latter’s expulsion of the party due 
to al-Bashir’s military constituency. This weakened the NCP leadership, which, fearing 
a U.S. intervention after Afghanistan and under international, regional, and domestic 
pressure, felt obliged to seek rapprochement. 
 
The deeper focus on Sudan resulted in an intense diplomatic effort to engage the NIF 
and the SPLM/A in peace talks. This was initiated through the appointment of the U.S. 
special envoy John Danforth to Sudan to investigate the possibility for peace. Due to the 
opportune conditions mentioned above Danforth was able to facilitate an internationally 
observed ceasefire in the Nuba Mountains that proved successful, as the NCP was 
pressured to negotiate and Danforth recommended in his final report to the President in 
April 2002 that a U.S. led international effort597 for peace in Sudan under the IGAD 
should be promoted under interested Kenyan leadership (Danforth, 2002: 31-3). 
 
Danforth also endorsed Sudan’s unity, which became disputed. This was in part because 
in 1997 the NIF had, endorsed its southern secessionist allies in a strategic move and 
signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with SPLA breakaway factions and government 
militias, recognizing southern Sudan’s right to self-determination (KPA, 1997: 15-6). In 
contrast, Egypt’s fears of losing control over Nile waters through IGAD’s influence, or 
Sudan’s possible disintegration, had propelled a parallel 2001 Libyan-Egyptian peace 
initiative that was seen by some as a strategic move to discredit the IGAD process. 
Interestingly, this initiative called for a national conference of all Sudanese political 
forces, many part of the National Democratic Alliance,598 instead of exclusively dealing 
                                                 
597
 The IGAD was supported by a group of Western countries called Friends of IGAD (later IGAD 
Partners’ Forum), including Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the U.K., and the U.S. 
598
 The NDA was an umbrella organization of Sudanese political and armed opposition parties founded in 
1995 in which the SPLM/A has been the main protagonist. Other parties were the mainstream sections of 
the DUP, Umma, the Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP), the SCP, the General Council of the Trade 
Unions Federations, the Legitimate Command of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Beja Congress, The 
Sudan Alliance Forces, the Federal Democratic Alliance, the Rashaida Free Lions, the Arab Baath 
Socialist Party, Independent National Figures, representatives of the Liberated Areas, and the Sudanese 
National Party. This again shows the ability of political formations in Sudan to overcome political or 
identity differences for common objectives. 
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with the two dominant parties as in the case of the IGAD, but it deliberately left out the 
question of religion and self-determination (Woodward, 2006: 126).599 
     
In this context, the IGAD peace process was pushed forward. Endorsed by IGAD’s 
Western partners, principally the U.S., Kenyan Lt. Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo was 
assigned as the main IGAD Special Envoy. Although his personal role was enormous, it 
was largely the U.S. and the U.K. which kept the eight-man negotiation committees of 
the NCP and the SPLM/A with the process that resulted in the signing of the Machakos 
Protocol on 20 July 2002 (Woodward, 2006: 127). The Machakos Protocol was a 
breakthrough in the negotiations as it overcame the earlier impasses, including the 
nature and structure of the state, role of religion, and self-determination, laying the base 
for the final peace treaty, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (MP, 2002).   
 
Although groundbreaking, the signing of the Machakos Protocol did not end the war. 
Soon after the signing, hostilities in southern Sudan resumed, but the international 
pressure particularly on the NCP culminated in the signing of the U.S. Sudan Peace Act 
into a law on 21 October 2002 by president Bush.600 The Sudan Peace Act became one 
of the main instruments of pressure that kept the NCP committed to the peace process 
during 2003-4 with specifics of future wealth- and power-sharing and military 
arrangements601 being concluded by 26 May 2004.  
 
Yet, the signing of the final agreement was delayed by the deteriorating situation in 
Darfur. This was owed to a large extent to the exclusion of Darfurian opposition groups 
from the peace negotiations that promised political and economic concessions from the 
                                                 
599
 It is likely that Egypt’s influence on northern Sudan and its concerns over the peace process served as 
an incentive for Danforth to visit Cairo in 2002 in order to push aside the competing peace initiative. It is 
possible that Danforth’s final position endorsing an idea of “one Sudan, two systems”, which ruled out 
secession for the South as unfeasible, was influenced by Egypt (Woodward, 2006: 123, 126). However, 
this would require further investigation. 
600
 It threatened with a number of sanctions if the NCP would negotiate in bad faith, and resulted in other 
rounds of negotiations that produced a Memorandum of Understanding on cessation of hostilities on 18 
November 2002 (SPA, 2002; Woodward, 2006: 128-9). 
601
 Among these were the protocols dictating the interim period political autonomy for southern Sudan 
until 2011 self-determination referendum, with general and presidential elections taking place in 2009. 
Abyei would also enjoy self-determination referendum in connection to the one in southern Sudan, while 
other transitional areas, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, would have a popular consultation through 
newly elected state representatives of 2009 about their adherence to the peace agreement and position 
respective to the “North” and the “South”. Other deals were the arrangements on security in the forming 
of Joint Integrated Units, and wealth-sharing particularly dealing with oil revenue according to 50/50 
formula, for the “North” and the “South”, parallel banking systems, and development.  
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central government only to the SPLM/A and southern Sudan. Consequently, the 
international pressure was elevated further, headed by the U.S. that described the 
situation in Darfur as genocidal in order to rally UN and AU involvement, being itself 
militarily stretched in Iraq and Afghanistan (Woodward, 2006: 131). On the other hand, 
the escalating situation became dangerous also for the NCP, which was now 
increasingly pressured militarily from southern Sudan and Darfur. This affected its 
strategic calculations and preference for a quick settlement with the SPLM/A in which it 
would share part of political power and wealth but only with the southern rebel 
movement. As a result, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) became a narrow 
power- and wealth-sharing peace treaty between the NCP and the SPLM/A, along the 
“North-South” “Arab-African” conundrum, on 9 January 2005.602 While the CPA 
ensured the NCP overall domination of Sudanese politics and economy, the SPLM/A, 
which monopolized the representation of southern Sudan as the most powerful party 
(reflecting in this sense the NCP in northern Sudan) secured a referendum on self-
determination for the southern states following a prior interim period of autonomous 
administration during which Sudanese general elections would be convened, 
irrespective of a successful restructuring of the state and wealth sharing (CPA, 2005).  
    
The CPA is, however, hardly comprehensive. Rather as mentioned above, it is a narrow 
power sharing treaty between the two main protagonists that has inspired political and 
armed opposition by a number of excluded parties. To a degree, it portrays and 
consolidates the narrow view of the nation as divided between primordial identities and 
regional entities of “North” and “South”, while at the same time promoting the view of 
the war having taken place between “Arab-Muslims” dominating “African Christians 
and Animists”. The war in Darfur, which has been principally fought between Muslims, 
has helped to change this image to an extent, but the real reasons lie with the exclusive 
governance and domination of the marginalizing state by the narrow Arabized elite. 
This has been left largely unaddressed by the CPA. As an internationally pressured 
agreement lacking the necessary mechanisms for effective outside third-party 
monitoring and supervision by international actors, the CPA has allowed the NCP 
hegemony over the state in Sudan to go largely unchallenged. The NCP has dominated 
and largely manipulated and controlled the general and presidential elections that took 
                                                 
602
 The final settlement was made possible largely by external pressure of international actors, the Troika 
(the U.S., the U.K., and Norway), with the U.S. being the principal force. 
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place in April 2010, and maintained power through a behind the scenes control of 
Sudanese politics and economy. It has also maneuvered politically by signing separate 
agreements with insurgents in Darfur and eastern Sudan since concluding the CPA, but 
continues to maintain its exclusive grip on the marginalizing state without 
accommodating other political forces. Meanwhile, the SPLM/A has dominated the 
Government of Southern Sudan, manipulated the elections in southern states, and 
maintained its position as the main protagonist in the South despite challenges from 
other groups, as it looks forward to setting up its own sovereign state after the 2011 
referendum for self-determination stipulated in the CPA.  
 
Whereas the CPA and other peace agreements provide hope for breaking the dynamics 
and logic of the marginalizing state, remedying the identity rift exacerbated by violent 
conflict, and transforming the political system and culture into more inclusive, this will 
be difficult to achieve. Based on the analysis conducted in this dissertation, if the 
dynamics of the marginalizing state and governance are not broken, Sudan will likely 
continue to experience political instability and armed insurgencies. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As discussed in the previous Chapter VII, the second insurgency in southern Sudan 
emerged in the context of a deteriorating political and economic situation and opportune 
regional and international conditions. This was conducive to sustaining animosity 
towards the exclusively Arabized elite controlled marginalizing state in the South, 
leading to militarization and the proliferation of armed groups. However, these 
conditions, such as the re-division of the South and the perceived resumption of direct 
northern domination in which Islam was politicized and to an extent instrumentalized, 
were merely contributing elements that made many southerners oppose the state and 
support renewed armed opposition. Although John Garang pointed out that the 
paramount reason for the resumption of armed opposition in southern Sudan was the 
process of integration of the former Anya Nya troops according to the Addis Ababa 
Agreement (Heritage, 1987a: 4), which the officers’ underground movement opposed 
because it meant neutralization of the remaining southern military units, this was hardly 
the only cause. The success of the conspiracy would have been nearly impossible 
without generalized grievances, discontent, and fear in the South. 
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It appears that in the planning of the mutinies, which took place prematurely, the 
calculations of support were important. The mutinies were better organized and enjoyed 
wider support than previous uprisings during the 1970s which led to their success in 
triggering a full-scale rebellion. These took place in an external and internal context 
conducive to rebellion, with Ethiopia and Libya seeking to destabilize Nimeiri, and 
coinciding with heightening generalized local grievances, fear of shari’a, and the 
resumption of direct domination by the marginalizing state in southern Sudan. 
 
However, a greater structural cause behind the renewed war continued to be the 
exclusive political and economic power of sections of the Arabized elite. This becomes 
apparent from the SPLM/A objectives and the wide appeal of its New Sudan approach 
not only in the South but in other peripheral regions as well. Thus, it could be asserted 
that in the case of Sudan the political and economic dynamics and logic of the 
marginalizing state have been particularly conflictive as they have led to a political 
culture of intense competition with marginalizing and excluding effect.    
 
Although on the surface it again appears that the SPLM/A insurgency could have been 
avoided with less aggressive policies towards the South and particularly its military 
leadership, a look into the deeper relationships between the leading societal forces 
shows otherwise. It must be considered that threatened by sectors of the Arabized elite, 
Nimeiri sought to appease this opposition by maintaining the dynamics and structures of 
the marginalizing state and repositioning himself against the South. External pressures 
also encouraged this development, which Nimeiri would have had difficulty to fight 
back. Consequently, the South appeared as a lesser threat to the regime than the 
Arabized elite opposition and was sacrificed for the continuity of the marginalizing 
structures and policies that have characterized the Sudanese political system since 
colonialism. This proved to be a miscalculation as external support allowed the 
SPLM/A to launch the large-scale insurgency that greatly contributed to Nimeiri’s 
downfall in 1985. 
 
The path towards peace after the collapse of the Nimeiri regime was to a large extent a 
combination of pressures on the NCP section of the Arabized elite governing the 
marginalizing state. The growing regional interest in ending the insurgency in southern 
Sudan since the early 1990s was owed largely to the will to contain Khartoum’s 
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regional and international Islamist agenda. This initiated the involvement of the 
interested international parties also concerned about Sudan’s regionally destabilizing 
role. However, it was only after the 11 September 2001 that international pressure and 
the threat of external intervention increased, when the NCP adopted a more active 
approach to the search for peace. It was principally the NCP, and to a lesser degree the 
SPLM/A, which had to be persuaded to negotiate for peace in good faith, as the pressure 
of the Troika of interested states, headed by the U.S., proved instrumental. The final 
CPA treaty was to a large extent a strategic concession by the NCP to remain in power 
and continue to exercise its exclusive political and economic control behind the façade 
of power- and wealth-sharing dictated by the CPA.     
 
Finally, as mentioned above, the peace implemented currently in Sudan according to the 
CPA is hardly durable if the dynamics and logic (including the political system and 
political culture) of the marginalizing state are allowed to continue. One sign of the 
challenges to the current bilateral power- and wealth-sharing formula founded on a 
narrow perception of Sudan divided along “North” and “South”, and “Arab-Muslim” 
and “African, Christian and Animist” lines is the war in Darfur, which escalated during 
the final CPA negotiations due to the exclusive character of the peace treaty. While the 
CPA has prevented the return of major hostilities in southern Sudan during the interim 
period (2005-2010), it is possible that the approaching 2011 referendum may restart the 
war.603 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
603
 For further analysis on the CPA implementation and political dynamics in Sudan during the interim 
period see i.e. Ylönen (2010). 
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Chapter IX: General Conclusion 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This dissertation has analyzed the dynamics of the process of insurgencies formation in 
southern Sudan. It has introduced the marginalizing state as a theoretical concept to 
highlight the role of governing and local elites in Sudanese politics and in organizing 
insurgencies. In addition, the dissertation has sought to reach beyond the broad 
categorizations characterized by the historical literature, which obscure the elite agency 
and colonial responsibility related to the insurgencies. It has focused on the emergence 
of the Anya Nya rebellion and the SPLM/A insurgency and shown how both have 
materialized in response to the governance and policies of the marginalizing state, and 
against the attitudes and logic that maintain it. However, the analysis has also 
demonstrated that insurgency formation in southern Sudan has not been an isolated 
local or domestic process, but deeply affected by intersecting regional and international 
actors and forces. Thus, this dissertation has shown that a broad-based analysis is 
necessary for a more comprehensive approach highlighting the process of insurgencies 
formation. 
 
The following section recapitulates the main findings of this dissertation and addresses 
the research questions established in Chapter I. A later section then discusses the 
relevance of the concepts forming part of the theoretical framework, pointing out their 
useful elements and shortcomings. In the final section some possible paths for future 
research are pointed out. 
 
2. Addressing the Research Questions 
  
This section summarizes the findings of the dissertation by answering the main research 
questions.  
 
     Research Question 1: 
What is the role of state formation and construction processes in insurgencies 
formation in southern Sudan?  
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In this dissertation it is argued that state formation and construction are inherently 
linked to political competition, strife, and conflict. It is shown that the concept, 
understanding, and attitudes towards the state are shaped by the local context with its 
experiences and historical legacy. Chapter II of this dissertation showed that particularly 
the 19th century, historical processes are essential to the understanding of contemporary 
Sudan. It demonstrated that historical factors and processes from that time period are 
important for state formation and the emergence of a marginalizing polity in Sudan, 
here designated as the “marginalizing state”. In this, the agency of particular elites 
which aspired to become “regional” is highlighted, and the historical relationship and 
experiences in southern Sudan with respect to the “state” as a dominating political force 
are demonstrated.  
 
The following Chapter III shed light to the processes of consolidation of the 
marginalizing colonial state during the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period. It also 
displayed the effects of the policy of isolation of southern Sudan, which ultimately 
resulted in the emergence of elites with a political identity and project forged in reaction 
to historical domination (slavery and social hierarchy, violent extraction of resources) 
from northern Sudan. Similarly to its counterpart Arabized elite in northern Sudan, this 
elite sought prominence in the southern provinces and to extend a southern “regional” 
identity.  
 
From the analyses in chapters II and III it becomes apparent that the view of the state 
and nation promoted by the Arabized elite in northern Sudan was based on a perception 
of superiority over southern Sudan as the other or the opposite, which was portrayed as 
socially, economically, and politically inferior. In contrast, a particular view of northern 
Sudan aspiring to extend its domination was instrumental in constructing vision and the 
identity for “the South”. This way, the center of the state and its margins interact and 
contribute to the nature of the state constantly being (re)constructed and (re)negotiated 
among the most powerful elites in Sudan. 
 
Chapter IV pointed out the impact of the marginalizing state policies in the process of 
de-colonization, which ultimately led to the first insurgency in southern Sudan. In this 
chapter it was shown how local interpretations of specific events, rumors and emotional 
factors, and attitudes towards the marginalizing state led to widespread fear of Arabized 
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Muslim domination at the dawn of independence, particularly when the majority of the 
southern elite was excluded from higher level employment, political representation, and 
participation in decision-making processes at the national level.  
 
Whereas Chapter V dealt with the first insurgency in southern Sudan, highlighting the 
factors that led to the end of the war and a short term inclusion to the marginalizing 
state by a number of southern representatives, Chapter VI focused on the issues related 
to the implementation of the 1972 Addis Ababa Peace Accord in southern Sudan. While 
it was shown that state reforms accommodated interests of part of the southern elite for 
a brief period of time, the peace treaty failed to address southern grievances in the long 
term due to the reconfiguration of the marginalizing state constituencies. As Chapter VI 
shows, this reinforced the dynamics and logic of marginalization, again leading to 
increasingly exclusive governance by the ruling factions of the Arabized elite and 
policies that undermined the southern autonomous position. 
 
Furthermore, Chapter VII analyzed president Nimeiri’s shifting alliances and the 
development of intimate ties with the Islamist section of the Arabized elite. This shift of 
constituencies led to the reconfiguration of political structures and of the state, and 
reinforced the marginalizing logic crystallizing in policies that had a deteriorating effect 
on political stability in southern Sudan. The increasingly controversial policies of the 
marginalizing state, along with problems of integration of the former southern rebels to 
the armed forces, gave impetus to the plans of the military elite to reinitiate the 
insurgency. The continuation of this process was shown in Chapter VIII, which also 
discussed the remainder of the conflict during which the Islamist faction of the Arabized 
elite consolidated its hold of the state, and which has largely lasted until the time of 
writing this dissertation. However, as pointed out in Chapter VIII the recent peace 
agreements provide hope for reconfiguration of the marginalizing state and its elites, 
which, if successful, would possibly lead to more enduring peace.  
 
Thus, based on the evidence compiled in this dissertation, it can be concluded that in the 
case of both rebellions in southern Sudan, the processes of state formation and 
construction were intimately related to the insurgency formation. However, the altering 
character of the degree of marginalization and continuing (re)construction and 
(re)negotiation of the state should be emphasized. This is because as it was shown that 
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various sectors within the Arabized elite have competed over the state power. This in 
turn has translated into periods of authoritarian and multi-party governments with 
varying degree of authority, legitimacy, and repressive policies towards southern Sudan, 
which poses as the main threat to the continuity of the exclusive political and economic 
power of the Arabized elite.  
 
As the analysis indicates, insurgency formation and consolidation have taken place 
during the repressive periods in the history of southern Sudan. This confirms the 
hypothesis presented in Chapter I which assumes that the theoretical framework based 
on the concept of marginalizing state provides an adequate foundation for explaining 
insurgency formation in southern Sudan. 
 
     Research Question 2: 
How do the historical, socially, economically, and politically (re)constructed, 
“Arab Muslim” and “African” identities portray differences between the “North” 
and the “South” in Sudan? 
 
As proposed in Chapter I, in this dissertation a mixed constructivist-instrumentalist 
position of group identities was adopted. Chapter II demonstrated how in the process of 
state formation in Sudan the Arabized Muslim dominated social hierarchy became a 
major force within which group based political and economic power was configured. 
The following Chapter III concentrated on the Anglo-Egyptian colonial period and 
showed how the colonial policies channeled power into the hands of a particular 
Arabized Muslim elite. This extended into a political project to foment the perception of 
a homogeneous “Arab-Muslim North” and its geographical extension as “a region”, in 
spite of the highly heterogeneous nature of northern Sudan. Chapter III also highlighted 
how the colonial Southern Policy led to the formation of political elite in southern 
Sudan that in response to the “North” projected a view of a southern region, or the 
“South”. Attempting to homogenize a possibly even a more heterogeneous entity, the 
elite project promoted and continues to promote the “South” as a culturally unified 
“African” region opposed to an “Arab North”, building upon a narrative of history of 
northern domination, slavery, and social hierarchy particularly in the 19th century. 
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The chapters that followed indicated the periodical changes in the collective identities. 
They pointed to the facilitation of an altering fluidity, movement, and changing 
positions among and between northern and southern elites, reinforcing during other 
periods a more polarized and dividing identity categorization. This has either propelled 
insurgencies or in contrast promoted more peaceful eras. In Chapter IV it was shown 
how the political competition and strife led to the securitization of the “Southern 
Problem” in the process of de-colonization, and fostered a growing identity rift between 
the marginalizing state dominated by sections of the Arabized elite and the powerful 
sectors of the southern elite. Chapter V demonstrated how in the latter part of the first 
southern insurgency this “North-South” and “Arab-African” identity rift was partially 
amended, facilitating a negotiated solution to end the war.  
 
In contrast, Chapters VI and VII showed how the implementation of the new political 
structures ensuring political autonomy for the “South” ultimately failed and contributed 
to the formation of a new insurgency orchestrated principally by discontented elements 
in the southern military leadership, and to a lesser extent by a number of politicians. 
During this period the identity rift widened again due to actions by the elites. It is 
demonstrated that while the most powerful Islamist section of the northern elite pushed 
for more repressive state policies, sectors of the southern elite responded by increasing 
militantism which again led to a widening gap of collective identities between the 
“North” and the “South”. Finally, while Chapter VII pointed out how the renewed 
insurgency initially extended the identity rift further and a more moderate approach by 
the protagonists again facilitated a negotiated settlement, Chapter VIII showed that the 
peace processes leading to the CPA and beyond offer a possibility to remedy the 
identity polarization and encourage peace in the future.   
 
This dissertation has demonstrated that the (re)constructed and reinforced identity 
categories vary and change over time. They are closely connected to the 
(re)construction and changing views of the state and nation. It is proposed that the 
constructed identities adjust, responding to periods of various degrees of political 
instability, strife, and conflict, and are at times instrumentalized in pursuit of the 
specific interests of the dominant elites. This has facilitated periodical settlements to 
remedy violence and war while occasionally including other groups than the Arabized 
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elite, although largely without decision-making power, within the structure of the 
Sudanese state and governments.  
 
This confirms the second hypothesis presented in Chapter I, which refers to the 
(re)construction of changing identities and thus rejects their primordiality. As suggested 
in this dissertation, it appears that identities in relation to the Sudanese state, and 
involved in its ongoing (re)construction, are constructed along narratives that highlight 
differential social status and distinct collective experiences portrayed as “regional”. This 
is why identities are not merely instrumental, but rather constructed, believed in, and at 
times used instrumentally.  
 
As a result, it is shown here that the position of a number of prominent authors of a 
principally Anglo-Saxon tradition is to an extent inaccurate. Although they have played 
an important role in shaping popular views on war in Sudan as an inevitable primordial 
battle between culturally distinct “Arab vs. African”, “Muslim vs. Christian and 
Animist”, or “North vs. South”, this is largely not the case as such identity categories 
are constructed and constantly (re)negotiated, fluid, and changing. It rather becomes 
obvious from the analysis conducted in this dissertation that such views promoting 
primordiality and inevitability of the conflict fall into the “ancient hatreds” 
argumentation and obscure the agency of the elites and the role and responsibility of 
external actors, principally the colonizing powers Britain and Egypt.   
 
     Research Question 3: 
How have external (international and regional) factors influenced state 
formation in Sudan and the insurgencies formation processes in southern Sudan? 
 
This dissertation has sought to highlight the importance of external (international and 
regional) actors and forces in the internal political dynamics of Sudan. Chapter II 
showed how the process of state formation in Sudan involved external forces and actors 
as major actors and led to the construction of a marginalizing polity. This progression, 
as pointed out in Chapter III, was extended further by the Anglo-Egyptian (principally 
British) domination, crystallizing in the marginalizing colonial state. Chapter IV 
demonstrated how this state became dominated exclusively by sectors of the narrowly 
defined Arabized elite in a contentious process of de-colonization that intimately 
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involved regional and international actors and interests contesting over regional 
hegemony and influence. It was shown that not only did regional and international 
actors and forces dominate the state formation in Sudan, but they also affected the 
insurgency formation in southern Sudan. 
 
External (regional and international) actors were particularly present in the latter stages 
of the first insurgency in southern Sudan, as demonstrated in Chapter V, by directly 
supporting the protagonists, with some of them playing an integral role in the mediation 
that facilitated the negotiated settlement to the war. Chapters VI and VII showed that 
similarly some external actors affected the re-emergence of increasingly repressive 
policies of the marginalizing state, and Chapter VII indicated that external actors appear 
to have been integrally involved in the political and economic situation in which the 
second insurgency in southern Sudan materialized. Finally, Chapter VIII also pointed 
out that external actors and influences were paramount in bringing the second 
insurgency to an end.  
 
Thus, external direct and indirect involvement by regional and international forces and 
actors has been an important element in creating conditions conducive to both war and 
peace in southern Sudan. This refutes the thesis of some prominent authors (see Chapter 
I) about the exclusivity of local dynamics in the making of insurgencies, and confirms 
the hypothesis presented in Chapter I that the mainstream literature on insurgency 
formation in southern Sudan lacks regional and international analysis. It clearly 
underemphasizes these relevant elements in the origins of insurgencies, as it has been 
shown in this dissertation that such external actors and forces influenced directly, and in 
some cases indirectly, the processes of insurgency formation in southern Sudan. 
 
     Research Question 4: 
Why did the process of de-colonization and the conditions in the early 1980s 
lead to insurgencies in southern Sudan and not in other areas of the Sudanese 
state periphery? Was the second insurgency merely a continuation of the first? 
 
In this dissertation an attempt has been made to discover why large scale insurgencies 
have materialized in two occasions in southern Sudan and, in relation to this, why major 
insurgencies did not take place in other parts of Sudanese periphery until much more 
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recently. It is emphasized here that the particular historical trajectories of state 
formation and (re)construction, along with elite agency and domination, are integral to 
the understanding of the particularity of the case of southern Sudan.  
 
Chapter II pointed to the legacies of the 19th century, and earlier history. It aimed to 
explain how the role of slavery and social hierarchy have affected inter-group relations 
in Sudan until today and established an enduring particular logic of institutionalized 
social domination. Chapter III then showed the importance of colonial history in 
shaping societal and political structures, and reinforcing particular highly hierarchical 
types of inclusion and exclusion that shaped inter-group attitudes and identities in 
relation to the marginalizing state.  
 
These historical processes promoted cleavages between the elites in the northern and 
southern part of the country as they were equipped with distinct narratives about the 
state and nation. This contributed to the deterioration of the political climate during de-
colonization, which was characterized by exclusive views of social privileges and 
marginal reincorporation of southern provinces to the state. As Chapter IV indicated, 
colonial policies favored the emergence of regionalist elites in southern Sudan as the 
first area in the Sudanese periphery, owing in part to the promotion of a narrative 
derived from the historical experience and legacy of slavery and subjugation. This 
became increasingly important in the process of de-colonization and contributed to the 
emergence of the insurgencies in part due to the (re)construction of particular identity 
categories referring to “the North” and “the South” as opposites. The particularities of 
the identity (re)construction process were different in the marginalizing state’s 
relationship with other peripheries.   
 
Moreover, Chapter V showed how the first insurgency in southern Sudan was 
extensively destructive, and although it was ended through a negotiated settlement, 
residual organized violence lingered. Chapter VI pointed out the difficulties of peace 
implementation and continued grievances in southern Sudan. To this extent the second 
insurgency triggered in the early 1980s, and analyzed in Chapters VII and VIII, can be 
considered as a continuation of the first. It was led by a number of rebel leaders of the 
earlier movement and capitalized on unaddressed generalized local grievances, among 
other diverse motivations, which had emerged due to perceived inequality, injustice, 
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and lack of self-determination and economic development relative to north-central 
Sudan. These grievances were to an extent addressed by the CPA that ended the 
insurgency, but its implementation has suffered from serious shortcomings. 
 
The analysis conducted here has also indicated that insurgencies result from complex 
interacting processes and multiple motivations rather than being based primarily on 
opportunity and rational choice. Thus, one-sided interpretations based on Homo 
Economicus, economic opportunity and rational choice to rebel, merely explain part of 
the material reasons for organizing an insurgency, leaving out other material and non-
material motivations. Such a view therefore reduces reality according to unidisciplinary 
bias, which undermines its inherent value for policy recommendations and suggestions 
for action in case of insurgencies formation.   
 
In sum, evidence gathered and analyzed in this dissertation demonstrated that particular 
historical (political, economic, and social) trajectories have bounded southern Sudan to 
form part of the Sudanese polity, but denied its elites effective participation and 
influence over the state. This is largely responsible for the insurgencies in southern 
Sudan. This history also largely explains the particularity of the insurgencies in the area, 
why they materialized there, and why the second insurgency followed the first. This 
confirms part of the hypothesis presented in Chapter I.  
 
However, it refutes the assumption made that the two insurgencies were inherently 
different. Rather, the evidence analyzed has shown that the second insurgency was to a 
large extent a continuation of the first. It appears also that neither insurgency was 
inevitable as maintained by a number of historians of the British tradition. Rather, it 
seems that they were conditioned during their formational processes by a combination 
of external actors and forces and those related to the dynamics and logic of the 
marginalizing state in Sudan. In this, the particular political system and political culture, 
products of specific historical processes in Sudan, were paramount in creating a political 
context in which exclusive and narrowly distributed political and economic power to the 
most powerful sectors of the Arabized elite became highly conflictive in the post-
colonial state.  
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As a result, it can be concluded from the analysis conducted in this dissertation that both 
rebellions were potentially avoidable through better preparation of the process of de-
colonization and through transformation of the marginalizing state towards more 
inclusive governance accommodating sectors of the southern elite. The analysis 
conducted here suggests that the situation could possibly be remedied in the future by 
more equal sharing of political and economic power, which could gradually break the 
historically formed exclusionary dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state.   
 
3. Relevance of Theoretical Framework Utilized 
 
This section assesses the relevance of the main theoretical considerations used for the 
research process and the analysis conducted in this dissertation. 
 
     Utility of Main Theoretical Concepts 
 
In the introductory chapter, this dissertation built a theoretical framework based on the 
concept of the “marginalizing state”. The research process has demonstrated that this 
framework founded on historical research is robust but malleable enough as a 
theoretical structure to accommodate other analytical elements. Thus, the theoretical 
framework founded upon the concept of the marginalizing state and viewing insurgency 
formation as a process has proven useful for analyzing insurgencies in southern Sudan 
because it allows for the incorporation of the mixed constructional-instrumental identity 
discourse and the analysis of external actors. Consequently, the adopted framework 
permits a more comprehensive analysis than those restricted by disciplinary boundaries. 
 
Theoretical elements proposed in Chapter I and incorporated in the analytical 
framework of the marginalizing state helped to highlight various aspects of the research 
topic. First, the mixed identity approach based on constructivism and instrumentalism, 
which was incorporated as part of the framework of the marginalizing state, was helpful 
in understanding the dynamics of domination and resistance relevant to insurgency 
formation in southern Sudan. It permitted a focus on elite agency, while allowing a 
deeper comprehension of political and sociological processes.  
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Second, the concept of power adopted was helpful to highlight the exclusivity of 
dominant elites in northern and southern Sudan, although elite theory itself was less 
present and less useful in terms of providing new perspectives to the analysis. Third, the 
concepts of uneven development and internal colonialism were deemed highly useful as 
elements that pointed out the importance of regional imbalances in the relationship 
between the state and its periphery. For example, they allowed an ample politico-
economic recognition of the exclusive governance and relative differences in 
development related to local grievances. 
 
Moreover, the idea of extraversion was applied in the analysis in an attempt to 
comprehend interaction between local, regional, and international spheres. Application 
of Bayart’s extraversion was particularly useful in highlighting strategies and their 
impact, but the network approach was less helpful due to the lack of available data to be 
analyzed on a number of key relationships. 
 
Finally, the theoretical focus on emphasizing the process of insurgency formation was 
useful to break the potentially limited categorizations related to analyses on causes of 
rebellions. It was used to avoid a strict and potentially reductionist approach, such as 
root causes, proximate causes, and triggers, and focused on the historical processes and 
their contribution to contemporary and immediate reality. The idea of Kalyvas of 
examining violence as a process, helped to highlight continuities from the historical 
experience and the interconnection of the two insurgencies. Examining the process 
unveiled the continuities of the marginalizing state and economic disparities, elevating 
grievances and facilitating insurgency formation.       
 
4. Possible Avenues for Future Research  
 
This final section indicates some possible avenues for future research based on the 
analysis conducted in this dissertation. 
 
     Possible Future Research  
 
The analysis of insurgency formation processes in southern Sudan conducted in this 
dissertation generates a number of questions that require deeper examination. While 
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some of these questions relate to the state, governance, the role of elites, and 
insurgencies formation focused, others involve realities and dynamics during the 
insurgencies or relate to the ending of rebellions. 
 
First, the dynamics and logic of the marginalizing state (a particular political system and 
culture) and the specific cases of insurgency formation analyzed here apply to the case 
of southern Sudan. However, their applicability to other cases of state (re)construction, 
governance, elite agency, and conflict formation in Africa that would lead to more 
general explanation should be examined. While the case of southern Sudan presents 
many particularities that may not apply to other cases, testing the logic of the theoretical 
concept of marginalizing state and comparing insurgency formation processes with 
other case studies provide possible avenues for future research. This way, research 
comparing similarities and differences with other insurgencies should be promoted. 
 
Another potential path for future research that emerges from the analysis is investigation 
of the elite identity discourses and their relation to intra-group inclusion and exclusion. 
It is recognized in this dissertation that the most dominant “regional” elite groups are 
heterogeneous themselves and include mainly those who benefit more from their 
agendas. These dynamics of inclusion and exclusion merit further research as they 
would shed further light onto the internal dynamics of particular elite groups, and 
identify within them power centers and those excluded from power. This would help to 
see increasingly beyond the agglomerated groups of elites in the “North” and the 
“South”. 
 
Third, the question of the state in Africa and Sudan is still widely debated. In the case of 
Sudan, further research should be conducted on the hybrid governance structures, elites, 
and the exercise of power in various local contexts. This would unveil dynamics and 
relationships related to the interaction of the centralized administration as a 
superstructure and the local political and governance structures, and how both interact 
with non-state and non-governmental actors. 
 
Fourth, this dissertation has concentrated on the processes of insurgencies formation. 
However, wider questions related to the duration and termination of rebellions in Sudan 
merit further research. Particularly, the dynamics and duration of insurgencies in the 
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case of Sudan appear to have been left with less scholarly attention. Despite the 
existence of some literature on these topics, more specific studies could help pinpoint 
strategies for conflict transformation and resolution. Additionally, case study evidence 
on these aspects should be generated not only of Sudan but also for other states in 
Africa, which would then encourage comparative studies.  
 
Finally, one more obvious avenue for future research is the investigation on 
developments in Sudan since the completion, or incompletion, of the CPA. Particularly 
interesting would be studies conducted after the referendum on self-determination for 
southern Sudan and the Abyei, which at the time of writing has been scheduled for 
January 2011. The referendum appears as the main theme that may trigger a return to 
war or maintain Sudan on the fragile path of peace consolidation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
396        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography         397 
 
Bibliography 
 
Abbink, Jon G. (2004) “Reconstructing Southern Sudan in the Post-War Era: 
Challenges and Prospects of ‘Quick Impact Programmes’”. Working Paper 55, African 
Studies Centre, Leiden. 
 
Abdel Rahim, Muddathir. (1969) Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan: A Study in 
Constitutional and Political Development. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
‘Abd al-Rahim, Muddathir. (1970) “Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the 
Sudan”. Journal of Modern African Studies, 8(2), pp. 233-49. 
 
Abdul-Jalil, Musa Adam. (2006) “Land Tenure, Land Use and Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in 
Darfur” In: Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed and Leif Manger. Understanding the Crisis in 
Darfur: Listening to Sudanese Voices. Bergen: University of Bergen, 20-32. 
 
Abu Hasabu, Afaf Abdel Majid. (1985) Factional Conflict in the Sudanese Nationalist 
Movement, 1918-1948. Khartoum: University of Khartoum. 
 
Adam, Gamal A., Bartlett, Anne A., and Baballa H. Nour (2009). “Slavery in Sudan: 
From Stereotyping to Practice”. Paper presented at the International Sudan Studies 
Conference, UNISA, 25-28 November. 
 
Adams, William Y. (1991). “North and South in Sudanese History”. Second 
International Sudan Studies Conference Papers, University of Durham. 
 
Adefuye, Ade. (1985) “Kakwa of Uganda and the Sudan: The Ethnic Factor in National 
and International Factors” In: Asiwaju, A. I. Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations 
across Africa’s International Boundaries, 1884-1984. London: C. Hurst & Co., 51-69. 
 
African Rights (1995) ”Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan”. London, July. Available 
online: http://www.justiceafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/ [accessed 12 August 
2010] 
 
398        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Aguirre, Mariano. (2006) “África: El debate sobre el crisis del Estado” In: Aguirre, 
Mariano y Sogge, David. Crisis del Estado y dominios civiles en África. 30 Working 
Paper, FRIDE, 1-11. 
 
Ahmad, Hassan Aziz. (1977) “Some Economic Factors Hampering the Development of 
Sudanese Trade during the Nineteenth Century”. Sudan Journal of Economic and Social 
Studies, 2(1), pp. 31-9.  
 
Ake, Claude. (2000) The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa. Dakar: Codesria.  
 
Akok, Garang and Schultz, Ulrike. (2009) ”’Life Would Be Easy If I would Be Dinka’: 
The Construction of Ethnic Identities in Southern Sudanese Communities after the 
CPA”. Paper presented at the International Sudan Studies Conference, University of 
South Africa, 25-28 November. 
 
Akol, Lam. (2007) Southern Sudan: Colonialism, Resistance, and Autonomy. Asmara: 
The Red Sea Press. 
 
Akol, Lam. (2001) SPLM/SPLA: Inside African Revolution. Khartoum: Khartoum 
University Press. 
 
Al-Gaddal, Mohammed. S. (1985) Al-Imaam Al-Mahdi: A Profile of a Sudanese 
Revolutionary. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. 
 
Albino, Oliver. (1970) The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint. London: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Alexander, Lindsay and Smith, Dan. (2004) “Evidence & Analysis: Tackling the 
Structural Causes of Conflict in Africa & Strengthening Preventive Responses”. 
International Alert. Paper prepared for Commission of Africa. Available online: 
http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/background/alexander_and_smith_b
ackground.pdf  [accessed 23 April 2008]  
 
Bibliography         399 
 
Alier, Abel. (1990) Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. London, 
Ithaca. 
 
Anyanwu, John. (2004) “Economic and Political Causes of Civil Wars in Africa: Some 
Econometric Results”. Peace, Conflict and Development, 4. Available online: 
http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/docs/CivilWarAfrica.PDF [accessed 23 April 
2008] 
 
Appandurai, Arjun. (1996) “The Production of Locality” In: Appandurai, Arjun. 
Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 178-204.  
 
Arfi, Badredine. (1998) “Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity” Security 
Studies 8, pp. 151-203. 
 
Arou, K. N. Mom. (1988) “Devolution: Decentralization and the Division of the 
Southern Region into Three Regions in 1983” In: Arou, Mom, K. N. and Yongo-Bure, 
Benaiah. North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa Agreement. 
Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 166-88. 
 
Arou, K. N. Mom. (1982) “Regional Devolution in the Southern Sudan 1972-1981”. 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Edinburgh.  
 
Austen, Ralph. (1996) African Economic History: International Development and 
External Dependency. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
Awur, Deng Wenyin. (1988) “The Integration of the Anya-Nya into the National Army” 
In: Arou, Mom, K. N. and Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. North-South Relations in the Sudan 
since the Addis Ababa Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 57-119. 
 
Ayittey, George B. N. (1998) Africa in Chaos. New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
 
400        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Ayoob, Muhammed. (2001) “State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure” In:  
Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, Fen Osler and Pamela Aall. Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 127-42. 
 
Azam, Jean Paul. (2001) “The Redistributive State and Conflicts in Africa”. Journal of 
Peace Research, 38(4), pp. 429-44.  
 
Badal, Raphael, K. (1994) “Political Cleavages within the Southern Sudan” In: Tvedt, 
Terje and Harir, Sharif. Short-Cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan. Uppsala: Nordic Africa 
Institute, 105-125. 
 
Badal, Raphael, K. (1976) “Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan”. African 
Affairs, 75(301), pp. 463-74. 
 
Ballentine, Karen. (2003) “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic 
Dynamics of Armed Conflict” In: Ballentine, Karen and Sherman, Jake. The Political 
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
259-83. 
 
Ballentine, Karen and Nitzsche, Heiko. (2003) “Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy 
Lessons from Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict”. International Peace 
Academy Policy Report. Available online: 
http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/study/bak05_1.pdf [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Baraja, L. Gwaki Wori. (2004) “Synopses of Past Events as Compared to Developing 
Events”. Sudan Vision Daily, 28 August. Available online: 
http://sudanvisiondaily.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=2879 
[accessed on 23 April 2008]  
 
Bariagaber, Assefaw. (2006) Conflict and the Refugee Experience: Flight, Exile, and 
Repatriation in the Horn of Africa. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Barth, Frederik. (1969) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. Boston: Little Brown. 
Bibliography         401 
 
Bates, Darrell. (1984) The Fashoda Incident of 1898:Encounter on the Nile. London: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Bates, Robert H. (2008) When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Bates, Robert H. (1983) “Modernization, Ethnic Competition and the Rationality of 
Politics in Contemporary Africa”. In: Rothchild, Donald and Olorunsola, Victor A. 
State versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas. Boulder (CO): Westview, pp. 
152-71. 
 
Bayart, Jean-François. (2005) The Illusion of Cultural Identity. London: Hurst & 
Company. 
 
Bayart, Jean-François. (2000) “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion”. African 
Affairs, 99, pp. 217-67. 
 
Bayart, Jean-François. (1993) The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly. New York: 
Longman Publishing. 
 
Bayart, Jean-François. (1991) “L’Etat”. In: Coulon, C. and Martin, Denis-Constant. Les 
Afriques Politiques. Paris: Editions La Découverte, pp. 213-30.  
 
Bayart, Jean-François, Ellis, Stephen, and Beatrice Hibou. (1999) The Criminalization 
of State in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Bechtold, Peter. (1976) Politics in the Sudan. New York: Praeger. 
 
Berdal, Mats. (2003) “How ‘New’ Are ‘New Wars’? Global Economic Change and 
Study of Civil War”. Global Governance, 9, pp. 477-502. 
 
Berman, Bruce and Lonsdale, John. (1992) Unhappy Valley. Vol. 2: Violence and 
Ethnicity. Oxford: James Currey. 
 
402        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Beshir, Mohamed Omer. (1975) The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace. 
Khartoum: Khartoum Bookshop. 
 
Beshir, Mohamed Omer. (1974) Revolution and Nationalism in the Sudan. London: Rex 
Collins. 
 
Beshir, Mohamed Omer. (1968) The Southern Sudan: Background to Conflict. London: 
Hurst. 
 
Beswick, Stephanie. (2004) Sudan’s Blood Memory: The Legacy of War, Ethnicity, and 
Slavery in Early South Sudan. Rochester (NY): University of Rochester Press. 
 
Beswick, Stephanie. (1994) “Islam and the Dinka of the Southern Sudan from the Pre-
Colonial Period to Independence (1956)”. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 29(3-
4), pp. 172-85.  
 
Betléhemy, Jean-Claude, Kauffman Céline, Renard, Laurence and Lucia Wegner. 
“Political Instability, Political Regime and Economic Performance in African 
Countries”. OECD Development Center. Available online: 
http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2002-UPaGiSSA/papers/Kauffmann-
csae2002.pdf  [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Björkelo, Anders. (1989) Prelude to Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi 
Region, 1821-1885. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Björkelo, Anders. (1984) “Turco-Jallaba Relations, 1821-1885”. In: Manger, Leif O. 
Trade and Traders in the Sudan, Bergen: University of Bergen, pp. 81-107. 
 
Bodley, John. (1999) Victims of Progress. Palo Alto (CA): Mayfield. 
 
Bodley, John. (1988) “Introduction: Tribal Peoples and Development”. In: Bodley, John 
H. Tribal Peoples and Development Issues, Mountain View (CA): Mayfield, pp. 1-7. 
 
Bibliography         403 
 
Bowles, Samuel, Franzini, Maurizio and Ugo Pagano. (eds.) (1999) The Politics and 
Economics of Power. London: Routledge.  
 
Branch, Adam and Mampilly Zachariah Cherian. (2005) “Winning the War, but Losing 
the Peace? The Dilemma of SPLM/A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead”. 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 43(1), pp. 1-20. 
 
Brass, Paul R. (1991) Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. New Delhi: 
Sage. 
 
Brown, Richard. (1986) “International Responses to Sudan’s Economic Crisis: 1978 to 
the April 1985 Coup d’Etat”. Development and Change, 17(3), pp. 487-511. 
 
Buckley, Stephen. (1997) “African Lives: Chaos of War Strips Sudanese of Dignity, 
Traditions, and Identity”, The Washington Post, 24 August, p. A22. 
 
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Lalman, David. (1992) War and Reason: Domestic and 
International Imperatives. London: Yale University Press.  
 
Buhaug, Halvard and Gates, Scott. (2002) “The Geography of Civil War”. Journal of 
Peace Research, 39(4), pp. 417-33. 
 
Burr, J. Millard and Collins, Robert O.. (1999) Africa’s Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad, 
and the Sudan. Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Buzan, Barry, Wæver, Ole, and de Wilde, Jaap. (1998) Security: A Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Callaghy, Thomas M., Kassimir, Ronald, and Robert Latham. (eds.) (2001) Intervention 
and Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
404        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Campos Serrano, Alicia. (2000) “La aparición de los estados africanos en el sistema 
internacional: la descolonización de África” In: Peñas, Francisco Javier. África en el 
sistema internacional. Madrid: Catarata, 15-50. 
 
Castells, Manuel. (1998) End of Millenium. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Castells, Manuel. (1997) The Power of Identity. Vol. I1, The Information Age: 
Economy, Society and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Castells, Manuel. (1996) The Rise of the Network Society. Vol. 1, The Information Age: 
Economy, Society and Culture. Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Cater, Charles. (2003) “The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: 
Rethinking the Critical Cases of Africa” In: Ballentine, Karen and Sherman, Jake. The 
Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 19-45. 
 
CBS. (1984) Lord Come To Our Aid: Message Of The Catholic Bishops Of Sudan On 
Christian Behaviour And Attitudes In The face Of The Current Situation In The 
Country. Juba: Catholic Press Institute. 
 
Chabal, Patrick. (2009) Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling. London: Zed 
Books. 
 
Chabal, Patrick. (2007) State and Governance: The Limits of Decentralisation. The 
Hague: SNV Netherlands Development Organisation. 
 
Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal. (2005) Culture Troubles: Politics and the 
Interpretation of Meaning. London: Hurts & Co. 
 
Chabal, Patrick and Daloz, Jean-Pascal. (1999) Africa Works: Disorder as Political 
Instrument. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Bibliography         405 
 
Chaigneau, Pascal. (2002) “The Geopolitics of African Conflicts”. African Geopolitics, 
7-8(Summer-Fall), pp. 85-91.  
 
Chan, Hoth Giw and Zuor, Riang Yer. (2006) South Sudan: A Legitimate Struggle. 
Baltimore: PublishAmerica. 
 
Chandler, David. (2006) Empire in Denial: The Politics of State-building. London: 
Pluto Press. 
 
Clapham, Christopher. (ed.) (1998) African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey. 
 
Clapham, Christopher. (1996) Africa and the International System: The Politics of State 
Survival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Clapham, Christopher, Herbst, Jeffrey and Mills, Greg. (eds.) (2006) Big African States: 
Angola, Sudan, DRC, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa. Johannesburg: Wits University 
Press.  
 
Clare, Michael T. (2002) Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict. New 
York: Henry Holt. 
 
Clayton, Anthony. (2003) “Violence in Africa since 1950: Frontiersmen” In: Pumphrey, 
Caroline and Schwarz-Barcott, Rye. Armed Conflict in Africa. Lanham (US): 
Scarecrow, 43-67. 
 
Cobham, Alex. (2005) “Causes of Conflict in Sudan: Testing The Black Book”. The 
European Journal of Development Research, 17(3), pp. 462-80. 
 
Collier, Paul. (2003a) Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Collier, Paul. (2003b) “The Market for Civil War”. Foreign Policy, 136, pp. 38-46.  
 
406        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Collier, Paul. (2000a) “Rebellion as Quasi-Criminal Activity”.  Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 44(6), pp.  839-53. 
 
Collier, Paul. (2000b) “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for 
Policy”. Working Paper, The World Bank. Available online: 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.pdf [accessed 10 
February 2007] 
 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 56, pp. 563-95.  
 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. (2002a) “On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa”. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), pp. 13-28. 
 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. (2002b) “Understanding Civil War: A New Agenda”. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), pp. 3-12. 
 
Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke. (1998) “On Economic Causes of Civil War”. Oxford 
Economic Papers, 50, pp. 563-73.  
 
Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas. (eds.) (2005a) Understanding Civil War: 
Evidence and Analysis. Volume I: Africa. Herndon (VA): The World Bank. 
 
Collier, Paul and Sambanis, Nicholas. (eds.) (2005b) Understanding Civil War: 
Evidence and Analysis. Volume II: Europe, Central Asia and Other Regions. Herndon 
(VA): The World Bank. 
 
Collins, Robert O. (2008) A History of Modern Sudan. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Collins, Robert O. (2005) Civil Wars and Revolution in the Sudan: Essays on the Sudan, 
Southern Sudan, and Darfur, 1962-2004. Hollywood, CA: Tsehai Publishing.  
 
Bibliography         407 
 
Collins, Robert O. (1992) “The Nilotic Slave Trade: Past and Present” In: Savage, 
Elizabeth. Human Commodity: Perspective of the trans-Saharan Slave Trade. London: 
Frank Cass.  
Collins, Robert O. (1990) The Waters of the Nile. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
 
Collins, Robert O. (1985) “The Big Ditch: The Jonglei Canal Scheme” In: Daly, Martin 
W. Modernization in the Sudan. New York: Lilian Barber Press, 135-46. 
 
Collins, Robert O. (1983) Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-
1956. London: Yale University Press. 
 
Collins, Robert O. (1975) The Southern Sudan in Historical Perspective. Tel Aviv: 
Israel Press. 
 
Collins, Robert O. (1971) The Land Beyond the Rivers: The Southern Sudan, 1898-
1918. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Collins, Robert O. (1962) The Southern Sudan, 1883-1898: A Struggle for Control. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Cooper, Frederick and Stoler, Ann Laura. (eds.) (1997) Tensions of Empire: Colonial 
Cultures in a Bourgeois World. Berkeley: University of California Press.   
 
CPA. (2005) “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement”. Available online: 
http://www.aec-sudan.org/docs/cpa/cpa-en.pdf [accessed 23 August 2010] 
 
Cramer, Cristopher. (2006) Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing: Accounting for Violence in 
Developing Countries. London: C. Hurst & Co.  
 
Cramer, Cristopher. (2003) “Does Inequality Cause Conflict?”. Journal of International 
Development, 15, pp. 397-412.  
 
408        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Cramer, Christopher. (2002) “Homo Economicus Goes to War: Methodological 
Individualism, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of War”. World 
Development, 30(11), pp. 1845-64. 
 
Crisp, Jeff and Ayling, Rachel. (1985) “Ugandan Refugees in Sudan and Zaire” Report, 
British Refugee Council, February. 
 
Cunnison, Ian. (1971) “Classification by Genealogy: A Problem of the Baqqara Belt” 
In: Fadl Hasan, Yusuf. Sudan in Africa. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press, 186-96. 
 
Currea-Lugo, Victor. (2008) “Los Estados Imposibles”. Available online: 
http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=109740 [accessed 1 January 
2008]  
 
Dak, Othwonh. (1988) “Southern Regions: Decentralization or Recentralization” In: 
Arou, Mom, K. N. and Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. North-South Relations in the Sudan since 
the Addis Ababa Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 188-201. 
 
Dallalah, Salwa Kamil. (1988) “Oil and Politics in Southern Sudan” In: Arou, Mom, K. 
N. and Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis 
Ababa Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 430-55. 
 
Daly, Martin W. (1993) “Broken Bridge and Empty Basket: The Political and Economic 
Background of the Sudanese Civil War” In: Daly, John and Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad. 
Civil War in the Sudan. London: British Academic Press, 1-26. 
 
Daly, Martin W. (1991) Imperial Sudan: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, 1934-
1956. London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Daly, Martin W. (1986) The Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-
1934. London: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
 
Bibliography         409 
 
Danforth, John C. (2002) “Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook 
for Peace in Sudan”. 26 April. Available online: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10258.pdf [accessed 18 August 2010] 
 
de Chand, David. (2000). “The Sources of Conflict between the North and the South in 
Sudan”. Paper presented at the Fifth International Sudan Studies Conference, University 
of Durham, 30 August-1 September. Available online: 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/justin.willis/chand.htm [accessed 23 April 2008]   
 
de Waal, Alex. (2007a) “Sudan: What Kind of State? What Kind of Crisis?”. Occasional 
Paper No. 2, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, April. 
 
de Waal, Alex. (2007b) “Sudan: international Dimensions to the State and its Crisis”. 
Occasional Paper No. 3, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 
April. 
 
de Waal, Alex. (1994) “Turabi’s Muslim Brothers: Theocracy in Sudan”. Covert Action 
Quarterly, 12, pp. 48-61.  
 
de Waal, Alex. (1993) “Some Comments on Militias in the Contemporary Sudan” In: 
Daly, John and Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad. Civil War in the Sudan. London: British 
Academic Press, 142-56. 
 
Deeb, Mary Jane. (1991) Libya’s Foreign Policy in North Africa. Boulder: Westview 
Press. 
 
Deng, Francis Mading. (1995a) War of Visions: Conflict Identities in the Sudan. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.  
 
Deng, Francis Mading. (1995b) “Negotiating a Hidden Agenda: Sudan’s Conflict of 
Identities” In: Zartman, I. William. Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. 
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 77-102. 
 
410        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Deng, Francis Mading. (1978) Africans of Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Deng Aluok, Albino. (2008) “Response of Southern Sudanese Intellectuals to African 
Nationalism”. The Journal of Pan African Studies, 2(5), pp. 130-41 
 
Dhal, Abraham Matoc. (2004) The Colonial Economy and the Underdevelopment of the 
Southern Sudan, 1899-1989. Khartoum: Communication Services. 
 
Doornbos, Martin. (1994) “State Formation and Collapse: Reflections on Identity and 
Power” In: van Bakel, M., Hagesteijn, R. and van de Welde, P. Pivot Politics: Changing 
Cultural Identities in Early State Formation Processes. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 281-
93. 
 
Dreyfus, Hubert L. and Rabinow, Paul. (1982) Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism 
and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Duffield, Mark. (2001) Global Governance and New Wars: The Merging of 
Development and Security. London: Zed Books. 
 
Duffield, Mark. (1993) “NGO’s, Disaster Relief and Asset Transfer in the Horn: 
Political Survival in a Permanent Emergency”. Development and Change, 14(1), pp. 
131-57. 
 
Duffield, Mark. (1992) “Famine, Conflict and the Internationalization of Public 
Welfare” In: Doornbos, Martin, Cliffe, Lionel,  Ahmed, Abdel Ghaffal M. and John 
Markakis. Beyond Conflict in the Horn: Prospects for Peace. The Hague: Institute of 
Social Studies, 49-62. 
 
El-Amin Khalifa, Mohamed. (2003) Ten Years of Peace Making in Sudan, 1989-1999. 
Khartoum: COFPA. 
 
El Zain, Mahmud (1996) “Tribe and Religion in Sudan”. Review of African Political 
Economy 70(23), pp. 523-9. 
Bibliography         411 
 
El Zain, Mahmud (1987) “Politics of Native Administration in the Sudan”. Unpublished 
B.Sc. Thesis, University of Khartoum. 
 
Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas. (2000) “Why Are There So Many Civil 
Wars in Africa?”. Journal of African Economics, 9(3), pp. 244-69. 
 
Elhassan, Abdalla Mohamed. (1985) “The State and the Development of Capitalism in 
Agriculture in Sudan: The Case of the Savannah Rainland”. Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
University of East Anglia. 
 
Eltahir, Yashir Awad Abdalla. (2009) “Sudan Politics in Ethnicization: Mismanaging 
Diversity, Dismantling the State”. Paper presented at the International Sudan Studies 
Conference, UNISA, 25-28 November. 
 
Englebert, Pierre. (2000) State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
 
Eprile, Cecil. (1974) War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972. London: David & 
Charles. 
 
Epstein, A. L. (1958) Politics in an Urban African Community. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
 
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. (1993) Ethnicity and Nationalism. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Erlich, Haggai. (1983) The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962 to 1978: War and Revolution in 
the Horn of Africa. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Press. 
 
ESIS. (2004) “Muhammad Ali Pasha”. Egypt State Information Service. Available 
online: http://www.sis.gov.eg/rulers/html/en01m.htm [accessed 17 February 2007] 
 
 
 
412        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
ESPAC. (2002) “The Search for Peace in the Sudan: A Chronology of Sudanese Peace 
Process, 1989-2001”. Report, The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London. 
Available online: http://www.espac.org/pdf/search_for_peace.pdf [accessed 29 August 
2008] 
 
Ezza, El-Sadig Yahya Abdallah and Libis, Amir Mohammed Salih. (2009) “The Role of 
Language in Negotiating Power in Sudan”. Paper presented at the International Sudan 
Studies Conference, UNISA, 25-28 November. 
 
Fatton, Robert Jr. (1992) Predatory Rule: State and Civil Society in Africa. London: 
Lynne Rienner.  
 
Fearon, James D. and Laitin, David D. (2000) “Violence and the Social Construction of 
Ethnic Identity”. International Organization, 54(4), pp. 845-77.  
 
Fine, Ben. (2001) “Economics Imperialism and Intellectual Progress: The Present as 
History of Economic Thought?”. History of Economics Review, 32(1), pp. 10-36.       
 
Fine, Ben. (1999) “A Question of Economics: Is It Colonising the Social Sciences?”. 
Economy and Society, 28(3), pp. 403-25.   
 
First, Ruth. (1970) The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d’État. 
London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 
 
Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn and Rhodes, Kharissa. (eds.) (2004) Race and Identity in the 
Nile Valley: ancient and Modern Perspectives. Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press. 
 
Frimpong-Ansah, Jonathan H. (1991) The Vampire State in Africa: The Political 
Economy of Decline in Ghana. London: James Currey. 
 
Gadir Ali, Ali Abdel. (2000) “The Economics of Conflicts in Africa: An Overview”. 
Journal of African Economies, 9(3), pp. 235-43. 
 
Bibliography         413 
 
Gadir Ali, Abdel, Ali, Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Atta El-Batahani. (2005) “Sudan’s Civil 
War: Why Has It Prevailed for So Long” In: Collier, Paul. Understanding Civil War: 
Evidence and Analysis Volume I: Africa. Herndon (VA): The World Bank, 193-219. 
Garang, John. (1987) John Garang Speaks. London: Kegan Paul International. 
 
Garnett, John. (2002) “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace” In: Baylis, John 
Wirtz, James, Cohen, Eliot and Colin S. Gray. Strategy in the Contemporary World: An 
Introduction to Strategic Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 66-87. 
  
Geffray, Christian. (1990) La cause des armes au Mozambique: Anthropologie d’une 
guerre civile. Paris: Karthala. 
 
Gleditsch, Kristian S. (2006) “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War”. Manuscript, 
Division of Social Sciences, University of San Diego. Available online: 
http://weber.ucsd.edu/~kgledits/papers/transnational.pdf [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Graham, Thomas. (1990) Sudan, 1950-1985: Death of a Dream. London: Darf. 
 
Gray, Richard. (2002) “Some Reflections on Christian Involvement 1955-1972” In: 
Fadl Hasan, Yusuf and Richard Gray. Religion and Conflict in Sudan. Nairobi: Paulines 
Publications Africa. 
 
Gray, Richard. (1961) A History of the Southern Sudan 1839-1889. London: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Grey-Johnson, Crispin. (2006) “Beyond Peacekeeing: The Challenge of Post-Conflict 
Recontruction and Peacebuilding in Africa”. UN Chronicle XLIII, 1. Available online: 
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2006/issue1/0106p08.htm [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Grossman, Hershel. (1995) “Insurrections” In: Hartley, K. and Sandler, T. Handbook of 
Defense Economics, Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B. V.  
 
Grossman, Hershel. (1991) “A General Equilibrium Model of Insurgencies”. American 
Economic Review, 81, pp. 912-21. 
414        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Gurr, Ted. (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Handelman, Howard. (1996) The Challenge of Third World Development. Upper Addle 
River (NJ): Prentice Hall. 
 
Hanes, William Travis (1995) Imperial Diplomacy in the Era of Decolonization: The 
Sudan and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1955-1956. Westport (CT): Greenwood Press.  
 
Hart, Gillian. (2002) Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South 
Africa. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. 
 
Hasan, Yusuf Fadl. (2003) Studies in Sudanese History.  Khartoum: Sudatek Limited. 
 
Hasan, Yusuf Fadl. (1985) Kitaab Attabaqaat. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. 
 
Hassan Makki, Mohamed Ahmed. (1989) Sudan: The Christian Design. Markfield, 
Leicester: The Islamic Foundation. 
 
Heldman, Dan C. (1981) The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy under Khrushchev. New 
York: Praeger. 
 
Henderson, Errol and Singer, J. David. (2000) “Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 
1946-1992”. Journal of Peace Research, 37(3), pp. 275-99. 
 
Henze, Paul. (1991) The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace. New York: St. Martin’s 
Press. 
 
Heraclides, Alexis. (1987) “Janus or Sisyphus? The Souhern Problem of the Sudan”. 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 25(2), pp. 213-31. 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey. (2000) “Economic Incentives, Natural Resources and Conflict in 
Africa”. Journal of African Economies, 9(3), pp. 270-94.    
 
Bibliography         415 
 
Herbst, Jeffrey. (1990) “War and the State in Africa”. International Security, 14(4), pp. 
117-39. 
 
Heritage. (1987a) “Colonel Dr. John Garang Speaks to Heritage on War and Peace in 
the Sudan-2”. Heritage newspaper, Khartoum, 2 November, p. 4. 
 
Heritage. (1987b) “Colonel Dr. John Garang Speaks to Heritage on War and Peace in 
the Sudan-2”. Heritage newspaper, Khartoum, 9 November, p. 4. 
 
Heritage. (1987c) “Colonel Dr. John Garang Speaks to Heritage on War and Peace in 
the Sudan-2”. Heritage newspaper, Khartoum, 16 November, p. 4. 
 
Hernandez Zubizarreta, Juan. (2009) “El Tribunal Penal Internacional. ¿Justicia 
Universal en Sudán?” Pueblos, 24 March. Available at  
http://www.revistapueblos.org/spip.php?article1553 [accessed 2 April 2009]. 
 
Hill, Richard. (1959) Egypt in the Sudan, 1820-1881. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hirshleifer, Jack. (1995) “Theorizing about Conflict”. Handbook of Defense Economics, 
Vol. 1. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B. V., 169-189.  
 
Hirshleifer, Jack. (1994) “The Dark Side of the Force”. Economic Inquiry, 32, pp. 1-10. 
 
Hirshleifer, Jack. (1987) “Conflict and Settlement” In: Eatwell, John, Milgate Murray 
and Peter Newman. The New Palgrave: Dictionary of Economic Thought and Doctrine. 
London: Macmillan. Draft available online: 
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp360.pdf [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence. (eds.) (1992) The Invention of Tradition. 
Cambridge (MA): Cambridge University Press.  
 
Holt, Peter M. (1961) A Modern History of the Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the 
Present Day. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. 
 
416        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Holt, Peter M. (1958) The Mahdist State in Sudan, 1881-1898: A Study of its Origins, 
Development, and Overthrow. Oxford: Clarendon. 
 
Holt, Peter M. and Daly, Martin W. (2000) A History of the Sudan: From the Coming of 
Islam to the Present Day. Harlow (UK): Longman. 
 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1999) Environment Scarcity and Violence. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1994) “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: 
Evidence from Cases”. International Security, 19(1), pp. 5-40. 
 
Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. (1991) “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes 
of Acute Conflict”. International Security, 16(2), pp. 76-116. 
 
Horowitz, David. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
Howell, John. (1978a) “Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict”. 
International Affairs, 54(3), pp. 421-36.  
 
Howell, John. (1978b) “Political Leadership and Organisation in the Southern Sudan”. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Reading. 
 
Howell, John. (1973) “Politics in the Southern Sudan”. African Affairs, 72(287), pp. 
163-78. 
 
Humphreys, Macartan. (2003) “Economics and Violent Conflict”. Manuscript, Harvard 
University. Available online: http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/economics 
[accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Hunter, Floyd. (1953) Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers. 
Chapel Hill (NC): University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Bibliography         417 
 
Huntington, Samuel. (1997) The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of World 
Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
 
Hutchinson, Sharon E. (1996) Nuer Dilemmas: Coping with Money, War, and the State. 
London: University of California Press. 
 
Hyden, Goran. (1983) No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development in Perspective. 
London: Heinemann. 
 
IAO (2004). “Sudan – History”. Islam in Africa Organization. Available online: 
http://www.Islaminafrica.org/sudan-h.htm [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Ibrahim, Hassan Ahmed. (2000) “The Strategy, Responses and Legacy of the First 
Imperialist Era in the Sudan, 1820-1885”. Presented in the Fifth International Sudan 
Studies Conference, University of Durham, 30 August-1 September. Available online: 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/justin.willis/hassanibrahim1.htm [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
ICG. (2002) “God, Oil, and Country: Changing the Logic of War in Sudan”. Report, 
International Crisis Group, Brussels. Available online: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1615&l=1 [accessed 23 April 2008]  
 
Idris, Amir H. (2005) Conflict and Politics of Identity in Sudan. New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
 
Idris, Amir H. (2001) Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities. 
Edwin Mellen Press: Ceredigion. 
 
Ignatieff, Michael. (1997) The Warrior's Honour: Ethnic War and the Modern 
Conscience. New York: Henry Holt. 
 
Iyob, Ruth and Khadiagala, Gilbert M. (2006) Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace. 
Boulder (CO): Lynne Rienner. 
 
418        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Izzedin, Nejla Abu. (1981) Nasser of the Arabs: An Arab Assessment. London: Third 
World Centre. 
 
Jackson, Robert. (1990) Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the 
Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Jendia, Catherine. (2002) The Sudanese Civil Conflict 1969-1985. Oxford: Peter Lang. 
 
Johnson, Douglas. (2006) “Darfur: Peace, Genocide & Crimes Against Humanity in 
Sudan” In: Kaarsholm, Preben. Violence, Political Culture & Development in Africa. 
Oxford: James Currey, 92-104. 
 
Johnson, Douglas. (2003) The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars. Oxford: James 
Currey.  
 
Johnson, Douglas. (2002). “Food Aid, Land Tenure and the Survival of the Subsistence 
Economy”. Presented at ‘Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan’ conference, 
Brussels, 12-13 June. Available online: 
www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/10johnson17june02.pdf [last visited on 23 April 2008] 
 
Johnson, Douglas. (1998) “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of 
Factionalism” In: Clapham, Christopher. African Guerrillas. Oxford: James Currey, 53-
72. 
 
Johnson, Douglas. (1991) “From Military to Tribal Police: Policing the Upper Nile 
Province of the Sudan” In: Anderson, David M. and Killingray, David. Policing the 
Empire: Government, Authority, and Control, 1830-1940. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 151-67. 
 
Johnson, Douglas. (1986) “On the Nilotic Frontier: Imperial Ethiopia in the Southern 
Sudan, 1898-1936” In: Donham, Donald L. and James, Wendy. The Southern Marches 
of Imperial Ethiopia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 216-45. 
 
Bibliography         419 
 
Johnson, Douglas and Prunier, Gerard. (1993) “The Foundation and Expansion of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army” In: Daly, John and Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad. Civil 
War in the Sudan. London: British Academic Press, 117-41. 
 
Jok, Jok Madut. (2007) Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence. Oxford: Oneworld. 
 
Jok, Jok Madut. (2001) War and Slavery in Sudan. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Jok, Jok Madut and Hutchinson, Sarah Elaine. (1999) “Sudan’s Prolonged Civil War 
and the Militarization of Nuer and Dinka Identities” African Studies Review, 42(2), pp. 
125-45. 
 
Kaarsholm, Preben. (2006) “States of Failure, Societies in Collapse? Understandings of 
Violent Conflict in Africa” In: Kaarsholm, Preben. Violence, Political Culture and 
Development in Africa. Oxford: James Currey, 1-24. 
 
Kaldor, Mary. (2009) “New Wars” The Broker, 14(June), pp. 14-7. 
 
Kaldor, Mary. (2003) Global Civil Society: An Answer to War. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Kaldor, Mary. (1999) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. 
Cambridge: Polity Press.  
 
Kalyvas, Stathis. (2009) “War’s Evolution” The Broker, 14(June), pp. 18-20. 
 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Kaplan, Robert (2000) The Coming of Anarchy. New York: Random House. 
 
Kaplan, Robert (1994) “The Coming of Anarchy” Atlantic Monthly, February, pp. 44-
76. 
 
420        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Karsani, Awad al-Sid. (1993) “Beyond Sufism: The Case of Millenial Islam in Sudan” 
In: Brenner, Louis. Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa. London: 
Hurst, 134-53. 
 
Kebbede, Girma. (1999) “Sudan: The North-South Conflict in Historical Perspective” 
In: Kebbede, Girma. Sudan's Predicament: Civil War, Displacement and Ecological 
Degradation. Aldershot: Ashgate, 11-43.  
 
Keen, David. (2001) “Sudan: Conflict and Rationality” In: Stewart, Frances, FitzGerald, 
Valpy et. al. War and Underdevelopment Volume II: Country Experiences. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 220-303. 
 
Keen, David. (1998) “The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars.” Adelphi 
Paper 320. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies. 
 
Khalid, Mansour. (1990) The Government They Deserve: The Role of the Elite in 
Sudan's Political Economy. London: Kegan Paul. 
 
Khalid, Mansour. (1985) Nimeiri and the Revolution of Dis-May. London: Kegan Paul 
International. 
 
Kirkinen, Heikki. (1972) Kehitysalue – Kehitysmaa: Laulu Kotimaisesta 
Kolonialismista. Tampere: Tampereen Kirjapaino. 
 
Knoke, David. (1994) Political Networks: The Structural Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Knoke, David and Burnmeister-May, Jodi. (1990) “International Relations” In: Knoke, 
David. Political Networks: The Structural Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 175-202. 
 
Kok, Peter Nyon. (1996) “Sudan: Between Radical Restructuring and Deconstruction of 
State Systems”. Review of African Political Economy, 70(23), pp. 555-62. 
 
Bibliography         421 
 
Kok, Peter Nyon. (1992) “Adding fuel to the conflict: Oil, War and Peace in the Sudan” 
In: Cliffe, Lionel, Doornbos, Martin, Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed, and Markakis, John. 
Beyong Conflict in the Horn: The Prospects for Peace, recovery and Development in 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Sudan. London: James Currey, 104-112. 
 
Kopstein, Jeremy and Lichbach, Mark. (eds.) (2005) Comparative Politics: Interests, 
Identities, and Institutions in a Changing Global Order. New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Korn, David A. (1993) Assassination in Khartoum. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
 
KPA. (1997) “The Sudan’s Khartoum Peace Agreement”. Available online: 
http://www.splamilitary.net/documents/Khartoum%20peaced%20agreement%201997.p
df [accessed 18 August 2010] 
 
Kulusika, Simon E. (1998) Southern Sudan: Political and Economic Power Dilemmas 
and Options. London: Minerva Press. 
 
Kuol, Monyluak Alor (1997) “Administration of Justice in the (SPLA/M) Liberated 
Areas: Court Cases in War-Torn Southern Sudan”. Oxford: Refugee Studies 
Programme, February. 
 
Lagu, Joseph. (1981) Decentralization: A Necessity for the Southern Provinces of the 
Sudan. Khartoum: Samar Printing Press. 
 
Latif Mohammed, Nadir Abdel. (1999) “Economic Implications of Civil Wars in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Economic Policies Necessary for the Successful Transition”. 
Journal of African Economies 8(AERC Supplement), pp. 107-148. 
 
Lefevbre, Jeffrey. (1991) Arms for the Horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and 
Somalia, 1953-1991. Petersburg: Pittsburg University Press. 
 
422        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Legum, Colin and Lee, Bill. (1979) The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis. New 
York: Africana Publishing. 
 
Lemarchand, Réne. (2003) “Ethnicity as Myth: The View from Central Africa”. In: 
Pumphrey, Carolyn and Schwartz-Barcott, Rye. Armed Conflict in Africa. Lanham 
(U.S.): Scarecrow, 87-112. 
 
Leonardi, Cherry. (2007) “‘Liberation’ or Capture: Youth in between ‘Hakuma’, and 
‘Home’ during Civil War and Its Aftermath in Southern Sudan”. African Affairs, 
106(424), pp. 391-412.  
 
Lesch, Ann Mosely. (1998) The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press.  
 
Lobell, Steven E. and Mauceri, Philip. (2004) Ethnic Conflict and International 
Politics: Explaining Diffusion and Escalation. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
LOC. (1991) Country Study: Sudan. Washington: The U.S. Library of Congress. 
 
Long, David E. and Reich, Bernard. (eds.) (1980) The Government of the Middle East 
and North Africa. Boulder: Westview Press.  
 
Lonsdale, John. (1994) “Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism” In: Kaarsholm, Preben 
and Hultin, Jan. Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological 
Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism. Roskilde: International 
Development Studies, 131-50. 
 
Louis, William Roger. (2006) Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, 
Suez, and Decolonization. London: I. B. Tauris. 
 
Lusk, Gill. (2005) “The Sudan & The Darfur”. Covert Action Quarterly, Spring. 
Available at http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Genocide/Sudan_Darfur.html [visited 7 
October 2009]  
 
Bibliography         423 
 
Lyons, Roy. (1978) “The USSR, China and the Horn of Africa”. Review of African 
Political Economy, 12(May-August), pp. 5-30. 
 
MacEoin, Dennis and Al-Shahi, Ahmed. (1983) Islam in the Modern World. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
MacIver, Robert Morrison. (1947) The Web of Government. New York: The MacMillan 
Company. 
 
Madut-Arop, Arop. (2006) Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of the 
Founding and the Development of the SPLM/A. Charleston (SC): BookSurge, LLC. 
 
Majak, Damazo Dut. (1997) “Rape of Nature: The Environmental Destruction and 
Ethnic Cleansing of the Sudan”. Journal of Developing Societies, 13(1), pp. 135-49. 
 
Malwal, Bona. (1985) The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood. New York: 
Thornton Books. 
 
Mamdani, Mahmood. (1997) Citizen and Subject: Decentralized Despotism and the 
Legacy of Late Colonialism. Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
 
Markakis, John. (1998) Resource Conflict in the Horn of Africa. London: Sage.  
 
Martín Muñoz, Gema. (1999) El Estado Árabe: Crisis de Legitimidad y Contestación 
Islamista. Barcelona: Bellaterra.  
 
Mateos Martin, Oscar. (2007) “Sur Sudán. Incertidumbres y amenazas en la actual 
posguerra”. Revista Académica de Relaciones Internacionales 6(April). Available 
online: http://www.relacionesinternacionales.info/RRII/N6/artmateos6.htm [accessed 23 
April 2008] 
 
Matturi, Kai. (2007) “Understanding the Wars of West Africa through the Prism of 
Political Economy”. Presented in the PSAI Postgraduate Conference, Trinity College, 
Dublin, 27-28 April. 
424        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Mawut, Lazarus Leek. (1983) Dinka Resistance to Condominium Rule 1902-1932. 
Khartoum: University of Khartoum. 
 
Mayall, James. (2005) “The Legacy of Colonialism” In: Chesterman, Simon, Ignatieff, 
Michael and Thakur, Ramesh. Making the States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of 
Governance. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 36-58. 
 
Mazrui, Ali. (1973) “The Black Arabs in Comparative Perspective: The Political 
Socialogy of Race Mixture”. In: Wai, Dunstan M. The Southern Sudan: The Problem of 
National Integration, London: Frank Cass, 47-81.  
 
Mazrui, Ali. (1975) Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military 
Ethnocracy. Beverly Hills: Sage. 
 
McSweeney, Bill. (1999) Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International 
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Meredith, Martin. (2005) The State of Aftica: A History of Fifty Years of Independence. 
London: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Milliken, Jennifer and Krause, Keith. (2002) “State Failure, State Collapse, and State 
Reconstruction”. Development and Change, 33(5), pp. 753-74. 
 
Mills, C. Wright. (1956) The Power Elite. Oxford: Oxford Press. 
 
Miner, Edward. (2003) “The Historical Background of Missionary Activity in the 
Sudan”. Indiana University Digital Library. Available online: 
http://www.dlib.indiana.edu/collections/nuer/edward/missionary.html [accessed 23 
April 2008] 
 
Mitchell, J. Clyde. (1956) “The Kalela Dance: Aspects of Social Relationships among 
Urban Africans in Northern Rhodesia”, Paper No. 27, Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. 
 
Bibliography         425 
 
Mkandawire, Thandika. (2002) “The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial ‘Rebel Movements’ 
in Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence against the Peasantry”. Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 40(2), pp. 181-215. 
 
MP (2002) “Machakos Protocol”, 20 July. Available online: http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/sudan/key-texts-machakos.php [accessed 19 August 2010] 
 
Mueller, John (2002) “Thugs as Residual Combatants”. Presented at the International 
Studies Association Annual Convention, New Orleans, 24-27 March.  
 
Muhammad Ali, Abbas Ibrahim. (1972) The British, the Slave Trade, and Slavery in the 
Sudan. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press.  
 
Munene, Macharia. (2001) “Culture and the Economy: The Creation of Poverty”, 
Presented at the Culture Week Seminar, Kenyatta University, 20 September. 
 
Munene, Macharia. (1995) The Truman Administration and the Decolonization of Sub-
Saharan Africa. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press. 
 
Murithi, Timothy. (2005) The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and 
Development. Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Murshed, S. Mansoob. (2002) “Conflict, Civil War and Underdevelopment”. Journal of 
Peace Research, 39(4), pp. 387-93. 
 
Musa, Hassan Attiyah. (1988) “Refugees in Southern Sudan” In: Arou, Mom, K. N. and 
Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 456-70. 
 
Musso, Georgio. (2009) “‘We Will Revert Back to how We Were’: The National 
Congress Party Face to the Elections and Referendum”. Paper presented at the 
International Sudan Studies Conference, UNISA, 25-28 November.  
 
Münkler, Herfried. (2004) The New Wars. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
426        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Nafziger, E. Wayne, Stewart, Frances, and Raimo Väyrynen. (eds.) (2000) War, 
Hunger, and Displacement: The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies. Volume 1: 
Analyses. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
New York Times. (1899) “The Khalifa’s Position”, New York Times, 15 June. 
 
Niblock, Tim. (1987) Class and Power in Sudan: The Dynamics of Sudanese Politics, 
1898-1985. Albany (NY): State University of New York Press. 
 
Nicoll, Fergus. (2004) The Sword of the Prophet: The Mahdi of Sudan and the Death of 
General Gordon. Phoenix Mill: Sutton Publishing. 
 
Nile Mirror. (1975) “A Colonel and Seven Soldiers Die in Akobo”, 14 March. 
 
Nordstrom, Carolyn. (2004) Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International 
Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Nordstrom, Carolyn. (2001) “Out of the Shadows” In: Callaghy, Thomas, Kassimir, 
Ronald, and Robert Latham. Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 216-39. 
 
Nyaba, Peter Adwok. (2000) The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan: An Insider’s 
View. Second Edition. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. 
 
O’Ballance, Edgar. (2000) Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press.  
 
O’Ballance, Edgar. (1977) The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972. London: Faber and 
Faber.  
 
O’Brien, Adam. (2009) “Sudan’s Election Paradox”. ENOUGH, June. 
 
O’Brien, Jay. (1979) The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment: 
An Introduction. Khartoum: Khartoum University Press. 
Bibliography         427 
 
O’Fahey, Rex S. (2002) “They are Slaves, but Yet They Go Free” In: Hasan, Yusuf 
Fadl and Gray, Richard. Religion and Conflict in Sudan. Nairobi: Paulines Publications. 
O’Fahey, Rex S. (1973) “Slavery and the Slave Trade in Dar Fur”. Journal of African 
History, 14(1), pp. 29-43. 
O’Fahey, Rex S. and Spaulding, Jay L. (1974) Kingdoms of the Sudan. London: 
Methuen. 
 
O’Neill, Bard E. (1990). Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary 
Warfare. Oxford: Brassey’s. 
 
O’Neill, Bard E. (1980) “Insurgency: A Framework for Analysis”, in Bard O. Neill, 
William R. Heaton, and Donald J. Alberts (eds.), Insurgency in the Modern World, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1-42. 
 
Oduho, Joseph and Deng, William. (1963) The Problem of the Southern Sudan. 
London: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ottaway, Marina, Herbst, Jeffrey and Mills, Greg. (2004) “Africa’s Big States: Towards 
a New Realism”. Policy Outlook, Carnegie Foundation for International Peace, 
February. Available online: 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PolicyOutlookOttaway.pdf [accessed 23 April 
2008]   
 
Pantuliano, Sarah. (2007) “The Land Question: Sudan’s Peace Nemesis”. HPG Working 
Paper, Overseas Development Institute, December. Available online: 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3182.pdf [accessed 23 April 2008]   
 
Pearce, Jenny (2005) “Policy Failure and Petroleum Predation: The Economics of Civil 
War Debate Viewed ‘From the War-Zone’”. Government and Opposition, 40(2), pp. 
152-80.  
 
Peters, Ralph (1994) “The New Warrior Class”. Parameters, 24(2), pp. 16-26.  
428        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Piaget, Jean (1985). The Equilibration of Cognitive Structures: The Central Problem of 
Intellectual Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Piaget, Jean. (1971) Biology and Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Poggo, Scopas S. (2008) The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in 
the Southern Sudan, 1955-1972. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Posner, Daniel. (2005) Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Prunier, Gérard. (1986) “From Peace to War: The Southern Sudan (1972-1983)”. 
Occasional Paper No. 3, University of Hull, Department of Sociology and 
Anthropology. 
 
Prunier, Gérard and Gisselquist, Rachel M. (2003) “The Sudan: A Successfully Failed 
State” In: Rotberg, Robert I. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. 
Cambridge (MA): World Peace Foundation, 101-28.  
 
Pumphrey, Carolyn. (2003) “General Introduction”. In: Pumphrey, Carolyn and 
Schwartz-Barcott, Rye. Armed Conflict in Africa. Lanham (U.S.): Scarecrow, 1-19. 
 
Pumphrey, Carolyn and Schwartz-Barcott, Rye. (eds.) (2003) Armed Conflict in Africa. 
Lanham (U.S.): Scarecrow.  
 
Pureza, José M., Duffield, Mark, Woodward, Sudan and Sogge, David. (2006) 
“Peacebuilding and failed States: Some Theoretical Notes”. Working Paper 256, Oficina 
do CES, Centro de Estudos Sociais, University of Coimbra. Available online: 
http://www.ces.uc.pt/publicacoes/oficina/256/256.pdf [accessed 23 April 2008]  
 
Putnam, Robert D. (1976) The Comparative Study of Political Elites. New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall. 
 
Bibliography         429 
 
Ranger, Terence. (1992) “The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa” In: 
Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 211-62.  
 
Rapoport, David C. (1996) “Importance of Space in Violent Ethno-Religious Strife”. 
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2(2), pp. 258-85. 
 
RCIDSS. (1956) “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Disturbances in the 
Southern Sudan during August, 1955”. Ministry of Interior, Republic of the Sudan: 
McCorquedale & Co. 
 
Reich, Bernard. (1980) “The Sudan” In: Long David E. and Reich, Bernard. The 
Government of the Middle East and North Africa. Boulder: Wesview Press, 353-69. 
 
Reno, William. (2005) “The Politics of Violent Opposition in Collapsing States”. 
Government and Opposition, 40(2), pp. 127-51. 
 
Reno, William. (2004) “Empirical Challenge to Economic Analyses of Conflicts”. 
Presented at ‘The Economic Analysis of Conflict: Problems and Prospects’, Washington 
DC, April 19-20.  
 
Reno, William. (2003). “‘Resource Wars’ in the Shadow of State Collapse”. Presented 
at “Resource Politics and Security in a Global Age”, University of Sheffield, June 26-
28. 
 
Reno, William (2002). “Economies of War and their Transformation: Sudan and the 
Variable Impact of Natural Resources on Conflict”. Presented at “Money Makes the 
War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan”, Brussels, June 12-13. 
Available online: http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/5reno20august02.pdf  [accessed 
23 April 2008] 
 
 
 
430        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Reno, William. (2001) “How Sovereignty Matters: International Markets and the 
Political Economy of Local Politics in Weak States” In: Callaghy, Thomas, Kassimir, 
Ronald, and Robert Latham. Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 197-215. 
 
Reno, William. (1998) Warlord Politics and African States. Boulder (CO): Lynne 
Rienner.  
 
Reno, William. (1997) “War, Market, and the Reconfiguration of West Africa’s Weak 
States”. Comparative Politics, 29(4), pp. 493-509. 
 
Reynal-Querol, Marta. (2002) “Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars”. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, 46(1), pp. 29-54. 
 
Richards, Paul. (2007) “Peripheral Wars in Africa: Is General Explanation Possible?”. 
Studia Africana, 18, pp. 8-14. 
 
Richards, Paul. (2005) “New War: An Ethnographic Approach” In: Richards, Paul. No 
Peace No War: An Anthropology of Contemporary Armed Conflicts. Oxford: James 
Currey, 1-21. 
 
Richards, Paul. (1996) Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra 
Leone. Oxford: James Currey. 
 
Rist, Gilbert. (1997) The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global 
Faith. Atlantic Highlands (NJ): Zed Books. 
  
RJC. (1947) “Juba Conference 1947”. Record of the Juba Conference. EP/SCR/1.A.5/1. 
Available online: 
http://www.gurtong.org/resourcecenter/Documents/Articles/juba_conference_1947.pdf 
[accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
RMFEP. (1977) The Six-Year Plan of Economic and Social Development: 1977/78-
1982/3”. Juba: Regional Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 
Bibliography         431 
 
Roden, David. (1974) “Regional Inequality and Rebellion in the Sudan”. Geographical 
Review, 64(4), pp. 498-516. 
 
Rogier, Emeric. (2005) “No More Hills Ahead? Sudan’s Tortuous Ascent to the Heights 
of Peace”. Security Paper No.1, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 
Clingendael, The Hague. 
 
Rolandsen, Øystein. (2005) Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern 
Sudan during the 1990s. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. 
 
Romanucci-Ross, Lola and DeVos, George. (eds.) (1998) Ethnic Identity: Creation, 
Conflict, and Accommodation. London: AltMira Press. 
 
Ross, Michael L. (2004) “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence 
from Thirteen Cases” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 1 (Winter, 2004), pp. 
35-67. 
  
Ross, Michael L. (2003) “Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: The Varying Role of Natural 
Resources in Civil War” In: Ballentine, Karen and Sherman, Jake. The Political 
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
47-70. 
 
Rotberg, Robert I. (2004) “The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, 
Prevention, and Repair” In: Rotberg, Robert I. When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1-49. 
 
Rotberg, Robert I. (2003a) “Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators” In: Rotberg, Robert I. State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. 
Washington (DC): The Brookings Institution, 1-25. 
 
Rotberg, Robert I. (2003b) “Nation-State Failure: A Recurring Phenomenon?”, 
Discussion Paper, NIC 2020 Project. Available online: 
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_2020_Support/2003_11_06_papers/panel2_nov6.pdf 
[accessed 23 April 2008] 
432        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
RPRA. (1981) Resolution of the People’s Regional Assembly No. 14, 31 March, Juba.   
 
RPS (1978) “Regional Policy Statement”. The Regional Ministry of Information and 
Culture, Juba, June 1978. 
 
Ruay, Deng D. Akol. (1994) The Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North 
1821-1969. Motala: Nordic Africa Institute. 
 
Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta, Itziar. (2002) “Los Conflictos Armados del África Subsahariana 
Contemporánea”. Pueblos 4, pp. 31-34. 
 
Ruiz-Giménez Arrieta, Itziar. (2000) “El Colapso del Estado Poscolonial en la Decada 
de los Noventa”. In: Peñas, Francisco Javier. África en el Sistema Internacional: Cinco 
Siglos de Frontera. Madrid: Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, pp. 165-207. 
 
Russell, Bertrand. (1962) Power: A New Social Analysis. New York: Routledge. 
 
Ryan, Stephen. (1995) Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Publishing Company. 
 
Said, Beshir Mohammed. (1965) The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa. London: Dufours.  
 
Salvi, Sergio. (1973) Le Nazioni Proibite: Guida a Dieci Colonie Interne dell'Europa 
Occidentale. Florence: Valletti. 
 
Sanderson, George N. (1985) “The Ghost of Adam Smith: Ideology, Bureaucracy, and 
the Frustration of Economic Development in the Sudan, 1934-1940” In: Daly, Martin 
W. Modernization in the Sudan. New York: Lilian Barber Press. 
 
Sarkesian, Sam C. (1973) “The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment”. African Studies 
Review, 16(1), pp. 1-22. 
 
Sconyers, David. (1978) “British Policy and Mission Education in the Southern Sudan, 
1928-1946”. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania.  
Bibliography         433 
 
Scott, John. (1991) Social Network Analysis: A Handbook. London: SAGE. 
 
SEC. (1954) “Final Report on the 1953 Elections”. Sudanese Elections Commission. 
Government Printer, Khartoum. 
Segal, Ronald. (2002) Islam’s Black Slaves: The Other Black Diaspora. New York: 
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 
Sharkey, Heather J. (2007) “When does Ethnic Identity Turn into Racism”. Chicken 
Bones: A Journal. Online at: http://www.nathanieltuner.com/whendoesethnic 
identityturnintoracism.htm [accessed 3 April 2009] 
 
Sharkey, Heather J. (2003) Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Sherman, Jake. (2000) “Profit vs. Peace: The Clandestine Diamond Economy of 
Angola”. Journal of International Affairs, 53(2), pp. 699-719. 
 
Sidahmed, Abdel Salam. (1997) Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. Richmond: 
Curzon. 
 
Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and Sidahmed, Alsir. (2005) Sudan. Abingdon (UK): 
RoutledgeCurzon. 
 
Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad. (1996) Slaves into Workers. Austin: University of Texas 
Press. 
 
Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad. (1993) “Northern Sudanese Political Parties and the Civil 
War” In: Daly, John and Sikainga, Ahmad Alawad. Civil War in the Sudan. London: 
British Academic Press, 78-96. 
 
Simonse, Simon. (1991) Kings of Disaster: Dualism, Centralism and the Scapegoat 
King in Southeastern Sudan. Leiden: E.J. Brill. 
 
434        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Simpson, Morag C. (1981) “Large-scale Mechanised Rain-fed Farming Developments 
in the Sudan” In: Presented at Centre of African Studies Seminar, University of 
Edinburgh, 21-22 November, 1980. Published as part of seminar proceedings in Post-
Independence Sudan. University of Edinburg: Centre of African Studies, 197-212. 
 
Snow, Donald M. (1996) Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal 
Conflicts. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
 
SPA. (2002) “Sudan Peace Act”. Public Law 107–245, 21 October. Available online: 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/19897.pdf [accessed 3 April 2009] 
 
Spaulding, Jay. (2006) “Pastoralism, Slavery, Commerce, Culture and the fate of the 
Nubians of Northern and Central Kordofan under Dar Fur rule, ca. 1750-ca. 1850”. 
International journal of African Historical Studies, 39(3), pp. 393-412.  
 
Spaulding, Jay. (1988) “The Business of Slavery in the Central Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 
1910-1930”. African Economic History, 17, pp. 23-44.  
 
Spaulding, Jay. (1985) The Heroic Age in Sinnar. East Lansing: Michigan State 
University. 
 
Spaulding, Jay. (1982) “Slavery, Land Tenure, and Social Class in the Northern Turkish 
Sudan”. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, 15(2), pp. 1-20.  
 
SPLM/A Manifesto. Published 31 July 1983. 
 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha and Nielsen, Zoe. (2004) Exploring Subregional Conflict: 
Opportunities for Conflict Prevention. London: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Stewart, Frances. (2001) “Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of 
Development”. CRISE Working Paper 1, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. 
Available online: http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper1.pdf [accessed 23 April 
2008] 
 
Bibliography         435 
 
Stewart, Frances. (2000) “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities”. Oxford 
Development Studies, 28(3), pp. 246-62. 
 
Sørensen, Georg. (1998) Democracy and Democtratization: Processes and Prospects in 
a Changing World. Boulder: Westwood Press. 
 
Patrick, Stewart M. (2006) “Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction”. The 
Washington Quarterly, Spring, pp. 27-53. 
 
Taisier, M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews. (1999) Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and 
Resolution. London: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
 
Taylor, Charles. (1984) “Foucault on Freedom and Truth”. Political Theory, 12(2), pp. 
152-83.  
 
Thompson, Alex. (2004) An Introduction to African Politics. London: Routledge. 
 
Tignor, Robert L. (1987) “The Sudanese Private Sector: an Historical Overview”. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 25(2): 179-212. 
 
Tilly, Charles. (1992) Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 1990-1992. 
Cambridge: Blackwell. 
 
Tilly, Charles. (1985) “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” In: Evans, 
Peter B., Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Skocpol, Theda. Bringing the State Back in. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 169-191. 
 
Tiyambe Zeleza, Paul. (1993) A Modern Economic History of Africa Volume I: The 
Nineteenth Century. Dakar: Codesria. 
 
Turner, John W. (1998) Continent Ablaze: The Insurgency Wars in Africa 1960 to 
Present. London: Arms and Armour. 
 
436        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
UCDP. (2008) “Active Conflicts by Conflict Type and Year”. Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program. Uppsala University. Available online: 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/graphs/type_year.gif  [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
van de Walle, Nicolas. (2001) African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 
1979-1999. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
van Dijk, Teun A. (1993) Elite discourse and Racism. London: Sage. 
 
Vandervort, Bruce. (1998) Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914. London: 
University College Press. 
 
Vlassenroot, Koen and Raeymaekers, Timothy. (2004) Conflict and Social 
Transformation in Eastern DR Congo. Gent: Academia Press. 
 
Wakoson, Elias Nyamlell. (1993) “The Politics of Southern Self-Government 1972-83” 
In: Daly, Martin W. and Sikainga, Ahmad A. Civil War in the Sudan. London: British 
Academic Press, 27-50.  
 
Wakoson, Elias Nyamlell. (1984) “Origins and Development of the Anya-nya 
Movement 1955-1972” In: Beshir, Mohammed Omer. Southern Sudan: Regionalism 
and Religion. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Graduate College, 127-204. 
 
Walter, Victor. (1969) Terror and Resistance: A Study of Political Violence. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Walz, Terence. (1978) Trade between Egypt and Bilad as-Sudan, 1700-1820. Cairo: 
Institut Francais d'Archeologie Orientale du Caire. 
 
Warburg, Gabriel. (2003) Islam, Sectarianism and Politics in Sudan since the 
Mahdiyya. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
 
Bibliography         437 
 
Warburg, Gabriel. (2000) “The Nile Waters, Border Issues and Radical Islam in 
Egyptian-Sudanese Relations: 1956-1995” In: Spaulding, Jay and Stephanie Beswick. 
White Nile, Black Blood: War, Leadership, and Ethnicity from Khartoum to Kampala. 
Lawrenceville (NJ): The Red Sea Press, 73-90. 
 
Warburg, Gabriel. (1993) “Sudan: Diversity and Conflict in an Unstable State” Middle 
Eastern Studies, 29, 339-54. 
 
Wassara, Samson. (2007) “Traditional Mechanisms of Conflict Resolution in Southern 
Sudan”. Berghof Foundation for Peace Support. 
 
Weber, Max. (1968) Basic Concepts of Sociology: Economy and Society, Part One, 
Chapter I. Translated by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. Available online: 
http://www.ne.jp/asahi/moriyuki/abukuma/weber/method/basic/basic_concept_frame.ht
ml [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Weinstein, Jeremy. (2005) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Weiss, Holger. (1999) “The 1889-90 Famine and the Mahdiyya in the Sudan: An 
Attempt to Implement the Principles of an Islamic Economy”. Working Paper 4/99, 
Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki.  
 
Whitaker, Jennifer. (1988) How Can Africa Survive? NewYork: Harper and Row. 
 
Widatalla, Abdel Latif. (1988) “A History of Oil Exploration in the Sudan Leading to 
the Present Activities of Chevron in the Interior of the Country” In: Arou, Mom, K. N. 
and Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. North-South Relations in the Sudan since the Addis Ababa 
Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 420-9. 
 
Woodward, Bob. (1987) Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-87. New York: Simon 
and Schuster. 
 
438        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Woodward, Peter. (2006) US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa. Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
 
Woodward, Peter. (2003) The Horn of Africa: Politics and International Relations. 
London: I. B. Tauris. 
 
Woodward, Peter. (2002) “Peace and Elite Non-Oil Economic Interests”. Presented at 
‘Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan’ conference, Brussels, 12-13 June. 
Available online: http://www.bicc.de/events/sudanws/7woodward16june02.pdf 
[accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Woodward, Peter. (1997) “Sudan: Islamic Radicals in Power” In: Esposito, John L. 
Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism, or Reform. Cairo: American University in 
Cairo Press, 95-114. 
 
Woodward, Peter. (1995) “Sudan: War Without End” In: Furley, Oliver. Conflict in 
Africa. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 92-109. 
 
Woodward, Susan. (2005) “Fragile States: Exploring the Concept”. Commentary, 
December. FRIDE. Available online: http://www.fride.org/publication/97/fragile-states-
exploring-the-concept [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
World Bank (2008) “Projects & Operations”. Available online: 
http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=217672&piPK=95916&theSi
tePK=40941&menuPK=223661&sortorder=DESC&pagenumber=2&pagesize=50&cou
ntrycode=SD&regioncode=1&category=regcountries&sortby=BOARDSORTDATE 
[accessed 11 August 2008] 
 
World Bank. (2003) “Country Brief – Sudan”. Available online:  
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/sd/sd_ctry_brief.htm [accessed 23 April 2008] 
 
Wright, Deil S. (1978) Understanding Intergovernmental Relations. North Scrituate: 
Duxbury Press.  
 
Bibliography         439 
 
Ylönen, Aleksi. (2010) “The Failure of ‘Making Unity Attractive’: Uncertain Future of 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) Implementation in Sudan”, In: Murithi, 
Timothy and Mesfin, Berouk (eds.), Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of 
Africa, Addis Ababa: Institute for Security Studies, forthcoming. 
 
Ylönen, Aleksi. (2009) “On Sources of Political Violence in Africa: The Case of 
‘Marginalizing State’ in Sudan” Política y Cultura, 32, Fall, pp. 37-59. 
 
Ylönen, Aleksi. (2008) “Political Marginalization and Economic Exclusion in the 
Making of Insurgencies in Sudan” In: Ström, Kaare and Öberg, Magnus. Resources, 
Governance and Civil Conflict. Milton Park, Abingdon: Routledge, 125-146. 
 
Ylönen, Aleksi. (2005) “Grievances in the Roots of Insurgencies: Southern Sudan and 
Darfur” Peace, Conflict and Development, 7, pp. 99-134. 
 
Yohannes, Okbazghi. (1997) The United States and the Horn of Africa: An Analytical 
Study of Pattern and Progress. Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. (1993) “The Underdevelopment of the Southern Sudan since 
Independence” In: Daly, Martin, W. and Sikainga, Ahmad, Alawad. Civil War in the 
Sudan. London: British Academic Press, 51-77. 
 
Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. (1988a) “The First Decade of Development in the Southern 
Sudan” In: Arou, Mom, K. N. and Yongo-Bure, Benaiah. North-South Relations in the 
Sudan since the Addis Ababa Agreement. Khartoum: University of Khartoum Press, 
371-407. 
 
Young, William C. (2000) “The Cultural Dimensions of the Sudanese Civil War” In: 
Lacey, Robert Kevin and Coury, Ralph M. The Arab-African and Islamic Worlds: 
Interdisciplinary Studies. Oxford: Peter Lang, 183-99. 
 
440        Aleksi Ylönen-Doctoral Thesis-2010         
  
Zartman, I. William. (2005) “Need, Creed, and Greed in Intrastate Conflict” In: Arnson, 
Cynthia J. and Zartman, I. William. Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection 
of Need, Creed, and Greed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 256-84. 
 
Zartman, I. William. (1995) “Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse” In: 
Zartman, I. William. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of 
Legitimate Authority. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1-11. 
 
Zartman, I. William. (1985) Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Zeidan, David. (1999) “Radical Islam in Egypt: A Comparison of Two Groups”. Middle 
East Review of International Affairs, 3(3) September. Available at: 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue3/jv3n3a1.html [accessed 5 February 2009]. 
 
Zubaida, Sami. (2000) “Trajectories of Political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey”. The 
Political Quarterly, 71(3), pp. 60-78.  
 
 
